Provincial parties in the 2023 legislative elections in Ecuador

RÉGIS DANDOY Provincial parties in the 2023 legislative elections in Ecuador Partidos provinciales en las elecciones legislativas 2023 en Ecuador Régis Dandoy Recepción: 29-02-2024 Aceptación: 08-04-2024 Democracias • Vol.11 • Quito, agosto 2023 • pp.95-119 ©Instituto de la Democracia • ISSN-E:2737-6192 • ISSN: 1390-826X Abstract A significant portion of political parties competing in the 2023 legislative elections in Ecuador can be considered as provincial parties, i.e., as parties that compete and obtain votes in only one province. Provincial parties have a large impact on both national and sub-national politics and are capable of attracting important vote shares. Based on an empirical analysis of all political parties competing for the provincial seats in the Ecuadorian legislative elections of 2017-2023, this article aims at understanding the electoral performance of provincial parties. It observes that – compared to national parties – provincial parties receive an electoral bonus in legislative elections. This is particularly true for provincial parties participating to alliance with at least one national party, indicating that national parties have in interest in forging alliances with provincial parties. The article concludes by calling for further research on provincial parties in Ecuador, and in particular their ideology and electoral strategies. Keywords: Provincial parties, legislative elections, electoral performance, electoral alliance, Ecuador Resumen Una parte importante de los partidos políticos que compitieron en las elecciones legislativas de 2023 en Ecuador pueden ser considerados como partidos provinciales, es decir, como partidos que compiten y obtienen votos en una sola provincia. Los partidos provinciales tienen un gran impacto en la política nacional y subnacional y son capaces de atraer importantes porcentajes de votos. Basado en un análisis empírico de todos los partidos políticos que compiten por los escaños provinciales en las elecciones legislativas ecuatorianas de 2017-2023, este artículo tiene como objetivo comprender el desempeño electoral de los partidos provinciales. Observa que –en comparación con los partidos nacionales– los partidos provinciales reciben un bonus electoral en las elecciones legislativas. Esto es particularmente cierto para los partidos provinciales que participan en alianzas con al menos un partido nacional, lo que indica que los partidos nacionales tienen interés en forjar alianzas con partidos provinciales. El artículo concluye llamando a realizar más investigaciones sobre los partidos provinciales en Ecuador, y en particular sobre sus ideologías y estrategias electorales. Palabras claves: Partidos provinciales, elecciones legislativas, desempeño electoral, alianza electoral, Ecuador 95 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 PROVINCIAL PARTIES IN THE 2023 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR Introduction he scholarly discourse surrounding electoral processes in Ecuador, despite its breadth, has predominantly fixated on national elections and the activities of national political actors. Traditionally, the focus on political parties, candidates, and media coverage has gravitated around presidential elections, reflecting a prevailing emphasis on national-level dynamics and phenomena. This inclination is underscored by voter behaviour, with national (presidential) elections witnessing higher turnout rates and a lower incidence of invalid and blank votes, a tendency for governing parties to lose votes and for small, new and opposition parties to gain vote shares. Within political science scholarship, presidential elections earned the classification of ‘first-order’ elections in presidential systems (Reif & Schmitt 1980; Jeffery & Hough 2009). T In the Ecuadorian context, the pre-eminence of first-order elections naturally corresponds to presidential elections, especially since its electoral calendar mirrors the one of the mid-term congressional elections in the US. Elections for the US congress are held every second year and they coincide with US presidential elections once every four years. Hence, a mid-term election occurs when an election for the Congress is held at mid-term between two presidential elections. The idea is that every other election is subordinate to the first-order presidential election and are used by voters to send a signal to the presidential party (Miller & Mackie 1973; Tufte 1975; Niemi and Fett 1986). Despite Ecuador’s unitary structure, the significance of its provincial, cantonal, and parochial levels of government cannot be overlooked, as each of them hosts directly elected institutions. Notably, the presence of provincial seats within the national assembly marks an intersection of national and sub-national interests, warranting attention from political scientists. Given the reliance on nationwide electoral districts for national referendum, popular consultation, presidential election, the designation of the 15 national seats in the national assembly, and the Andean election, the analysis of election outcomes aggregated at the national level becomes imperative in Ecuador. 96 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 RÉGIS DANDOY However, a nuanced examination of national elections reveals intriguing patterns: notable variations in voting behaviour across different regions of Ecuador. Analysts of Ecuadorian elections have long observed these sub-national discrepancies, including for legislative elections (see for instance Van Cott 2005; Moncagatta, Espinosa Fernández de Córdova & Pazmiño 2023). In some cases, these sub-national entities correspond to the existing provincial level (Freidenberg, Alcántara 2001), while several authors also refer to larger geographical units (such as the ‘sierra’, the ‘costa’, etc.) or to large cities and their agglomeration as Guayaquil and Quito (Pachano 1996; Sánchez 2008). This article aims to explore the significance of the provincial level of government in shaping the outcome of national elections in Ecuador. This ‘provincialization’ of national elections manifests in various forms: the emergence of provincial candidates and parties, the heightened focus on provincial issues in party platforms and in electoral campaigns, the formation of electoral alliances between national and provincial parties, and the concentration of party support within specific provinces (see for instance Pachano 2006; Hurtado Arroba 2007; Dandoy 2014; 2017; Molina 2023). This study focuses on two demand-side aspects of the national elections: the electoral performance of provincial political and of the parties electoral alliances comprising at least one provincial party. Ecuador provides a particularly compelling case for examining the performance of provincial parties in national electoral processes. The structure of the Ecuadorian national assembly features two distinct types of seats: national seats allocated based on a single national electoral district, and provincial seats allocated based on provincial electoral districts, with the number of seats contingent upon population size.1 This dual-ballot system allows Ecuadorian voters to engage in split- or straight-ticket voting behaviours. In addition, the electoral calendar implies that both types of elections occur simultaneously on 1 The vote of Ecuadorians living abroad (and therefore their six reserved seats in the national assembly) has not been included in these analyses. The votes in the three provinces (Guayas, Pichincha, Manabí) that allocate legislative seats based on sub-provincial districts have been aggregated at the provincial level in order to facilitate the empirical comparison across provinces in this article. 97 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 PROVINCIAL PARTIES IN THE 2023 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR the same day, facilitating direct comparison of voting patterns. The utilization of provinces as electoral districts for the majority of legislative seats profoundly influences party competition. Even if the district magnitude depends on the size of the population of the province, an important malapportionment can be observed in the Ecuadorian case. This partly due to the minimum number of seats (at least two per province, even for very small provinces) and to the fact that the electoral districts of the three more populated provinces are further divided. As a result, political parties can secure assembly representation with relatively few votes, particularly in smaller provinces (Pachano 2006). This element potentially advantages provincial parties, national parties that concentrate their campaign efforts in a small number of (small) provinces, or national parties forging alliances with provincial parties in specific provinces. This article undertakes an analysis of the electoral performance of Ecuadorian provincial parties in the national legislative elections spanning from 2017 to 2023. The subsequent sections of this article are the following. In a first section, I delineate the methodology employed in identifying provincial parties and their electoral alliances. I identify provincial parties based on a series of indicators and I stress the importance of distinguishing between stand-alone provincial parties, and provincial parties that forge electoral alliance with other (national and/or provincial) parties. In a second section, I quantitatively investigate the Ecuadorian national legislative elections of 2017, 2021 and 2023 at the provincial level and test whether provincial parties tend to gather more vote shares than national parties. Finally, the article concludes by synthesizing the findings and offering insights into the multi-level electoral phenomena observed in the Ecuadorian context. Provincial parties in national elections in Ecuador When one wants to observe differences in voting behaviour across subnational units, a preliminary step is the understanding of the electoral offer. If different sets of political parties participate in elections in different provinces, it is very likely that different election results will 98 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 RÉGIS DANDOY be observed. On the contrary, when the electoral offer is similar across provinces, the observed differences can entirely be explained by the electoral demand. Provincial parties are often considered as the first source of observed differences across provinces. The logic is rather simple: the larger the vote shares obtained by a provincial party in a province, the more the elections in this province display a different pattern from the national level and from other provinces. Provincial parties are often defined as political parties that compete and obtain votes in only one province of a country (see for example Brancati 2008). It is important to underline that provincial parties are not political organizations that only participate in provincial elections, i.e., the election of the provincial prefects or the election of the socalled provincial seats of the national assembly in Ecuador. In fact, provincial parties can participate in elections in different levels of government (local, provincial, national etc.), as long as they compete only within the provincial border. In the framework of this article, I use this definition to distinguish between national and provincial parties rather than the official classification of parties by the National Electoral Council (even if both classifications broadly lead to a similar distinction). The number of provincial parties officially registered by the National Electoral Council does not correspond to the number of provincial parties actually participating in the elections. Indeed, being registered does not mean that these parties have to compete in elections, and many decide not to participate in (some) elections. In addition, national parties have the possibility to participate in elections in only one province, which would make them de facto provincial parties while they are officially considered as national parties. On the contrary, political parties have also the possibility to register as provincial parties in several different provinces, which would make them de facto national parties while they are officially considered as separate provincial parties. At the occasion of the 2023 elections, no less that 69 provincial parties were registered by the National Electoral Council, while I identified ‘only’ 33 of them (19 as stand-alone parties and 14 in electoral alliance – see below). 99 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 PROVINCIAL PARTIES IN THE 2023 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR Provincial parties in the 2023 elections The task of identifying provincial parties participating in the legislative elections is methodologically challenging. A first way to identify those provincial parties is the analysis of their labels or party list’s names. Some lists participating in the 2023 legislative elections make a clear reference to the provincial level of government, such as the Movimiento Politico Provincial Cambio (Provincial Political Movement Change) in the province of Chimborazo or the Movimiento Politico Unete (Political Movement United) in the province of Santa Elena. Other lists clearly mention the name of the province in their label, such as the Movimiento Social Conservador del Carchi (Social Conservative Movement of Carchi) in the province of Carchi, the Movimiento Politico Unidos por Pastaza (Political Movement United for Pastaza) in the province of Pastaza, or the Movimiento Politico Alianza Tsachila (Political Movement Alliance Tsachila) in the province of Santo Domingo. The difficulty arises when the lists does not refer to the provincial level or to a specific province. This for instance the case of the Movimiento Politico Organizacion Progresista Cuidadana (Political Movement Progressist Citizen’s Organization) in the province of Cotopaxi, the Movimiento Politico Renovacion (Political Movement Renovation) or the Movimiento Intercultural de Gente Activa ‘Minga’ (Intercultural Movement of Active People) both in the province of Chimborazo in 2023. Overall, no less than 19 provincial parties participated in the legislative elections of 2023 for the so-called provincial seats. This figure is relatively low, as it indicates that there are less than one provincial party per province. However, this figure is in line with previous legislative elections as there were 16 and 26 provincial parties in the 2017 and 2021 elections respectively (See Table 1). Provincial parties participating on their own represent exactly 7.00% of the total number of electoral lists present in the 2017, 2021 and 2023 legislative elections. Surprisingly, the percentage of stand-alone provincial parties is fairly similar for both provincial and legislative elections: 6.90% for the 2014 provincial elections and 7.63 % for the 2019 provincial elections (Dandoy 2019). 100 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 RÉGIS DANDOY This comparative perspective across three legislative elections also allows us to observe that there is no stability in the electoral offer at the provincial level. Only three provinces offered the same number of provincial parties across the last three elections (two parties in Santa Elena, one in Cotopaxi and Galapagos)2 while these parties have been absent in the provinces of Cañar and Esmeraldas in 2017, 2021 and 2023. In all other cases, the number of provincial parties varies over the last three legislative elections. In 2023, the largest number of stand-alone provincial parties was to be found in the province of Chimborazo (four provincial parties), followed by the province of Pastaza (three parties). The number of provincial parties participating in the legislative elections varies but how can we explain this variation? It seems that the number of provincial parties does not depend on the size of the provinces (in terms of population). For instance, we observe the presence of provincial parties in the two smallest provinces in 2023 (Galapagos and Pastaza) but not a single provincial party in the three other small provinces (Zamora Chinchipe, Napo and Morona Santiago). On the contrary, the five largest provinces did not display provincial parties. In addition, there seems to have no clear geographical patterns, if one delves into the larger geographical units that structure the country. Provincial parties can be found in some mountainous provinces such as in Chimborazo or Tungurahua but not in others (see for instance Cañar or Imbabura). The same applies for the coastal provinces, with provincial parties in El Oro and Santa Elena but not in the provinces of Esmeraldas or El Oro, and for the Amazonian provinces, with provincial parties in Pastaza and Sucumbíos but not in Morona Santiago or Napo. Finally, one has to underline that there are no standalone provincial parties in the metropolitan provinces of Guayas and Pichincha. 2 Even if the number of provincial parties remains the same over time, it does not concern the same parties. For instance, the provincial party in Galapagos was the Movimiento Reencuentro Ya (Movement Re-assembly Now, MRY) in 2017 and 2023, while the provincial party that competed in the 2021 elections in the same province was the Movimiento de Identidad Provincial (Movement of Provincial Identity, MIP). 101 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 PROVINCIAL PARTIES IN THE 2023 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR Table 1: Number of stand-alone provincial parties (2017-2023 legislative elections – provincial seats) Province Provincial party 2017 2021 2023 Azuay 1 0 0 Bolivar 0 1 1 Cañar 0 0 0 Carchi 2 2 1 Chimborazo 1 1 4 Cotopaxi 1 1 1 El Oro 1 3 1 Esmeraldas 0 0 0 Galapagos 1 1 1 Guayas 1 1 0 Imbabura 0 1 0 Loja 0 2 1 Los Rios 1 0 0 Manabí 1 3* 0 Morona Santiago 0 1 0 Napo 0 1 0 Orellana 0 1 0 Pastaza 1 0 3 Pichincha 1 0 0 Santa Elena 2 2 2 Santo Domingo 1 2 2 Sucumbíos 0 1 1 Tungurahua 0 2 1 Zamora Chinchipe 1 0 0 Total 16 26 19 Note: * The number of provincial parties varies within the Manabí province: two provincial parties in the electoral district #1 and three in the electoral district #2 in 2021. 102 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 RÉGIS DANDOY Electoral alliances with provincial parties in the 2023 elections Provincial parties do not always compete on their own, but they may also want to unite their electoral destiny with another political party and therefore create an electoral alliance (vom Hau & Srebotnjak 2021). Since 1996 and the end of the ban of electoral alliances, the Ecuadorian electoral law allows parties to choose between two options: to participate in the elections on their own or to create an alliance with one or several other political parties. There are no legal restrictions on the number of parties included in the alliance or on their nature – there can be national parties, provincial parties or both types of parties in the electoral alliance. This creates a large diversity of scenarios and potential strategies for political parties willing to forge pre-electoral alliances and a quasi-experiment for political scientists. An initial challenge for this research is the identification of provincial parties based on their label or the alliance’s name. Unlike political parties that participate on their own, not a single electoral alliance participating in the 2023 legislative elections makes a clear reference to the provincial level of government. On the contrary, several of them make mention the name of the province in their label, such as the alliance Azuay sin miedo (Azuay without fear) that gathers the PSC and a provincial party in the province of Azuay, or the alliance Somos Bolivarenses (We are Bolivarians) that gathers the ID and two provincial parties in the province of Bolivar. Overall, no less than 14 provincial parties participated in electoral alliances in the legislative elections of 2023 for the so-called provincial seats, i.e., about one provincial party every two provinces. This figure is lower than in previous legislative elections: 23 in 2017 and 20 in 2021 (see Table 2). Electoral alliances with at least one provincial party represent no less than 6,54% of the total number of electoral lists present in the 2017, 2021 and 2023 legislative elections. Unsurprisingly, this percentage of electoral alliances of national parties with at least one provincial party is higher for provincial elections: 16,38 % for the 2014 provincial elections and 15,25 % for the 2019 provincial elections (Dandoy 2019). 103 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 PROVINCIAL PARTIES IN THE 2023 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR Interestingly, out of the 14 electoral alliances including at least one provincial parties in 2023, six are composed of one national party and one provincial party, four are composed of one national party and two provincial parties and four are composed of two national parties and one provincial party. Note that - contrary to previous legislative elections - there are no electoral alliances composed solely of provincial parties in 2023. The PSC was involved in no less than seven electoral alliances with a provincial party (the most famous on being the alliance being this party and Madera de Guerrero in the province of Guayas), followed by the ID (two alliances), PSP (two alliances), RC (two alliances), SUMA (two alliances), Avanza (one alliance), CD (one alliance) and RETO (one alliance). We equally find provincial parties in electoral alliances in poorly populated provinces (such as Napo or Orellana) as well as in larger provinces (such as Guayas or Manabí). Similarly to standalone provincial parties, we do not observe patterns based on the larger geographical units that structure the country. Provincial parties in electoral alliances can be found in some mountainous provinces such as in Bolivar and Chimborazo but not in others (see for instance Carchi or Cotopaxi). The same applies for the coastal provinces, with electoral alliances including at least one provincial party in El Oro and Manabí but not in the provinces of Esmeraldas and Los Rios, for the Amazonian provinces, with electoral alliances including at least one provincial party in Napo and Orellana but not in Pastaza and Zamora Chinchipe, and for the metropolitan provinces with electoral alliances including at least one provincial party in Guayas but not in Pichincha. 104 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 RÉGIS DANDOY Table 2: Number of electoral alliances including at least one provincial parties (2017-2023 legislative elections – provincial seats) Province Provincial party 2017 2021 2023 Azuay 2 1 2 Bolivar 2 1 1 Cañar 0 0 0 Carchi 1 0 0 Chimborazo 2 2 1 Cotopaxi 0 0 0 El Oro 1 0 2 Esmeraldas 0 0 0 Galapagos 0 0 0 Guayas 1 1 1 Imbabura 0 0 0 Loja 2 1 0 Los Rios 0 0 0 Manabí 2 1 1* Morona Santiago 0 1 0 Napo 1 1 1 Orellana 2 1 1 Pastaza 0 1 0 Pichincha 1 2 0 Santa Elena 1 1 1 Santo Domingo 1 2 1 Sucumbíos 1 1 1 Tungurahua 2 2 1 Zamora Chinchipe 1 1 0 Total 23 20 14 Note: * The number of electoral alliances with provincial parties varies within the Manabí province: one in the electoral district #1 but none in the electoral district #2 in 2023. 105 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 PROVINCIAL PARTIES IN THE 2023 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR Electoral performance of provincial parties Measuring the electoral results of provincial parties The next step following the identification of provincial parties is the measurement of their vote shares. As mentioned above, elections for the national assembly in Ecuador provides a unique setting for the analysis of national election results at the level of the provinces. As seats in this assembly are clustered by province and as provincial parties can opt for very different campaign strategies (on their own, in alliance with a national party, in an alliance with another provincial party, etc.), the measurement of the parties’ vote shares requires several methodological decisions. If the measurement of the electoral performance of stand-alone provincial parties does not pose many problems, the same does not apply to electoral alliances. As it is difficult to determine which party was dominant in such alliances (Faust & Harbersy 2011), I considered each party equally, independently on its status (national vs. provincial party) or its previous electoral success in the district. As a result, I took into the number of votes for each individual party, i.e., to the total number of votes gathered by the alliance divided by the number of partners. For instance, the 50.258 votes obtained by the alliance Alianza Unidos Somos Mas (Alliance United We are More) in the province of Manabí are divided equally between the PSC and the provincial party Caminantes (Hikers), i.e., 25.129 votes for each party. In the case of provinces with different party configurations across subprovincial electoral districts, I summed the results of the provincial party in each electoral district of the province. These calculations indicate that provincial parties are not very successful in the 2023 national legislative elections (provincial seats). Altogether, the managed to gather 7.59% of the votes. This figure can be sub-divided into the different categories of provincial parties: the provincial parties that stand alone in elections obtained 3.20% while the provincial parties in electoral alliances gather 4.39% When compared to previous national elections, we observe that this figure is in decline. Provincial parties managed to obtain 8,56% and 13,39% of the votes in the legislative elections of 2021 and 2017 respectively. 106 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 RÉGIS DANDOY The electoral performance of provincial parties is not homogeneous across the Ecuadorian territory. We can observe large variations of their performance across provinces. Graph 1 represents the vote shares for all provincial parties at the provincial level for the legislative elections (provincial seats) for both categories of parties (stand-alone and in alliances). First, no provincial party participated in the 2023 legislative elections in seven provinces (Cañar, Esmeraldas, Imbabura, Los Rios, Morona Santiago, Pichincha and Zamora Chinchipe). In comparison, there were at least one provincial party participating in the 2017 legislative elections in each province. In provinces such as Cotopaxi or Manabí, provincial parties did not perform well. They obtain less than five per cent of the votes. The least successful stand-alone provincial parties are to be found in the provinces of Santo Domingo (Movimiento Politico Alianza Tsachila, Political Movement Tsachila Alliance, 1,99%), of Tungurahua (Movimiento Civico Por Ambato, Civic Movement for Ambato, 2,05%) and of Cotopaxi (OPCION, OPTION, 2,11%). The least successful electoral alliances that include at least one provincial party are to be found in the provinces of Azuay (Unidos por el Azuay, United for Azuay, 2,87%), Santa Elena (Actuemos, Let’s act, 3,43%) and Chimborazo (Alianza Unidos Seguridad y Progreso, Alliance United Security and Progess, 5,21%). On the other side of the axis, we observe very successful provincial parties. In the provinces of Pastaza and Santa Elena, they even obtain more than 40% of the votes. As a consequence, they became major players on the electoral scene and managed to obtain several seats in the national assembly. In Pastaza, no less than three provincial parties participated in the 2023 legislative elections: The Movimiento Unidos por Pastaza (Movement United for Pastaza) obtained no less than 29,18% of the votes, while the Movimiento Politico Semilla (Political Movement Seed) and the Movimiento Politico Integracion, Progreso y Cambio (Political Movement Integration, Progress and Change) gathered 21,20% and 12,48% respectively. Altogether, these three provincial parties obtained 62,85% of the votes. In Santa Elena, two provincial parties were competing on their own and two others were in an alliance with a national party. 107 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 PROVINCIAL PARTIES IN THE 2023 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR The Movimiento Peninsular Creyendo en nuestra Gente (Peninsular Movement Believing in our People) obtained 23,12% of the votes, while the Movimiento Provincial Unete (Provincial Movement Unite) gathered 17,41%. The electoral alliance Actuemos (Let’s act) that was composed of the national party Suma and two provincial parties FLC and Somos obtain only 3,43% of the votes. Graph 1: Vote shares of provincial parties per province (2023 legislative elections – provincial seats) Source: Own elaboration Explanatory models (2017-2023) This last section aims at explaining the electoral performance of provincial parties by including these variables into a basic linear regression model. With the help of a small series of independent and control variables, I explore whether provincial parties attract more vote shares than other types of parties. The dependent variable consists in party vote shares for all the electoral lists participating in the 2017, 2021 and 2023 national 108 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 RÉGIS DANDOY legislative elections (provincial seats) at the level of the 24 provinces.3 Votes for the sub-provincial electoral districts have been aggregated at the level of the three provinces of Guayas, Manabí and Pichincha respectively. The vote shares for no less than 872 electoral lists have been included in the database: 289 lists in 2017, 349 lists in 2021 and 234 in 2023. On average, electoral lists gather 8.26% of the vote shares. The largest vote share has been recorded for the national party Revolucion Cuidadana (Citizen’s revolution) in 2023 in the province Manabí (56.49%) while the lowest vote share can be found for the national party Podemos (We Can) in 2021 in the province of Esmeraldas (0.29%). The independent variable concerns the presence of provincial parties on the legislative election ballots. As demonstrated above, provincial parties frequently participate in national elections in Ecuador and their specific nature could have an impact on election results. The main independent variable consists in a dummy variable, i.e., whether the list is a provincial party, be it in an alliance with another party(ies) or on its own. For the 2017, 2021 and 2023 elections, no less than 118 provincial parties participated in the Ecuadorian legislative elections, representing 13.5% of the total number of lists. I also divided the independent variable into two complementary indicators to be used in an alternative model: whether the provincial party participates in the election on its own (dummy, N = 61), or as part of an electoral alliance with at least one another political party (dummy, N = 57). A small set of control variables have also been included in the models. The first variable concerns party competition. Given that the dependent variable consists in party vote shares, it is important to control for the number of electoral lists participating in the election. A smaller vote share could be explained by a larger competition and vice-versa for a larger vote share. Second, an important feature of the Ecuadorian decentralization model is its geographical and demographic diversity. The 24 provinces can be classified in four main categories based on dummy variables: Mountainous provinces, coastal provinces, Amazonian provinces and metropolitan provinces.4 3 The three electoral districts abroad have been excluded from the analysis. 4 One could argue that the Galapagos province presents a distinct characteristic given its insular 109 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 PROVINCIAL PARTIES IN THE 2023 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR Similarly, the large demographic variation has been taken into account by the variables of province size, based on the number of inhabitants in each province (2022 census). Finally, I included election year dummies in the regression models. The results of this explorative analysis confirm that provincial parties receive an electoral bonus in legislative elections in Ecuador. Even if the explanatory power of the two tested models remains modest, the coefficients for the presence of provincial parties are positive and significant. In a first model, we observe that provincial parties receive about 2.74% additional votes than national parties when participating in legislative elections. In a second model, I disaggregated the variable of provincial parties according to the two types of party strategies of provincial parties. It confirms that the impact observed in the first model is entirely due to one type of provincial parties: provincial parties participating to alliance with at least another (national) party obtains about 6.26% additional votes. In other words, national parties have a direct interest to participate in legislative elections based on an alliance with provincial parties as it brings a direct electoral bonus. The coefficient for the variable of stand-alone party is negative – indicating a lower electoral success – but not significant. Unsurprisingly, the control variable of party competition – i.e., the number of lists competing in each electoral district – is negatively associated to party vote shares. The higher the competition, the lower the vote shares obtained by each individual list. No other control variables, be it geographic or demographic, proved to be significant. status, but the province is in reality poorly politically or demographically relevant to be considered as a specific type of province. 110 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 RÉGIS DANDOY Table 3: Analysis of party vote shares (legislative elections – provincial seats, 2017-2023) Provincial party (all) Model 1 Model 2 2.741*** - (0.913 Provincial party (alliance) - 6.263*** (1.253) Provincial party (standalone) Party competition Province size Mountainous province - -0.602 -0.647*** -0.634*** (0.148) (0.147) -9.00e-08 -2.95e-07 (1.01e-06) (1.01e-06) -0.183 -0.0527 (1.223) (0.989) (0.981) Coastal province -0.00803 0.300 (1.136) (1.128) Metropolitan province -0.0844 0.578 (3.656) (3.627) -0.632 -0.745 (0.864) (0.857) -0.279 -0.197 2017 elections 2023 elections Constant Observations R-squared (1.126) (1.116) 16.71*** 16.52*** (1.949) (1.932) 872 872 0.067 0.084 Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The 2021 elections and Amazonian provinces are considered as reference categories. Source: Own elaboration 111 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 PROVINCIAL PARTIES IN THE 2023 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR Conclusion This article aimed at evaluating the importance of the provincial actors for the analysis of national election results in Ecuador. Most analyses of national elections in this country focus on the national actors, national parties and national issues while acknowledging that sub-national dynamics may be at play. There are indeed significant variations of the voting behaviour across different parts of the Ecuadorian territory and these sub-national dynamics have been observed by many analysts of the Ecuadorian elections over time. Some focused on the existence of differences between the national party system at the national level and the provincial systems (see for example Pachano 2004; 2007; Sánchez 2008; Freidenberg & Alcántara 2001; Polga-Hecimovich 2014); while others investigate the provincialization vs. nationalization trends of the Ecuadorian national elections (Polga-Hecimovich 2014; Došek 2015; Freidenberg & Pachano 2016; Dandoy 2017).5 By focusing on the observed sub-national differences for the Ecuadorian national elections, this article analysed of the electoral performance of provincial parties in the legislative elections spanning from 2017 to 2023. A first important task concerned the identification of provincial parties, for instance based on their label or based on their participation in some territories. This led us to identify two main types of provincial parties: provincial parties that participate in national elections on their own (the so-called ‘stand-alone provincial parties’) and provincial parties that create electoral alliances with national parties. Overall, provincial parties are relevant actors, not only for provincial races but also for national elections. No less than 118 provincial parties participated in the Ecuadorian legislative elections of 2017, 2021 and 2023, representing 13.5% of the total number of lists. This far from an anecdotical group of parties, especially as they participated in all recent provincial and legislative elections in a majority of provinces. Finally, provincial parties are also relevant actors as they are capable of attracting important vote shares (8.26% 5 However, the inclusion of the territorial dimension in the analysis of variation of turnout, or the provincial electoral dynamics in the sub-national elections in Ecuador are still underexplored. 112 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 RÉGIS DANDOY in the last three national elections) and to have a significant impact on national election results. Based on this identification of provincial parties, I quantitatively investigated the vote shares obtained by these parties in Ecuadorian national legislative elections at the provincial level. We observed large variations of the electoral performance of provincial parties across time and across provinces: provincial party vote shares are not homogeneous across the Ecuadorian territory and future works must look into the explanations of this phenomenon. The first clues to this explanation were present in a basic regression model and intended to test whether provincial parties tend to gather more votes than national parties. It concluded that – compared to national parties - provincial parties receive an electoral bonus in legislative elections in Ecuador. This is particularly true for provincial parties participating to alliance with at least another (national) party as they obtain about 6.26% additional votes, compared to other parties participating in national elections. In other words, national parties have in interest in forging alliances with provincial parties if they want to register a greater electoral success in national races. These findings are in line with previous research about the impact of electoral alliances on voting behaviour (Duch, May & Armstrong 2010; Gschwend, Meffert & Stoetzer 2017), particularly at the sub-regional level (Plescia 2017). This article calls for further research in order to understand the electoral success of provincial parties. First, the phenomenon of crosslevel electoral alliances (i.e., alliance between provincial and national parties) should be further investigated. Since this type of alliance leads to larger electoral success in both provincial and national elections, more insight is needed on the conditions of their creation and their characteristics. For instance, what is the impact of the number of partners on the electoral success of the alliance? Is there an optimal number of national and/or provincial parties in the alliance? Is the ideological proximity between the different partners a condition for electoral success? In addition, more investigation is needed on the regulation of electoral alliances (see also Clerici & Scherlis 2014). This large liberty given to parties to choose their optimal strategy implies that they can opt for largely different strategies and directly impact the electoral offer. 113 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 PROVINCIAL PARTIES IN THE 2023 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR On a related topic, the ideology of provincial parties needs to be taken into account in any analysis of their weight on provincial and national politics in Ecuador. Not only the ideological proximity between the alliance partners could be important for its electoral success, but also the core ideology of the provincial party itself could also have an impact on the party strategy (to stand in elections alone or in alliance) and electoral performance. It is particularly important to identify regionalist parties, i.e., provincial parties that defend the interest of a specific provinces and that, to some extent, promote a further decentralisation or autonomy of the province compared to other levels of government (see also De Winter 1998; Gomes-Reino, De Winter, Lynch 2006; Dandoy 2010). This identification requires an extensive analysis of the party discourse and ideology, for instance via an in-depth study of its party manifesto. Another promising avenue of research concerns the explanation of the volatility of the electoral offer at the provincial level in Ecuador. The number of provincial parties varied over the last three legislative elections and there is also an important variation of the electoral offer in some provinces over time. We also observed that few provincial parties participated in the last three consecutive national elections: some established provincial parties disappeared or decided not to run in these elections, while short-lived provincial parties sometimes run in one single election. This volatility of the electoral offer also concerns the electoral alliance as provincial parties sometimes forge an alliance with a national party in one election, stand-alone for the next and forge an alliance with another national party for the third election. While quantitative research may be helpful to identify common patterns and outliers, qualitative case study would provide unique insights on the characteristics of the electoral offer at the provincial level in Ecuador. Finally, while vote shares for provincial seats in legislative elections were specifically investigated, comparisons could also be made with other electoral processes such as gubernatorial elections or other national elections analysed at the sub-national level. This comparison would help us understand the nature of the cross-provincial variance of electoral offer in electoral processes. Since provincial actors remain at the centre of the national electoral dynamics in Ecuador, provincial-based socio-demographic explanations should 114 Democracias Vol.12 • mayo 2024 • pp. 95-119 RÉGIS DANDOY been included in comprehensive analyses of voting behaviour in Ecuador. 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