On the Common Universal Things (Alexander of Aphrodisias)

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2011

2010

My dissertation focuses on what I call Aristotle's "problem of katholou" in order to distinguish it from the "problem of universals" which is traditionally framed as the problem about the ontological status of universals. Aristotle coins the term katholou (traditionally rendered as "universal") and defines it as "that which is by nature predicated of many things" (De Int. 17a38). Yet, the traditional focus on the ontological status of universals is not Aristotle's. His positive remarks about universals remain neutral with regard to their ontological status and escape the standard divide of realism and nominalism. I start with Aristotle's neutrality and focus on his problem concerning universals and particulars.

2

2021

The present edition of Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics is the outcome of a project (GO 2467/1-1) which was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) from January 2015 to August 2017. I am extremely grateful to Oliver Primavesi (Munich) and the anonymous referees for supporting my project. Because of the generous funding from the DFG, I was able to travel through Italy for seven months and to inspect in situ thirteen out of twenty-three manuscripts that contain Alexander's commentary on the Metaphysics, then to spend almost two years in Paris, working at the Bibliothèque nationale de France, in which a further seven manuscripts of the commentary reside, and at the Centre Léon Robin (CNRS), where I fruitfully discussed problematic aspects of the textual tradition of the commentary. The edition was brought to completion in the framework of the project Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina under the auspices of the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften during the years 2018-2021. I would like to express my warmest thanks to the colleagues and friends who helped me with my research, through discussion and practical support, in Italy and

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2024

The idea that nous comes from without, deriving from Aristotle's Generation of Animals II.3, became a key element in late ancient and Medieval accounts of human rationality drawing on Aristotle's De Anima. But two very different understandings of the concept were around (often occurring next to each other): either it was taken to refer to the human capacity for thought and its origin outside the natural ontogenetic process; or it was taken to stand for the most perfect act of thought, existing separately as the supreme divinity, and becoming, hopefully, ours at the very climax of human development. This paper shows how these two influential conceptions derive from the work of the two greatest scholars of Aristotle's school, Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias, respectively. More to the point: it shows that (i) there is an intriguing philosophical story to be told of how the notion developed from one understanding to the other, this being the core of a larger story of nous from without in Western thought; and that (ii) this story sheds new light on what was at stake in the earlygenuinely Peripatetic-reception of Aristotle's account of nous (as contrasted with later, heavily Platonized, interpretations). The published version can be downloaded here: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/JXDWY9WHTMMDD6SMGRED/full?target=10.1080/09608788.2023.2265970

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2004

In contemporary literature, the philosophical problem of universals is frequently framed as a problem about the ontological status of properties. 1 When considering the historical background to the problem, one typically reads of the opposition of Plato and Aristotle with regard to this ontological status. For example, it is a commonplace that Plato 'reified' or 'hypostasized' universals. The problem of universals is thus in part viewed as the opposition between two alternative theories: universals are or are not to be posited as existing on their own. According to this way of framing the problem, Plato's theory of Forms is taken to be a theory of ante rem universals which is the alternative to a theory of post rem or in re universals. 2 Evidently, the origin of this observation is to be located in Aristotle's frequent criticism that Plato, in positing Forms, made universals into individual substances. 3 Making them individual substances is what reifying them or hypostasizing them is supposed to amount to. The word used by Aristotle that is always translated as 'universal' is to; kaqov lou, which is a nominalized form of the adverb kaqov lou. But neither the nominalized form of the word nor even the adverb appear in Plato's writings. This fact alone should at least lead us to wonder whether Plato himself thought that he was 'reifying' universals or that in positing Forms he was solving a problem that universals are supposed to solve. It is reasonably clear that when Aristotle accuses Plato of wrongly making universals into individual substances, he is not thereby denying the existence of universals. Aristotle never gives as the reason why universals are not individual substances that universals do not exist, though if universals did not exist, it would, of course, be true that they are not individual substances. In fact, Aristotle explicitly 1 See, e. g., Moreland 2001, 1. 2 See, e. g., Landesman 1971, 'The Problem of Universals' 15, who assumes that the dispute between Aristotle and Plato is a dispute over whether universals can exist independently of particulars. See also Quine, 1961, 224 and Wolterstorff 1970, 263-81, especially 278, where Forms are identified as universals. Sometimes, the Aristotelian theory of universals is characterized as holding that the universal is in re rather than post rem. But this seems to me to be at least misleading. For however we construe the issue, there is a category confusion between that which is post rem (a word or a concept, etc.) and that which is in re (some item the theory's ontology). 3 See Metaphysics B 6, 1003a7-13 where the problem of the relationship between individuality and universality is raised as needing treatment. For Aristotle, a substance (ouj siv a) is an individual (tov de ti, to; kaq j e{ kaston). The argument is made against the Platonic approach at Z 13, 1038b35-1039a3; Z 16, 1040b25-30; M 9, 1086a32-5. The Aristotelian principle that an individual is not a universal is already stated at Sophistici Elenchi 22, 178b37-9, 179a8-10.

1994

TABLE OF CONTENTS (ANALYTICAL) Xlll Chapter Two: The contents qf On mixed premisses 2.1 [p. 53] Introduction. The modal syllogistic was controversial from the beginning. Theophrastus appears to have had a different analysis (the peiorem rule). Alexander's was contained in On mixed premisses. 2.2 [p. 59] Philoponus speaks in his commentary of the "sides" to the debate. He considers the Theophrastan argument, which involves types of necessity and the (connected) notion of "genuine parts." Most importandy, he talks about Sosigenes. We should read the pertinent passage in a way that makes Alexander agree with Sosigenes. The Alexandrian position (assuming he and Sosigenes agree) would involve the idea that the adduction of terms for "AaB & NBaC ~ AaC' and non-adduction of terms for 'NAaB & BaC ~ NAaC' is significant. There is, however, an internal implausibility in Philoponus's account. 2.3 [p. 65] Pseudo-Ammonius also speaks in his commentary of the "sides" to the debate. And we find again the notion of "genuine parts" but with a difference: pseudo-Ammonius suggests a necessary conclusion must be derived. There is a connection between the pseudo-Ammonius passage and On mixed premisses. 2.3.1 [p. 68] Relationship between Philoponus and pseudo-Ammonius. The two depend on a common source ("On Mixed Premisses."). 2.3.2 [p. 70] A difference regarding the reductio solution. Philoponus and pseudo-Ammonius both comment on a reductio proof of "NAaB & AaC ~ NAaC." Pseudo-Ammonius incorrectly ascribes it to Alexander. Philoponus therefore is the better source in this regard. There is a lesson on this: Alexander's style is subtle, his preferred position often difficult to establish. 2.4 [p. 74] Hypothetical necessity. 2.4.1 [p. 74] Philoponus and pseudo-Ammonius compared. In Philoponus hypothetical necessity is hypothetical necessity "while the predicate (of the conclusion) holds"; in pseudo-Ammonius, the hypothetical character XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS (ANALYTICAL) seems to be bound up with the middle term. Is pseudo-Ammonius more reliable? Yes and no. 2.4.2 [p. 75] A look at Alexander's in A.Pr.l40 (more particularly 140.14-28) gives some answers. Alexander suggests that Sosigenes isolated the notion of a limiting term: i.e., a term such as 'movement' which pertains to a temporary state. Alexander and pseudo-Ammonius and Alexander work to cross-purposes: pseudo-Ammonius uses this approach to say that Sosigenes is to be faulted; Alexander uses it to say that Sosigenes got over the problems of Aristotle's approach. 2.4.3 [p. 78] Moraux thinks Alexander's in A.Pr.l40.25-8 is anti-Sosigenes. But, for textual reasons and because Sosigenes is known to have been in favour of the Aristotelian position, this cannot be correct. But how does Alexander's in A.Pr.140.25-8 help Sosigenes? We have to look at another Aristotelian notion first: the notion of "universals not limited in respect of time." Alexander presumes this notion in his account of Aristotle's understanding of assertoric-apodeictic mixed modal syllogisms. 2.4.4 [p. 81] With respect to Alexander's in A.Pr.l40.29-34, Moraux fails to distinguish limited (i.e., syllogistic) necessity from hypothetical necessity. It is possible that Sosigenes also failed to make this terminological distinction-although he employed what Alexander calls hypothetical necessity. 2.4.5 [p. 83] Alexander's in A.Pr.141.1-6 argues that Aristotle intraduced hypothetical necessity in his Int. This understanding is consistent with the Philoponus passage (in A.Pr.126) where he uses the pertinent Int. passage to the same (i.e., pro-Sosigenes) purpose. 2.4.6 [p. 85] The last bit in this series (i.e., in A.Pr.141.6-16) is not anti-Sosigenes. Moraux has the larger section wrong: in general intent, it is not anti-Sosigenes. 2.4.7 [p. 86] Alexander discusses hypothetical necessity at in A.Pr.l29-30. According to Alexander, we must assume the weak dictum de omni with regard to apodeictic premisses. If one maintains the strong 6 in A.Pr.250.2. 7 Peters (1968b), p. 233. 8 I shall refer to this work, as is customary, by means of the abbreviation in A.Pr. The same abbreviation seJVes also for other ancient commentaries on Aristode's Prior Anafytics. When in A.Pr. refers to a commentary other than Alexander's, I shall try to make this very clear. 9 See in A.Pr.74.6, 125.16 and also Moraux (1984), pp. 382-394. 12 Lukasiewicz (1957), p. 62. 13 Aristode uses this term for the "thing taken out" at An.Pr.30al2. Alexander 19 Thus, note 21 at Barnes et al (1991), p. 88, is wrong. 20 See Barnes et al (1991), p. 87, n. 20. 21 Ross's apparatus criticus notes that Alexander does not read tou ll1tOKEtJ.1Evou at An.Pr.24b29 and thus he puts the two words within brackets. See in A.Pr.24.29, 32 and also 54.7-also Barnes et al (1991), p. 199. Wallies includes tou {l1toKEtJ.1EvOU within the quotation at in A.Pr.24.29 but this is probably not correct. ECTHESIS 9 'tO n. 'tOU't 1 ECI'tt 'tO ~ijlov, 'ttVt 'tijl P, 'tOU't 1 E<J'tt 'tijl A.oytKijl, KOtvmVEt 'tE Kat 1mapxn [in A.Pr.l 00.5-7]. 52 The Greek for the proof itself is as follows: E7tEt yap KEt'tat Kilt 'tO n Kat 'tO p 7tUV'tt 'tijl r imapxov'ta, iiv UV'tt 'tOU r Ml~ffij.l.Ev 'tt 'tWV 1mo 'tO r. 'tOU't<p1mapxn of\A.ov O'tt Kilt 'tO n Kat toP, Et YE Kilt 7tUVtt tijl U1t0 tOr. outm~ OE onxefJcrEtUt Kat ton ttvt 'tijl p U7tapxov. Kat AaJl~UVEt YE toN. tOUtOU o' OUt~ £xovto~ Kilt ton. !pT)<Jt, ttvt tijl p U7tap~Et [in A.Pr.99.22-27]. Alexander's remarks on the proof follow immediately: &A.A.U OOKEt YE outm~ j.J.T)OEv 1tAEOV YEYOVEvUt 7tp0~ 'tO onxSf\vat to 7tpOKEtj.l.EVOV. t{ yap OtacpepEt tijl r U7tapxnv Aa~EtV 7taVtt t6 tEn Kilt top Kat j.J.EpEt nvt 'tOUr tijl N; to yap auto Kilt E7tt tOU N AT)cp8EV't0~ j.l.EvEt. ~ yap au'tft <JU~uy{a £crt{v, &v tE KUta 'tOU N 7tUVt0~ EKEtvmv EKUtEpov, &v tE KUta tOU r KUtT)yopf\tat [in A.Pr.99.27-31]. 53 At in A.Pr.99.33, Alexander glosses this with the phrase n tour.