’For Democracy — Against Violence’: A Kosovar Alternative

Gëzim Krasniqi “For Democracy — Against Violence”: A Kosovar Alternative Throughout the 1980s, Kosovo was the hotspot of the Yugoslav economic and political crisis. That volatile decade, which started with the student and popular protests in the spring of 1981, reached its peak in 1988 and 1989 with the discussions on the issue of Kosovo’s autonomy and the Serb attempts to abolish it. The subsequent increased state control, on the one hand, and popular protests, workers’ strikes and marches organised in defence of Kosovo’s autonomy, on the other, resulted in an ever more intense nationalist mobilisation among both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, turning Kosovo into Yugoslavia’s “powder keg”. These events, which culminated in the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy and the subsequent violent clashes between the Albanian protesters and state police and military, had two major opposing yet interconnected effects. First, by pushing Kosovo towards an open conflict, they put in question the capabilities of the post-Tito Yugoslavia to solve its political disputes peacefully, weakening its internal and external legitimacy. Second, by discrediting the ineffective communist officials in Kosovo in the eyes of the local population, these events paved the way for the emergence of new elites, associations and parties that aimed to represent the interests of the Kosovo Albanians. The decision of the Kosovo Albanians to adopt the strategy of nonviolence changed the tide of the events and led to consequences which could not have been anticipated. This chapter outlines the emergence and development of a plethora of human rights groups, pro-democracy and anti-war associations and political parties that came to be known as the “Kosovar Alternative”1 in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I argue that: (a) despite many internal differences and disagreements, these groups were united by their demands for the introduction of pluralism and democracy in Yugoslavia and in Kosovo; (b) irrespective of the increasing homogenisation of Kosovo Albanians in opposition to Serbia, 1 This is a generic term that came into use in the late 1980s and was employed by various local media to describe the first human rights groups and associations active outside of the framework of the Communist League of Kosovo. The term gained more prominence with the establishment (in Ljubljana) of a monthly magazine in Albanian that carried the same name (Alternativa) and was an organ of the Albanian Cultural Association “Migjeni”. The latter gathered Albanian university professors, writers and activists from Kosovo and Yugoslavia, as well as some Slovenian intellectuals. See Ali Podrimja, “Si lindi ‘Alternativa,’” Alternativa, (1990) 6, pp. 34–6. 83 the Kosovar Alternative was not monolithic. Rather, it represented a platform upon which divergent understandings of politics, civic engagement and nationhood came together; (c) the Kosovar Alternative is not synonymous with the Kosovo Albanian “parallel state”2 — it was a wider, more diverse movement that faded away once Yugoslavia’s dissolution became a fait accompli. Therefore, in this chapter, I explore the theoretico-political underpinnings and other social factors that conditioned the adoption of a nonviolent political strategy by the Kosovar Alternative. I elucidate the close ties of the Kosovar Alternative with other pro-democracy initiatives in Yugoslavia that championed pluralism, democracy and reformation of the Yugoslav federal system. In doing so, I rely mostly on primary sources — interviews, newspaper clips and protagonists’ memoirs. This is complemented by other secondary sources, including books and journal articles on Kosovo and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. With regard to secondary sources, a great deal of work tends to focus on Kosovo’s “parallel state” and the independence movement led by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). However, the operation of the Democratic League only became more prominent in late 1992, at the expense of earlier groups and associations whose point of reference was democracy within Yugoslavia. Thus, it is the pre-1993 groups and associations that I am mostly concerned with here. A prelude to war: 1981 Kosovo riots The 1968–1974 period,3 which was marked by overall social and economic progress as well as increased political and national emancipation in Kosovo, was followed by a major setback in 1981 with the eruption of protests in Kosovo and the state response that followed. In the spring of 1981, the University of Pristina [Universiteti i Prishtinës] students started protesting against the poor catering and living conditions in the dormitories. In a matter of days, this led to Kosovo-wide political demonstrations where people demanded a “Republic of Kosovo” and even unification with Albania. The Yugoslav authorities swiftly condemned this outburst of discontent as “Alba- 2 3 84 This term is used to depict a set of political, educational, health and sports institutions set up by Kosovo Albanians in reaction to the abolition by Serbia of Kosovo’s institutions and massive dismissal of Albanians from working places in the early 1990s. They functioned independent of and parallel to the official Serb state institutions in Kosovo. Following the constitutional changes in 1974, Kosovo became a “socialist autonomous province” and obtained its own constitution, parliament, government, central bank, constitutional court, as well as representation in the federal institutions independent from the Republic of Serbia and thus was a republic in everything but name. See Momčilo Pavlović, “Kosovo under Autonomy, 1974–1990,” in Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert (eds.), Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative (Washington D.C. and West Lafayette: United States Institute of Peace and Purdue University Press, 2009), pp. 48–81, here p. 54. nian nationalism and irredentism” or “counterrevolution,” and introduced martial law.4 Kosovo’s communist leadership was forced to step down as well. The violent suppression of these demonstrations by the Yugoslav army and police resulted in the death of several dozen protesters and hundreds injured. Blaming Albanian émigrés and foreign agents (primarily those from Albania), the state authorities initiated a wide operation of arrests of the people who were deemed responsible for the protest organisation.5 Although the open confrontation ceased after almost two months, passive resistance in the form of slogan painting, distribution of leaflets and industrial sabotage continued for years to come.6 After the student protests, it was the University of Pristina that came under direct attack from the regime; the rector was forced to step down and a process of “political and ideological differentiation” among the staff members followed.7 The regime identified the University of Pristina as the “fortress of Albanian nationalism” and “the bastion of counter-revolution” in Yugoslavia. Indeed, the rapid development of the school system between 1966 and 1981 in Kosovo resulted in a situation where one third of the country’s population was enrolled in a school or university.8 In turn, this led to the creation of a new stratum of young people, fully conscious of their national rights, economically and socially better off, which could be radicalised much easier than the old communist cadres that had led Kosovo since WWII. In the same vein, these people became critical of the widening social and economic gap between Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia. The establishment of the University (15 February 1970), which was the first and only Albanianlanguage university in Yugoslavia, marked the beginning of a new era of opportunities for the cultural development of Albanians in Yugoslavia. It soon became the cultural, social, and scientific centre of Albanians living in Yugoslavia.9 4 5 6 7 8 9 Pavlović, Kosovo under Autonomy, pp. 60–1; Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 22. A report by the Kosovo Secretariat for Internal Affairs presented at the Kosovo Assembly in 1988 states that between 1981 and 1988 the police and courts dealt with some 580,000 persons in Kosovo as part of the campaign against “Albanian nationalism and irredentism”. Out of this number, tens of thousands of people were sentenced to serve anything from thirty days to fourteen years of imprisonment for political activities punishable according to Articles 114 and 133 of the Yugoslav Criminal Code. See Muhamedin Kullashi, “The Production of Hatred in Kosovo (1981-1991),” in Ger Duijzings, Dušan Janjić and Shkëlzen Maliqi (eds.), Kosovo-Kosova: Confrontation or Coexistence (Nijmegen: Peace Research Centre and Political Cultural Centre O42, 1996), pp. 56–69, here p. 66. Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracing the Break-Up 1980-1992 (London & New York: Verso, 1993), p. 6. Meier, Yugoslavia, p. 33. Dennison Rusinow, Yugoslavia: Oblique Insights and Observations. Edited by Gale Stokes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), p. 255. Gëzim Krasniqi, “Socialism, National Utopia, and Rock Music: Inside the Albanian Rock Scene of Yugoslavia, 1970–1989,” East Central Europe, 38 (2011) 2–3, pp. 336–54, here p. 339. 85 Nevertheless, the 1981 protests happened at a very complex moment for the socialist Yugoslavia. With the death of its undisputed and charismatic leader, Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia entered a period of political uncertainty, which was later coupled with a general economic crisis. In the aftermath of Tito’s death, Yugoslavia has been beset by serious economic difficulties, by the reappearance of problems in inter-nationality relations, by renewed intellectual dissent, by a clear decline in the effectiveness of established decision-making institutions and procedures, and by an increasing level of conflict and declining level of cohesion in the party leadership.10 This overall political instability played a role in increasing expectations among various underground groups in Kosovo who demanded the status of a republic for Kosovo.11 On the other hand, at the time of the student protests, Albanians in Yugoslavia achieved the highest level of integration in the political and sociocultural system that they had ever enjoyed within Yugoslavia and were (re)discovering and (re)defining their national identity (including the reinforcement of the sense of fraternity with their co-ethnics in Albania). Thus, this was not only a protest against the central state authorities and Kosovo’s “hybrid constitutional status”12 within the federation; it was also a protest against the Albanian party apparatchiks in Kosovo. As a participant in the 1981 protests and later prime minister of Kosovo, Bajram Kosumi, put it, “1981 was the year when two Albanian policies in Kosovo finally clashed: the official pro-Yugoslav policy and the policy for a Kosovo free from Belgrade’s tutelage”.13 In fact, the 1981 protests were a prelude to a more serious and organised clash between the old party cadres in Kosovo and the new intelligentsia, that would happen at the end of the decade. These events galvanised activists both among Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, whose mobilisation took place after a rise in political expectations of the respective groups.14 Although the 1981 protests were initially motivated by social and economic motives, they subsequently became dominated by political and nationalist tones. In this way they opened a new venue for articulation of political demands by various Albanian underground nationalist groups and at the same 10 11 12 13 14 86 Steven L. Burg, “Elite Conflict in Post-Tito Yugoslavia,” Soviet Studies, 38 (1986) 2, pp. 170–93, here p. 170. Nebojša Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 105. In the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo acquired the status of a fully-fledged federal unit, but at the same time remained within, or was subordinated to, another federal unit (Serbia). Gazmend Zajmi “Kosova’s Constitutional Position in the Former Yugoslavia,” in Duijzings et al. (eds.), Kosovo-Kosova, pp. 95–101, p. 98. Bajram Kosumi, “Çka solli 1981-shi?” Koha Net, 12 March 2011. Available at: <www.koha.net/index.php?cid=1,12,52134> (Accessed 5 June 2012). Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution, pp. 78–108. time brought about the direct involvement of the Yugoslav federal institutions in the province. This involvement of (as well as the media control by) the Yugoslav League of Communists, helped create a public opinion that was wholly anti-Albanian.15 Nonetheless, as Julie Mertus argues, “calling the demonstrations counterrevolutionary served to hide the larger national, social and economic issues behind the unrest”.16 The effects of the 1981 protests Although the situation was stabilised in a matter of months, the 1981 protests had far-reaching consequences for Kosovo and Yugoslavia. While bringing to the surface the position of Albanians in Yugoslavia and the demand for an equal status (republic) for Kosovo, they also encouraged Serbian nationalism in Kosovo and at the same time opened-up the issue of Serbia’s unequal status in the federation. Serbia was the only Yugoslav republic with two autonomous provinces — Kosovo and Vojvodina — which were constitutive elements of the federation.17 Thus, there were two opposing yet interlocking nationalisms: one demanding full legal equality18 for Albanians in Yugoslavia to be achieved through the “Republic of Kosovo” and the other demanding a fully-fledged “Republic of Serbia,” whose sovereignty would not be limited by the existence of autonomous provinces. Serbian nationalism in the 1980s was articulated around two different, but complementary, issues; the protection of Kosovo Serbs (it was claimed that their position had deteriorated following Kosovo’s acquisition of autonomy in 1974 and the subsequent “Albanisation” of the province) and equal status for Serbia (at the expense of the autonomy of its two provinces) within Yugoslavia.19 While the Serbian 15 16 17 18 19 Nevenka Tromp-Vrkić, “Kosovo and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” in Duijzings et al. (eds.), Kosovo-Kosova, pp. 48–55, here p. 49. Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 32. Shkelzen Maliqi, Nyja e Kosovës (Pristina: MM and Center for Humanistic Studies, 2010), p. 110. According to Gazmend Zajmi, the demand for equality of Albanians in Yugoslavia, which gained wide popular support, combined a threefold yearning of the Albanians: “1. for selfrespect, which was clearly reflected in the wish for equality, 2. for liberation from the heritage of Serbian domination, and 3. for social and economic prosperity, in an economy free of colonial characteristics.” Zajmi, “Kosova’s Constitutional Position,” p. 96. The mobilisation of Serbs in Kosovo in the mid-1980s and the issue of Serbia’s unequal status are two different things. As argued by Vladisavljević, mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs, undertaken by various grassroots groups, originated from the effects of the post1966 constitutional and political changes (that empowered Albanians), and their demographic decline, as well as from the rise in their political expectations. On the other hand, various Serb leaders raised the issue of increasing the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina from Serbia at different occasions since the publication of the so-called “Blue Book” in 1977, which called for closer coordination between Serbia and its two provinces. The issue was later revived by Petar Stambolić and Draža Marković after the 1981 protests in Kosovo. However, this issue only appeared in the political agenda of the Kosovo Serbs af- 87 public opinion20 was showing increased concern with the issue of Kosovo and Serbs living there, the communist leadership in Serbia did not openly support the networks of Serbs in Kosovo until late 1980s when Milošević ascended to power. Whereas Ivan Stambolić, the leader of the League of Communists of Serbia, used institutional channels to pressure Kosovo’s communist leadership in addressing the grievances of Kosovo Serbs, Milošević used a different strategy: he aimed to establish direct control over Kosovo Serbs by co-opting prominent activists, thus turning the fortunes of the Serb nationalist mobilisation in Kosovo.21 Albanian nationalism, on the other hand, was hibernating after the suppression of the 1981 protests. Kosovo’s communist cadres from that period were replaced with new leaders that showed more determination to counter demands for a “Republic of Kosovo”. Various illegal groups, which had been seemingly mushrooming in the 1980s, were put under constant surveillance and their members arrested. The pursuit of “nationalist, irredentist and counterrevolutionary” organisations was a major task for Kosovo’s communist leadership in the 1980s. Many groups and individuals were uncovered and imprisoned, while Albanian intellectuals in Kosovo (especially university professors) came under scrutiny and increasing pressure from state organs in Kosovo and Serbia. In the late 1980s, as the leadership in Serbia initiated constitutional changes at both the provincial and republican levels, tensions rose again in Kosovo. The Albanian communist leaders, such as Azem Vllasi (who experienced a fast advancement in his career thanks to his tough stance on the 1981 protests) and Kaqusha Jashari, who stood up in defence of Kosovo’s autonomy, were faced with mounting pressure from Serbs in Kosovo and communist officials from Serbia. Vllasi and Jashari were eventually forced to resign in 1988 and were later replaced by older communist cadres from Kosovo. The appointment of Rrahman Morina (a former head of the Kosovar police)22 as the head of the Communist League of Kosovo triggered a wave of protests around Kosovo, as well as miners’ marches and strikes. Throughout the volatile years of 1989 and 1990, in addition to the riots which broke out in most of Kosovo’s major cities, there were also other manifestations of civil disobedience, above all, a series of hunger strikes, and a 40-kilometre march coordinated by the miners at Trepca.23 The latter action 20 21 22 23 88 ter the rise to power of Slobodan Milošević. See Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution, Chapters 2 and 3. Many Serbian intellectuals were also engaged in debates on Kosovo in the 1980s. For more on these debates, see Jasna Dragovic-Soso, Saviours of the Nation: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003). Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution, p. 102. Meier, Yugoslavia, pp. 80–1. Andrew March and Rudra Sil, “The “Republic of Kosova” (1989–1998) and the Resolution of Ethno-Separatist Conflict: Rethinking “Sovereignty” in the Post-Cold War Era,” CIAO Working Paper 5/99 (Pittsburgh: Browne Center for International Politics, 1999). was a decisive moment in the political mobilisation of Albanians and it represented a much bigger challenge to Yugoslav and Serbian political authorities than the 1981 student protests. This time the protests were organised by miners — the symbol of Yugoslavia’s working class.24 Because of the new context and rifts within Kosovo’s provincial leadership, Azem Vllasi, became “the last symbol of Kosovo’s autonomy”.25 Nonetheless, despite widespread discontent and protests, Kosovo’s Assembly, under direct police and military pressure (tanks were stationed in front of the assembly building) and intimidation, adopted constitutional changes that would abolish Kosovo’s nearly two-decades-long autonomy. The political dynamics of Kosovo Albanians in the 1980s were influenced, on the one hand, by leaders of the underground organisations, who could often mobilise relatively wide support, and by Kosovo’s provincial and party leaders, on the other. For most of the 1980s, these were diametrically opposite positions. While the former challenged the status quo (Kosovo’s autonomous status), the latter defended it on the basis of constitutional order and the principles of socialism and “brotherhood and unity”. Power struggles within the League of Communists of Kosovo resulted in a split between those older communist cadres (Morina, Shukriu, Hasani, Azemi) who were cooperating with Milošević26 in his endeavour to decrease Kosovo’s autonomy (“the unionists”) and newer cadres (Vllasi, Jashari, Kolgeci) who favoured an autonomous Kosovo (“the autonomists”). The fall of “the autonomists” became the symbol of Kosovo’s loss of autonomy in 1989. The post-1989 Kosovar establishment was, thus, seen as illegitimate by many people in Kosovo and a sense of being politically unrepresented emerged among Kosovar Albanians. This new reality, together with developments elsewhere in Yugoslavia (debates about democratisation) that were triggered by the changes in the Eastern Bloc, created a window of opportunity for the emergence of a new elite that came to be known as the Kosovar Alternative. The “unrepresented people” and the birth of the Kosovar Alternative The increased state pressure and control (both through police force and media censorship), as well as changes in the political leadership in Kosovo created a huge gap between the people and state institutions. The submissive attitude of Kosovo’s provincial leadership in the late 1980s made them highly unpopular and paved the way for other groups and individuals to come to the fore and speak on behalf of the people. The new elites in Kosovo came mainly from the ranks of intelligentsia and university staff. Educated in the period of en24 25 26 Besnik Pula, “The Emergence of the Kosovo ‘Parallel State’, 1988–1992,” Nationalities Papers, 32 (2004) 4, pp. 797–826, here p. 803. Maliqi, Nyja e Kosoves, p. 289. Meier, Yugoslavia, p. 85 89 hanced political and economic liberalisation in Yugoslavia, the new elite would soon take the lead in the battle for democratisation and defence of the Kosovo Albanian interests. In particular, the Writers’ Association of Kosovo came to prominence, with its members, such as Ibrahim Rugova and Rexhep Qosja, standing up in defence of the rights of Kosovar Albanians. Due to the increased state censorship and control of the main daily newspaper in Albanian Rilindja and provincial TV channel RTP, Kosovar Albanian intellectuals used alternative media, such as literary magazines in Kosovo or media from other Yugoslav republics (mainly Croatia and Slovenia) to channel their opinions and discontent.27 One of the first acts of dissent by Kosovar Albanian intellectuals was “Appeal 215,” an appeal to the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities against the repression in Kosovo and plans to abolish Kosovo’s autonomy signed by 215 Albanian intellectuals on 21 February 1989.28 The same group that organised the signing of this document was also engaged in the establishment of the International Council for Equality, Justice and Friendship [Këshilli për Barazi, Drejtësi dhe Miqësi Ndërnacionale], whose aim was to promote the equality of nations and nationalities based on the Yugoslav constitutional principles.29 In an interview for Mladina in July 1989, one of the most active intellectuals in the late 1980s and head of the Writers’ Association, Ibrahim Rugova, characterised his political activity as an effort by a random intellectual to say something about the Kosovo situation at a time when it lacked politicians prepared to represent its people.30 In December 1989, after the abolition of autonomy and in the context of the broader Yugoslav tendencies for the introduction of pluralism and democracy, as well as promotion of human rights, Albanian intellectuals and activists came together to create two different organisations that would play a crucial role in the following decade. The first one was the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedom [Këshilli për Mbrojtjen e Lirive dhe të Drejtave të Njeriut (KMLDNJ)], established on 14 December 1989. Next came the creation of an alternative political organisation called the Democratic League of Kosovo [Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK)] on 23 December. Ibrahim Rugova was elected its president. In a short period of time, it became Kosovo’s biggest political organisation. This was followed by the establishment of the Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo [Bashkimi i Sindikatave të Pavarura të Kosovës (BSPK)], the Independent Student Union of the University of Pristina [Unioni i Pavarur i Studentëve të Universitetit të Prishtinës (UPSUP)], the Women’s Illiteracy Programme “Motrat Qiriazi” and other political parties such as the Social Democratic Party [Partia Social Demokrate e Kosovës (PSDK)], Parliamentary Party [Partia Par27 28 29 30 90 Kullashi, “The Production of Hatred in Kosovo,” p. 67. Zekeria Cana, Apeli 215 i Intelektualëve Shqiptarë (Pristina: Rilindja, 2001), pp. 126–30. Cana, Apeli 215, pp. 117–22. Interview with Ibrahim Rugova, Mladina, 7 July 1989, republished in Ibrahim Rugova, Independence and Democracy: Interviews and Articles (Pristina: Fjala, 1991), p. 73. lamentare e Kosovës (PPK)], Albanian Christian Democratic Party, Peasant’s Party of Kosovo, Green Party of Kosovo etc. While all these parties defined themselves as “Kosovar,” another group of prominent Kosovar Albanian intellectuals, such as Veton Surroi, Shkëlzen Maliqi, Muhamedin Kullashi etc, were engaged in forming the Kosovo branch of the pro-democracy and reformation Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative [Udruženje za jugoslovensku demokratsku inicijativu (UJDI)] in December 1989. Because of their initial functioning outside the monist institutional establishment in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, these groups came to be known as the Kosovar Alternative. What united all of these groups was their demand for the introduction of pluralism and democracy in Yugoslavia and Kosovo. In this regard, most of them had close ties with other pro-democracy initiatives in other Yugoslav republics that campaigned for reformation of the Yugoslav federal system. Notwithstanding the demands for pluralism and democratisation, these parties had rather vague frameworks when it came to the issue of Kosovo’s status and the rights of Albanians in Yugoslavia. For example, LDK, the most popular political organisation of the time in Kosovo (in 1990 it claimed to number half a million members), initially rose in defence of Kosovo’s autonomy and the 1974 constitution. Months later, its leader Rugova claimed that LDK acted for a “broader form of autonomy and independence within the Federation”.31 However, LDK’s political stance and discourse was contingent on developments in Kosovo and elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Thus, after June 1990 — the time when Albanian members of the Kosovo Assembly overruled the previous decision to reduce Kosovo’s autonomy and adopted a “Declaration for Kosovo as an Equal Subject within the Federation,” LDK’s leadership dropped the term “autonomy” from its political vocabulary. By late 1990, following developments elsewhere in Yugoslavia and the prevalence of centrifugal tendencies at the federal level, independence within a “Yugoslav Union of Independent States” or full independence became the political goals of LDK and other smaller parties. In an attempt to unify political positions, the main political parties in Kosovo came together in June 1991 to create the Coordination Council of Political Parties in Kosovo. Months later, in response to the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crises and initiation of an International Conference for Yugoslavia, all the Albanian political parties in Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Serbia proper, Macedonia and Montenegro) created the Coordination Council of Albanian Political Parties in Yugoslavia. Clearly, this was an attempt to create a common political front. An interesting development in 1990 was the increasing cooperation between the Kosovar Alternative and Kosovo’s provincial assembly. This came as a result of a U-turn by the Kosovo Assembly, which started to act in 31 Interview with Ibrahim Rugova, Fjala, 15 May 1990, republished in Rugova, Independence and Democracy, p. 112. 91 conformity with demands made by the Kosovar Alternative. As a result, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a declaration for Kosovo as an equal subject within Yugoslavia (2 July 1990) and later, a new constitution that declared Kosovo to be a republic (7 September 1990). None of these acts were recognised by any Serbian or Yugoslav institutions. Moreover, Serbia suspended the Kosovo Assembly and government in July 1990 and arrested some of the MPs. In the meantime, the Coordinating Council of Political Parties called a boycott of the December 1990 Serbian elections and later the census of 1991, in a move that was aimed at delegitimising Serbia’s rule in Kosovo. As Slovenia and Croatia moved on with their declarations of independence in June 1991, Kosovo’s exiled parliament decided to organise a referendum on Kosovo’s independence, which was held between 26 and 30 September 1991. Based on the results of the referendum, the Kosovo Assembly met on 19 October 1991 and adopted the “Resolution on Independence and Sovereignty of Kosovo”.32 Although no state other than Albania recognised this declaration of independence, it laid the foundations of a “parallel state” and society in Kosovo. The Kosovar Alternative managed to maintain a solid level of cohesion and coordination between 1989 and 1992. However, in mid-1992, it reached a critically low point following the failure to secure international support and be an equal partner in the internationally sponsored Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (1991-1992). This, combined with an increased domination of the LDK in the Albanian movement (consolidated through the overwhelming victory in the secret elections of May 1992), led to an increase in dissent among various groups and individuals within the movement. Unhappy with the “improvised pluralism and democracy” that existed in Kosovo at the time, many prominent figures, such as Qosja, Demaçi, Surroi and Maliqi, distanced themselves from LDK and Rugova, and intensified their criticism towards him. Consequently, between mid-1992 and 1996, LDK ruled almost unchallenged in the “parallel state” of Kosovo: the LDK-led movement had two different, though intimately related, dimensions: the political one, embodied in the so-called “Institutions of the Republic of Kosovo” and the social dimension — a parallel education system and health care network. Adoption of the strategy of “peaceful resistance” The possibility of military conflict in Kosovo loomed larger with the intensification of political and national mobilisation and the increasing distance between ethnic Albanians and Serbs. Nonetheless, under the leadership of the newly established human rights groups and political formations, Albanians adopted a strategy of peaceful resistance (often referred to as “Gandhism”) 32 92 “Kosova shtet sovran e i pavarur,” Bujku, 22 October 1991, p. 1. against the constitutional changes and ever-increasing state oppression. According to Shkëlzen Maliqi, a publicist and political activist, “Albanian Gandhism” came as a surprise not only to the militaristic leadership in Serbia, but also to the Albanians themselves, who had never before imagined themselves playing such a role”.33 As early as 1990, peaceful resistance became the main strategy of political action for the Kosovar Alternative. Although many scholars and commentators ascribe this to LDK and Rugova’s leadership, the concept had been established earlier and, strangely enough, without much public debate. As Maliqi recalls: in the winter and spring of 1990 a sudden, radical, change took place. Overnight, warriors became unfashionable. It is interesting that there were no great theoretical debates about or organised propaganda campaigns for non-violence. Nor was there a figure seeking to take the role of an Albanian Gandhi. Ibrahim Rugova, the most influential Kosova leader, came to the fore later after the concept had already been spontaneously adopted. Somehow the strategy of nonviolence imposed itself as the best, most pragmatic, and most effective response to Serbia's aggressive plans.34 Notwithstanding the role of LDK and Rugova in the initial adoption of the concept of nonviolence in response to Serbia’s oppressive policies35 in Kosovo, this form of action came to be identified with the former, mainly due to their dominance of the political scene in Kosovo, especially since mid-1992. Even in the period between 1989 and 1992, LDK used its authority and influence to call on people to refrain from provocations and stand behind LDK’s leadership in the struggle for freedom, democracy, and independence. Indeed, it was these three terms that became the motto of LDK and Rugova in the next two decades of their political activity. Regarding the adoption of a nonviolent political strategy in Kosovo in the early 1990s, there are at least three main factors that conditioned such a choice. The first one is linked to the nature of the alternative groups in Kosovo. Most of these groups were established in opposition to the one party system in Yugoslavia. Some, such as the branch of UJDI in Kosovo, were defined solely as pro-democracy initiatives. At the height of the crisis in the mid-1990s, representatives of UJDI, as well as the Society of Sociologists 33 34 35 Shkelzen Maliqi, “Albanian Self-Understanding through Non-Violence: The Construction of National Identity in Opposition to Serbs,” Journal of Area Studies, 1 (1993) 3, pp. 120– 8, here p. 121. Maliqi, “Albanian Self-Understanding,” p. 122. Having abolished Kosovo’s autonomy in March 1989, Serbian authorities undertook the initiative to adopt a set of laws and regulations under the title “Program for the Realisation of Peace and Prosperity in Kosovo”, which were aimed at the Albanian population in Kosovo. They resulted in the abolishing of Kosovo’s institutions, dismissal of around 80,000 people from state and socially-owned companies and institutions and suppression of the Albanian media. See Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 345–6. 93 and Philosophers of Kosovo and the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms proposed a declaration entitled “For Democracy — Against Violence” demanding the abolition of state enforced extraordinary measures, the release of all political prisoners, the legalisation of political parties and free elections. This declaration, together with more than 300,000 signatures, was sent to the assemblies of Kosovo, Serbia and Yugoslavia.36 The predominant idea among many political groups was that the Kosovo issue would be resolved only through democratic means, which would rule out violence. According to this logic, with the introduction of democracy, both Albanians and Serbs would win. In line with such perceptions of democracy, Adem Demaçi, one of the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians, was quoted saying that “democracy’s victory would free both Albanians and Serb brothers from the police control”.37 Indeed, Demaçi and other pro-democracy proponents were convinced that irrespective of the obstacles, the path of democracy, and dialogue would win over violence and the use of force.38 The second factor was the regional context. The Kosovar Alternative came into being at a time of major political and socio-economic change triggered by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. As Maliqi argues, “the wave of democratic change which brought down Communist rule in Eastern Europe awakened the hope that the key to the Kosova problem — and to the ‘Albanian Question’ — might lie in democracy”.39 The idea was that at a time of democratic change all around Europe, the only way to solve problems, including the national question, was through democratic means. According to this logic, the introduction of democracy and creation of legitimate democratic institutions would open a new space for Kosovo to channel its national interests. Given that Albanians constituted around 90% of the population in Kosovo, the realisation of political rights through democratic mechanisms of majority decision-making seemed the right path to pursue. Thus, Albanians’ self-understanding of nonviolence was functionally linked to their self-affirmation as a sovereign people in a democratic society.40 The third factor is the emancipatory character of the Kosovar Alternative. Throughout the 1980s, Kosovo Albanians became the subject of attacks by the official media in Serbia and politicians where they were often portrayed as “violent,” “uncivilised” and “backward”. The emerging elite in Kosovo saw it necessary to mobilise people in a peaceful and democratic way to counter these images. They wanted to present Albanians as European, peaceful and pro-democracy oriented people. In fact, such restraint by the Albanians at a time when tensions rose high elsewhere in Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia), was acclaimed by many intellectuals in Yugo36 37 38 39 40 94 I. B., “Kosova nuk mund të mbetet zonë speciale,” Rilindja, 23 June 1990. B. Reka and K. Hapçiu, “Demokracia do të fitojë edhe në Kosovë,” Rilindja, 9 June 1990. Shemsi Reçica, “Republika e Kosovës-barazi e shqiptarëve me popujt e tjerë të Jugosllavisë: Interview with Adem Demaçi,” Alternativa, (1990) 5, pp. 6–19. Maliqi, “Albanian Self-Understanding,” p. 122. Ibid., p. 125. slavia, including Slavoj Žižek, who said that “Kosova Albanians are a European people that is endowed with patience, that in the political sense uses Gandhian methods, and that insists on negotiations and rejects violence.”41 In line with this strategy of pacification and homogenisation, certain political actions were taken to strengthen the inter-group cohesion. One of them was the “Action for Reconciliation and Elimination of [the phenomenon of] Blood Feuds”. This campaign, led by Anton Çetta in 1990–1992, succeeded in resolving more than 2,000 feuds, half of them involving death,42 thus removing quite a big barrier toward national and ethnic homogenisation of Kosovo Albanians. Organisation, repertories43 and audiences Despite the existence of a variety of groups and organisations within the Kosovar Alternative, LDK — due to its massive membership and support — played a central role in the Kosovo Albanian movement. First, it chose a strategy of boycott towards Serbia and its institutions in Kosovo. Second, it endorsed a political and peaceful strategy of resistance. This was often referred to as “passive resistance”. Rugova stated that “passive resistance means refusal to cooperate with an occupying government and standing firm on your demands to find a political solution of the problem”.44 LDK’s main aim was restraining people from violence and responding peacefully to police brutality and everyday provocations. This was a form of resistance “based on nonviolence and solidarity”45 which, according to Rugova, helped Albanians to achieve something that they did not have for a long time — “an inner freedom”: The Kosovar Albanian society feels an inner freedom. Oppressed, but organised. This is the first time that people feel empowered; feel that the people and power structures are theirs. This is the first time that Albanians feel as citizens despite the fact that we are under occupation.46 41 42 43 44 45 46 Cited in Maliqi, “Albanian Self-Understanding,” p. 125. Howard Clark, “Have Albanians Been Against a Peaceful Solution to the Question of Kosova’s Autonomy?” in Anna Di Lellio (ed.), The Case for Kosova: Passage to Independence (London and New York: Anthem Press, 2006), pp. 85–92, here p. 86. According to Charles Tilly, social movement repertories represent a set of culturally available forms of political action, such as creation of associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petitions, leafleting etc. Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768–2004 (Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), p. 3. Interview with Ibrahim Rugova, Fokus, September 1990, republished in Rugova, Independence and Democracy, p. 160. Rugova, Çështja e Kosovës, p. 134. Ibid., p. 187. 95 Contingent on developments elsewhere in Yugoslavia, LDK was, over a couple of years, transformed from a pro-democracy association into a proindependence and national political movement. According to Howard Clark, the peaceful Kosovar movement led by LDK had four aims: the survival of the Albanian community in Kosovo, contesting the legitimacy of Serbian state institutions and counter imposing the legitimacy of Kosovar Albanian institutions, commitment to civil resistance and, finally, mobilisation of international support.47 Therefore, to achieve its aim, LDK was relying heavily on both the domestic and international audiences and support. By the early 1990s, LDK managed to build a well-organised and functional party structure that stretched across both urban and rural parts of Kosovo. “Thus, the LDK established a highly effective system of control that for several years enabled it to maintain the fragile peace and the mantle of nonviolent resistance”.48 At some point, its membership reached half a million people — from all ranks, regions and backgrounds — including many of those who had previously been imprisoned for their underground activities. In reality, by 1991, LDK had managed to co-opt a large part of the Popular Movement of Kosovo (LPK)49 membership, including some of its leading figures.50 This absorption of prominent members into LDK relegated LPK to the fringes of Kosovar politics. LDK dominance grew in the media and information sector as well. Throughout the 1990s, LDK controlled the only daily newspaper in Albanian, Bujku, which was published in Kosovo as well as another daily, Rilindja that was circulated in the diaspora. In 1990 it established a news agency, Kosovo Information Centre [Qendra për Informim e Kosovës (QIK)] and later started publishing its temporary magazines Demokracia and Ora.51 It also arranged a two hour broadcast from Tirana every night through Albania’s satellite channel. This was an important instrument for Rugova and LDK, who in this way, could speak to their constituents.52 In many instances, LDK utilised these media instruments to attack and discredit other groups, in particular the underground organisations. LDK used its party structure to control the local population and prevent any escalation of the situation. Its leadership called on people to refrain from provocations and violence and made it very clear during their regular press 47 48 49 50 51 52 96 Clark, “Have Albanians Been Against a Peaceful Solution?” p. 86. Pula, “The Emergence of the Kosovo ‘Parallel State,’” p. 809. LPK is an underground umbrella organisation that emerged after the 1981 protests in Kosovo and was quite active in the 1980s in promoting more radical forms of resistance and political solutions for Kosovo. In the mid-1990s, its members played a crucial role in the creation and running of the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA). See Keiichi Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime: The Genesis and Expansion of the UÇK in Kosovo,” Europe-Asia Studies, 62 (2010) 7, pp. 1135–52. Jusuf Buxhovi, Kthesa Historike 1: Vitet e Gjermanisë dhe epoka e LDK-së (Pristina: Faik Konica, 2010), pp. 300–17. Buxhovi, Kthesa Historike, p. 319. Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 92. conferences that war was to be avoided by all means. LDK utilised its structures to stay in close contact with the people, especially when there were tensions. As Rugova put it, “[w]henever there is a police action or raid somewhere, our activists go there to calm our people, show solidarity with them, to restrain them, to bear witness to the violence”.53 Certainly, this strategy, which offered nothing more than moral support and sympathy to local people, helped LDK to maintain its control over the local population. Thus, as Howard Clark pointed out, What was emerging [in Kosovo] was a set of methods and organisational structures to identify violence with the Serbian oppressor while restraining counterviolence from the population, to strengthen social solidarity while emboldening the population to use the limited space available to communicate their defiance.54 LDK also managed to establish party branches in the United States and most of the Western European countries.55 It had control over the provisional government of Kosovo that operated in exile under the leadership of Bujar Bukoshi, an LDK member. In March 1992, the previously existing “Solidarity Fund” was replaced by the “Fund for the Republic of Kosovo,” which was known as the “three per cent fund”.56 Mobilisation of international support was one of the main aims of LDK’s policy. Therefore, from its very creation, people like Rugova, Bukoshi, as well as Edita Tahiri, who acted as a de facto foreign minister, embarked on an intensive diplomatic campaign to amass support for Kosovo. Particularly in the period between 1991 and 1992, Kosovo leaders intensified their diplomatic efforts by meeting high-level officials from the main European countries as well as the United States, which became the target of the Kosovar diplomacy. However, faced with the more immediate problems resulting from the Yugoslav disintegration and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, the international community continued to express its sympathy towards Rugova’s path of nonviolence while refusing to even put Kosovo on the agenda, let alone support its independence. In short, in terms of the aims of a movement as defined by Toch,57 the Kosovar Albanian socio-political movement made a shift from the aim of resisting change (attempts to resist the abolition of autonomy and other key institutions in the late 1980s) to the aim of promoting change (political 53 54 55 56 57 Rugova, Çështja e Kosovës, p. 139. Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 59. Buxhovi, Kthesa Historike, p. 300. The Kosovar government in exile decreed that all the Albanians in the diaspora and in Kosovo should be obliged to pay three percent of their salaries into this fund. See Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 223. Cited in Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 244. 97 movement for independence). As Clark put it, “the defence of autonomy had grown into a movement for independence from Serbia”.58 Although, with the passage of time, the political goal of LDK gradually grew to include full independence it held firm to the principles of nonviolence. Moreover, Rugova was constantly engaged in the pursuit of a stable and a democratic “borderless region”.59 He used his popularity to influence the adoption of a nonviolent course by other Albanian parties and leaders in south Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, who had come together under a Coordinating Council chaired by Rugova himself. “Active versus passive resistance” Although there was a general consensus on nonviolent strategy within the Kosovar Alternative, disagreements on forms of activity became imminent. LDK’s approach of preventing any action that provoked violence was ever more heavily criticised. Individuals such as Adem Demaçi, Rexhep Qosja, along with associations such as the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, the Helsinki Committee (branch in Pristina), the Trade Unions, as well as parties, such as the Parliamentary Party, Social Democratic Party etc, promoted a more active form of resistance and civil disobedience. Thus, in 1991, the Parliamentary Party (PPK), which was led by Veton Surroi, organised a peace march called “Let’s bury the violent present”60 which was attended by some 100,000 people as well as a protest against hunger and poverty in Kosovo.61 According to Surroi, the strategy of PPK was the organisation of nonviolent activities such as civil protests and civil disobedience which would force the regime to change its stance.62 Peace protests were organised by other groups as well, such as women’s associations which gathered in Pristina on 8 March 1990, International Women’s Day, to protest against the police violence in Kosovo as well as against the violence of conscription.63 Based on the logic of non-provocation, the LDK leadership often refused to openly support such manifestations of protest and discontent. The non-provocation approach adopted by LDK was soon faced with mounting opposition and criticism from Albanian intellectuals as well. For instance, Qosja, a distinguished intellectual, criticised LDK for its rhetoric of resistance, which did not produce any action; “Our civil disobedience is still mainly a rhetorical disobedience. Therefore, our peaceful resistance is rhetorical resistance.”64 LDK and Rugova were also criticised for their reliance on 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 98 Clark, Civil Resistance, p. 2. Rugova, Çështja e Kosovës, p. 186 “Kosova don ta varrosë dhunën me paqe,” Bujku, 14 June 1991. Z. Gecaj, “Javën e ardhshme manifestimi i urisë në Kosovë,” Bujku, 20 June 1991. Agim Zogaj, “Vetëm aktiviteti është rezistencë,” Zëri i Rinisë, 29 June 1991. Clark, Civil Resistance, p. 58. Rexhep Qosja, “Mosbindje qytetare a mosbindje retorike,” Zëri i Rinisë, 3 October 1992. international intervention to prevent the conflict in Kosovo and solve its political problems. These voices were spearheaded by Demaçi who insisted on the need to become more active internally (while retaining the nonviolent character of the movement) and stop relying solely on the external factors.65 Such criticisms and contending voices would become more frequent in Kosovo, engendering what could be called the “active versus passive resistance” debate. Nonetheless, in the early 1990s, the main challenge to the LDK strategy of non-provocation and self-restraint came from the Union of Independent Trade Unions (BSPK), which was created in the summer of 1990.66 On 2 September 1990, in response to the massive dismissal of Albanian workers from all sectors of employment and from the former trade unions aligned with the League of Communists, BSPK organised a one-day general strike and a march on 1 July 1991 under the slogan “We Stand for Dialogue — And you?”67 However, this action, which was not supported by LDK, failed to achieve its aim. It was actually counterproductive as Serbian authorities responded by firing another 5,000 Albanian workers.68 Irrespective of this, BSPK retained its independence from LDK and although it managed to join various international trade unions and receive external sympathies, it soon almost lost its appeal for it remained without the constituency it aimed to represent — the working class. Kosovar Alternative in a wider Yugoslav context The Kosovar social and political movement came into being at a time of increasing pressure for democratisation of the Yugoslav society. The unfolding pluralisation of political life and democratisation in Yugoslavia opened up political opportunities for civic engagement. The bearers of the intellectual and political activity in Kosovo, who would later become the leaders of the Kosovar Alternative, cooperated with other Yugoslav pro-democracy and anti-war groups and associations in two ways. The first was through UJDI.69 When UJDI had their founding meeting on 2 February 1989 in Zagreb, Kosovo was represented by Shkëlzen Maliqi, Muhamedin Kullashi and Drago Đurić.70 Months later, on 9 December 1989, a Kosovar branch of UJDI was constituted in Pristina with Veton Surroi as its head. 65 66 67 68 69 70 Blerim Reka, “Adem Demaçi: Rezistencë paqësore, por active,” Koha, 27 February 1991. The creation of an independent workers’ union was initiated in December 1989 by Veton Surroi. See Halil Matoshi, Katedralë Letre (Shtëpia – Qyteti – Shteti; Saga për Prishtinën, njerëzit e saj dhe tregime tjera) (Pristina: ELTA BS, 2012), pp. 119–24. March and Sil, The ‘Republic of Kosova’. Pula, “The Emergence of the Kosovo ‘Parallel State,’” p. 811. For more on UJDI, see Ljubica Spaskovska, “Landscapes of Resistance, Hope and Loss: Yugoslav Supra-Nationalism and Anti-Nationalism,” this volume. Shkëlzen Maliqi, Shembja e Jugosllavisë, Kosova dhe rrëfime tjera. Dialog me Baton Haxhiun (Tirana: UET Press, 2011), pp. 26–8. 99 Although this association never managed to grow in membership comparable to LDK, it played a major role in the democratisation of the Kosovar society and civic emancipation using open debates, round tables and anti-war protests. However, as left democrats belonging to a pan-Yugoslav network, they needed “the time to define their political profile within the Albanian national discourse”.71 Time was short, though, as the Kosovo institutions were suspended and Serbia refused to organise Kosovo-based elections which would eventually lead to political pluralism and democratisation in the province. Likewise, LDK’s ever more important role in the Kosovar society marginalised other political groups. However, even after it ceased to exist, UJDI’s leaders such as Surroi and Maliqi continued their activities while always looking for new channels of communication and dialogue with other Yugoslav pro-democracy and anti-war forces (in particular groups associated with UJDI). Another form of engagement with pro-democracy and anti-war groups was open dialogue. In the spring of 1990, UJDI organised two round-table talks, one in Mostar and one in Pristina, with the participation of some 20 groups and parties from Kosovo and Yugoslavia. The participants called for the introduction of democracy as well as the adoption of a supranational approach to the Kosovo and Yugoslav problem.72 On 1 July 1990, the main pro-democracy associations and political parties in Kosovo came together to form the Democratic Forum of Kosovo (Forumi Demokratik i Kosovës). The Forum adopted a declaration which called for the introduction of democracy in Kosovo and at the same time expressed the readiness of the Kosovar representatives to join forces with other opposition and pro-democracy groups in Yugoslavia in their attempt to reform and democratise the country.73 Likewise, Maliqi and Surroi, former UJDI members and later heads of PSDK and PPK, respectively, made several attempts to approach the Serbian public; during a press conference in Belgrade in December 1991, they extended a formal initiation to the Serbian opposition to start a constructive dialogue on Kosovo as a precondition for democratisation of both Serbia and Kosovo.74 Although the representatives of the Kosovar Alternative were constantly seeking support for their cause, they ruled out calls for arming and military mobilisation. During a secret meeting with the Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, held in early 1991 in Stubičke Toplice, the representatives of the Albanian parties in Yugoslavia turned down the Croatian offer to receive arms and ammunition in exchange for a military revolt in Kosovo.75 Nonetheless, as the armed conflicts began in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo issue and the need to address the dire human rights 71 72 73 74 75 100 Surroi, as cited in Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, p. 253. Blerim Reka and Kelmend Hapçiu, “Demokraci në Kosovë, Demokraci në Jugosllavi,” Rilindja, 1 April 1990. Behxhet Haliti, “Kosovë e re — sipas vullnetit të Popullit,” Rilindja, 2 July 1990. Alida Berisha, “Ftesë për dialog me opozitën e Serbisë,” Bujku, 19 December 1991. Veton Surroi, Libri i fluturave (Pristina: Koha, 2011), pp. 36–7. situation soon sank into oblivion. After the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, Kosovo went its own “parallel” way. By 1993, Kosovo’s popular movement was further crystallised into two opposing camps; the semi-legal camp of parties that were gathered into the institutions of the “Republic of Kosovo” under the leadership of Rugova and LDK, and the underground camp comprising LPK and LKÇK.76 In between, there emerged a group of actors that was dissatisfied with Rugova and LDK’s monopoly in Kosovo’s “parallel state,” but who were not directly involved in politics. In a way, these individuals set up what would be known as Kosovo’s “civil society”. Influential figures, such as Surroi, Demaçi, Maliqi, Blerim Shala and others, used weekly magazines such as KOHA, Zëri and Forumi to channel their discontent with the situation in Kosovo and Rugova’s leadership. The aims of the peaceful Kosovar movement varied significantly throughout its development and were related to the political events taking place elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Thus, the first phase (until the summer of 1990) was dominated by goals based on the restoration of autonomy and introduction of political pluralism and democracy in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. In the second phase (until late 1991), the main aim was to achieve an equal status (republic) for Kosovo in a democratic federal or confederal Yugoslavia. From late 1991 until late 1992, when the Kosovar Alternative dissolved to pave the way for the LDK-run “one party-rule”77 “parallel state,” the independence of Kosovo became the main goal. Despite significant overlapping, the Kosovar Alternative and the “parallel state” represent political processes and movements that differ significantly in terms of time, context and aims. In spite of the maximalisation of political claims, the Kosovar movement continued to promote nonviolence until the late 1990s. However, nonviolence started losing its appeal as a result of the lack of concrete international support for Kosovo, deterioration of the security situation and emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army [Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK)] in 1996.78 Conclusion Triggered by broader processes of democratisation and nationalist mobilisation in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe, the social movement of Kosovo Albanians that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a novel phenomenon. Irrespective of the highly politicised and militarised setting in which it 76 77 78 The National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo (Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës) was a splinter group of LPK that propagated general mobilisation and armed uprising against the Serbian regime. Isuf Berisha, “Pristina’s One-Party Rule,” Balkan War Report, (February 1994), p. 12. See Shkëlzen Maliqi, “Why the Peaceful Resistance Movement in Kosovo Failed,” in Robert Hudson and Glen Bowman (eds.), After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within the Successor States (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 43–76. 101 developed, the nonviolent and anti-war engagement was unexampled in a wider context for it formed the foundation of the popular movement in Kosovo, rather than being on its fringes. By instigating and introducing new forms of nonviolent civic engagement and activity, it created a new political culture in Kosovo that had patience and restraint against violence at its heart. The “struggle for civil rights combined with a fledgling pro-democracy movement in Kosovo have altered Albanian consciousness, producing an unforeseen effect on the way they [Kosovo Albanians] perceive and construct reality”.79 Indeed, that was a form of political engagement and organisation that, as expressed in the words of one of its main protagonists, enabled people to achieve an inner, psychical freedom, as the first step towards the physical collective freedom.80 Or as Reitan framed it, the strategy applied by the Kosovar leadership was “rooted in de la Boétie’s fundamental assumption that through withdrawing consent, a people could bring down an illegitimate political authority”.81 However, despite the increasing homogenisation of the Kosovo Albanian population in the early 1990s and a solid level of coordination within the Kosovar Alternative, it should not be seen as a monolithic movement. On the contrary, it represented a platform upon which competing understandings of politics, civic engagement and nationhood came together. As is the case with many other social and political movements,82 its programme varied significantly both across time and in its member-groups. The fate of the Kosovar Alternative was in many ways related to the fate of Yugoslavia, not least because a reformed and democratic Yugoslavia, where Albanians would be equal with other nations, was its initial point of reference. Therefore, once Yugoslavia ceased to exist de facto and de iure in mid-1992, the Alternative gradually faded away, enabling LDK to monopolise the Albanian movement in Kosovo and “assert[ed] popular sovereignty”83 through the “parallel state” in an attempt to counter the legitimacy of the Serbian institutions. Subsequently, important elements of the Kosovar Alternative within or close to LDK remained active within the LDK-led independence movement, whereas other prominent figures mostly continued their civic engagement in the media sector. Although the Alternative disappeared from the Kosovo political scene, its legacy was evident in the LDK rule until the late 1990s. As a result of the Kosovar Albanians’ movement of peaceful resistance, open warfare in Kosovo was avoided for almost a decade in spite of the state oppression, rising 79 80 81 82 83 102 Janet Reineck, “Seizing the Past, Forging the Present: Changing Visions of Self and Nation among the Kosova Albanians,” Anthropology of East Europe Review, 11 (1993) 1– 2, pp. 100–09, here p. 106. Rugova, Çështja e Kosovës, p. 188. Ruth Reitan, “Strategic Nonviolent Conflict in Kosovo,” Peace & Change, 25 (2000) 1, pp. 71–102, p. 73. Tilly, Social Movements, p. 12. Ibid., p. 13. tensions and political and ethnic mobilisation.84 Moreover, nonviolence and pro-democracy orientation was the raison d’être of various groups and associations that were formed later, such as women’s associations (the Center for the Protection of the Women and Children, “Norma”, “Elena” etc.) and youth organisations such as the Post-Pessimists.85 Likewise, despite openly defying Rugova and LDK, the student union (UPSUP) was guided by principles of nonviolence in the organisation of a series of massive protests it initiated in late 1997. Lastly, people’s attachment to the nonviolent movement in the 1990s played a great role in enabling LDK’s and Rugova’s electoral domination over the UÇK-based political parties from 1999 until the death of Rugova in 2006. This happened in spite of the fact that the UÇK insurgency was critical in precipitating the international community’s military intervention in Kosovo. 84 85 In February 1994, at a meeting with Albanian, Serbian and foreign intellectuals in the Netherland, Fehmi Agani, a prominent figure in LDK and Rugova’s right-hand man, argued that the fact that war had been avoided in spite of everything was a crucial element in the search for a peaceful solution. According to him, the absence of war was not a result of the Serbian control and terror, but rather of the adoption of the strategy of peaceful resistance by Kosovo Albanians. Fehmi Agani, “Is a Peaceful Solution of the Kosova Crisis Possible?” in Duijzings et al. (eds.), Kosovo-Kosova, pp. 200–05, here p. 202. This was part of a network which had groups in Belgrade, Subotica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zagreb and Oslo and was initiated at an inter-ethnic meeting in 1993 in Norway. The group in Kosovo, which included young people from different ethnic communities, was very active in the mid-1990s and produced two cultural magazines, organised concerts, a debating club, exhibitions etc. See Clark, Civil Resistance, pp. 149–50. 103