Debate in the Tibetan Tradition

Debate in the Tibetan Tradition Debate in the Tibetan Tradition Jonathan Samuels, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.013.752 Published online: 28 June 2021 Summary “Debate” (Tibetan: rtsod pa), in the present context, refers to a uniquely Tibetan method of structured analysis and discourse conducted between two (or more) parties on matters pertaining to religion. The practice is extremely technical and has traditionally been the province of monks. It has medieval roots, and it references logical principles derived from the Indian Buddhist pramāṇa system. Debate is also closely aligned with the tradition of commentarial writing, in which the evaluation and critiquing of earlier interpretations of Indian-origin Buddhist works has long been standard. A custom among Tibetan religious writers has been to deal with “rival” interpretations in a truculent fashion, redolent of an actual confrontation. There is also much in the dialectical approach, analytical process, and language that can best be described as shared between the literary and oral spheres (with frequent crossover and borrowing). But debate is primarily to be understood as a face-to-face practice, distinct from what is represented in the written medium, and only truly comprehensible in terms of the institutional context of its performance. Furthermore, while inspired by Indian scholastic traditions, this kind of argumentation is peculiarly Tibetan in its formulation. The practice of debate is especially associated with the largest school of Tibetan Buddhism, the Geluk (dGe lugs). In the school’s major scholastic centers, which were, for a number of centuries, the largest monasteries in the world, debate was employed as the primary tool of education, with those trained in the scholastic tradition, including its most prominent figures, such as various Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas, having been required to master it. Academic understanding of debate relies heavily on analysis of the so-called Collected Topics (bsDus grwa) works, primer materials, chiefly composed of sample debates, from which students (and academics) learn about the logical principles, basic taxonomies, and informal “rules” that structure debate. Keywords: Subjects: Tibet, Buddhism, debate, monastic, education, logic, argumentation Buddhism Introduction In the sense that religious groups and identities are largely defined by differences on matters of doctrine, philosophy, and practice, it is unsurprising that the pages of religious history are replete with accounts of clashes on such matters. Terms such as “debate,” “dispute,” and “controversy” feature regularly in such accounts, primarily in reference to the substantive content of the exchanges. Less attention is generally given to the means by which exchanges have been conducted. And while such exchanges may always have been regulated by sets of customs, it Page 1 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition should be recognized that only in certain times and places (and perhaps relatively rarely) have religious traditions developed strict rules and formalized practices regarding the medium and form of exchanges. Such was the case in Tibet. The generic quality of a term such as “debate” and the wide spectrum of interactions that it could be said to encompass mean that even in the context of Tibetan religion, where there is a clearly identifiable practice, with a name translatable as “debate” (i.e., rtsod pa), discussion may lack focus. Hazy notions regarding a Buddhist “tradition” of questioning and enquiry, which some may assert that such a practice of argumentation either reflects or belongs to, can result in confusion regarding categories and history. To develop a clearer understanding, it is necessary to distinguish between different domains (e.g., the written and spoken; content and format) and to tease apart elements within these, which are usually bundled together. Here, therefore, the term “debate” is used specifically in a technical sense, to refer to this formalized practice of rulesbased, public exchange, denoted by the aforesaid Tibetan term. In order to separate some constituents of the bundle, we turn first to consideration of the practice’s history in Tibet. Origin and Historical Evolution The claim of tradition is that Tibetan monastic debate has its origins in the great Buddhist monastic centers of India, particularly Nālandā and Vikramaśilā, which thrived during medieval 1 times. Events such as the late 8th-century “Samyé debate” are cited in support of assertions about a long history of religious public debate in Tibet. But the evolution of practices in Tibet has been subject to little historical research. Aspects of the traditional narrative of continuity also seem unreliable. Greater clarity, with respect to both the nature of practices and what is known about them, is gained by differentiating between three broad periods of history: (a) the Tibetan imperial era (7th–9th centuries); (b) the postimperial, medieval era (11th–15th centuries); and 2 (c) the late medieval to the modern day. Each appears to be associated with a different stage relating to the practice’s evolution, describable, respectively, as the phases of informal practice, formal disputation, and debate. Regarding the first, we encounter questions about transmission and the relation between Indian 3 and Tibetan practices. Formal debate was undoubtedly practiced in Nālandā and Vikramaśilā. But it cannot be seen as the creation of such Buddhist centers. The philosophical ideas on which this debate facilitated discourse, the procedures of that debate, and the literature concerning itself with both of these were all products of a wider culture of intellectual exchange. The contribution of non-Buddhist philosophical schools, most notably the Nyāya, must be acknowledged. However, despite the clear importance of formal debate to these great Buddhist centers, historical details about how it was actually practiced are scarce. Certain intrepid Tibetans, a number of whom went on to be major translators, gained exposure to these practices during their time at these institutions, but there are no specific accounts of attempts to introduce debate modeled on Indian practices into Tibet. Potentially more significant with regard to transmission were the activities of celebrated monastic figures from the subcontinent, such as Śāntarakṣita (725–788) and Kamalaśīla (740–795). They took up residence in Tibet, had strong ties with the Indian centers, and promoted the analytical brand of Buddhism prevalent in them at the time. This brand Page 2 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition made inroads in central Tibet and enjoyed imperial support. Samyé (bSam yas), Tibet’s first monastery, became the early center of intellectual activity and also hosted the so-called Samyé debate, one of the most important subjects of Tibetan religious narrative, between Kamalaśīla and a Chinese opponent (Moheyan). The event is often evoked by those who claim that the practice of religious debate in Tibet has a long and unbroken tradition. But this conflates Indianorigin monastic practices with what could more accurately be characterized as court debate, a category to which this encounter more properly belongs. The latter involved representatives of different traditions (chiefly religious) who were summoned to engage in public argumentation for the benefit of a ruler, with outcomes invariably having implications in terms of imperial/royal 4 patronage. The Samyé discourse was not an isolated event in Tibet. Other court encounters, such as those between representatives of Buddhist and Bön (Bon) traditions, are reported to have occurred during imperial times. Other confrontations involving Tibetan religious figures were also organized much later, during the Yuan dynasty, when, for instance, Chögyel Pakpa (Chos rgyal ’Phags pa, 1235–1280) was called upon to argue against Daoist representatives before Kublai Khan. The discourse element to such public events necessarily involved some formalization, but such accounts as exist suggest a straightforward, question–answer format, with basic adjudication. Nothing indicates the deployment of formalized procedures, strict rules, or technical practices, as probably existed in the Indian centers. Such a specialized format also seems unfeasible, given the nonscholastic backgrounds of most participants and attendees. Looking beyond such court debates, there is no credible historical evidence that during imperial times Tibetans either adopted or sought to develop formalized practices for structuring religious discourse within a public context. More specifically, there is no obvious sign of a precursor or antecedent for the later, highly technical, rules-based monastic activity. Debate practice, however, must be distinguished from other elements with imperial-era origins that shaped the later scholastic tradition within which debate functioned. The brand of Buddhism promoted by the likes of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla left a legacy of conceptual frameworks, taxonomies, translated terminology, and a portion of the literature that would eventually be regarded as part of a scholastic canon. Certain other aspects of religious activity during imperial times, particularly the methodical manner in which translation was approached within a statesponsored project, also seem influenced by the analytical, scholastic brand of Buddhism. It should also be noted that several, mainly shorter works relating to Buddhist logic were translated into Tibetan during the imperial period. But in the sphere of monastic learning, evidence of systematization and the enshrinement of institutional practices is more tenuous. The second phase, during which formalized practices appear to have emerged, coincides with the start of the so-called later dissemination (phyi dar) of Buddhism in Tibet, during which, from the 11th century onward, there was an upsurge in translation activity, a fresh influx of teachings and teachers, and a series of major intellectual and artistic developments, particularly evident in the central and western regions. Perhaps most significantly, concerted efforts were made to create a solid institutional basis for monastic Buddhism. Here, the role played by the monastery of Sangpu (gSang phu ne’u thog), close to Lhasa, proved vital. This was founded in 1073 by Ngok Lekpé shérap (rNgogs Legs pa’i shes rab, fl. 11th century), an immediate disciple of Dīpaṃkara Śrījñāna Page 3 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition (982–1054), the Bengali teacher (popularly known as Atiśa), who evolved (both in reality and in the imagination) into perhaps the preeminent figure of the Tibetan later dissemination. Atiśa’s Tibetan followers developed a religious tradition they referred to as Kadam (bKa’ gdams). But Sangpu’s alignment with the tradition was loose, and with the accession of the second abbot, Ngok Loden shérap (rNgogs Blo ldan shes rab, 1059–1109), “nephew” of the monastery’s founder, activities there took a distinctive intellectual turn. Loden shérap was a major translator, who had earlier spent time in Kashmir and took a keen interest in logic. In terms of theory (as already advanced in Tibet by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla), the Buddhist practitioner should strive for perception of higher truths through meditation, but the initial route to these, and knowledge beyond the mundane, was inference. Reliable inference depended on logical principles and the ability to recognize whether particular proofs met stipulated criteria. An interest in logic, and specifically the treatises of the Indian pramāṇa (logico-epistemological) tradition, could therefore be justified in terms of spiritual goals. The importance of the pramāṇa tradition, and the works of its two chief thinkers, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (5th/6th and 7th centuries CE, respectively), had already been recognized in other Buddhist monastic traditions in Japan, China, and Korea. In some of these, logic, as presented in the pramāṇa works, was studied as a separate branch of Buddhist learning. In Tibet, Loden shérap was the first to translate certain major works of Dharmakīrti, thereby bringing the pramāṇa system to wider Tibetan attention within an institutional setting. Crucially, at Sangpu, rather than merely being considered a distinct topic, logic began to inform the approach to other areas of study and galvanized the organization of learning. It was at Sangpu that, apparently for the first time in Tibet, an institutional model for monastic education was successfully developed, eventually resulting in the formation of a scholastic curriculum, innovations in the field of educational materials, and the creation of a system of examinations 5 and titles. Convinced of the efficacy of the analytical approach and the place of logic within it, Sangpu scholars seem to have developed a logical method, designed to achieve not so much the more distant goals of spiritual realization already alluded to, but the more immediate ones, of structuring discourse. Logical structure, it was believed, should guide and inform dialectical discourse, something that was realized in the creation of a rules-based form of exchange, suiting employment in public situations. Popular tradition identifies Sangpu’s sixth abbot, Chapa Chökyi sengé (Phwya pa Chos kyi seng ge, 1109–1169), with certain significant changes to practices (to be discussed later). The formalized practices appear to have spread widely through central Tibet, the main area of medieval Tibetan scholastic activity, as the Sangpu model gained in popularity, and seem largely to have been embraced by major monastic centers entirely independent of Sangpu, 6 such as Sakya (Sa skya), despite some early misgivings. By the late 13th or early 14th century, reliance on the characteristic “language,” the formalized medium of dialectical discourse (to be discussed in the section “Tibetan Innovation: Shifting Discourse”), was standard. As will become clear in the section “The Debate Session: Form and Structure”, certain features of logic and content link medieval practices with those of subsequent times (i.e., the third phase, encompassing the present). And although much remains to be discovered about the exact nature of the medieval ones, aspects of their form, and more importantly their context and purpose, distinguished them from later ones. In recognition of this distinction, and in acknowledgment of Page 4 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition certain correspondences with contemporaneous practices of European scholasticism, it seems appropriate to use the term “disputation” to denote the medieval Tibetan practice. Such disputation, as a method and practice, was employed during that era both in an educational context and for public confrontations between established scholars. The differences between medieval disputation and the debate of the later, third phase are not 7 discussed further here. The exact process of transition from one to the other requires further research. But the rise of the Geluk school (from the 15th century onward) and its eventual dominance within the Tibetan state (from the 17th century) are heavily implicated in changes that occurred within the realm of practice. Geluk power (stretching far beyond the religious sphere) became concentrated in its major monastic institutions, especially the “three seats” near 8 Lhasa. As scholastic centers, these adopted a Sangpu-inspired model, emphasizing the importance of dialectical learning. Burgeoning institutional power, combined with growing insularity, contributed to an increased emphasis on debate, which established itself as the primary medium for learning and examination. Debate also became invested with substantial symbolic power. During the Mönlam or Great Prayer Festival (sMon lam chen mo) in Lhasa, an annual event, originally created in 1409 by Tsong kha pa (commonly described as the founder of the Geluk school), debate eventually formed a centerpiece, with those seeking the highest scholastic degree subjected to public examination. This huge gathering of monks from the three seats served as a showcase for Geluk power, the prominence of debate within the spectacle impressing upon the wider consciousness its importance within the Geluk order. While this power nexus only took its ultimate form in the 19th and 20th centuries, evidence of continuity in debate practice itself comes to us in a rare account by an outsider, the Jesuit missionary Ippolito Desideri (1684–1733), who was resident in Tibet between 1717 and 1721. Desideri set out to master the Tibetan scholastic system, and the debate practices that he 9 describes closely correspond with those of today. Logical Underpinnings The chief inspiration behind the structure of discourse in Tibetan debate is a system of logic that originated in India. Tibetan scholars identified this system with the Indian Buddhist pramāṇa tradition, as expounded by its chief exponents, Dignāga and his principal commentator, Dharmakīrti. The writings of these two have served as the main sources for the Tibetan debate tradition. Tibetan scholars have tended to depict this system of logic as exclusively Buddhist. More correctly, many elements within it should be seen as belonging to a shared Indian tradition. Buddhist logicians such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti built upon centuries of earlier work. It is in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika literature that we see the first moves toward the formulation of logic and the structuring of discourse through rules. In this section, the emphasis is on the Tibetan interpretation of that Indian heritage, but there is much here that would be entirely recognizable to logicians of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Jain traditions. Certain similarities with Aristotelian logic may also seem apparent. The logic of the Indian system is, however, quite distinct. Trying to Page 5 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition understand its formulations through the prism of the Western syllogism is misleading, and where terms such as “proof” are used here, they refer to the system’s own concepts, not those familiar from the Western context. A stock exemplar used in the tradition, for the purposes of analysis and demonstration, is: On the smoky mountain (A) There is fire (B), Because there is smoke (C), As in a kitchen hearth (D). That is, according to the Tibetan understanding of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s system, a correct logical assertion should take the following form: A is B because of being C, as is the case with D. The constituents are the subject (A), the predicate (B), the reason (C), and the example (D). The combination of the first two (“A is B”) forms the probandum, that which needs to be proved. The reason is used to establish the probandum, and the example is cited in support. The copula “is” can indicate various forms of relationship, such as, in the exemplar, that in location A, there is B. The whole formulation constitutes a logical proof. Such proofs may be either correct or flawed. A correct proof rests on two bases: first, that C is a property of A (in the exemplar, that there is smoke on the mountain in question), and second, that where there is C there is B (i.e., that where there is smoke there is fire). The second, C’s concomitant relationship with B, is known as the “pervasion” (Sanskrit: vyāpti; Tibetan: khyab pa). Thus, the proof combines the particular (the specific smoke) with the general (that smoke is always related to fire). It is by means of logical proofs that one can move from the domain of perceptual to inferential knowledge; that is, one can know something beyond the realm of immediate experience. The cornerstone of this pramāṇa theory is that an inference arising from correct logic constitutes certain and indisputable knowledge—pramāṇa. In the Buddhist context, pramāṇa refers, primarily, to the epistemic instrument through which such knowledge is gained. Hence, pramāṇa is generally translated as “valid cognition” (tshad ma). Logical principles, once understood in terms of mundane phenomena, such as smoke and fire, are then supposed to be applied to inferences about more obscure phenomena, including technical and abstract features of the Buddhist spiritual path. The pramāṇa tradition is concerned with not only how the individual can use logic to gain inferential knowledge personally, but also how an individual can bring about inferences (i.e., correct inferential knowledge) in another party. The state of that party’s knowledge is a factor here. Our exemplar is generally regarded as a correct proof, but if it was presented to a second party who was unable to perceive the smoke in question or did not know that where there is smoke there is fire, it would not yield a correct inference. Moreover, a second party may not be amenable to generating a correct inference if that second party trenchantly believes in a contrary position. Much pramāṇa literature is devoted to identifying spurious philosophical views, which it attributes to various non-Buddhist and Buddhist schools. But it also expounds an argumentation Page 6 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition theory. Here we encounter a crucial variant of the earlier logical form, known as the “consequence” (Sanskrit: prasaṅga; Tibetan: thal ’gyur), which is especially relevant to debate. Secondary literature frequently describes the consequence as a reductio ad absurdum argument. As such, it is most regularly associated with the method employed in Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, particularly by its most celebrated proponent, Nāgārjuna. To Tibetan scholars, the consequence seemed critical to distinguishing divergent positions among Nāgārjuna’s commentators and had a central role in discussions on Madhyamaka philosophy and soteriology. In the pramāṇa writings (especially those of Tibet), the consequence is not linked to any such single issue, and its treatment, within argumentation theory, is more systematic. The consequence largely dispenses with the example (D). But aside from this, the constituents are the same as those of the logical proof. The consequence is supposed to be deployed during a structured exchange between two parties, when one party wants to expose a flaw in the second party’s position and to demonstrate, thereby, that the position is unsustainable. The consequence’s basic form is: It follows (therefore) that A is B, because of being C. The consequence co-opts a position held by the second party to reach a conclusion that the same party is unable to accept. That party must be someone who, elsewhere, has asserted that A is C. It must also be the case, for the same party, that if something is C, it is necessarily also B (or, in many cases, simply that C entails B). But the conclusion, that A is B, is one that contradicts another of the second party’s positions. A correct logical proof must be rooted in fact; A actually is C, and so on. This is not a requirement of a correct consequence. It need only be the case that its conclusion derives from the second party’s own assertion. The consequence is not designed to lead to an “absurd” conclusion. Instead, it is intended to leave the second party with no means of response, save that of relinquishing one of the positions held by that party. Hence, the consequence’s frame of reference differs markedly from that of the logical proof. Consequences are conceived of within a framework of argumentation theory. Discussions about their usage necessarily concern themselves more with errant views than with correct ones. They also put greater emphasis on interaction and outcome than on striving for the truth. What has been set out in this section, it should be stressed, relates mainly to the theory behind employment of the consequence. Let us next consider the consequence’s relevance to the evolution of debate in Tibet. Tibetan Innovation: Shifting Discourse Despite proclaimed loyalty to the pramāṇa tradition, as historical writings attest, Tibetan thinkers put their own slant on that tradition’s writings and, with regard to logic, made their own contributions. The topic of these Tibetan variations is well represented in academic literature. But here, focusing on debate practice, our attention is drawn to Chapa Chökyi sengé (the sixth abbot of Sangpu) and the various important changes that popular tradition attributes to him. He is particularly associated with the introduction of the consequence format and, according to some, even the creation of the distinctive physical gestures that accompany debate (to be discussed in Page 7 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition the section “The Debate Session: Form and Structure”). Chapa Chökyi sengé was undoubtedly a 10 significant figure and important writer. But in terms of historical documentation, the precise nature of his innovations remains unclear. Nevertheless, it is at least consistent with current evidence that by the mid- to late 12th century a set of formalized practices was being used at Sangpu to structure dialectical discourse. From the 12th century, we see the emergence in literature of the debate language. A lexicon of technical terms, useful for certain classificatory and descriptive purposes, can be thought of as one component of the language. But it is chiefly to be understood as a standardized medium, by means of which arguments (and responses) could be formulated and communicated. The language has various features, including an idiosyncratic use of personal pronouns in place of 11 demonstratives. But its most significant trait is its clear marking of the individual portions that the proof or consequence comprises. These elements are, respectively, the subject (A), predicate (B), and reason (C). The language distinguishes each by means of separate affixes—chos can (A), te and so forth (B–proof), thal (B–consequence), and phyir (C). In addition to clearly identifying and delineating each portion, these markers also largely determine the order in which they are to be presented (here implied by the A–B–C formulation). Although certain components of the language existed earlier, by the 12th century it had essentially reached its final form and began to be applied systematically and prescriptively. Although it is easy to see the language as ancillary to content, the extent to which its application shaped discourse, transforming it into a highly formulaic affair, is difficult to exaggerate. The introduction of the language (i.e., primarily the standardized form of the “marked” consequence) must be seen as the seminal event in terms of the Tibetan debate tradition. Several observations can be made about this introduction, all of which are relevant to understanding the direction and form of later practice: 1. Whether employed in the written or verbal domain, the language was intended to bring greater clarity to the positions held by individuals and whatever criticism others might wish to make of them. In this regard the introduction was largely a success, creating both a tool of analysis, by means of which the merits and implications of various positions and arguments could be subjected to scrutiny, and a medium of communication between two parties seeking exchange on these matters. 2. Analysis or discourse structured around the consequence format necessarily lends itself primarily to critiquing. It is neither designed, nor particularly able, to accommodate the presentation of an argument. 3. Not only does the language serve as the vehicle for the formulation and delivery of a criticism, structurally, it also dictates the form that the answer to it must take. The only effective means of responding to a consequence is to do so directly, in its own terms. This limits the options of response to three. An individual can either (a) accept the conclusion, (b) deny the relationship of C to A (that the reason is true of the subject), or (c) deny the pervasion (that C entails B). Expressed in terms of the debate language, these are reduced to three terse replies: (a) “(I) accept” (’dod), (b) “Reason not established” (rtags ma grub), or (c) “No pervasion” (ma khyab or khyab pa ma byung). Reference is occasionally made to a fourth answer, but this is simply a demand that the reason be stated where it has temporarily been withheld—something expressed as, “For what reason?” (ci’i phyir). Page 8 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition 4. The challenge–response structure helps define two distinct roles within the exchange. But, particularly through the restrictions it places on responses, it creates an asymmetrical dynamic between the two participants. 5. The language’s introduction clearly pushes exchanges into a more technical sphere. Quite apart from knowledge of the content, participation in discourse requires mastery of the language and, by implication, some form of training. A new dimension to exchanges is also necessarily opened up, with questions about whether the language has been employed correctly, further contestation about how correct usage is to be defined, and so forth. While insufficient to explain the direction that dialectical discourse in Tibet took, highlighting these attributes helps us understand how decisive the introduction of the format was and how it appears to have launched practice on a particular trajectory. A format that may have been intended to bring greater precision to exchanges and purge them of extraneous content may seem, in its sparse, pared-down style, to lend itself to procedure and, if rigidly enforced, to have the potential to impede the free flow of discourse and ideas. The language is regarded as characteristic of both dialectical literature and debate practice. The tendency has been to look to historical writings (commentaries and treatises) by Tibetan authors for clues about the introduction of such features as the consequence form. But the assumption that innovations would necessarily have originated or found their first expression in the literary sphere, only later to be introduced into that of practice, seems questionable. There are no manuals of instruction for the language, even in the recently rediscovered writings of Chapa Chökyi sengé. Furthermore, particularly given the general Tibetan literary compulsion toward elaboration and ornamentation, the terse, repetitious style of the language is far more reminiscent of a verbal formulation, designed to encourage rapid interactions, rather than a literary one. Current Practice Debate Within the Context of Monastic Education In recent years, especially in Tibetan exile communities, the range of those introduced to debate has expanded to include nuns, lay college students, and even schoolchildren. Traditionally, however, debate has overwhelmingly been regarded as the province of monks, pursuing a particular style of learning, culminating in the awarding of a scholastic degree and title. The best-known scholastic title, that of geshé (dge bshes), is now especially associated with the Geluk school. Debate also plays a significant role in other monastic educational programs, all of which have a scholastic dimension, even though their curricula and the titles they lead to— including kachen (dka’ chen), rapjampa (rab ‘byams pa), and khenpo (mkhan po)—differ. One or more of such programs and titles are found in every school of Tibetan Buddhism and also in the Bön tradition, despite varied and sometimes complex relations with the scholastic approach. The growing appreciation of its rigor and uniqueness has, in recent years, resulted in debate’s becoming a more pervasive feature of Tibetan learning. The profile of debate within religious Page 9 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition schools and monastic institutions differs, but it is in the main scholastic centers of the Geluk that 12 debate and the culture surrounding it are at their most robust. The remainder of this article focuses on debate within the Geluk educational system, although much of what is set out here is extendable far beyond the Geluk centers. The scholastic curriculum is divided into two branches: topics of preliminary study and the principal, core topics. The five core topics (Prajñāpāramitā, Pramāṇa, Madhyamaka, Abhidharma, and Vinaya) are not individual texts, as suggested by their collective designation, “the five major tomes” (gzhung chen po ti lnga), but rather areas of study, albeit each organized around a single “root” text, of Indian origin, which has spawned a sizeable corpus of Indian and Tibetan commentarial writings. Study of both preliminary and core topics is organized into classes, through which the student progresses annually, following examination. Students who complete the classes on the curriculum and pass the examinations are eligible for final testing, by means of which they can gain the title of geshé. Previously, the whole process in Tibet, which might take twenty or more years, was regularly protracted in its latter stages, with candidates obliged to wait for final examination. The time required for completion is now shorter but can still be expected to be twelve or more years, with an average of one or two years spent on the preliminaries, and the remainder on the core topics. Debate, it is essential to note, is the key pedagogical method within this scholastic system, not a separate field of study, and the approach to it is entirely heuristic. Students receive no classes or separate instructions on debate, nor on the theory and technique of argumentation. The debate method is one they must learn through observation and imitation, somewhat akin to the process of informal language acquisition, the initial challenge simply being to grasp the basics of comprehension and communication. The model of learning involves three mutually dependent educational activities, performed in discrete locations. These are (a) memorization, (b) class learning, and (c) debate. Memorization is not organized formally but engaged in, like text reading, during self-study time, usually in or around the student’s room, or some accommodating open space. Students are required to equip themselves for participation in class and debate sessions. The system’s great emphasis on committing material to memory, rendering it instantly retrievable in the appropriate public setting, without the support of the physical text, places great demands on the memory. In addition to numerous definitions, divisions, and individual fragments of quotation, the students must memorize the root texts, large portions of their manuals (which are discussed in the following section, “Materials and Topics of Debate”), and other relevant commentarial writings. The prodigious ability they develop to acquire material, in terms of both amount and speed, derives not from complex techniques but from daily practice and rhythmic recitation. Memorization is never a silent exercise, and there is no notion of reciting with excessive volume. The second activity, performed in a classroom or some other indoor venue, is generally confined to a single daily session. As reflected in the activity’s name (dpe khrid), which literally means “leading (through the) text,” this is not a lecture, but a session during which a teacher walks the students through that section of the prescribed work the class has reached. Students receive instruction on the basic import of the words and the issues being addressed. But the session, like the texts themselves, is largely structured dialectically. The teacher’s role is that of stimulating Page 10 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition discussion and not of offering definitive answers. As various arguments and counterarguments are considered, the teacher can usually be relied on to adopt the position contrary to that of the students. The whole process thereby supplies food for the day’s debate sessions. The final component (which is discussed at more length in the section “The Debate Session: Form and Structure”) is the debate session itself. In terms of both duration and frequency, debate sessions exceed class sessions roughly on a ratio of three to one. Debate sessions are long (rarely less than a couple of hours each) and are conducted in an open, dedicated space. This is the “debate ground” (chos ra/grwa)—an unenclosed area, usually paved, and loosely surrounded or interspersed with trees—from which the debate session itself derives its name. As debate has constituted the central method of learning, unsurprisingly it has also served as the medium for examination during both annual and final testing. Only in recent decades, in a trend that began in exile, has a written component been added to examination procedures. Examination by debate has always been public, in the sense of having been conducted before the monastic assembly. But the Mönlam in Lhasa created an additional dimension to public testing. There are different subcategories of geshé, the highest being the lha-ram (lha rams). Those in the lha-ram class have also been ranked, based on their performance in the annual public debates, traditionally performed at the festival. Hence, a great deal of prestige has been attached to the 13 titles, especially linked with these public performances. Materials and Topics of Debate The written materials that serve as the direct basis for the classes and which students are expected to have the most intimate knowledge of favor a debate format. Although, as already mentioned, the core topics are each associated with a root text, the curriculum’s preliminary subjects are not drawn directly from Indian works. They are based on Tibetan writings that condense and codify information, mainly from the pramāṇa tradition. These works, in terms of both their genre and content, have their origins in Sangpu and have principally been developed as educational materials, supporting the scholastic model’s style of knowledge transmission. The first and most important of the primer materials is the “Collected Topics” (bsDus grwa). This is followed by two more (Blo rig/rigs and rTags rig/rigs) dealing respectively with fundamentals of epistemology and logical reasons (categories, definitions, etc.). The Collected Topics writings comprise almost exclusively paradigmatic debates. While providing no direct explanation or instruction, they help beginners become acquainted with debate through their organization and gradual introduction of topics. The first chapter begins with relatively straightforward material (starting with categories of colors and shapes). However, much in the Collected Topics is highly abstruse and is evidently intended to fuel debate, rather than provide any simple lessons. For study of the core topics, although materials are organized around and always refer back to their respective Indian roots, students primarily learn from what are often described as “manuals” (yig cha). Individual monasteries or colleges within them have their own manuals, generally a collection of works by a single author (the majority hailing from the 15th and 16th centuries). The manual has two main genres, which are employed in tandem. Those of the first type (entitled spyi don) are more structured and present the divisions, definitions, debates, and Page 11 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition passages of commentary that are understood to delineate a particular topic. Works of the second genre (mtha’ dpyod) contain only debates. The topic is, therefore, predominantly explored through a series of debates or dialectically structured discourses, which generally present the responses of “our own system” to challenges mounted to it by various anonymous opponents. Thus, debates regularly begin with the phrase “someone says” (kha cig). While debates clearly identify “incorrect” interpretations and stances, they do not always end with clear-cut conclusions or unambiguous statements about what constitutes the correct one. An understanding of what represents “our own system” emerges gradually, largely through negation, and is subject to increasing refinement. Despite the tradition’s professed commitment to reasoned analysis, “our system” is underpinned by numerous implicit and largely unquestioned articles of faith. However, it is difficult to characterize it as a doctrine, and the scholastic approach, if it were intended to transmit such a thing, could well be deemed a colossal failure. Instead, the system is more concerned with inculcating a correct way of thinking, which could, theoretically, be applied to the analysis and understanding of matters on which textbooks offer only limited clarity or guidance. The material covered in the program of scholastic classes follows, somewhat loosely, the order of their presentation in the chosen root texts. But it is commentarial writings that organize the material into distinct topics. The manuals have a special role in processing this material, identifying points of contention, bringing greater clarity to the issues, and implicitly determining what is, from the scholastic perspective, significant and worthy of interest. In this sense, with regard to the realm of debate, the manuals and their authors perform gatekeeper roles. The range of topics debated during the course of the long education can only be dealt with cursorily here. But outlined generally, the commentarial tradition is preoccupied with the exact meaning of terms, phrases, and statements in the root texts, scriptures, and so forth. Correct understanding of these is supposed to reveal the actual intent of their authors, and ultimately the Buddha. Because of this proclaimed goal, debates, like the commentarial writings, begin in specific sections of the source materials (a point elaborated on in the section “The Debate Session: Form and Structure”). The areas and issues seen as debate’s natural territory relate to the philosophical, hermeneutical, logical, and epistemological. In terms of material, no real divide is acknowledged between content and form: technical matters regarding an argument’s formulation and criteria pertaining to it are of as much interest as what the argument conveys. Definitions, correct and incorrect, are a favorite topic of debate, and the term roughly translatable as “definition” (mtshan nyid) at least partly informs the name of the scholastic approach. Related to its interest in meaning and import (inside the textual domain), debate is concerned with principles and generalities; its concern with particulars is only to the extent that they may instantiate these. Conversely, specific individuals, events, and circumstances, in all their unpredictability and unrepresentativeness, are seen as deficient in abstract value. Accordingly, debate is disinterested in such things as history, current affairs, and popular issues. It is also closed to new interpretations. The tradition projects a notion of debate-worthiness that does not simply inform discourse but verges on the proscriptive. It is also notable that debate practice appears always to have been confined to the scholastic domain: its techniques seem never to have been extended to other fields. Even within the monastic setting, it has also been restricted to the Page 12 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition scholastic rather than the broader curriculum. Ritual, liturgy, grammar, poetry, tantra, and meditation, among others, have generally been seen as areas worthy of monastic attention and learning. Several also have corpuses of scholarly writing (e.g., commentarial) associated with them, which monks may receive teachings on. But these are generally not seen as territory for debate. Even in terms of the core curriculum, during study of Abhidharma and Vinaya (the latter two of the five areas), debate is a more muted, “senior” affair, devoted to sedentary reckoning and enumeration. It is in the study of the first three areas that the real energy and passion of debate are truly evident. The Debate Session: Form and Structure 14 We return to the debate ground for a more detailed look at practice there. This description contains few Tibetan terms (technical or otherwise), it being a curious fact that some of the most basic and important elements within the domain of practice lack names. Those who enter the ground for the session carry only a cushion/mat (gdan) and a string of religious beads (phreng ba). Reflecting the emphasis on memory and orality, the texts (e.g., manuals) are not permitted in the space. Debate sessions are convened at the same times each day, and all monk students, from complete beginners to the most senior, participate. Debate has only two forms of configuration: paired and group encounters. All participants on the debate ground are generally arranged, simultaneously, in either the first or the second configuration. Daily debate is principally between classmates, who mainly work in pairs. Individuals choose their partners for the session at its commencement. A debate has two distinct roles, those of challenger and respondent, most commonly referred to simply as “the one who debates” and “the one who answers” (with 15 phrases such as rtags gsal gtong mkhan and lan rgyag mkhan). Hence, it is also decided, by the participants, which of the roles each will adopt, although these may be switched later in the session. As is implied by the English terms used here for these roles, the debate is not an open discourse, but neither is it conducted in the style of a simple interrogation. Every aspect of the interaction is governed by the assigned roles. On the physical level, this manifests in the respondent being required to sit cross-legged on his cushion/mat, while the challenger must stand. The debate language is the required medium of communication, with arguments presented in consequence form and responses limited to the three/four outlined earlier. Only the challenger, whose role is dominant, may present arguments, choose what is debated, and generally steer the course of the interaction. The respondent should, upon the challenger’s signal, answer sparsely, without elaboration (unless invited to do otherwise). The overriding duty of the participants is to perform their assigned roles well. These roles are oppositional and there are various resonances with those performed by parties arguing for the prosecution and defense in an adversarial legal system, as there are with aspects of procedure and various contrived features of the exercise. Neither the session nor the individual encounters within them have any predetermined topic, although daily debates are expected to explore material covered in recent classes. The debate generally begins with the challenger citing a few words of text, then calling on the respondent to identify their source, locate them within the textual scheme, and explain their meaning. Even these “questions” must be formulated, verbally, as consequences, despite the empty meaning of the phrase “it follows.” During these opening exchanges, in what is effectively the debate’s Page 13 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition orientation stage, the scheme of the root and commentarial overlay are partially rehearsed and mapped out, something essential both to the learning process and to situating the discussion. But this stage is only preparatory to the real debate. The challenger is either seeking or leading toward an entry point, through which an attack can be launched. Thus, the challenger tries to find an identifiable position attributable to the respondent, which it can be argued leads to an unwanted consequence. The presentation of an unwanted consequence, followed by the response to it, is the basic pattern of exchange between the two parties. But as the respondent is essentially limited to either conceding or denying the fault, an exchange structured around a single consequence-criticism (and response) would be a short-lived one, resulting in immediate submission or stalemate. There would be nothing to sustain the process nor any benefit to derive from it. Hence, the respondent inevitably rebuts the criticism, at which point the challenger presents a new consequence. If, for example, the challenger’s argument, “It follows that A is B because of C,” is met with the respondent denying the reason (that C is true of A), the challenger would commonly present another consequence, centering on the relationship between C and A, and so forth. Thus, the interaction is made up of the challenger constantly reconfiguring critical consequences, based on the responses. Each new consequence is meant to be related to and in some way derive from what has preceded it. The challenger’s approach is sometimes described as one that uses “chains of consequence” (thal phreng). Although the process is represented as “logical,” the progress from one consequence to the next is not always linear, nor is debate so systematic as to deal with and settle each individual issue before moving to the next. In more general terms, the method employed by the challenger can be characterized as one that employs dissonance as procedure. He introduces passages of text or lines of reasoning that seem to conflict with the respondent’s answers. The task of the respondent is, ostensibly, to resolve the apparent contradictions. But the other aspect of the challenger’s role is more affirmative, since he must constantly search for potential links between textual passages, lines of reason, and the respondent’s answers, hoping to discover new avenues of attack. As part of the daily grind, especially for those with insufficient familiarity or motivation, debate can sometimes be a meandering and unproductive affair, in which the challenges lack strategy and the responses are evasive. However, in the hands of keen and conversant interlocutors, the process is far more constructive. Although the debate does not begin with a stated position or thesis from either side, the challenger may follow a well-considered plan, structured around the answers expected of the respondent. The respondent may either choose or be pushed into adopting a particular line, and occasionally, a clearly defined stance may emerge through the exchange. This “basic thesis” (rtsa ba’i dam bca’) will henceforth serve as the challenger’s main target. While more generally the challenger aims to entangle the respondent within a web of conflicting and unsustainable positions, ultimately he will attempt to assert chains of entailment, leading back to the basic thesis. As the respondent’s role is to resist the challenger, he cannot afford to relinquish this thesis and must try to block potential routes back to it. Debate can, therefore, develop into a highly sophisticated contest, with each participant anticipating the likely moves of the opponent and seeking to thwart them by taking appropriate measures. Page 14 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition One of debate’s most striking features, which further emphasizes the dominance of the challenger’s role, is the use of physical gestures and movement. As the challenger is about to finish his point, he raises his left foot above the ground, projecting it forward. He also extends the left arm forward and bends the right arm back, above his head. Coinciding with the final words of his articulation, he simultaneously brings the left foot and the right arm down, both stamping on the ground and clapping in the respondent’s direction. The clapping motion is a stylish one, which ends with the string of beads being gripped by the right hand and drawn up the left arm, around which they are wrapped. The two further gestures at the challenger’s disposal involve him hitting the back of the right hand against the palm of his left, while calling out tsha (the exact spelling and etymology of which is not agreed upon) and that in which he circles the beads around the head of the respondent while uttering a phrase that literally means “three spheres” (’khor gsum). The first indicates the challenger asserting that the respondent has lost the point, the second that he has, in some way, contradicted himself. Various explanations have been advanced about what is denoted by the “three spheres.” But none of them are entirely consistent with usage on the debate ground nor in historical debate literature. While the basic pattern of these movements is fixed, there is a considerable range of expression within them. As the debate begins, the challenger’s gestures are more restrained. But having dispensed with the procedural niceties, he binds the upper part of his robes around his waist, creating a more workmanlike and imposing impression. And as discussion continues and grows more heated, gestures and movements become more animated. The challenger may also pace and prowl around the respondent. As the general noise of the debate ground grows, voices are necessarily raised, the clapping becomes more audible, and the stamping more vigorous. Displays of exuberance are common and the gestures, which become more exaggerated, are clearly used in an intimidatory fashion. This, combined with the growing rapidity of the exchanges, creates further pressure on the respondent, increasing the likelihood of errors. The group debate (popularly referred to as dam bca’) is largely an extension of the paired exchange. Generally, there are two respondents, seated beside each other, referred to as “those who sit for the group debate” (dam bca’ la sdod mkhan, shortened to dam bca’). Other monks sit in parallel opposing ranks, at right angles to the respondents, so that an empty aisle is formed in front of them, in which the challenger(s) move. Each debate begins with a single challenger, who will soon be joined by companions. The respondents may, therefore, be faced by a relatively large group of assailants. The audience members also generally act in support of the challenge. If they feel that the respondent has taken too long to answer, they will clap and shout the final word of the consequence formula (phyir) in unison three times (or, more occasionally, 16 once). Predictably, serving as respondent in a group debate (sometimes referred to as “defense”) is regarded as the most testing of roles. Another remarkable feature of debate, distinguishing it from the adversarial contests of courtrooms and medieval universities, is the absence of any third-party role. Debate is generally an unsupervised affair. Teachers, senior scholars, and those serving in a disciplinary role are prone to wandering around the debate ground and may stop to listen and occasionally intervene —the debate ground setup, generally, encourages such circulation and interaction between those of different levels. But students are largely left to their own devices. Most strikingly, there is Page 15 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition nothing equivalent to a moderator or adjudicator. Hence, while the audience and participants have their own perceptions regarding the quality of performances, there are no rulings or judgments about which individual or position has prevailed. Debate clearly benefits its practitioners, increasing their knowledge of and familiarity with the material, but also allowing them to venture into and test new waters. It also greatly develops verbal skills, dexterity of thinking, powers of reasoning, and even fosters some degree of creativity. But as a process it is not designed to reach any outcomes, final decisions, or resolutions. And the only conclusions it reaches are those imposed by time. This aspect can prove perplexing to outside observers. Other features of debate, especially its physicality, volubility, provocative gesturing, and generally confrontational nature, have also regularly attracted criticism from those favoring more quiescent approaches to Buddhism. And those explaining debate regularly find themselves having to defend the practice, which itself represents an interesting comment on cultural interfaces and stereotypes of religious expression. Despite the undeniable rigidity of the debate structure, exemplified by reliance on the language, exchanges can be more expansive than the format might immediately suggest. Discussion frequently strays outside the prescribed parameters, giving way to bursts of more open discourse and exploration of the topic—“digressions,” which it is the challenger’s prerogative to allow. There are also other dimensions to the practice beyond those relating to religion and logic. The quickfire nature of the exchanges is, for instance, ideal for sharpening the 17 wits, and humor is a prized feature of exchanges. The verbal jousting and performative aspects of debate have only rarely been touched on. Only more recently have anthropological perspectives on debate been taken more seriously. Given debate’s resilience and longevity, its centrality to a dominant religious system, and the fact that it remains the main daily practice for thousands of those within the Tibetan cultural sphere, it is perhaps surprising that it has not been the subject of more extensive and varied research. Discussion of the Literature Academic understanding of debate relies heavily on the Collected Topics writings. Notable early 18 studies include those of Goldberg, Onoda, and Perdue. These studies focus on the works’ contents, that is, their topics and individual debates, with particular interest given to the logic employed and the theory behind it. Although Goldberg’s analysis has been criticized for being overly etic, all these studies are informative and help convey the sense of a characteristically Tibetan tradition. Some more recent significant work, such as Tillemans, exploring relations with Indian pramāṇa writings, and Hugon, on Chapa Chökyi sengé’s use of consequences, help us to better understand the 19 intellectual progression of logic and theory within a tradition of interpretation. The heft and title of Perdue’s 1992 volume, Debate in Tibetan Buddhism, leads some to assume that it represents a comprehensive and even definitive study on Tibetan debate. This clearly misunderstands the work’s scope. It deals only with the first portion of a text on the Collected Page 16 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition Topics, which, it must be remembered, are primer works. Analyzing the content of such works may be essential to fathoming the logic and its theory, but it does not constitute an investigation of the whole tradition. This points to the main shortcoming with much of the academic writing on Tibetan debate: namely, its overreliance on the Collected Topics. Many academics seem to equate Tibetan Buddhist debate with the contents of these works. References to “practice” are, therefore, somewhat unreliable, as they seem to denote the customs among authors rather than those of individuals engaged in face-to-face encounters. The debates that serve as the basis of academic analysis are, in their original formulation, intended to be instructive and do not purport to be records of practice. But the academic writings on them do not sufficiently convey their artificiality. Readers turning to analysis of these debates to learn about the activity could justifiably feel confused. What, they may wonder, would be the point of two individuals engaging in a debate if its outcome was a foregone conclusion and one of them, apparently from the outset, was understood to be in the wrong? When it comes to learning about the actual practice of debate, there is evidently a need to move outside the spheres of logic and theory. Despite its age and the fact that it is based on interviews with a single informant, Sierksma’s 1964 article can be fully recommended as a starting point. It 20 is an early attempt to approach debate anthropologically. And, despite the author’s limited grasp of Tibetan, it offers a more accurate guide to the terminology of debate than most later studies, which privilege literary sources. Although Sierksma’s approach was not immediately followed up, being largely replaced with the sort of textual analysis referred to earlier, some more recent studies have brought us much closer to aspects of the practice itself. The studies of Dreyfus, Lempert, and Samuels explore debate within educational, sociocultural, and historical 21 contexts, respectively. They have the added advantage of bringing the perspective of those who have trained in the practice or observed it at close quarters. Several of the studies cited earlier include portions of script from genuine debates. At least one 22 sustained attempt has also been made to translate and analyze recorded exchanges. But analyzing individual debates is a daunting prospect, due to not only their technical nature but also the convoluted and unpredictable course they take. When the help of the original participants is enlisted in deciphering such debates, they are rarely content with their performance and find it difficult to resist the urge to edit the script, somewhat undermining the exercise. The results to date, therefore, leave something to be desired. Notwithstanding the challenges relating to individual exchanges, in terms of demystifying the practice of debate, more could be done to explain its general structure, rather than presenting artificial samples. Some comparative 23 analysis is offered in Samuels, but far more is needed. It is also curious that some of the really characteristic features of the practice, such as the absence of any third-party role or clear outcomes, barely seem to warrant mention in most academic writings. Primary Sources Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469–1546). rGyan ’grel spyi don rol mtsho. Beijing: Krung go bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, 1989. Page 17 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition ’Jam dbyangs mchog lha ’od zer (1429–1500). Rwa stod bsdus grwa—Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi bsdus gzhung shes bya’i sgo ’byed rgol ngan glang po ’joms pa gdong lnga’i gad rgyangs rgyu rig lde mig. Dharamsala: Damchoe Sangpo, 1980. Paṇ chen bsod nams grags pa (1478–1554). Phar phyin mtha’ dpyod yum don yang gsal sgron me. Lhasa: Gangs can khyad nor dpe tshogs, 2009. Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182–1251). mKhas pa la ’jug pa’i sgo. In Sa paṇ Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan gyi gsung ’bum, Vol. 1, 459– 501. Lhasa, 1992. Further Reading Dreyfus, Georges. The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: The Education of a Tibetan Buddhist Monk. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Dreyfus, Georges. “What Is Debate For? The Rationality of Tibetan Debates and the Role of Humor.” Argumentation 22, no. 1 (2008): 43–58. Goldberg, Margaret. “Entity and Antimony in Tibetan Bsdus grwa Logic (Parts 1 & 2).” Journal of Indian Philosophy 13 (1985): 153–199 and 273–304. Hugon, Pascale. “Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and His Successors on the Classification of Arguments by Consequence (thal ʾgyur) Based on the Type of the Logical Reason.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 44 (2016): 883–938. Hugon, Pascale. “Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Argumentation by Consequence (thal ’gyur) (2): The Analysis of the Correspondence Between a Consequence and Its Reverse Form and the Thirteenfold Typology of Consequences.” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 39 (2016): 51–113. Jackson, David. The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III): Sa skya Paṇḍita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of Pramāṇa and Philosophical Debate. Wein, Austria: Universität Wien, 1987. Lempert, Michael. Discipline and Debate: The Language of Violence in a Tibetan Buddhist Monastery. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012. Onoda, Shunzo. Monastic Debate in Tibet: A Study on the History and Structures of Bsdus Grwa Logic. Wein, Austria: Universität Wien, 1992. Perdue, Daniel. Debate in Tibetan Buddhism. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1992. Perdue, Daniel. The Course in Buddhist Reasoning and Debate. Boston: Snow Lion, 2014. Samuels, Jonathan. “The Tibetan Institutionalisation of Disputation: Understanding a Medieval Monastic Practice.” Medieval Worlds 12 (2020): 96–120. Samuels, Jonathan. “Tours, Titles, and Tests: Issues of Scholastic Standardisation in Medieval Tibet.” Journal for the International Association of Buddhist Studies 43 (2020): 181–213. Sierksma, Fokke. “Rstod-pa: The Monachal Disputations in Tibet.” Indo-Iranian Journal 8, no. 2 (1964): 130–152. Page 18 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition Tillemans, Tom. Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and His Tibetan Successors. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999. Notes 1. As remarked by Georges Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: The Education of a Tibetan Buddhist Monk (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 5. The Indian centers survived until the 12th or 13th century. For more on them, see Hartmut Scharfe, Education in Ancient India (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 131–165. 2. It should be noted, more generally, that objections have been raised to usage of the term “medieval” in the Tibetan context. See Bryan Cuevas, “Some Reflections on the Periodization of Tibetan History,” Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 10 (2006): 44–55. 3. As attested by the accounts of Chinese pilgrims; Hartmut Scharfe, Education in Ancient India, 162. 5. On the phenomenon of court debate in India during the same era, see Johannes Bronkhorst, “Modes of Debate and Refutation of Adversaries in Classical and Medieval India: A Preliminary Investigation, ”Atinqvorvm Philosophia 1 (2007): 270–271. 5. For more on the medieval institutions of monastic learning, see Jonathan Samuels, “Tours, Titles, and Tests: Issues of Scholastic Standardisation in Medieval Tibet,” Journal for the International Association of Buddhist Studies 43 (2020): 181–213. 6. In his treatise “Entrance to Scholarship” (mKhas pa la ’jug pa’i sgo), Sakya Pandita (Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan, 1182–1251) voiced what appear to be objections to Sangpu practices. For a translation of the portion of this text relating to debate, see David Jackson, The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III): Sa skya Paṇḍita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of Pramāṇa and Philosophical Debate (Vienna: Universität Wien, 1987), 249–462. 7. For more on this, see Jonathan Samuels, “The Tibetan Institutionalisation of Disputation: Understanding a Medieval Monastic Practice,” Medieval Worlds 12 (2020): 96–120. 8. Ganden, Drepung, and Sera (dGa’ ldan, ’Bras spungs, and Se ra), which were for centuries the largest monasteries in the world. 9. See Filippo de Filippi, ed., An Account of Tibet, The Travels of Ippolito Desideri of Pistoia, S.J., 1712–1727 (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1937 [1932]), 185–186. 10. A large number of his writings have only recently resurfaced and have been published in the bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum (Sichuan: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2006). 11. For more on some of these features, see Samuels, “The Tibetan Institutionalisation of Disputation”; and Tom Tillemans, “Formal and Semantic Aspects of Tibetan Buddhist Logic,” in Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and His Tibetan Successors (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999), 117–149. 12. The contrasting place of debate, and contemporary monastic education more generally, have been dealt with most extensively in Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping, especially 229–266. 13. Footage of the 14th Dalai Lama’s debate examinations, from Lhasa in 1958 <https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=hbnKkuYR3Jk>, survives. Page 19 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023 Debate in the Tibetan Tradition 14. The following description is based on personal experience. As such, it represents debate in the Geluk system, as practiced between monks . But it is worth observing that no significant variations relating to religious affiliation, institution, region, or indeed gender have yet been reported with regard to the way that debate is conducted. 15. This is a prime example of one of the flaws of previous studies, most of which include “technical” terms for these two roles, which are not those used by debaters but derive from literary sources and belong to other contexts. 16. The gesture is clearly the same one referred to by Desideri, An Account of Tibet, 185. 17. For more on this feature, see Georges Dreyfus, “What Is Debate For? The Rationality of Tibetan Debates and the Role of Humor,” Argumentation 22, no. 1 (2008): 43–58. 18. Margaret Goldberg, “Entity and Antimony in Tibetan Bsdus grwa Logic (Parts 1 & 2),” Journal of Indian Philosophy 13 (1985): 153–199 and 273–304; Shunzo Onoda, Monastic Debate in Tibet: A Study on the History and Structures of Bsdus Grwa Logic (Vienna: Universität Wien, 1992); and Daniel Perdue, Debate in Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 1992). 19. Tom Tillemans, Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and His Tibetan Successors (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999); Pascale Hugon, “Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and His Successors on the Classification of Arguments by Consequence (thal ’gyur) Based on the Type of the Logical Reason,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 44 (2016): 883– 938; Pascale Hugon, “Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Argumentation by Consequence (thal ’gyur) (2): The Analysis of the Correspondence Between a Consequence and Its Reverse Form and the Thirteenfold Typology of Consequences,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 39 (2016): 51–113. 20. Fokke Sierksma, “Rstod-pa: The Monachal Disputations in Tibet,” Indo-Iranian Journal 8, no. 2 (1964): 130–152. 21. Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping, 195–228; Dreyfus, “What Is Debate For?”; Michael Lempert, Discipline and Debate: The Language of Violence in a Tibetan Buddhist Monastery (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Samuels, “Tours, Titles, and Tests; and Samuels, “The Tibetan Institutionalisation of Disputation.” 22. Kenneth Liberman, Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture: An Ethnomethodological Inquiry into Formal Reasoning (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 23. Samuels, “The Tibetan Institutionalisation of Disputation.” Related Articles Tibetan Book of the Dead (Bardo Thödol) Tibetan Buddhism and the Gesar Epic Page 20 of 20 Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Religion. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 29 June 2023