Representation and Republicanism: Two Views

Representation and Republicanism: Two Views Jean Yarbrough Loyola University In recent years, the concept of representation in the American founding has received considerable scholarly attention. Two of the most important studies have been The Creation of the American Republic: 1776 to 1787 by Gordon Wood and Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic by J.R. Pole.1 Both Pole and Wood believe that the constitution of the American republic marks a watershed in the theory of representation, though they assess this development differently. Wood and Pole agree that the architects of the constitution, and especially James Madison, sought to replace the representation of virtue, traditional in republics, with the representation of interests. For Wood, this means "the decline of classical politics," that is, the disappearance social homogeneity and the disintegration of the organic connection between the representative and his constituents on matters affecting the common good. Wood argues that the Federalists twisted the rhetoric of republicanism to create a liberal representative government based upon an "elitist theory of democracy." Wood's central concern is with the meaning and requirements of republican government, and with the kind of representation appropriate to it. Pole is both more and less critical of the founding than Wood. Although Pole also believes that the framers substituted for virtue the representation of material interests, he goes even further than Wood when he argues that "the representatives of interest were not obliged even in theory to consult for the public good" (p. 531). Instead of disinterested representatives deliberating about the common good, the common good is now understood to be nothing more than the balancing of conflicting interests. Jean Yarbrough, assistant professor of political science at Loyola University, teaches political philosophy and American political thought. 1 Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic: 1776 to 1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); J.R. Pole, Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). 77 78 Publius/Spring 1979 According to 2Pole, James Madison is the principal spokesman for this view. Pole criticizes Madison and the theory of interest group representation because he believes that . .. the need of interests, as interests, does not provide the theoretical basis for republican government. That basis can consist only of the equal representation of individuals, because equal and numerical representation is the only political foundation which provides that the demands of specific interests be measured according to a single standard (p. 535). Pole's search for a "single standard" is guided by his belief that "the problem of equity can be stated as a problem of measurement" (p. 536). Thus, it is only in spite of Madison that the founding made significant progress toward a democratic and egalitarian theory of representation. What mattered most of all for that time—the time of and the making of Constitutions—was the fact that individuals came to be counted as the basic units of representation. That they might be fewer in number than the whole population, that they might even constitute some sort of privileged elite, was less significant for the moment than the fact that they were now counted as individuals. Americans did not yet say "one manone vote," but they did say "one elector-one vote," and that by itself was a major breach . . . (p. 537). In contrast to Wood, Pole seems to accept the Federalists' equation of republicanism with representation; his emphasis is on the mechanics of democracy. Although Wood and Pole have helped to restore interest in American theories of representation, their different conclusions demonstrate that the debate is far from settled. Although I am indebted to both Wood and Pole for their careful historical research, I nevertheless disagree with both their interpretations. I am not persuaded that the Federalists believed that the purpose of representation was the representation of interests simply, or that they saw the public good as the sum total of private conflicting interests. Nor am I convinced by Wood's argument that republican government requires a homogeneity of interests to bind the representative to his constituents or by Pole's insistence that "equal and numerical representation" provides the "only foundation" for republican government. There may be compelling reasons for departing from the principle of "one man-one vote." Madison offers us one. To the extent that he defended the unequal representation of interests, his concern was not with pro'• Pole, Political Representation, p. 531. Representation and Republicanism 79 tecting special economic interests. As Pole himself notes,3 but then dismisses, Madison's defense of agrarianism was linked to his belief that agrarianism encouraged the habits and virtues necessary to preserve republican government. In this respect, Madison did not substitute interest for virtue, but relied upon certain interests to promote virtue. In this article, I shall argue that the Federalists believed that the purpose of representation was to improve upon direct democracy by refining the interests and opinions of the people. This does not make them either elitist democrats (as opposed to republicans) or interest group theoreticians. In fact, if any group was primarily concerned with the actual representation of distinct economic interests, it was the Anti-federalists. To this end, we shall examine the views of two leading Anti-federalists, Melancton Smith and Richard Henry Lee, and the two most prominent (and frequently misunderstood) Federalists, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. As we shall see, their views of representation were influenced by two different colonial experiences, though both the Anti-federalists and the Federalists transformed these respective theories to meet the requirements of their changing political situation. We shall focus especially on the Federalists' position and argue that their effort to make the colonial experience with virtual representation more compatible with republican government as they understood has obscured their intentions. As we shall see, the Federalists' equation of the right to vote with being represented is at once the key to their solution and the heart of the problem. I Two contradictory views of representation, one based upon their relationship to England, the other on their relationship to the colonial assemblies, established the horizon within which the debate over representation was carried on in America. On the one hand, the Americans were denied the right to send representatives of their own choosing to the British Parliament. The predominant view in England was that the colonies were "virtually" represented by their British counterparts. What virtual representation assumed was that the constituents did not need to elect their representatives in order to be represented by them. What made a representative "representative" was that he shared with his constituents, both those who elected him and those who did not, a mutuality of interests and sympathy of 3 Ibid., pp. 303-304. 80 Publius/Spring 1979 sentiments. This commonality, not election, was what bound them together. Virtual representation does not in itself, however, explain the representative function;4 rather it follows from a particular understanding of representation which rests, in turn, on a particular view of the political community. According to Edmund Burke, the classic exponent of this view, the political community has but one main interest, the good of the whole. The primary function of the representatives is to act as the deliberative body for the entire country and to arrive at, through rational discussion, a common understanding of the general good.5 In Burke's view, the representatives are the guides not the instruments of the people; their purpose is to improve not to mirror popular opinions. Accordingly, he rejects any attempt to make the representatives dependent upon their constituents, either by instruction or broader suffrage. The first of these restrictions is inconsistent with the deliberative function of the representative; the second, inconsequential at best. Since the purpose of representation is to obtain representatives capable of pursuing the public interest better than the people themselves, election is not an essential criterion of representation. Indeed, as long as there is a mutuality of interests between the representative and all his constituents, a select group of voters may actually choose a better representative of the people's true interests than the people themselves. The trouble with this view, as Burke also recognized, is that it assumed that there was a "communion of interests and sympathy in feelings and desires" between the British representatives and the colonists. Since this commonality was lacking, virtual representation could not injustice be applied to the Americans. The American rejection of virtual representation by the British did not, however, lead to a wholesale rejection by them of the purpose of representation implied by this principle,6 namely, 4 Wood tends to equate virtual representation with a communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments, while leaving out the reason why this commonality of interests was important: not everyone was allowed to vote. Thus, he is forced into such paradoxical statements as ". . . some sort of conception of virtual representation was a necessary concomitant of their republican ideology . . ." in American Republic, p. 188. 5 The Philosophy of Edmund Burke: A Selection from his Speeches and Writings, eds. Louis I. Bredvold and Ralph G. Ross (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1970), pp. 147-148. 6 Indeed, Americans did not reject the notion of virtual representation for certain groups in society, notably women, young men, and those who were without a tangible attachment to the community. In these cases it was assumed that the groups in question were represented because they shared a mutuality of interests with electors and representatives. See for example, Alexander Hamilton, The Papers ofAlexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) I: 105-107. For a discussion, see Wood, American Republic, pp. 179, 183. Representation and Republicanism 81 to secure as representatives men who would refine and enlarge the public views. Prominent political figures, ranging from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, all believed that republican government required the elevation of the best men, though they did not all agree on how to get the people to select such men as their representatives. Yet this was but one side of the colonial experience. At the same time that these revolutionary leaders were recommending men of merit, another and opposite move was afoot. Especially in New England, but throughout the thirteen states, local leaders argued that the only form of representation consistent with republican principles was an "actual" representation of the people.7 According to this view, republicanism required a close connection between the citizens and their representatives, for only then would the people feel confident that the laws reflected their wishes. Actual representation meant that the people were represented by someone who resembled them and reflected their interests. To further insure that they were "actually" represented, the people insisted upon annual elections, residence requirements for the representatives, and written instructions.8 The practice of instructing representatives in writing had a long history in America. From the beginning, the people believed they could instruct their representatives on how to vote because they believed that the function of the representative was to secure favorable decisions on local matters. The problem was that the people saw all issues from the standpoint of how they affected their particular community; consequently, they thought they were also competent to bind the representatives on matters concerning the common good. From their perspective, the particular and the general good were barely distinguishable. In both cases, the function of the representative was merely to transmit the views of his constituents to the assembly.9 This view of representation was open to criticism on two grounds. First, as James Madison argued, even if one knows what the views of his constituents are and is confident that these views will not change in the near future,10 the promotion of these views does not automatically result in the common good. On the contrary, if these views are not enlarged and refined, 7 See for example the arguments of Richard Henry Lee, "An Old Whig," and "Cato," in the Antifederalist Papers, ed. Morton Borden (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1965), pp. 3, 45-46, 38-39. 8 Wood, American Republic, p. 184; Pole, Political Representation, pp. 72 ff. 9 Wood, American Republic, pp. 190-191 10 James Madison, in The Records of the Federal Convention ofl 787, ed. Max Farrand, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), 1:215. 82 Publius/Spring 1979 they are likely to impede the general good. Consequently, the instruction view is defective because it does not recognize that there is frequently a tension between the local and the general good. An even more fundamental objection to the instruction view is that it fails on its own terms. Although instruction is intended to serve as a pragmatic solution to the problem of how to continue self-government in an extended territory, it is no substitute for pure democracy because each town directs its representatives on how to vote before the full question can be heard.11 Whereas pure democracy allows the general body to deliberate about questions concerning the whole, instruction requires that the issues be determined by the different parts before the substitute for the whole is ever assembled. In spite of these difficulties, the use of written instructions actually increased during the early years of the revolution.12 Apparently, the distrust of independent public officials and the revulsion to virtual representation was so great that instruction appeared to be essential to the preservation of liberty. Only later did the difficulties resulting from the extreme narrowness of this view become manifest, and cause a retreat from this radical position. From the foregoing, we can see how instruction, as a means of mirroring democracy, was as defective at one end of the political spectrum as virtual representation, as a means of improving democracy, was inappropriate at the other. Consequently, supporters of both positions were compelled to discover new ways of encouraging the kind of representation they believed was compatible with republican government. Those who held that representation is merely a substitute for pure democracy gradually stopped insisting upon written instructions. Given the broad suffrage and restrictions placed upon public officials, they came to feel that they could trust their representative if he shared their socio-economic condition, a requirement quite easily met in the small electoral districts of the states. As long as the representative resembled his constituents, it was assumed that he would reflect their interests and opinions. This was consistent with the view of republican government as mild government, where the people voluntarily obey the laws because they have confidence that the laws reflect their wishes.13 In fact, reflection improves 11 Pole, Political Representation, pp. 541-542. Wood, American Republic, pp. 189-191. 13 Richard Henry Lee, An Additional Number of Letters from the Federal Farmer to a Republican (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1962), p. 51. 12 Representation and Republicanism 83 upon the instruction view because it encourages responsiveness without preventing deliberation. In this respect, reflection is actually more consistent with the view of representation as a pragmatic solution to the problem of pure democracy in an extended territory than is the more radical instruction view. On the other hand, supporters of the view that representation should improve upon pure democracy could not rely upon virtual representation (at least not for free white males) as a device for securing a refined representation. Indeed, their solution was the very opposite of virtual representation: they sought to encourage the selection of the best men by making the right to vote the sole criterion of representation.14 The key to this proposal lay in the constitution of the large republic. By greatly expanding the size of the electoral district for federal representatives, supporters of refinement hoped to use the broad suffrage to elevate the best men. This was consistent with their view of republican government as representative democracy, which protects the rights of all without violating the cardinal principle of majority rule. Whether to depart from the model of small commercial republics loosely united in confederation and to erect one federal republic with the authority to draw the states into closer union, brought to the fore the question of what republican government meant. On the one side the Anti-federalists opposed the plan because they held, with Montesquieu, that republican governments must remain small.15 Civic virtue and civil liberty demanded the close attachment of the people to their government. Only in a small homogeneous community could there be an equality of manners and similarity of habits to dispose the people to obey the law. The Anti-federalists also questioned how far the bonds of political obligation could be extended.16 There are natural limits to human care and confidence which make it necessary to restrict the size of republican government. Republican government depends upon the vigilance of the people and this, in turn, requires them to feel all threats to the republic as if they were threats to themselves. For all these reasons, they 14 For a different perspective, see Wood, American Republic, pp. 378 ff. Charles Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1949), p. 120. For a discussion of the difficulties of this position, see Herbert J. Storing, "The Problem of Big Government," in A Nation of States, ed. Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1964), pp. 65-87. For a discussion of the Antifederalist's position, see the classic essay by Cecilia Kenyon," The Political Thought of The Antifederalists," introduction to The Antifederalists (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill and Co., 1966). 16 George Clinton, "Cato," in Borden, Anti-federalist Papers, p. 38. 15 84 Publius/Spring 1979 insisted that republican liberty and virtue are subject to spatial limitations. But perhaps their greatest objection to the extended republic was that it did not provide a sufficient number of representatives to reflect accurately society as a whole. Size made it impossible for every interest in America to send a representative to Congress, but those groups which did not were not truly represented and, hence, in danger of losing their liberty. Although the constitution permitted most citizens to participate in the election of their representatives, election by itself was insufficient to make a representative truly representative. What the Anti-federalists objected to was this completely formal definition of representation. To be truly representative, the representative had not only to be elected by those whom he was to represent, but he had to come from the same social class and occupation, and he had faithfully to reflect the views of his constituents. Only then could liberty, as the Anti-federalists understood it, be secure. For liberty meant mild government, and mild government depended upon the confidence of the citizens which in turn required the representatives to be "a true picture" of the society so that they might act like the people themselves. As we have seen, the crux of the Anti-federalist argument was that representation is but a substitute for the meeting of the people in person. Accordingly, a fair and equal representation is that in which the interests, feelings, opinions, and views of the people are collected, in such manner as they would be were the people all assembled.17 From this perspective, there were two problems with the constitution. It provided too few representatives to allow the actual representation of the different classes by members of those classes. And it favored the upper classes. Because the number of representatives was so limited, the office would be "highly elevated and distinguished." No less than the Federalists, the Anti-federalists recognized that this would encourage the candidacy and election of only the most distinguished citizens. When we call on thirty or forty thousand inhabitants to unite in giving their votes for one man, it will be uniformly impracticable for them to unite in any men, except those few who have become eminent for their civil or military rank, or their popular legal abilities . . .18 17 Lee, Additional Letters, p. 57. See also Kenyon, "Political Thought of Antifederalists," pp. XLDC-LXI. 18 Lee, ibid., p. 74. Representation and Republicanism 85 But whereas the Federalists were pleased to call this a refinement, the Anti-federalists considered it a partial and inadequate representation which reflected only the interests of the few. It was not that the Anti-federalists objected to the reflection of upper class interests as such, but they objected to the Federalists' view that these great men could represent that portion of the community which was not great. Rather, they argued, the non-great need their own representatives because there is no connection between these groups. The great "cannot have that sympathy with their constituents which is necessary to connect them closely to their [the non-greats'] interests"19 and, hence, can never fully or adequately represent them. The aim of the Anti-federalists then was not to substitute the non-great for the great, but to increase the number of representatives so that both classes would be represented by their own kind. But was an increase in numbers by itself sufficient to obtain a "true picture of the people"? Here the Anti-federalists divided. Melancton Smith, who debated Alexander Hamilton at the New York Ratifying Convention, argued that it was, while Richard Henry Lee, who wrote as the "Federal Farmer" in Virginia, insisted that it was not. Their arguments are impartant for an understanding of representation because they rest on different assumptions about the nature of society and the relations among the various social classes. Melancton Smith believed that increasing the size of the lower house would insure an adequate representation because he thought the increase would strengthen the middling classes. Although Smith wished to see both classes represented, he did not want to balance them; he wished to see the middling classes, especially the "substantial yeomanry", predominate. Smith's defense of this group rests on two assumptions: the middle classes are more virtuous and better able to pursue the common good. Not only are they "more temperate, of better morals, and less ambition,"20 but they can understand the views and feelings of all the people and pursue their true interests. In this instance. Smith further assumes that there is a connection between the interests of the middle classes and the good of the whole.21 Thus, although he rejected the argument that there is a natural connection between the upper classes and the middle and lower classes which would qualify the rich to represent the non-rich, 19 Melancton Smith, in The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, ed. J o n a t h a n Elliott, 5 vols. (Philadelphia: J . B . Lippincott Company, 1901) 11:248. 20 Smith, 11:247. 21 Ibid., 11:248. 86 Publius/Spring 1979 Smith does not reject the principle that one class can represent the interests of another. Though he does believe that the capacity to bind society together lies with the middle, rather than the upper classes. Whereas the "great consider themselves above the common people," and are not likely to sympathize with their pains and labors, the middle classes are in a position to understand the interests of both the rich and the poor. They are not so prosperous that they do not feel the burden of taxation, but they are not so poor that they are unconcerned with the protection of property. Thus, Smith concludes, "when . . . this class in society pursue their own 22 interest, they promote that of the public, for it is involved in it." What Smith is actually arguing for is not an actual representation of all the different interests or "a true picture of the people," but an increase in middle class representation. In part, this is because he recognized that a true picture was practically impossible. A "representation from the United States could not be so constituted as to represent completely the feelings and interests of the people" as a whole because a "complete representation would make the legislature too numerous."23 But more importantly, it is because he believes that the interests of the middle class are the most closely allied with the good of the whole. Although Smith rightly draws our attention to the political importance of the middle classes, his argument remains unconvincing for two reasons. First, if the middle classes comprise a majority of the population, then would it not be in the interests of whomever is elected to pursue their interests? And second, even if the middle classes do tend to be more moderate, what will incline them toward the interests of the poor, especially when the poor are the minority? As long as the purpose of representation is to reflect the interests and views of one's constituents, whom the representative resembles, there does not seem to be a way out of this dilemma. Moreover, even if we were to accept Smith's argument, his proposal is subject to one great practical difficulty. There is no guarantee that simply by increasing the number of representatives more of the middle classes will be elected. It is true that smaller electoral districts may facilitate middle class entry into government, but if elections are free, this outcome is not assured. Furthermore, even if smaller districts do tend to encourage middle class representation, there is no guarantee that each of the different occupational interests will be elected according to its relative strength. The only way to 22 23 Ibid., 11:248. Ibid., 11:248. Representation and Republicanism 87 achieve a proportional representation of group interests would be to build these requirements into the electoral process. Yet in a society where class lines and socio-economic interests are so fluid, such a solution may raise more problems than it solves. This is indeed a dilemma for Smith, for at the same time that he denies a commonality of interests between the few and the many, thereby making the representation of middle class interests by middle class representatives essential, he is unwilling to institutionalize class or occupational distinctions to insure the election of the middle class. Richard Henry Lee was not. Unlike Melancton Smith, Lee believed that liberty required the division of society into aristocratic and democratic orders, each with their own representatives. Only by balancing these two "natural classes of men" against each other and, further, by keeping the number of representatives in the "natural democracy" large enough to reflect the various economic interests "in proportion to what they have to gain or lose," could "free and mild" government be preserved.24 This solution is more consistent with the view that there is no natural connection between the aristocratic and democratic orders and, therefore, that to be represented, more than mere election is necessary. As Lee puts it, It is deceiving a people to tell them they are electors, and can chuse their legislators if they cannot in the nature of things chuse men from among themselves, and genuinely like themselves.25 But such a solution is deeply paradoxical: the liberty of the people is made to depend upon the institutionalization of a permanent aristocratic class. Moreover, despite their differences, Lee's solution is open to many of the same objections as Smith's. Like Smith, Lee's proposals obscure the plight of the poor: Lee seems to take for granted that the middle classes will represent the entire democratic order, for he makes no mention of lower class representation. Yet this silence is even less justified in Lee's case, since he makes no special claim for the middle class. Moreover, although Lee is willing to divide society into two orders, he does not formally divide the democratic order into different interests. Yet this means that he cannot insure that these different economic interests will elect someone like themselves or that they will even recognize themselves as a distinct interest. For the recognition of the principle of interest inevitably 24 25 Lee, Additional Letters. . ., p. 6 1 . Ibid., Additional Letters. . ., p. 59. 88 Publius/Spring 1979 leads to the splintering of all such groups. Upon closer analysis, it turns out that both these spokesmen for the Anti-federalists were more concerned with strengthening the middle class against upper class encroachments than they were with securing a "true picture" of the whole society. But insofar as they attempted to safeguard the rights of the middle class by a greater emphasis upon interest group representation, their influence is still felt. Dissatisfaction with the equation of election and representation frequently results in a renewed interest in reflection. Contemporary critics point to the need for greater attention to group interests, be they economic, sexual, racial, or ethnic. The Anti-federalists may have lost the battle for the constitution, but their arguments, stripped of their colonial extremism, continue to inform our thinking about the purpose of representation. The intellectual heirs of the Antifederalists are the proponents of interest group representation, who stress the reflection of group interests as a means of securing individual rights. Ill The framers of the constitution did not share the traditional view that republican government requires smallness and homogeneity. Based on their experience with the state governments, they concluded that the small republic breeds faction, not virtue, and is unable to protect liberty. When the representatives are closely tied to their constituents, they are likely to reflect their wishes all too faithfully, without regard for the rights of minorities. For this reason, supporters of the constitution could not accede to the Anti-federalists' demand that the federal representation be substantially increased. Unlike their opponents, they believed that liberty required the representatives to be more independent of their constituents' wishes. The architects of the constitution sought to join the states in an extended federal republic because they were convinced by the arguments of David Hume that largeness would help combat the evils of faction.26 But, as Douglass Adair has27shown, Hume's arguments were altered to fit American needs. Thus, Madison 26 David H u m e , "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," in Political Essays, ed. Charles Hendel (Indianapolis: T h e Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1953), pp. 145-158. For a discussion of H u m e ' s influence, see Douglass Adair, " "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science': David H u m e , J a m e s Madison, and t h e Tenth Federalist," in Fame and the Founding Fathers: Essays by Douglass Adair, ed. H. Trevor Colbourn (New York: W. W. Hamilton Norton & Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 93-106. Also, Gerald Stourzh, Alexander and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 119. 27 Adair, "Politics Reduced to a Science," pp. 97-103. Representation and Republicanism 89 tended to stress the multiplicity of interests and sects generated by the large republic as the first means of thwarting faction, but both he and his colleagues also expected that largeness would encourage a different kind of representation, one more favorable to the preservation of liberty. For this reason, the debate over the constitution was in part a debate over the purpose of representation in a republican government. The Federalists believed that the purpose of representation is to refine the wishes of the people and to deliberate about the common good. Though they were indebted to the British, and especially Edmund Burke,28 for this understanding of the purpose of representation, the means by which they obtained this representation were very different. Whereas British practice restricted election (which was possible because the British did not consider the right to vote essential to the question of representation), the Federalists made election the fundamental characteristic of representation, and representation29(thus defined) the fundamental characteristic of republicanism. In this way, they were able to improve upon popular government without violating the principle of majority rule. Despite the importance of representation to the framers' understanding of republican government, nowhere is this principle discussed systematically. Like their opponents, the framers were concerned with practical politics, not with developing a systematic theory of representation. Still, from their discussion of such practical matters as the size of the electoral district, the principle of voting, and the relationship between the representative and his constituents, it is possible to piece together a more comprehensive view. We shall concentrate on the arguments of Madison0 and Hamilton as they are presented in the Federalist Papers? especially those papers dealing with the House of Representatives. From an analysis of these papers, we can gain some insight into Federalists' position on the purpose of representation, who the representatives should be, and what binds them to the people they represent. 28 Although David H u m e also speaks of refining the democracy, his discussions seem to be limited to the means by which this refinement is to be obtained, t h a t is, to proposals for t h e indirect election of high officials. 29 For a n extended discussion of this point, see Murray Dry, "Representation and Republican Government in t h e American Founding" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1970). Also, Wood, American Republic, pp. 378 ff. 30 This discussion is not intended to provide a comprehensive account of the Federalists' view of representation in t h e House a n y more t h a n Lee a n d Smith can be presumed to speak for all the Anti-federalists. Nevertheless, it is one of the most import a n t sources for understanding certain key themes. For a full discussion of these themes, see Martin Diamond, "The Federalist," in History of Political Philosophy, eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1972), pp. 631-651. 90 Publius/Spring 1979 In the Federalist Papers, Madison discusses the advantages of the large electoral district for representatives to the lower house of the legislature. Madison and Hamilton support the large electoral district because it tends to encourage the election of the most qualified individuals. When voters must choose one from a great number, it is likely that only the most distinguished citizens will be known throughout the district. Moreover, as Hamilton observed, in a large district the rich and influential are less able to manipulate the votes of the poor because the poor of the district are not all dependent upon the same employer for their livelihood as they are likely to be in a smaller area. Consequently, the election is more apt to reflect the wishes of the community as a whole.31 Thus the first reason why Hamilton and Madison defend the large electoral district is because it makes the principle of popular election safe. The expanded electoral district solves the problem of how to select the best men without restricting the right to vote. In other words, the Federalists support of popular election does not so much depend upon its faith in the judgment and inclination of the people to choose the most talented, but on the tendency of the large electoral district to encourage the people to select such men. Moreover, not only does the large electoral district encourage the choice of qualified individuals; once elected, it encourages the representatives to enlarge and refine the views and interests of the people they represent. Because the congressional district encompasses a variety of interests and views, the representatives are not strictly tied to any one interest or opinion and, therefore, may consider each of these concerns from the standpoint of how it affects the district as a whole as well as the general good. Thus, the diversity of interests and opinions within the electoral district operates in much the same way as the multiplicity of interests and sects within the extended republic to encourage moderation and independence in the individual representative. Finally, the large electoral district contributes to refined representation in still a third way. These districts encourage rational discourse among the representatives by insuring that even the lower house of the legislature, the most popular of the federal offices, will remain small enough to deliberate calmly and dispassionately. For Madison understood that whenever the legislature grows too large, reason and deliberation give way to passion and confusion. And although numbers alone are suffi31 Hamilton, in Elliott, The Debates, 11:256-257, but cf. 1:147. Representation and Republicanism 91 cient to insure the dominance of passion, what further insures the triumph of irrationality is that the increase in numbers usually results in an increase in mediocre men.32 These conditions may indeed reflect society as a whole, but this is precisely why representation, even in the most popular branch of government, must do more than approximate pure democracy. The representatives should not try to imitate the people themselves because the people in their confusion and intemperance are incapable of "regular deliberation and concerted measures."33 Hence to duplicate these conditions in the legislature by encouraging the selection of representatives who merely reflect the narrow interests and views of their constituents and who are too numerous to act reasonably defeats the very purpose of republican government. In short, then, Madison's and Hamilton's support of refined representation rests on their understanding of how the ends of republican government, namely, the protection of the rights of all in a manner consistent with majority rule, can best be achieved. It is from this larger perspective that the principle of popular election must be seen. From the Federalist's discussion of the large electoral district we have inferred that Madison and Hamilton believe the purpose of representation is to improve upon pure democracy by selecting the best men "to refine and enlarge the public views." Still, two questions remain: who, more precisely, are the "best" men, and what will insure their fidelity to constituents whose interests and opinions are different from theirs? Then as now, critics argue that there is no connection between the various interests and social groups which can bind one to the other. This is why each group needs its own representative and why the elevation of the so-called best men actually results in a partial representation which reflects only the interests of the ruling class. Seen from this perspective, election by itself is insufficient to make the representatives truly representative. To be truly representative, public officials must not only be elected by those whom they are to represent, but they must also resemble them and reflect their interests. For without the actual representation of these interests, the rights of these groups will not be protected because there is nothing to bind the representatives to constituents when they do not share their interests. 32 The Federalist Papers, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961). Federalist No. 58, p. 396. 33 Federalist No. 48, p. 333; No. 58, p. 396. 92 Publius/Spring 1979 The defenders of the constitution must answer the charge that the government will degenerate into oligarchy since the representatives "will be taken from that class of citizens most likely to aim at an ambitious aggrandizement of the few."34 Madison and Hamilton give two reasons why this will not happen. First, the constitution provides institutional checks which remind the representative that his own interests lie in faithfully pursuing the wishes of his constituents. Second, their view of the "best" men transcends the realm of interest group politics and, thus, makes the representation of each interest by a member of that interest unnecessary. These arguments have been most fully developed in Federalist No. 35.35 But the problem with his paper is that Hamilton offers so many reasons why an actual representation of all classes is unnecessary and undesirable that 36the main thrust of his argument is usually misinterpreted. At the outset, Hamilton suggests that the merchant is the "natural patron and friend" of the mechanic and manufacturing classes. He then goes on to assert that all who are engaged in agriculture, from the poorest tenant farmer to the most opulent landowner, share a mutual interest. Both these arguments suggest that Hamilton viewed society as an organic whole, in which the various economic and social interests were hierarchically linked. Consequently, critics have objected that Hamilton's argument is deficient because it did not pay sufficient attention to the disintegrating factors at work in the modern pluralistic society Hamilton helped to shape. If this were all Hamilton had to say, there would be some truth to the assertion that Hamilton's understanding of representation is defective because it rests on an outmoded view of society. But Hamilton himself indicates that there are difficulties with his arguments.37 At various times, he suggests that the poor and middle classes may find that the upper classes do not have their interests sufficiently in mind. What are these classes to do then? Certainly Hamilton does not suggest that they should elect someone like themselves to represent them. But neither does he leave them to the mercy of the rich. 34 Federalist No. 57, p . 384. For a fuller discussion of this paper, see m y article, "Some Thoughts on the Federalist's View of Representation," Polity, forthcoming. 36 See for example, Wood, American Republic, pp. 179, 188; Pole, Political Representation, pp. 375-376; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1948), p. 9. For a different interpretation, see William B. Allen, "Federal Representation: T h e Design of t h e Thirty-fifth Federalist Paper," Publius 6, no. 3 (Summer 1976): 61-72. 37 Federalist No. 35, p. 221; No. 36, p. 239. 35 Representation and Republicanism 93 Instead he suggests that they choose someone from the professional classes, by which he chiefly means the lawyers. The difference between the members of the learned professions and the merchants and the landowners is that the members of the learned professions "truly form no distinct interest in society"38 and, consequently, are more likely to pursue the interests of the people with greater impartiality. It is the neutrality of the lawyers "to the rivalships between the different branches of industry" which explains why the people are more inclined to trust them to represent their interests and protect their rights.39 This does not mean that lawyers are completely disinterested. What Hamilton seems to suggest is that their interests are more likely to be political than economic, and that this will redound to the advantage of the people, since the lawyers will be inclined to pursue the interests of their constituents in order to remain in office. Although in principle this also applies to the wealthy merchants and opulent landowners, the likelihood of a conflict between their economic interests and their political ambitions makes a satisfactory resolution more problematic. Clearly then, Hamilton does not rely upon sheer disinterestedness to insure the loyalty of the lawyers to their constituents. What keeps even the best men faithful to their trust is that the distribution of public power makes it in their interest to be faithful: they are dependent upon their constituents for reelection. In the case of the lawyers, this reliance upon institutions designed to appeal to personal motives takes on added importance, since it is precisely their impartiality with respect to the great economic interests which makes the lawyers preferable as representatives, but which prevents either the natural connection or mutuality of interests from explaining why they will remain loyal to their constituents. In short then, Hamilton's intention is not simply to make the lower and middle classes dependent upon the rich, but rather, to place them in the position of having to choose between the representative of his particular interest who is rich and well known and the impartial lawyer, thereby encouraging them to choose the lawyer. In other words, Hamilton's alternative to the actual representation of all interests is to encourage the people, in part 38 Federalist No. 35, p. 220. Federalist No. 35, p. 221. Also, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Phillips Bradley, 2 vols. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966) 1:279. What Hamilton and Tocqueville have in mind are lawyers schooled in the great common law tradition. A respect for procedure and tradition, as well as an appreciation of the importance of institutions in preserving liberty distinguishes them from ordinary lawyers as well as merchants and farmers whose interest is private and whose motive is profit. 39 94 Publius/Spring 1979 through the tendency of large electoral districts, to elect representatives who are not spokesmen for any narrow social or economic issue, but who possess the impartiality and comprehensiveness of vision to transcend the domain of interest group politics, and to pursue particular interests only insofar as they are consistent with the interests common to the whole. It is Hamilton who spells out who the representatives should be if their purpose is to improve upon pure democracy, but it is the Madisonian analysis of society which gives urgency to this position. For whereas Hamilton at least pays lip service to the argument that republican government can only exist where there is a natural connection among the various parts, or where the parts are at least bound together by common interests, Madison sees society as diverse and fragmented.40 For Madison, this presents no difficulty for refined representation (on the contrary, as we shall see, it actually increases the need for such representatives), because natural connections and common interests (in the sense of identical socio-economic interests) are not the bonds which unite the representatives to their constituents. Rather, "duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people."41 In this respect, Madison and Hamilton agree that appeal to the personal motives of the representatives, coupled with a due dependence upon the people, will create, even where one does not previously or naturally exist, a "communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments" between the representatives and the people sufficient to guard against tyranny. Indeed, having provided "every security which can be devised or desired," to insure their loyalty, Madison states in Federalist No. 10 that the need for the most distinguished citizens actually increases as society becomes more heterogeneous and splintered. For when society is seen as a conglomeration of clashing interests, each of which it is impossible to actually represent, the best way to avoid a representation of some interests to the exclusion of others is to elect men "whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and schemes of injustice."42 In other words, to elect men capable of transcending these narrow socio-economic concerns because their own interests do not lie in the advancement of their economic situation. 40 Federalist No. 10. Federalist No. 57, p. 387; also Hamilton in Elliott, The Debates, 11:252. ^Federalist No. 10, p. 62. 41 Representation and Republicanism 95 For Gordon Wood, however, this vision of society as well as the kind of representation which the Federalist recommends as appropriate to it are incompatible with republicanism. In the Creation of the American Republic Wood argues that republican government requires an organic conception of society in which there is "a devotion to the transcendent public good" (p. 179). For Wood, this transcendent good "logically presume"[s] a mutuality of interests between the representative and his constituents. Only when the people have the same needs and interests and there is a conception of the public good which is distinct and prior to all private interests is rule by the best "comprehensible" (p. 517). For it is the existence of a common good to which all are dedicated which alone justifies the elevation of the "elite." The crucial question then is: can there be a common good in the extended republic? Here Madison and Wood seem to disagree. Although Wood acknowledges that Madison, in constructing the extended republic with its multiplicity of interests and sects, "had by no means abandoned the idea that the public good was the goal of government," (p. 505) he implies that Madison is mistaken. In a heterogeneous society like America there can be no transcendent public good. Consequently, when the "elite" are the representatives, they will be guided by their own "distinct professional, social, or economic interests" (p. 517). Wood admits that "institutional devices" may help keep these representatives loyal, but he insists that republicanism requires a stronger bond between the members of society and their representatives. Without an "organic wholeness" to society, where all recognize the same common good because all have the same needs and interests, rule by the best becomes merely rule by the elite, who interpret the common good through their own eyes. This seems to be what Wood means when he speaks of "the social bias underlying . . . [the Federalists'] expectations for their federal remedy" (p. 506). Central to Wood's thesis is the "assumption of organic social homogeneity upon which republicanism rest[s]" (p. 492). Curiously, however, Wood never considers whether this organic unity in fact ever existed and, if it did, whether it is desirable. Yet even those defenders of classical republicanism, from Plutarch up to Montesquieu and Rousseau, have insisted that this homogeneity, if it is possible at all (it is questionable whether the Roman Republic fits this description), can only be promoted by measures hostile to personal liberty. But Wood does not take up this question. In fact, he seems altogether unaware of its implications. In this respect, it is significant that Wood 96 Publius/Spring 1979 stresses the homogeneity of interests, and not opinion, when developing his theory of republicanism. Wood must omit the representation of opinion if he is to minimize the illiberal implications of his argument. Yet even if, ignoring the Federalist's view of representation, which includes opinions as well as interests, we consider only interest, Wood's failure to acknowledge the political price of this "organic social43homogeneity" makes his argument seem dangerously romantic. Like Wood, J.R. Pole tends to romanticize republicanism. He too contrasts the disinterested representative consulting only for the sake of the common good with the "explicit representation of interests" encouraged by the Federalists. But unlike Wood, Pole concludes that Madison, as the advocate of such representation, had no vision of the common good independent of private interests. The best that a theorist like Madison could do, when faced with the inevitability of some form of interest representation, was to argue that the public good would be served by the balancing of interests (p. 531). This is a common interpretation of Madison's position,44 but I believe it is mistaken. It is, as I have tried to show, the Antifederalists, and their successors, the advocates of interest group representation, who argue that the public good consists in reflecting and reconciling the claims of conflicting interests. To be sure, the demands of interest groups play an important role in the Federalist, but both Madison and Hamilton maintain that the public good is independent of particular private interests. What these "permanent and aggregate interests" are, the authors of the Federalist, largely in deference to the political sensibilities of the states, set forth only in the most general terms,45 but the virtue of refined representation is that it does indeed recognize such a distinction and seeks, through the election of the best men, to promote both these concerns: responsiveness to constituents and care for the common good of society. 43 This romanticism points to the essential defect of Wood's argument. On the one hand, he adopts a strict definition of republicanism because he wants to distinguish it from liberal democracy. But on the other hand, his definition is not strict enough, for he omits from his definition those elements of classical republicanism which are too illiberal, such as the regulation of wealth and civil religion. Moreover, although Wood is entirely correct in stressing the republican concern with character, he does not consider the extent to which republican virtue depended upon participation as opposed to representation. Consequently, there is something decidedly unrepublican in the strict sense about Wood's concern with representation. 44 Also, Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 191-208. 45 See especially, Federalist No. 23, pp. 146-147; No. 45, p. 313. Representation and Republicanism 97 IV In conclusion, what Madison and Hamilton do is take the British concern with refined representation and turn it completely around to meet the requirements of republicanism. The British encouraged the selection of the best men by relying upon virtual representation, or the disenfranchisement of portions of the community. They could do this because the essential criterion of representation was not the right to vote, but that the representative was linked to his constituents by a mutuality of interests. If the representative shared the same interests as his constituents, he was truly representative; if he did not, he was not, so that in either case suffrage was beside the point. The Federalists secured refined representation by just the opposite means. Recognizing that the people would never accept a constitution which deprived them of the right to vote, the framers had to devise some means of promoting the candidacy of the best men which was consistent with the republican principle of popular election. Their solution was the extended electoral district, a necessary concomitant of the extended republic. By increasing the ratio of constituents to representatives, they were able to secure the best men and yet allow for widespread suffrage. To increase the size of the electoral district required, however, the rejection of the principle of mutuality of interests as the essential criterion of representation. For as the Anti-federalists properly recognized, mutuality of interests could not operate in a large heterogeneous community because it required a close connection between the representative and his constituents. Yet, as the Federalists recognized, such a connection might prove fatal where widespread suffrage was allowed, since it would encourage the election of men with local views and narrow minds. Instead of mutuality of interests, the Federalists, counting upon the tendency of the large electoral district to elevate only the most distinguished citizens, made popular election the essential criterion of representation. What makes the representative "representative" is not that he shares the interests (in the sense of identical socio-economic interests) of his constituents, but that he is elected by them. And it is, in turn, election which insures his loyalty, since he is dependent upon the votes of his constituents for his continuance in office. Thus by making popular election the essential characteristic of representation, and representation the essential characteristic of republicanism, the Federalists invented an entirely novel way to secure the best citizens without violating the principle of majority rule. 98 Publius/Spring 1979 Still, this solution is not without its difficulties. By making the right to vote the essential criterion of representation, it has helped to make questions concerning the mechanics of voting central to the debate over representation. For we reason if participation in the election of our public officials is what makes them our representatives, then this participation should be as equal as possible. Ironically, it is not in spite of the Federalists theory of representation, but partly because of it, that we have come to focus on the principle of one man, one vote. But unlike Pole, who defends this principle for its own sake because it provides a "single standard" by which to measure different interests, Madison and Hamilton remind us of the reason why election is important. Election is important because it provides a means of encouraging the best men to seek office without having to deny citizens of the republic the right to vote. By reminding us of the purpose of election, the authors of the Federalist help us to focus on what they consider to be the fundamental question for republican government, namely, how we are to secure as representatives those individuals best able to preserve our rights and the rights of others.46 46 Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "Impartial Representation," in Representation and Misrepresentation, ed. Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1968) pp. 91-114. Also, Harry Jaffa, "The Nature and Origin of the American Party System," in Equality and Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 3-41, esp. pp. 26-30.