Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.
To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser.
Ethics & Medics, November 2014
…
4 pages
1 file
Originally written for the National Catholic Bioethics Center, this paper is an attempt to answer the question "when can pacemakers and ICDs be deactivated?" in accordance with the teachings of the Catholic Church.
Pacing and Clinical …, 2008
Background: Clinicians may receive requests to deactivate pacemakers and implantable cardioverterdefibrillators (ICDs) in terminally ill patients. Methods: We describe practices and attitudes regarding deactivation of pacemakers and ICDs in terminally ill patients among physicians, nurses, and others who manage treatment of patients with implanted cardiac devices and among field representatives of device manufacturers. A Web-based survey was provided to Heart Rhythm Society members and to representatives of two manufacturers of implantable cardiac devices. Measurements were the answers of 787 respondents. Results: Of the respondents, 86.8% reported involvement in requests for ICD deactivation and 77.6% reported involvement in pacemaker deactivation (P < 0.001). Having cared for a terminally ill patient for whom the respondent or a physician had ordered device deactivation was common (95.4% for ICDs vs 84.8% for pacemakers; P < 0.001). Having personally deactivated a device was also common (92.4% for ICDs vs 76.6% for pacemakers; P < 0.001). More respondents said they were comfortable with personally deactivating an ICD than deactivating a pacemaker (56.7% for ICDs vs 34.4% for pacemakers; P < 0.001). Respondents reported that the industry representative is the individual who deactivates the device most of the time (59.3% for ICDs and 49.7% for pacemakers).
Circulation: Arrhythmia and Electrophysiology, 2009
Circulation: Heart Failure, 2012
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 2009
A 68-year-old patient who suffered from gastric cancer diagnosed 8 months earlier presented with multiple peritoneal and hepatic metastasis, despite several rounds of chemo-and radiotherapy. After admission to hospital, his general condition quickly became severely compromised. He was nearly emaciated, despite being on partial parenteral feeding. Four years earlier, due to a cardiac arrhythmia that was refractory to medication, the patient had a cardiac pacemaker (CPM) implanted, regulated to go off at frequencies of below 70 beats per minute. Given the patient's terminal situation, the team started developing some doubts about the pacemaker's effects during his dying process. The patient had mentioned his intention to donate his pacemaker after his death, but had not asked for its deactivation. The specialists were not sure about the effect of the pacemaker in unnecessarily prolonging the patient's final hour. Nevertheless, they opposed deactivation, which they considered ethically uncertain. The family, who had been initially for the deactivation, decided against it. The patient's condition was progressively deteriorating, as he was falling into a state of sopor and, later, into a coma. This moribund phase stretched over 10 days, with a cardiac frequency invariably fixed at 70 beats per minute (BPM), which is explained by the action of the pacemaker.
Medical Devices: Evidence and Research, 2011
Population aging and broader indications for the implant of cardiac implantable electronic devices (CIEDs) are the main reasons for the continuous increase in the use of pacemakers (PMs), implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs) and devices for cardiac resynchronization therapy (CRT-P, CRT-D). The growing burden of comorbidities in CIED patients, the greater complexity of the devices, and the increased duration of procedures have led to an augmented risk of infections, which is out of proportion to the increase in implantation rate. CIED infections are an ominous condition, which often implies the necessity of hospitalization and carries an augmented risk of in-hospital death. Their clinical presentation may be either at pocket or at endocardial level, but they can also manifest themselves with lone bacteremia. The management of these infections requires the complete removal of the device and subsequent, specific, antibiotic therapy. CIED failures are monitored by competent public authorities, that require physicians to alert them to any failures, and that suggest the opportune strategies for their management. Although the replacement of all potentially affected devices is often suggested, common practice indicates the replacement of only a minority of devices, as close follow-up of the patients involved may be a safer strategy. Implantation of a PM or an ICD may cause problems in the patients' psychosocial adaptation and quality of life, and may contribute to the development of affective disorders. Clinicians are usually unaware of the psychosocial impact of implanted PMs and ICDs. The main difference between PM and ICD patients is the latter's dramatic experience of receiving a shock. Technological improvements and new clinical evidences may help reduce the total burden of shocks. A specific supporting team, providing psychosocial help, may contribute to improving patient quality of life.
Congestive Heart Failure, 2010
Background: Indications for implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs) in heart failure (HF) are expanding and may include more than 1 million patients. This study examined patient expectations from ICDs for primary prevention of sudden death in HF. Methods and Results: Study participants (n 5 105) had an EF !35% and symptomatic HF, without history of ventricular tachycardia/fibrillation or syncope. Subjects completed a written survey about perceived ICD benefits, survival expectations, and circumstances under which they might deactivate defibrillation. Mean age was 58, LVEF 21%, 40% were New York Heart Association Class III-IV, and 65% already had a primary prevention ICD. Most patients anticipated more than10 years survival despite symptomatic HF. Nearly 54% expected an ICD to save $50 lives per 100 during 5 years. ICD recipients expressed more confidence that the device would save their own lives compared with those without an ICD (P ! .001). Despite understanding the ease of deactivation, 70% of ICD recipients indicated they would keep the ICD on even if dying of cancer, 55% even if having daily shocks, and none would inactivate defibrillation even if suffering constant dyspnea at rest. Conclusions: HF patients anticipate long survival, overestimate survival benefits conferred by ICDs, and express reluctance to deactivate their devices even for end-stage disease. (J Cardiac Fail 2010;16:106e113)
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 2012
In spite of ethical analyses assimilating the palliative deactivation of pacemakers to commonly accepted withdrawings of life-sustaining therapy, many clinicians remain ethically uncomfortable with pacemaker deactivation at the end of life. Various reasons have been posited for this discomfort. Some cardiologists have suggested that reluctance to deactivate pacemakers may stem from a sense that the pacemaker has become part of the patient&amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s &amp;amp;amp;amp;quot;self.&amp;amp;amp;amp;quot; The authors suggest that Daniel Sulmasy is correct to contend that any such identification of the pacemaker is misguided. The authors argue that clinicians uncomfortable with pacemaker deactivation are nevertheless correct to see it as incompatible with the traditional medical ethics of withdrawal of support. Traditional medical ethics is presently taken by many to sanction pacemaker deactivation when such deactivation honors the patient&amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s right to refuse treatment. The authors suggest that the right to refuse treatment applies to treatments involving ongoing physician agency. This right cannot underwrite patient demands that physicians reverse the effects of treatments previously administered, in which ongoing physician agency is no longer implicated. The permanently indwelling pacemaker is best seen as such a treatment. As such, its deactivation in the pacemaker-dependent patient is best seen not as withdrawal of support but as active ending of life. That being the case, clinicians adhering to the usual ethical analysis of withdrawal of support are correct to be uncomfortable with pacemaker deactivation at the end of life.
Anesthesiology, 1997
2011
| This Review examines recommendations and principles that promote good decision-making with regard to the insertion, deactivation, and potential malfunction of implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs). This guidance is important because ICDs are now used for primary and secondary prevention of arrhythmias in more than 20 diverse clinical populations, which accounts for the exponential increase in insertion rates over the past decade. Current guidelines require clinicians to provide personalized, culturally appropriate, and easy to understand information to patients on the benefits and harms of proposed treatment choices; however, obtaining valid informed consent for insertion and deactivation of ICDs is challenging. Initiating early conversations with patients and continuing this dialogue over time, implementation of localized care protocols, increased collaboration (particularly between cardiac and palliative care teams), and the provision of training for all health professionals involved in the care of these patients, can help to ensure that adequate informed consent is maintained throughout their care. In addition to providing information, health professionals should identify and address high levels of anxiety in patients and their next of kin and promote effective communication throughout decision making. In the future, use of standardized checklists or decision aids based on a clear understanding of the principles underlying key topics could support this process.
I. Pacemakers and ICDs
Pacemakers are small devices placed in the chest or abdomen to help control abnormal heart rhythms. Through the use of light electrical impulses, they "prompt the heart" to beat at a pace determined beforehand by the patient's doctor. Another device, distinct from the typical pacemaker, is the implantable cardioverter defibrillator, or ICD. An ICD functions much the same as a pacemaker but is also able to deliver powerful shocks to the heart in the event of a drastic rise or fall in rhythm. This allows the ICD to treat unforeseeable problems like sudden cardiac arrests at the moment they occur, a unique function that has saved the lives of many.
The procedure required for implantation is minor. 4 No open-heart surgery is necessary, and patients can usually go home within twenty-four hours. The batteries for these devices last from five to ten years, and replacing them involves a procedure much like the original surgery but with less recovery time. 5 Deactivating a pacemaker or ICD requires only a computer command from the patient's cardiologist, which can even be done outside of the hospital. 6
II. Principles and Applications
As creatures crafted in the image of God, we are blessed with both intelligence and freedom, inestimably noble goods whose exercise always includes "responsible stewardship for all that we have received… including our physical health." 7 Possessing these goods, we are also commanded to love our neighbors and ourselves, from which stems the duty to protect and preserve our bodily and functional integrity and thus the prohibition of murder and suicide.
This duty is not absolute, however, for we carry along with it our human mortality. Because of this, there are times when "we may reject life-prolonging procedures that are insufficiently beneficial or excessively burdensome." 8 Discerning just what circumstances fit that exemption, however, can be a difficult task. The key criterion is whether a treatment constitutes extraordinary means; that is, whether it either (I) provides no benefit, (II) is too burdensome, (III) inspires strong psychological distress, or (IV) is excessively expensive.
Because of the relatively low cost, ease, and availability of these devices, implantation is often an ordinary means for people suffering from dangerous arrhythmia. However, circumstances exist in which their deactivation may be morally acceptable.
There are three main situations in which the question of ethical deactivation seems to arise frequently: first, when a patient is approaching the end of life and is equipped with an ICD; second, when a patient is kept alive by a pacemaker and is undergoing intense suffering; and third, when a pacemaker-dependent patient has become a great burden to family and loved ones.
Terminally ill patients outfitted with ICDs commonly request deactivation of their devices as they approach death. In such a circumstance, two elements can allow for ethical deactivation: first, the inevitability and proximity of death makes the ICD a futile treatment, thereby removing the hope of benefit necessary for ordinary means; and second, the intense pain that the ICD is sure to cause in the patient as the heartbeat slows might go beyond her capacity to bear it, and that treatment would therefore count as an exception to her regular duty. While a pacemaker does not threaten the same level of pain as an ICD, it too may cease to offer any hope of benefit, and if so, may also be deactivated according to the patient's wish.
If a patient is pacemaker-dependent and is undergoing intense suffering from a problem other than that which the device is intended to remedy, the question calls for more careful consideration. The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary does not take into account the entirety of a patient's medical situation; it can only concern the relationship between a specific problem, its corresponding treatment, and that treatment's effects. We may be tempted to conflate these with other details of the patient's condition. If for example the patient is suffering from perpetual migraines and is kept alive by an ICD, it might be claimed that the device is an extraordinary means because of her severe pain. But this reasoning would be erroneous because it sees the device as the source of pain when it is in fact causally unrelated. Unless the pain comes either from the treatment itself or from the underlying pathology's perseverance through that treatment, treatment remains in the category of the ordinary. If, however, her pain does derive from one of those sources, the device may be deactivated without constituting suicide or euthanasia.
Like other treatments, pacemakers and ICDs can play a part in turning patients into great financial or emotional burdens on friends and family, especially if the patient is pacemakerdependent in a persistent vegetative state. In this case, it may be tempting to count this burden as a type of great expense and therefore consider the device an extraordinary means. But again, it must be remembered that that distinction holds only in the relationship between a specific problem, its treatment, and that treatment's effects.
Presumably in these cases, as with Katy's father, it is not truly the pacemaker or the ICD that places a great burden on the family but rather the underlying pathology, which these devices are not intended to remedy. Therefore, the burden fails to warrant deactivation-that is, it fails under these criteria. If somehow the pacemaker itself were too great an expense for the family, deactivation might be permissible. Or, if other treatments were involved and one of them fit the category of extraordinary means, it too could be abandoned. What cannot be allowed, however, is the direct killing of a patient through removal of ordinary treatment inspired either by unhappiness on the part of a third party or the judgment that the patient's life is no longer worth living.
Many other situations give rise to the question of deactivation, though none are as common as those addressed above. For example, a small number of patients have reported that they could feel their devices beating in their chests and were in great discomfort because of it. In such cases, a device could be turned off if the patient decided that the psychological distress truly went beyond their ability to reasonably bear it.
There is also the question of whether the procedure needed for replacement of a depleted device counts as an ordinary or extraordinary means. As with all cases, independent judgment regarding the distinction must be made on the part of the patient and those involved with full awareness of the surrounding medical and financial context. But again, because of the relative accessibility of replacements, the procedure will likely be ordinary in most cases. Still, some situations could make it extraordinary; if, for example, the patient is extremely poor or approaching the end of life.
III. A Final Reminder
What must be kept in mind throughout all these questions and applications is that judgments must center on a patient's treatment rather than either subjective estimations of life's value or the desire to keep living. The positing of such value is not the work of human beings, after all, and the preserving of life is not a mere whim but is rather a God-given duty through which we are called to celebrate, contemplate, and worship the Divine Love.
Bulletin of University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary Medicine Cluj-Napoca: Horticulture, 2013
International Journal of Behavioral Development, 1998
International Journal of Supply Chain and Logistics, 2018
The White Tiger: A Novel by Aravind Adiga
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh: Section A Mathematics, 2000
Practical Law | Thomson Reuters Legal, 2020
100 Amazing Patterns An Adult Coloring Book With Fun Easy And Relaxing Coloring Pages by Summer
2014. Accentuation. In Encyclopedia of Ancient Greek Language and Linguistics. Vol 1: A–F, ed. Georgios K. Giannakis et al. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 7–12.
Social Science & Medicine - SOC SCI MED, 1992
DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals), 2021
Briliant: Jurnal Riset dan Konseptual
Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes, 2007
arXiv (Cornell University), 2008