At the close of Plato’s Apology, Socrates argues that death is a benefit regardless of whether it... more At the close of Plato’s Apology, Socrates argues that death is a benefit regardless of whether it results in annihilation or an afterlife. According to the standard interpretation, Socrates of the Phaedo rejects the idea that annihilation is a benefit, instead arguing that the soul is immortal and that annihilation would harm a philosopher. Socrates certainly suggests in a few passages that he would resent annihilation. In this paper, however, I argue that the Phaedo does not mark a significant shift in Socrates’ views about whether annihilation benefits. In both dialogues, he recognizes that if the gods choose to annihilate humans, they signal that human life is bad overall and that deprivation of a bad state is a benefit, albeit a benefit without an existing beneficiary. I contend that for Socrates, the possibility that humans benefit from annihilation entails neither the rationality of suicide nor the view that philosophers live miserable lives.
In Plato's Protagoras, Socrates claims (in defense of the poet Simonides) that a person must some... more In Plato's Protagoras, Socrates claims (in defense of the poet Simonides) that a person must sometimes force herself to praise her unjust family or country for purposes of reconciliation. The passage has been largely overlooked because it occurs in a lengthy and bizarre interpretive interlude that scholars have hesitated to take seriously. Nevertheless, I argue that we should take it seriously and that doing so undercuts popular understandings of Socrates' conception of sincerity, his submission to military authority, and his view about the relationship between virtue and psychic harmony.
Epicurus often serves as the standard-bearer for the view that we can and should use our rational... more Epicurus often serves as the standard-bearer for the view that we can and should use our rational capacities to eliminate our fear of death. Although Epicurus clearly thought that many varieties of the fear of death arise from errors in reasoning, I argue that he believed that the fear of violent death is ineliminable and sometimes even advantageous. Humans have a natural and necessary desire for physical security, and the prospect that this desire might be frustrated causes fear. Thus, the best way to manage (though not eliminate) one's fear of a violent death is to establish favorable political circumstances rather than employ arguments against false beliefs.
This paper considers two competing interpretations of Socrates' discussions of the appropriatenes... more This paper considers two competing interpretations of Socrates' discussions of the appropriateness of grief in Plato's Republic. The commonly accepted 'Stoic Reading' maintains that Plato thinks grief can and should be eliminated by the ideally virtuous individual. I offer a textual case for the 'Conflict Reading', according to which grief is ineliminable, and sometimes appropriate. I focus primarily on three passages: the justification for censoring depictions of grief in Book III (387d-388a), the shared grieving of the collective family in Book V (462a-463e), and the Book X passage about the decent person's measured grief (603e-604d). I show that these passages offer not only evidence that grief cannot be eliminated, but also hint at an underlying account of why it resists elimination.
Callicles does not want to die. He fears a politically motivated death, and he fears a nameless d... more Callicles does not want to die. He fears a politically motivated death, and he fears a nameless death. He believes that being without pleasure is like being dead and that maximizing pleasure is the antithesis of death. Readers have long fretted over Callicles' hedonism, immoralism, and political ambition, but I contend that it is his crippling fear of death that leaves him beyond the reach of Socratic argument.
At the close of Plato’s Apology, Socrates argues that death is a benefit regardless of whether it... more At the close of Plato’s Apology, Socrates argues that death is a benefit regardless of whether it results in annihilation or an afterlife. According to the standard interpretation, Socrates of the Phaedo rejects the idea that annihilation is a benefit, instead arguing that the soul is immortal and that annihilation would harm a philosopher. Socrates certainly suggests in a few passages that he would resent annihilation. In this paper, however, I argue that the Phaedo does not mark a significant shift in Socrates’ views about whether annihilation benefits. In both dialogues, he recognizes that if the gods choose to annihilate humans, they signal that human life is bad overall and that deprivation of a bad state is a benefit, albeit a benefit without an existing beneficiary. I contend that for Socrates, the possibility that humans benefit from annihilation entails neither the rationality of suicide nor the view that philosophers live miserable lives.
In Plato's Protagoras, Socrates claims (in defense of the poet Simonides) that a person must some... more In Plato's Protagoras, Socrates claims (in defense of the poet Simonides) that a person must sometimes force herself to praise her unjust family or country for purposes of reconciliation. The passage has been largely overlooked because it occurs in a lengthy and bizarre interpretive interlude that scholars have hesitated to take seriously. Nevertheless, I argue that we should take it seriously and that doing so undercuts popular understandings of Socrates' conception of sincerity, his submission to military authority, and his view about the relationship between virtue and psychic harmony.
Epicurus often serves as the standard-bearer for the view that we can and should use our rational... more Epicurus often serves as the standard-bearer for the view that we can and should use our rational capacities to eliminate our fear of death. Although Epicurus clearly thought that many varieties of the fear of death arise from errors in reasoning, I argue that he believed that the fear of violent death is ineliminable and sometimes even advantageous. Humans have a natural and necessary desire for physical security, and the prospect that this desire might be frustrated causes fear. Thus, the best way to manage (though not eliminate) one's fear of a violent death is to establish favorable political circumstances rather than employ arguments against false beliefs.
This paper considers two competing interpretations of Socrates' discussions of the appropriatenes... more This paper considers two competing interpretations of Socrates' discussions of the appropriateness of grief in Plato's Republic. The commonly accepted 'Stoic Reading' maintains that Plato thinks grief can and should be eliminated by the ideally virtuous individual. I offer a textual case for the 'Conflict Reading', according to which grief is ineliminable, and sometimes appropriate. I focus primarily on three passages: the justification for censoring depictions of grief in Book III (387d-388a), the shared grieving of the collective family in Book V (462a-463e), and the Book X passage about the decent person's measured grief (603e-604d). I show that these passages offer not only evidence that grief cannot be eliminated, but also hint at an underlying account of why it resists elimination.
Callicles does not want to die. He fears a politically motivated death, and he fears a nameless d... more Callicles does not want to die. He fears a politically motivated death, and he fears a nameless death. He believes that being without pleasure is like being dead and that maximizing pleasure is the antithesis of death. Readers have long fretted over Callicles' hedonism, immoralism, and political ambition, but I contend that it is his crippling fear of death that leaves him beyond the reach of Socratic argument.
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