Papers by Valentin Arts
Journal of Book of Mormon Studies (1992-2007)
In the Book of Mormon, two records (a large engraved stone and twenty-four gold plates) contain t... more In the Book of Mormon, two records (a large engraved stone and twenty-four gold plates) contain the story of an ancient civilization known as the Jaredites. There appears to be evidence of an unpublished third record that provides more information on this people and on the history of the world. When the brother of Jared received a vision of Jesus Christ, he was taught many things but was instructed not to share them with the world until the time of his death. The author proposes that the brother of Jared did, in fact, write those things down shortly before his death and then buried them, along with the interpreting stones, to be revealed to the world according to the timing of the Lord.
In the Book of Mormon, two records (a large engraved stone and twenty-four gold plates) contain t... more In the Book of Mormon, two records (a large engraved stone and twenty-four gold plates) contain the story of an ancient civilization known as the Jaredites. There appears to be evidence of an unpublished third record that provides more information on this people and on the history of the world. When the brother of Jared received a vision of Jesus Christ, he was taught many things but was instructed not to share them with the world until the time of his death. The author proposes that the brother of Jared did, in fact, write those things down shortly before his death and then buried them, along with the interpreting stones, to be revealed to the world according to the timing of the Lord.
Thesis Chapters by Valentin Arts
Drafts by Valentin Arts
Valentin Arts, 2010
Masters Thesis
Peer disagreement presupposes doxastic voluntary control stronger than indirect influence on our ... more Peer disagreement presupposes doxastic voluntary control stronger than indirect influence on our beliefs by voluntary actions.
Probably the most prominent response to Alston's argument from involuntarism, is that an epistemi... more Probably the most prominent response to Alston's argument from involuntarism, is that an epistemic deontology only needs compatibilist doxastic control which, it is argued, we have. Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have famously argued that guidance control and reasons-responsiveness are sufficient to hold someone responsible for her actions even if that person could not have done otherwise.1 It seems that a doxastic version of their reasonsresponsive compatibilism is a suitable reply to Alston's examples in which we cannot intentionally choose to believe otherwise than our evidence forces us to believe. These philosophers argue that we can be responsible for our doxastic attitudes, even if we cannot choose directly what we believe, because we are appropriately receptive to and reactive to reasons for our beliefs.2 I shall argue that reasons-responsive doxastic compatibilism is not a suitable reply to Alston's argument from doxastic involuntarism. The application of the theory of reasonsresponsive compatibilism, as developed by Fischer and Ravizza, to the ethics of belief is a good example of how the transfer of ideas on ethics of action to ethics of belief is not always obvious and can go wrong. The aim of this paper is to show that if Alston is right that we do not have doxastic voluntary control, then reasons-responsive doxastic compatibilism is not the right response to account for doxastic responsibility. Reasons-responsive doxastic compatibilism cannot refute Alston's argument from involuntarism because it relies on doxastic Frankfurt-style cases that are problematic.
Books by Valentin Arts
This dissertation explores the question of whether we bear moral responsibility for our beliefs a... more This dissertation explores the question of whether we bear moral responsibility for our beliefs and how this responsibility is possible. Since we cannot directly choose our convictions, some have argued that we have no obligations concerning what we believe. However, we frequently hold each other accountable for our beliefs. Philosophers have responded to the argument against ‘belief duties’ in various ways. One response is that we are responsible for how we influence our beliefs. Another argues that moral responsibility does not require the ability to choose. A third response claims that we, in fact, do have the ability to choose our beliefs. A fourth suggests that whether we have the freedom to choose our beliefs depends on how ‘belief’ is defined.
The central claim of this dissertation is that the first response is incomplete, the second is mistaken, and that the third and fourth are the most promising. This book investigates in depth what ‘belief’ entails. If we understand belief as placing trust in a possible truth in our practical reasoning, rather than having convictions, then we can have both doxastic voluntary control and belief-related obligations. What we believe is crucial to our actions, and therefore, the ethics of belief is deeply connected with the ethics of action.
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Papers by Valentin Arts
Thesis Chapters by Valentin Arts
Drafts by Valentin Arts
Books by Valentin Arts
The central claim of this dissertation is that the first response is incomplete, the second is mistaken, and that the third and fourth are the most promising. This book investigates in depth what ‘belief’ entails. If we understand belief as placing trust in a possible truth in our practical reasoning, rather than having convictions, then we can have both doxastic voluntary control and belief-related obligations. What we believe is crucial to our actions, and therefore, the ethics of belief is deeply connected with the ethics of action.
The central claim of this dissertation is that the first response is incomplete, the second is mistaken, and that the third and fourth are the most promising. This book investigates in depth what ‘belief’ entails. If we understand belief as placing trust in a possible truth in our practical reasoning, rather than having convictions, then we can have both doxastic voluntary control and belief-related obligations. What we believe is crucial to our actions, and therefore, the ethics of belief is deeply connected with the ethics of action.