Books by Matthew Congdon
Oxford University Press, 2024
Pre-proofs ToC, Intro, & Chap. 1
Papers by Matthew Congdon
Philosophy, 2023
This paper argues that Aristotelian ethical naturalism can combine two commitments that are often... more This paper argues that Aristotelian ethical naturalism can combine two commitments that are often held to be incompatible: (a) a commitment to a strong form of ethical objectivity and (b) a thoroughgoing historicism about ethical value. The notions of species and life-form invoked by ethical naturalism do not, I argue, rely upon an ahistorical picture of human nature. I develop this idea by building upon Philippa Foot's defense of ethical naturalism in Natural Goodness. I go on to argue that linguistic changes in the ways we articulate the conditions of human flourishing can be understood, in some cases, as transforming those very conditions.
Analysis, 2022
A Critical Notice of Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen's book, Moral Philosophy and Moral Life
Philosophical Topics, 2021
The editors' introduction to a special issue of Philosophical Topics on "Social Visibility."
Philosophical Topics, 2021
Acts of interpersonal moral address depend upon a shared space of social visibility in which huma... more Acts of interpersonal moral address depend upon a shared space of social visibility in which human beings can both display themselves and perceive others as morally important. This raises questions that have gone largely undiscussed in recent philosophical work on moral address. How does the social mediation of interpersonal perception by forces such as ideology shape and limit the possibilities for moral address? And how might creative acts of putting oneself on display make possible unanticipated forms of moral address, especially under ideological conditions? In this paper, I propose that we can make progress towards answering such questions by treating moral address as a fundamentally aesthetic phenomenon. I begin by drawing examples from literature that invite the idea that humans and animals possess ethically value-laden features that are open to empirical view, and argue that approaches to moral address that do not avail themselves of this idea face serious limits, focusing on Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint. I then illustrate the role of the aesthetic in moral address by offering a reading of the “Capitol Crawl,” a 1990 direct action in which people with disabilities left behind assistive devices in order to ascend the stairs leading to the US Capitol. Drawing from some ideas in Iris Murdoch, I argue that the aesthetically striking features of this collective act of moral address are inseparable from the moral demands it expresses, and that, read as an aesthetic whole, its morally expressive power extends beyond the discursive while nevertheless remaining a part of the space of reasons.
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2021
This paper reconstructs Nadja El Kassar's notion of intellectual self-trust and raises some quest... more This paper reconstructs Nadja El Kassar's notion of intellectual self-trust and raises some questions about its collective and social aspects.
European Journal of Philosophy, 2020
In order for the concept, 'recognition', to play a critical role in social theory, it must be pos... more In order for the concept, 'recognition', to play a critical role in social theory, it must be possible to draw a distinction between due recognition and failures of recognition. Some recognition theorists, including Axel Honneth, argue that this distinction can be preserved only if we presuppose that due recognition involves a rational response to "evaluative qualities" that can be rightly perceived in the context of social interaction. This paper points out a problem facing recent defenses of this "perception model" and proposes a solution. I begin by making explicit three criteria broadly shared by recognition theorists: an adequate theory of recognition must be (a) critical, capable of drawing a distinction between due recognition and recognitive failure; (b) minimally idealist, able to accommodate the mediating role of subjectivity in human receptivity to value; and (c) historicist, should not rule out a priori that the values involved in recognitive practice are historically emergent. I then argue that Honneth's version of the perception model cannot fulfill these criteria simultaneously. Drawing upon an Aristotelian notion of evaluative perception and working through an example from Zadie Smith's On Beauty, I defend an alternative view that is, I argue, better equipped to meet these three criteria.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2018
This paper develops two related theses concerning resentment. The first, which I label the 'prior... more This paper develops two related theses concerning resentment. The first, which I label the 'prior norm requirement', holds that feelings of resentment are grounded in the resenter's conviction that some portion of their existing normative expectations has been violated. The second holds that resentments can make a rational contribution to the development of new normative expectations, transforming the resenter's existing normative outlook. Certain expressions of the prior norm requirement in recent theory clash with the notion of norm-creative resentments, portraying resentment as essentially conservative of existing norms. Against this, I develop the notion of 'emotional articulation', according to which emotions like resentment can involve cognitively complex processes of working through the meaning of experiences of wrongdoing, in ways that give rise to genuinely new normative commitments. I develop this through critical comparison with Martha Nussbaum's cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion and by drawing from Charles Taylor's notion of articulation.
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 2018
Recent discussions in critical social epistemology have raised the idea that the concept 'knower'... more Recent discussions in critical social epistemology have raised the idea that the concept 'knower' is not only an epistemological concept, but an ethical concept as well. Though this idea plays a central role in these discussions, the theoretical underpinnings of the claim have not received extended scrutiny. This paper explores the idea that 'knower' is an irreducibly ethical concept in an effort to defend its use as a critical concept. In Section 1, I begin with the claim that 'knower' is an irreducibly normative and social concept, drawing from some ideas in Wilfrid Sellars. In Section 2, I argue that one's being a knower involves demands for various sorts of ethically-laden recognition. I develop this thought by arguing that Axel Honneth's threefold typology of recognition—love, respect, and esteem—finds clear expression within the context of socio-epistemic practice. I conclude in Section 3 by arguing that Miranda Fricker's proposed " analogy " between epistemic and moral perception should be modified to indicate a closer relationship than mere analogy.
The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice, ed. Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., 2017
In this paper, I discuss ways in which four normative ethical theories would understand the wrong... more In this paper, I discuss ways in which four normative ethical theories would understand the wrongfulness of epistemic injustice, focusing on consequentialism, virtue theory, Kantian ethics, and recognition theory. A normative view that synthesizes elements from each approach is defended.
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2016
In this paper, I discuss cases in which moral grievances, particularly assertions that a moral in... more In this paper, I discuss cases in which moral grievances, particularly assertions that a moral injury has taken place, are systematically obstructed by received linguistic and epistemic practices. I suggest a social epistemological model for theorizing such cases of moral epistemic injustice. Towards this end, I offer a reconstruction of Lyotard’s concept of the differend, comparing it to Miranda Fricker’s concept of hermeneutical injustice, and considering it in light of some criticisms posed by Axel Honneth. Through this reconstruction and a series of examples, I demonstrate that a basic formal structure recurs in cases of discursively repressed moral injury, namely, a particular kind of dilemma. I argue that appreciating this dilemma pushes us in the direction of a form of non-ideal ethical theory and I conclude by elaborating a conception of moral reflective judgment that begins from particular experiences of moral injury and moves towards the creation of new moral universals.
Episteme, 2015
In this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptualism in recent w... more In this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptualism in recent work in social epistemology exemplified by Miranda Fricker and Charles Mills. I offer a survey of recent writings at the intersection of social epistemology, feminism, and critical race theory, showing that commitments to realism and conceptualism are at once implied yet undertheorized in the existing literature. I go on to offer an explicit defense of these commitments by drawing from the epistemological framework of John McDowell, demonstrating the relevance of the metaphor of the “space of reasons” for theorizing and criticizing instances of epistemic injustice. I then point out how McDowell’s own view requires expansion and revision in light of Mills' concept of 'epistemologies of ignorance'. I conclude that, when their strengths are used to make up for each others' weaknesses, Mills and McDowell’s positions mutually reinforce one another, producing a powerful model for theorizing instances of systematic ignorance and false belief.
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 2013
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Books by Matthew Congdon
Papers by Matthew Congdon