The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs, the making of phot... more The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs, the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be 'used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship or research.' If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of 'fair use,' that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order, if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law.
An election campaign serves ritual functions for the American political system, beyond its manife... more An election campaign serves ritual functions for the American political system, beyond its manifest functions of determining which persons and interests will govern the country. The campaign ritual is analyzed in terms of Durkheim’s concept of the totem, including its regeneration and sacrifice. The dirty campaign is a sacrificial feast that establishes conditions for a proper mating between the candidate and the electorate. Voters declare their fidelity to the totem victor and receive a sacrificial promise in return
The computer revolution is less a revolution in the usual sense of the word than the announcement... more The computer revolution is less a revolution in the usual sense of the word than the announcement of a glamorous marriage between two powerful promises in the history of the modern West, the Enlightenment, the impulse to encompass the entire world in a rational system of knowledge, and the Industrial Revolution, the fruit of an ancient impulse to reduce the demands of nature to insignificance. By now we know that some of the fondest legacies of the Enlightenment, such as the belief that the world is fully knowable and that nothing more than rational knowledge is necessary to make us free, are ambiguous ones, but it is still difficult for us to admit that the vision of the Industrial Revolution was naive. In many ways we still believe that utopia is available to everyone who has the right equipment
Annenberg School for Communication John Peters' previous book, Speaking Into the Air: A History o... more Annenberg School for Communication John Peters' previous book, Speaking Into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication memorably enriched the discussion of mass communication by giving it sweeping historical scope and a distinctive ethical philosophy. In Courting the Abyss: Free Speech and the Liberal Tradition, Peters once more sets out to place communication on a wide intellectual stage. This time he takes on the culture wars, broadly interpreted, to challenge the communicative practice at the heart of liberal self-identity. The problem he poses is whether liberal freedom of expression has any decent sense of restraint, and why it matters if it doesn't. Peters is no dispassionate observer standing above the fray. He coins the term 'abyss-walking' to describe what he sees as a regrettable penchant of liberals to consort with the devil. The sort of thing he seems to have in mind is the infamous work of the Catholic, African-American, Puerto Rican New York artist Andres Serrano, whose photograph "Piss Christ" was a culture war emblem par excellence in the early '90s. Asked why he had made so offensive an image, Serrano's answer was roughly, God made urine, why should it offend? Peters doesn't discuss him, but Serrano seems to be an example of the abyss-walking breed Peters suspects of cynically provoking public outrage in order to preen, a motive Peters finds unworthy and damaging. But Serrano has always defended his art, and very articulately, as having a serious religious sensibility, and a group of religious thinkers for whom the difficult boundary between the sacred and the profane is no trivial question have taken him at his word. Such interpretive complexity is little addressed in Peters' extended polemic against liberalism in which he treats offense to public taste as an I-know-it-when-I see-it category and not as an historically moving target. Nor is there much discussion of how to rearrange the legal goalposts to improve how free speech is done in the United States. That's an important omission, since the evolution of liberal freedom of expression during the last century in the U.S. has unfolded largely in the ethical arena of legal philosophy and reasoning. Long before liberals had exasperated Peters, they were embarrassing those who once wore the label proudly. Progressive, the current term of art, is preferred by practitioners of what still amount to liberal values at base. Progressive sounds more intellectually independent and chicly radical than 'liberal' with its roots in those old-fashioned workhorses of classical liberal thought, Adam Smith and John Locke. Lately, the term has suffered an even more depressing fate, providing the root for 'neo-liberal,' a term that links the commercial roots of classical liberalism with the heartlessness of managerial global capitalism.
This chapter examines the work of the media “structuralists” of the so‐called Canadian or Toronto... more This chapter examines the work of the media “structuralists” of the so‐called Canadian or Toronto school of media studies: Harold Adams Innis, Marshall McLuhan, and Walter J. Ong, especially. Their work is placed within its historical context, both in terms of scholarly ancestry and in terms of its reception in North American universities and especially in schools of journalism. A critical assessment of the work of these scholars as media history is offered, recognizing its shortcomings as historical narrative but also its appeal as a way of understanding the influence of media forms.
The International Encyclopedia of Media Studies, 2012
This chapter examines the work of the media "structuralists" of the so-called Canadian or Toronto... more This chapter examines the work of the media "structuralists" of the so-called Canadian or Toronto school of media studies: Harold Adams Innis, Marshall McLuhan, and Walter J. Ong, especially. Their work is placed within its historical context, both in terms of scholarly ancestry and in terms of its reception in North American universities and especially in schools of journalism. A critical assessment of the work of these scholars as media history is offered, recognizing its shortcomings as historical narrative but also its appeal as a way of understanding the influence of media forms.
Americans live in a culture that is as religious as any that exists. In this article we contend t... more Americans live in a culture that is as religious as any that exists. In this article we contend that nationalism is the most powerful religion in the United States, and perhaps in many other countries. 1 Structurally speaking, nationalism mirrors sectarian systems of belief such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam and others that are more conventionally labeled as religious. It happens that nationalism also satisfies some of the most traditional definitions of religion, but citizens of nation-states have religious reasons for denying it. We argue that both sectarian and national religions organize killing energy by commuting devotees to sacrifice themselves to the group. We also briefly explore the ritual role of media in propagating national religion. Media are not the most important ritual vehicles for nationalism, but they matter. Though based in empirical observation, our claims are theoretical in nature. 2 Their value lies in rethinking certain empirical phenomena in relation to notions of nationalism and religion in the contemporary world. Our examples come mostly from the United States and its majority sectarian faith. Although generalization is risky, the principles we describe are broadly applicable to other enduring groups, defined as those for which members are willing to give their lives. By "religion" we mean a system of cosmological propositions grounded in a belief in a transcendent power expressed through a cult of divine being and giving rise to a set of ethical prescriptions. 3 In the moral world shared by many readers, these prescriptions deplore violence and regard any use of it as prima facie profane. Where religious devotees unapologetically embrace violence, the faiths to which they subscribe may be considered morally flawed. Alternatively, it may be claimed that practitioners of violence who act in the name of religion have mistaken the true prescriptions of their faith. The familiar claim that a religious view of the world is characterized by a moral opposition to violence ignores a more complex reality in which faiths that most deeply bind the commitment of devotees are structures for organizing killing energy. This is true both for religions that aggressively kill the other in the name of a deity or deities and those that pledge their devotees to self-sacrifice when confronted with violence. We shall argue that violent and so-called non-violent religions are structurally indistinguishable from a certain perspective. To equate nationalism and sectarianism unsettles champions of both Champions of nationalism see sectarianism as dangerous to nationalism's healthiest aspirations. Sectarianism, they fear, introduces passions that may manifest themselves in violence. They wish to separate church and state by subordinating the claims of the former to the latter Champions of sectarianism see nationalism as threatening to religious values, especially non-violence. The state, they say, is profane because it engages in violence. They wish to bend state claims to fundamental sectarian precepts. 4 Perhaps nationalism and sectarianism recognize something about each other that they hesitate to recognize about themselves. Each fears that members of the other community are willing to kill and die for truth as they understand it. For what is really true in any community is what its members can agree is worth killing for, or what they can be compelled to sacrifice their lives for. The sacred is thus easily recognized. It is that set of beliefs and persons for which we ought to shed our own blood, if necessary, when there is a serious threat. Rituals that celebrate this blood sacrifice give expression and witness to faith. Sacrificial death thus defines both sectarian and national identity. This is the first sense in which both are species of religion. On the whole, we misunderstand the genuinely religious character of American patriotism and the violent character of genuine religion. What distinguishes nationalism from sectarianism is not group logic, for both are religions of blood sacrifice. What distinguishes them is historical location. In the West Christianity once could kill and ask others to die in the name of its particular god. In some places it does this still. But in general in the West the power to compel believers to die passed from Christianity to the nation-state, where it largely remains. Christianity has no authorized guns within the boundaries of the United States, nor does any other denominational sect. In our religiously pluralist society sectarian faith is optional for citizens, as everyone knows. Though denominations are permitted to exist, they are not permitted to kill, for they are not officially true, which is a way of suggesting they are false. Only the true
The computer revolution is less a revolution in the usual sense of the word than the announcement... more The computer revolution is less a revolution in the usual sense of the word than the announcement of a glamorous marriage between two powerful promises in the history of the modern West, the Enlightenment, the impulse to encompass the entire world in a rational system of knowledge, and the Industrial Revolution, the fruit of an ancient impulse to reduce the demands of nature to insignificance. By now we know that some of the fondest legacies of the Enlightenment, such as the belief that the world is fully knowable and that nothing more than rational knowledge is necessary to make us free, are ambiguous ones, but it is still difficult for us to admit that the vision of the Industrial Revolution was naive. In many ways we still believe that utopia is available to everyone who has the right equipment. This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/76 The Illinois Issues Humanities Essays (second series) Fables for the Information Age:The F...
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs, the making of phot... more The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs, the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be 'used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship or research.' If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of 'fair use,' that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order, if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law.
An election campaign serves ritual functions for the American political system, beyond its manife... more An election campaign serves ritual functions for the American political system, beyond its manifest functions of determining which persons and interests will govern the country. The campaign ritual is analyzed in terms of Durkheim’s concept of the totem, including its regeneration and sacrifice. The dirty campaign is a sacrificial feast that establishes conditions for a proper mating between the candidate and the electorate. Voters declare their fidelity to the totem victor and receive a sacrificial promise in return
The computer revolution is less a revolution in the usual sense of the word than the announcement... more The computer revolution is less a revolution in the usual sense of the word than the announcement of a glamorous marriage between two powerful promises in the history of the modern West, the Enlightenment, the impulse to encompass the entire world in a rational system of knowledge, and the Industrial Revolution, the fruit of an ancient impulse to reduce the demands of nature to insignificance. By now we know that some of the fondest legacies of the Enlightenment, such as the belief that the world is fully knowable and that nothing more than rational knowledge is necessary to make us free, are ambiguous ones, but it is still difficult for us to admit that the vision of the Industrial Revolution was naive. In many ways we still believe that utopia is available to everyone who has the right equipment
Annenberg School for Communication John Peters' previous book, Speaking Into the Air: A History o... more Annenberg School for Communication John Peters' previous book, Speaking Into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication memorably enriched the discussion of mass communication by giving it sweeping historical scope and a distinctive ethical philosophy. In Courting the Abyss: Free Speech and the Liberal Tradition, Peters once more sets out to place communication on a wide intellectual stage. This time he takes on the culture wars, broadly interpreted, to challenge the communicative practice at the heart of liberal self-identity. The problem he poses is whether liberal freedom of expression has any decent sense of restraint, and why it matters if it doesn't. Peters is no dispassionate observer standing above the fray. He coins the term 'abyss-walking' to describe what he sees as a regrettable penchant of liberals to consort with the devil. The sort of thing he seems to have in mind is the infamous work of the Catholic, African-American, Puerto Rican New York artist Andres Serrano, whose photograph "Piss Christ" was a culture war emblem par excellence in the early '90s. Asked why he had made so offensive an image, Serrano's answer was roughly, God made urine, why should it offend? Peters doesn't discuss him, but Serrano seems to be an example of the abyss-walking breed Peters suspects of cynically provoking public outrage in order to preen, a motive Peters finds unworthy and damaging. But Serrano has always defended his art, and very articulately, as having a serious religious sensibility, and a group of religious thinkers for whom the difficult boundary between the sacred and the profane is no trivial question have taken him at his word. Such interpretive complexity is little addressed in Peters' extended polemic against liberalism in which he treats offense to public taste as an I-know-it-when-I see-it category and not as an historically moving target. Nor is there much discussion of how to rearrange the legal goalposts to improve how free speech is done in the United States. That's an important omission, since the evolution of liberal freedom of expression during the last century in the U.S. has unfolded largely in the ethical arena of legal philosophy and reasoning. Long before liberals had exasperated Peters, they were embarrassing those who once wore the label proudly. Progressive, the current term of art, is preferred by practitioners of what still amount to liberal values at base. Progressive sounds more intellectually independent and chicly radical than 'liberal' with its roots in those old-fashioned workhorses of classical liberal thought, Adam Smith and John Locke. Lately, the term has suffered an even more depressing fate, providing the root for 'neo-liberal,' a term that links the commercial roots of classical liberalism with the heartlessness of managerial global capitalism.
This chapter examines the work of the media “structuralists” of the so‐called Canadian or Toronto... more This chapter examines the work of the media “structuralists” of the so‐called Canadian or Toronto school of media studies: Harold Adams Innis, Marshall McLuhan, and Walter J. Ong, especially. Their work is placed within its historical context, both in terms of scholarly ancestry and in terms of its reception in North American universities and especially in schools of journalism. A critical assessment of the work of these scholars as media history is offered, recognizing its shortcomings as historical narrative but also its appeal as a way of understanding the influence of media forms.
The International Encyclopedia of Media Studies, 2012
This chapter examines the work of the media "structuralists" of the so-called Canadian or Toronto... more This chapter examines the work of the media "structuralists" of the so-called Canadian or Toronto school of media studies: Harold Adams Innis, Marshall McLuhan, and Walter J. Ong, especially. Their work is placed within its historical context, both in terms of scholarly ancestry and in terms of its reception in North American universities and especially in schools of journalism. A critical assessment of the work of these scholars as media history is offered, recognizing its shortcomings as historical narrative but also its appeal as a way of understanding the influence of media forms.
Americans live in a culture that is as religious as any that exists. In this article we contend t... more Americans live in a culture that is as religious as any that exists. In this article we contend that nationalism is the most powerful religion in the United States, and perhaps in many other countries. 1 Structurally speaking, nationalism mirrors sectarian systems of belief such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam and others that are more conventionally labeled as religious. It happens that nationalism also satisfies some of the most traditional definitions of religion, but citizens of nation-states have religious reasons for denying it. We argue that both sectarian and national religions organize killing energy by commuting devotees to sacrifice themselves to the group. We also briefly explore the ritual role of media in propagating national religion. Media are not the most important ritual vehicles for nationalism, but they matter. Though based in empirical observation, our claims are theoretical in nature. 2 Their value lies in rethinking certain empirical phenomena in relation to notions of nationalism and religion in the contemporary world. Our examples come mostly from the United States and its majority sectarian faith. Although generalization is risky, the principles we describe are broadly applicable to other enduring groups, defined as those for which members are willing to give their lives. By "religion" we mean a system of cosmological propositions grounded in a belief in a transcendent power expressed through a cult of divine being and giving rise to a set of ethical prescriptions. 3 In the moral world shared by many readers, these prescriptions deplore violence and regard any use of it as prima facie profane. Where religious devotees unapologetically embrace violence, the faiths to which they subscribe may be considered morally flawed. Alternatively, it may be claimed that practitioners of violence who act in the name of religion have mistaken the true prescriptions of their faith. The familiar claim that a religious view of the world is characterized by a moral opposition to violence ignores a more complex reality in which faiths that most deeply bind the commitment of devotees are structures for organizing killing energy. This is true both for religions that aggressively kill the other in the name of a deity or deities and those that pledge their devotees to self-sacrifice when confronted with violence. We shall argue that violent and so-called non-violent religions are structurally indistinguishable from a certain perspective. To equate nationalism and sectarianism unsettles champions of both Champions of nationalism see sectarianism as dangerous to nationalism's healthiest aspirations. Sectarianism, they fear, introduces passions that may manifest themselves in violence. They wish to separate church and state by subordinating the claims of the former to the latter Champions of sectarianism see nationalism as threatening to religious values, especially non-violence. The state, they say, is profane because it engages in violence. They wish to bend state claims to fundamental sectarian precepts. 4 Perhaps nationalism and sectarianism recognize something about each other that they hesitate to recognize about themselves. Each fears that members of the other community are willing to kill and die for truth as they understand it. For what is really true in any community is what its members can agree is worth killing for, or what they can be compelled to sacrifice their lives for. The sacred is thus easily recognized. It is that set of beliefs and persons for which we ought to shed our own blood, if necessary, when there is a serious threat. Rituals that celebrate this blood sacrifice give expression and witness to faith. Sacrificial death thus defines both sectarian and national identity. This is the first sense in which both are species of religion. On the whole, we misunderstand the genuinely religious character of American patriotism and the violent character of genuine religion. What distinguishes nationalism from sectarianism is not group logic, for both are religions of blood sacrifice. What distinguishes them is historical location. In the West Christianity once could kill and ask others to die in the name of its particular god. In some places it does this still. But in general in the West the power to compel believers to die passed from Christianity to the nation-state, where it largely remains. Christianity has no authorized guns within the boundaries of the United States, nor does any other denominational sect. In our religiously pluralist society sectarian faith is optional for citizens, as everyone knows. Though denominations are permitted to exist, they are not permitted to kill, for they are not officially true, which is a way of suggesting they are false. Only the true
The computer revolution is less a revolution in the usual sense of the word than the announcement... more The computer revolution is less a revolution in the usual sense of the word than the announcement of a glamorous marriage between two powerful promises in the history of the modern West, the Enlightenment, the impulse to encompass the entire world in a rational system of knowledge, and the Industrial Revolution, the fruit of an ancient impulse to reduce the demands of nature to insignificance. By now we know that some of the fondest legacies of the Enlightenment, such as the belief that the world is fully knowable and that nothing more than rational knowledge is necessary to make us free, are ambiguous ones, but it is still difficult for us to admit that the vision of the Industrial Revolution was naive. In many ways we still believe that utopia is available to everyone who has the right equipment. This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/76 The Illinois Issues Humanities Essays (second series) Fables for the Information Age:The F...
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