The aim of this dissertation is to provide a robust theory of environmental ethics which
can off... more The aim of this dissertation is to provide a robust theory of environmental ethics which can offer nuanced accounts of value while evading the central problem of subjective disagreement that plagues other theories. The theory in question has many names, but the best abstraction of it can be found in the term “ontocentrism.” Like pure biocentrism, this theory locates a monist center of value around which all other theorizations may orbit. Unlike biocentrism, however, this theory is not satisfied by anything short of the most basic commonality between valuable entities. That most basic value is existence, and it is taken to be the ground for all other values. This proposed theory, along with the methodology suggested, will be argued to be the next, if not final, step in theorization about environmental ethics.
This paper argues that those that subscribe to “Biocentrism”, specifically the Biocentrism argued... more This paper argues that those that subscribe to “Biocentrism”, specifically the Biocentrism argued for by Paul Taylor, ought to adopt “Ontocentrism” instead. Biocentrism, the theory that all and only living things are morally considerable, fails to account for important moral differences between living things. It cannot justify, without ad-hoc addition, the intuition that a man is worth more than a pig, and a pig is worth more than a mouse. It similarly fails to account for the status of larger systems such as ecosystems, and lastly it fails to account for the status of non-biological entities and artificial life. Ontocentrism, the theory that all existing things, broadly construed, are morally considerable, ought to be adopted because it can account for these things without being ad-hoc and arbitrary
The aim of this dissertation is to provide a robust theory of environmental ethics which
can off... more The aim of this dissertation is to provide a robust theory of environmental ethics which can offer nuanced accounts of value while evading the central problem of subjective disagreement that plagues other theories. The theory in question has many names, but the best abstraction of it can be found in the term “ontocentrism.” Like pure biocentrism, this theory locates a monist center of value around which all other theorizations may orbit. Unlike biocentrism, however, this theory is not satisfied by anything short of the most basic commonality between valuable entities. That most basic value is existence, and it is taken to be the ground for all other values. This proposed theory, along with the methodology suggested, will be argued to be the next, if not final, step in theorization about environmental ethics.
This paper argues that those that subscribe to “Biocentrism”, specifically the Biocentrism argued... more This paper argues that those that subscribe to “Biocentrism”, specifically the Biocentrism argued for by Paul Taylor, ought to adopt “Ontocentrism” instead. Biocentrism, the theory that all and only living things are morally considerable, fails to account for important moral differences between living things. It cannot justify, without ad-hoc addition, the intuition that a man is worth more than a pig, and a pig is worth more than a mouse. It similarly fails to account for the status of larger systems such as ecosystems, and lastly it fails to account for the status of non-biological entities and artificial life. Ontocentrism, the theory that all existing things, broadly construed, are morally considerable, ought to be adopted because it can account for these things without being ad-hoc and arbitrary
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Papers by Zeno Serban
can offer nuanced accounts of value while evading the central problem of subjective
disagreement that plagues other theories. The theory in question has many names, but the best
abstraction of it can be found in the term “ontocentrism.” Like pure biocentrism, this theory
locates a monist center of value around which all other theorizations may orbit. Unlike
biocentrism, however, this theory is not satisfied by anything short of the most basic
commonality between valuable entities. That most basic value is existence, and it is taken to be
the ground for all other values. This proposed theory, along with the methodology suggested,
will be argued to be the next, if not final, step in theorization about environmental ethics.
can offer nuanced accounts of value while evading the central problem of subjective
disagreement that plagues other theories. The theory in question has many names, but the best
abstraction of it can be found in the term “ontocentrism.” Like pure biocentrism, this theory
locates a monist center of value around which all other theorizations may orbit. Unlike
biocentrism, however, this theory is not satisfied by anything short of the most basic
commonality between valuable entities. That most basic value is existence, and it is taken to be
the ground for all other values. This proposed theory, along with the methodology suggested,
will be argued to be the next, if not final, step in theorization about environmental ethics.