Nicolas Aubert
I am a professor of finance at Aix-Marseille University graduate school of management (IAE), director of Aix-Marseille University research center in management (CERGAM) and Faculty fellow and mentor of the Rutgers University Institute for the study of employee ownership and profit sharing. I also serve as a member of the French employee ownership association scientific committee (FAS) and of the jury of the Best French employee ownership companies awards.
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Papers by Nicolas Aubert
cons stress the potential weakening of the board's supervisory function while the pros argue
that board level employee representation reduces information asymmetry. This paper presents
a comprehensive and critical literature review. It discusses the conditions of the
implementation of board employee representation improving corporate governance. We
suggest that their mandates are determined by three sets of factors: individual factors, micro
level corporate governance factors, and macro level factors related to the national governance
system. We state theoretical propositions defining board employee representation’s
contributions.
share ownership reduces the firm’s cost of capital by affecting its two components, i.e. the cost of equity and the cost of debt. We test this hypothesis in France, a leading country in terms of employee ownership, based on a panel of the 120 largest listed companies for the 2000-2011 period. We find: (i) no significant relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of equity; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of debt; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship relationship between employee stock ownership and the weighted average cost of capital. These results suggest debtholders regard ESO as positive as long it is moderate because its shifts risk from them to employees and that this effect is still perceptible in the weighted average cost of capital.
make his point valid. Bringing togethergift and participation finds its coherence in works focusing on employee financial participation. The most recent empirical studies show the relevance of gift and reciprocity theories to understand employees‟ participation.
The literature suggests that good managers use employee ownership as a reward management tool, whereas bad
managers implement it for entrenchment, thus suggesting the existence of an equilibrium level of employee
ownership. The contributions of this paper are both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, this paper fills a gap
in the published research by taking into account both positive and negative outcomes of employee ownership.
Our model produces three main conclusions: (i) Low-performing managers use employee ownership as an
entrenchment mechanism (ii) that increases the signaling cost of employee ownership for high-performingmanagers.
(iii) We suggest that employee ownership should not be left only to the management's discretion because
both types of managers have an incentive to implement employee ownership. Our empirical study investigates
how employee ownership affects management tenure. This study takes into account the two main motives for
employee ownership examined by the model (i.e., management entrenchment and reward management). We
find a positive relationship between employee ownership and management tenure. This result provides new
evidence that employee ownership can be used as an entrenchment mechanism.
cons stress the potential weakening of the board's supervisory function while the pros argue
that board level employee representation reduces information asymmetry. This paper presents
a comprehensive and critical literature review. It discusses the conditions of the
implementation of board employee representation improving corporate governance. We
suggest that their mandates are determined by three sets of factors: individual factors, micro
level corporate governance factors, and macro level factors related to the national governance
system. We state theoretical propositions defining board employee representation’s
contributions.
share ownership reduces the firm’s cost of capital by affecting its two components, i.e. the cost of equity and the cost of debt. We test this hypothesis in France, a leading country in terms of employee ownership, based on a panel of the 120 largest listed companies for the 2000-2011 period. We find: (i) no significant relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of equity; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of debt; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship relationship between employee stock ownership and the weighted average cost of capital. These results suggest debtholders regard ESO as positive as long it is moderate because its shifts risk from them to employees and that this effect is still perceptible in the weighted average cost of capital.
make his point valid. Bringing togethergift and participation finds its coherence in works focusing on employee financial participation. The most recent empirical studies show the relevance of gift and reciprocity theories to understand employees‟ participation.
The literature suggests that good managers use employee ownership as a reward management tool, whereas bad
managers implement it for entrenchment, thus suggesting the existence of an equilibrium level of employee
ownership. The contributions of this paper are both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, this paper fills a gap
in the published research by taking into account both positive and negative outcomes of employee ownership.
Our model produces three main conclusions: (i) Low-performing managers use employee ownership as an
entrenchment mechanism (ii) that increases the signaling cost of employee ownership for high-performingmanagers.
(iii) We suggest that employee ownership should not be left only to the management's discretion because
both types of managers have an incentive to implement employee ownership. Our empirical study investigates
how employee ownership affects management tenure. This study takes into account the two main motives for
employee ownership examined by the model (i.e., management entrenchment and reward management). We
find a positive relationship between employee ownership and management tenure. This result provides new
evidence that employee ownership can be used as an entrenchment mechanism.