Reports and Policy Papers by Agon Demjaha
Papers by Agon Demjaha
University of Tetova, 2020
SEEU Review, 2019
Eleven years after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, Spain’s position vis-à-vis Ko... more Eleven years after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, Spain’s position vis-à-vis Kosovo has not only not varied, but it has become stronger, turning Madrid into the leader of the Kosovo non recognizers club within the EU. This paper analyses Kosovo-Spain relations in the last eleven years. More specifically, the paper examines the reasons behind the non-recognition of Kosovo and the approach of the Spanish governments toward Kosovo’s statehood. This is followed by a thorough analysis on how Kosovo’s path for self-determination played a major role in Catalonia’s quest for independence in 2017. The empirical research demonstrates that Spain’s main reason not to recognise Kosovo is based on the country’s internal dynamics; namely, Catalonia and the Basque country. Likewise, the paper argues that the Spanish governments throughout the last eleven years have created an analogy between Kosovo and Catalonia; not in their political statements, but in their political decisions,...
Understanding and Managing Insurgent Movements, 2014
On December 8, 2017, Forum 2015 organized the next discussion that aimed to explore ways in which... more On December 8, 2017, Forum 2015 organized the next discussion that aimed to explore ways in which EU Member States politically interact with Kosovo. Kosovo’s declaration of independence, in February 2008, resulted in a deep division within the European Union. While 23 members recognised Kosovo, five refused to accept its statehood. At the time, many observers expected the non-recognisers to fall into line eventually and accept Kosovo. However, in the decade since then, that has not happened. If anything, the picture has become more complex. Rather than two distinct camps, four broad groups now exist. First, there are the countries that have recognised Kosovo, and have forged meaningful relations with it. These include Britain and Germany and most of the other members of the EU. At the other end of the scale there are the states that still refuse to recognise Kosovo, and continue to have very little to do with it. Spain and Cyprus fall into this category. However, between those two p...
The Politics of Recognition and Engagement, 2019
After the declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo embarked on the difficult task of obtaining... more After the declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo embarked on the difficult task of obtaining international recognition. This chapter explores the role of Kosovar diplomacy in this process and analyses the challenges Kosovo faced. A decade on, new recognitions have slowed and lobbying efforts by international partners have declined. As a result, Kosovo will have to rely on its own diplomatic capabilities to secure further recognitions. This requires an innovative and comprehensive plan for greater formal diplomatic engagement with non-recognisers that should also be complemented with a creative approach to public diplomacy.
This publication reflects only the views of the author(s); the European Commission and Research E... more This publication reflects only the views of the author(s); the European Commission and Research Executive Agency are not responsible for any information it contains. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed).
SEEU Review
Inter-ethnic relations between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia have been rather problemati... more Inter-ethnic relations between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia have been rather problematic since the times of former Yugoslavia. After independence, the new constitution of the Republic of Macedonia instead of improving it has further downgraded the position of Albanians and other minorities living in the country. The non-fulfilment of Albanians’ core demands led to an armed conflict in 2001. The Ohrid Agreement has in addition to ending the armed conflict, also provided for a range of legislative and policy measures to improve the position of the Albanians by ensuring equality and minority protection. However, 16 years after the Ohrid Agreement, inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia still remain burdened by prejudice and stereotypes, rather than cooperation and mutual prosperity. The main aim of the paper is to analyse the state of inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia, with special focus on relations between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. The paper also offers an ana...
SEEU Review
The paper aims to analyse the state of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo between ethnic Albanians ... more The paper aims to analyse the state of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs, with special focus on the period after unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008. Inter-ethnic conflict in Kosovo has exclusively been over its territory since both Serbs and Albanians have made claims about history and ethno-demography to justify their alleged exclusive right to this ethnically mixed region. Consequently, inter-ethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have been rather problematic throughout the most of the 20Immediately after the war, Serbs in Kosovo were occasionally exposed to acts of inter-ethnic and retaliatory violence. Inter-ethnic relations between the two major ethnicities continued to be tense and fragile after independence of Kosovo in 2008. Dramatic changes of ethnic composition structure, atrocities and huge number of refugees due to the war, have left a legacy of deep mistrust and animosities between Albanians ...
Surveying the Spectrum of EU Member State Policies Towards Kosovo
Edited Books & Volumes by Agon Demjaha
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, in February 2008, resulted in a deep division within the Eu... more Kosovo’s declaration of independence, in February 2008, resulted in a deep division within the European Union. While 23 members recognised Kosovo, fve refused to accept its statehood. At the time, many observers expected the non-recognisers to fall into line eventually and accept Kosovo. However, in the decade since then, that has not happened. If anything, the picture has become more complex. Rather than two distinct camps, four broad groups now exist. First, there are the countries that have recognised Kosovo, and have forged meaningful re-lations with it. These include Britain and Germany and most of the other members of the EU. At the other end of the scale there are the states that still refuse to recognise Kosovo, and continue to have very little to do with it. Spain and Cyprus fall into this category. However, between those two poles lie two other factions. Although Greece, Romania and Slovakia have refused to recognise Kosovo, they have nevertheless forged relatively good relations with Pristina. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic and Poland, while recognising Kosovo, have in fact had relatively little diplomatic interaction with Kosovo authorities over the past ten years.
This report examines Kosovo’s relations with these four broad categories of states. In doing so, it shows that even within these groups – what we can roughly term ‘recognisers and engagers’, ‘recognisers but non-engagers’, ‘non-recognisers but engagers’, and ‘non-recognisers and non-engagers’ – there are significant variations in how states behave. For ex-ample, even those states that recognise Kosovo, and have done a lot to support it in the past, may now be far less engaged than they once were. Also, whereas some counties that have always been hostile towards Kosovo have seen their positions harden, rather than soften, with the pas-sage of time, others have gone the other way and become more willing to engage with Pristina. As is shown, the reasons for these changes in positions are complex, and vary from country to country. In some cases, they refect domestic political changes. In other cases, it is driven by external policy concerns, such as a wish to be seen to be working closely with European partners. Also, the broader international political environment can play a part. For instance, events in Spain have made many countries warier about secession.
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Reports and Policy Papers by Agon Demjaha
Papers by Agon Demjaha
Edited Books & Volumes by Agon Demjaha
This report examines Kosovo’s relations with these four broad categories of states. In doing so, it shows that even within these groups – what we can roughly term ‘recognisers and engagers’, ‘recognisers but non-engagers’, ‘non-recognisers but engagers’, and ‘non-recognisers and non-engagers’ – there are significant variations in how states behave. For ex-ample, even those states that recognise Kosovo, and have done a lot to support it in the past, may now be far less engaged than they once were. Also, whereas some counties that have always been hostile towards Kosovo have seen their positions harden, rather than soften, with the pas-sage of time, others have gone the other way and become more willing to engage with Pristina. As is shown, the reasons for these changes in positions are complex, and vary from country to country. In some cases, they refect domestic political changes. In other cases, it is driven by external policy concerns, such as a wish to be seen to be working closely with European partners. Also, the broader international political environment can play a part. For instance, events in Spain have made many countries warier about secession.
This report examines Kosovo’s relations with these four broad categories of states. In doing so, it shows that even within these groups – what we can roughly term ‘recognisers and engagers’, ‘recognisers but non-engagers’, ‘non-recognisers but engagers’, and ‘non-recognisers and non-engagers’ – there are significant variations in how states behave. For ex-ample, even those states that recognise Kosovo, and have done a lot to support it in the past, may now be far less engaged than they once were. Also, whereas some counties that have always been hostile towards Kosovo have seen their positions harden, rather than soften, with the pas-sage of time, others have gone the other way and become more willing to engage with Pristina. As is shown, the reasons for these changes in positions are complex, and vary from country to country. In some cases, they refect domestic political changes. In other cases, it is driven by external policy concerns, such as a wish to be seen to be working closely with European partners. Also, the broader international political environment can play a part. For instance, events in Spain have made many countries warier about secession.