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Seungbae Park

UNIST, School of Liberal Arts, Faculty Member

UNIST, Division of General Studies, Faculty Member

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I served as an anonymous referee for Synthese Library, Cambridge Elements, Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Synthese, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Foundations of Science, Philosophia, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Social Epistemology, Theoria, and Journal of Ethics. My Videos on Scientific Realism: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjOMOQyQ8WxfvEVBGW1hzLw
Supervisors: Richard Healey
Address: https://philpeople.org/profiles/seungbae-park

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Papers by Seungbae Park

The Problem of Divine Evaluation

Symposion, 2024

I raise the following six moral objections to the way God evaluates us. (i) He violates the human... more I raise the following six moral objections to the way God evaluates us. (i) He violates the human right to free thought. (ii) He makes the dubious assumption that it is praiseworthy and blameworthy, respectively, to believe and disbelieve that he exists. (iii) He excessively rewards believers and excessively punishes disbelievers. (iv) He only assigns to his evaluatees the two extreme grades: eternal bliss and eternal damnation. (v) He overlooks diverse factors related to the belief of God. (vi) He is silent on the issue of whether to evaluate animals. Therefore, God, who is allegedly omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, does not exist.

Moral Subjectivism vs. Moral Objectivism

Filosofija. Sociologija, 2022

Moral subjectivism is not self-defeating, contrary to what moral objectivists claim. Ockham's Raz... more Moral subjectivism is not self-defeating, contrary to what moral objectivists claim. Ockham's Razor favors moral subjectivism over moral objectivism. It is circular for moral objectivists to say that since we construct sound and cogent arguments out of moral statements, moral statements are true. Moral subjectivism acknowledges the role that arguments play in our moral lives, contrary to what moral objectivists contend. The way in which moral objectivists attempt to establish moral objectivism ironically supports moral subjectivism.

The Realist and Selectionist Explanations for the Success of Science

Synthese, 2022

According to realists, theories are successful because they are true, but according to selectioni... more According to realists, theories are successful because they are true, but according to selectionists, theories are successful because they have gone through a rigorous selection process. Wray claims that the realist and selectionist explanations are rivals to each other. Lee objects that they are instead complementary to each other. In my view, Lee's objection presupposes that the realist explanation is true, and thus it begs the question against selectionists. By contrast, the selectionist explanation invokes a scientific theory, and thus it is not clear whether it is a realist explanation or an antirealist explanation. Finally, the six new arguments for scientific realism in the literature truly complement the no-miracles argument.

Inference to the Best Explanation, Naturalism, and Theism

Implicit Religion, 2022

De Ray argues that relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires the metaphysical b... more De Ray argues that relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires the metaphysical belief that most phenomena have explanations. I object that instead the metaphysical belief requires the use of IBE. De Ray uses IBE himself to establish theism that God is the cause of the metaphysical belief, and thus he has the burden of establishing the metaphysical belief independently of using IBE. Naturalism that the world is the cause of the metaphysical belief is preferable to theism, contrary to what de Ray thinks.

Cultural Relativism vs. Cultural Absolutism

I defend cultural relativism against the following objections: (i) The analogy between motion and... more I defend cultural relativism against the following objections: (i) The analogy between motion and morality is flawed. (ii) Cultural relativism has higher potential to be harmful to our daily lives than is cultural absolutism. (iii) We made moral progress when we moved from slavery to equality. (iv) There are some moral principles that are accepted by all cultures around the world. (v) Moral argumentation is impossible within the framework of cultural relativism. (vi) We construct arguments for and against cultures.

The Unvirtuous Prediction of the Pessimistic Induction

Filosofija. Sociologija, 2021

The pessimist predicts that future scientific theories will replace present scientific theories. ... more The pessimist predicts that future scientific theories will replace present scientific theories. However, she does not specify when the predicted events will take place, so we do not have the opportunity to blame her for having made a false prediction, although we might have the chance to praise her for having made a true prediction. Her prediction contrasts with the astronomer's prediction. The astronomer specifies when the next solar eclipse will happen, so we have both the chance to blame her for having made a false prediction and the chance to praise her for having made a true prediction. The pessimist's prediction remains unvirtuous until she specifies when scientific revolutions will occur. This critical point applies no less to the selectivist's prediction.

Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism

Metaphysica, 2021

Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic pro... more Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism.

In Defense of Religious Practicalism

European Journal of Science and Theology, 2021

Religious fictionalism holds that religious sentences are false, that religious practitioners acc... more Religious fictionalism holds that religious sentences are false, that religious practitioners accept rather than believe religious sentences, and that it is justifiable for them to act on religious sentences. I develop an alternative to religious fictionalism, which I call "religious practicalism." It holds that we do not know whether religious sentences are true or false, that religious practitioners believe rather than merely accept religious sentences, and that it is justifiable for them to act on religious sentences. I argue that religious practicalism has intellectual, moral, and practical advantages over religious fictionalism.

On the Argument from Double Spaces: A Reply to Moti Mizrahi

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2021

Van Fraassen infers the truth of the contextual theory from his observation that it has passed a ... more Van Fraassen infers the truth of the contextual theory from his observation that it has passed a crucial test. Mizrahi infers the comparative truth of our best theories from his observation that they are more successful than their competitors. Their inferences require, according to the argument from double spaces, the prior belief that it is more likely that their target theories were pulled out from the T-space than from the O-space. The T-space is the logical space of unconceived theories whose appearances agree with their realities; the O-space is the logical space of unconceived theories whose appearances may agree or disagree with their realities.

The Appearance and the Reality of a Scientific Theory

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2020

Scientific realists claim that the best of successful rival theories is (approximately) true. Rel... more Scientific realists claim that the best of successful rival theories is (approximately) true. Relative realists object that we cannot make the absolute judgment that a theory is successful, and that we can only make the relative judgment that it is more successful than its competitor. I argue that this objection is undermined by the cases in which empirical equivalents are successful. Relative realists invoke the argument from a bad lot to undermine scientific realism and to support relative realism. In response, I construct the argument from double spaces. It is similar to the argument from a bad lot, but threatens many philosophical inferences, including relative realists' inference from comparative success to comparative truth.

Replies to Healey’s Comments Regarding van Fraassen’s Positions

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2020

Healey (2019a) makes four comments on my (Park, 2019a) objections to van Fraassen's positions. Th... more Healey (2019a) makes four comments on my (Park, 2019a) objections to van Fraassen's positions. The four comments concern the issues of whether 'disbelief' is appropriate or inappropriate to characterize van Fraassen's position, what the relationship between a theory and models is for van Fraassen, whether he believes or not that a theory is empirically adequate, and whether destructive empiricism is tenable or not. I reply to those comments in this paper.

Formulational vs. Epistemological Debates Concerning Scientific Realism

A formulational debate is a debate over whether certain definitions of scientific realism and ant... more A formulational debate is a debate over whether certain definitions of scientific realism and antirealism are useful or useless. By contrast, an epistemological debate is a debate over whether we have sufficient evidence for scientific realism and antirealism defined in a certain manner. I argue that Hilary Putnam's definitions of scientific realism and antirealism are more useful than Bas van Fraassen's definitions of scientific realism and constructive empiricism because Putnam's definitions can generate both formulational and epistemological debates, whereas van Fraassen's can generate only formulational debates.

Constructive Empiricism in a Social World: Reply to Richard Healey

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2019

Constructive empiricism implies that if van Fraassen does not believe that scientific theories an... more Constructive empiricism implies that if van Fraassen does not believe that scientific theories and his positive philosophical theories, including his contextual theory of explanation, are empirically adequate, he cannot accept them, and hence he cannot use them for scientific and philosophical purposes. Moreover, his epistemic colleagues, who embrace epistemic reciprocalism, would not believe that his positive philosophical theories are empirically adequate. This epistemic disadvantage comes with practical disadvantages in a social world.

Surrealism Is Not an Alternative to Scientific Realism

Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2019

Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that... more Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that T is true. Surrealism and scientific realism give different explanations of why T is empirically adequate. According to surrealism, T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. According to scientific realism, T is empirically adequate because it is true. I argue that the surrealist explanation merely clarifies the concept of empirical adequacy, whereas the realist explanation makes an inductive inference about T. Therefore, the surrealist explanation is a conceptual one, whereas the realist explanation is an empirical one, and the former is not an alternative to the latter.

Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2019

The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the ... more The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén, 2016). I argue that Dellsén's criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.

How to Formulate Scientific Realism and Antirealism

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2019

The wider the gap between rivaling positions, the more there can be debates between rivaling inte... more The wider the gap between rivaling positions, the more there can be debates between rivaling interlocutors. The gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the Prussian conception of rationality is wider than the gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the English conception of rationality. Therefore, scientific realists and antirealists should choose the former over the latter as the framework of their debate.

Critiques of Axiological Realism and Surrealism Forthcoming in Acta Analytica

Acta Analytica, 2019

Lyons's (2003, 2018) axiological realism holds that science pursues true theories. I object that ... more Lyons's (2003, 2018) axiological realism holds that science pursues true theories. I object that despite its name, it is a variant of scientific antirealism, and is susceptible to all the problems with scientific antirealism. Lyons (2003, 2018) also advances a variant of surrealism as an alternative to the realist explanation for success. I object that it does not give rise to understanding because it is an ad hoc explanans and because it gives a conditional explanation. Lyons might use axiological realism to account for the success of a theory. I object that some alternative axiological explanations are better than the axiological realist explanation, and that the axiological realist explanation is teleological. Finally, I argue that Putnam's realist position is more elegant than Lyons's.

In Defense of Realism and Selectivism from Lyons's Objections

Foundations of Science, 2019

Lyons (2016, 2017, 2018) formulates Laudan's (1981) historical objection to scientific realism as... more Lyons (2016, 2017, 2018) formulates Laudan's (1981) historical objection to scientific realism as a modus tollens. I present a better formulation of Laudan's objection, and then argue that Lyons's formulation is supererogatory. Lyons rejects scientific realism (Putnam, 1975) on the grounds that some successful past theories were (completely) false. I reply that scientific realism is not the categorical hypothesis that all successful scientific theories are (approximately) true, but rather the statistical hypothesis that most successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. Lyons rejects selectivism (Kitcher, 1993; Psillos, 1999) on the grounds that some working assumptions were (completely) false in the history of science. I reply that selectivists would say not that all working assumptions are (approximately) true, but rather that most working assumptions are (approximately) true.

How to Overcome Antirealists’ Objections to Scientific Realism

Axiomathes, 2019

Van Fraassen contends that there is no argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve a succes... more Van Fraassen contends that there is no argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve a successful theory, T. I object that this contention places upon him the burden of showing that scientific antirealists’ favorite arguments, such as the pessimistic induction, do not rationally compel us to disbelieve T. Van Fraassen uses the English view of rationality to rationally disbelieve T. I argue that realists can use it to rationally believe T, despite scientific antirealists’ favorite arguments against T.

The Exemplar Approach to Science and Religion

Symposion, 2019

We can judge whether some activities are scientific or religious, depending on how similar they a... more We can judge whether some activities are scientific or religious, depending on how similar they are to exemplar scientific activities or to exemplar religious activities, even if we cannot specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for science and religion. The absence of the demarcation between science and religion does not justify the school policy of teaching the creationist hypothesis that God created the universe any more than it justifies the religious policy of teaching evolutionary theory, quantum mechanics, and the Big Bang theory in religious institutions.

The Problem of Divine Evaluation

Symposion, 2024

I raise the following six moral objections to the way God evaluates us. (i) He violates the human... more I raise the following six moral objections to the way God evaluates us. (i) He violates the human right to free thought. (ii) He makes the dubious assumption that it is praiseworthy and blameworthy, respectively, to believe and disbelieve that he exists. (iii) He excessively rewards believers and excessively punishes disbelievers. (iv) He only assigns to his evaluatees the two extreme grades: eternal bliss and eternal damnation. (v) He overlooks diverse factors related to the belief of God. (vi) He is silent on the issue of whether to evaluate animals. Therefore, God, who is allegedly omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, does not exist.

Moral Subjectivism vs. Moral Objectivism

Filosofija. Sociologija, 2022

Moral subjectivism is not self-defeating, contrary to what moral objectivists claim. Ockham's Raz... more Moral subjectivism is not self-defeating, contrary to what moral objectivists claim. Ockham's Razor favors moral subjectivism over moral objectivism. It is circular for moral objectivists to say that since we construct sound and cogent arguments out of moral statements, moral statements are true. Moral subjectivism acknowledges the role that arguments play in our moral lives, contrary to what moral objectivists contend. The way in which moral objectivists attempt to establish moral objectivism ironically supports moral subjectivism.

The Realist and Selectionist Explanations for the Success of Science

Synthese, 2022

According to realists, theories are successful because they are true, but according to selectioni... more According to realists, theories are successful because they are true, but according to selectionists, theories are successful because they have gone through a rigorous selection process. Wray claims that the realist and selectionist explanations are rivals to each other. Lee objects that they are instead complementary to each other. In my view, Lee's objection presupposes that the realist explanation is true, and thus it begs the question against selectionists. By contrast, the selectionist explanation invokes a scientific theory, and thus it is not clear whether it is a realist explanation or an antirealist explanation. Finally, the six new arguments for scientific realism in the literature truly complement the no-miracles argument.

Inference to the Best Explanation, Naturalism, and Theism

Implicit Religion, 2022

De Ray argues that relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires the metaphysical b... more De Ray argues that relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires the metaphysical belief that most phenomena have explanations. I object that instead the metaphysical belief requires the use of IBE. De Ray uses IBE himself to establish theism that God is the cause of the metaphysical belief, and thus he has the burden of establishing the metaphysical belief independently of using IBE. Naturalism that the world is the cause of the metaphysical belief is preferable to theism, contrary to what de Ray thinks.

Cultural Relativism vs. Cultural Absolutism

I defend cultural relativism against the following objections: (i) The analogy between motion and... more I defend cultural relativism against the following objections: (i) The analogy between motion and morality is flawed. (ii) Cultural relativism has higher potential to be harmful to our daily lives than is cultural absolutism. (iii) We made moral progress when we moved from slavery to equality. (iv) There are some moral principles that are accepted by all cultures around the world. (v) Moral argumentation is impossible within the framework of cultural relativism. (vi) We construct arguments for and against cultures.

The Unvirtuous Prediction of the Pessimistic Induction

Filosofija. Sociologija, 2021

The pessimist predicts that future scientific theories will replace present scientific theories. ... more The pessimist predicts that future scientific theories will replace present scientific theories. However, she does not specify when the predicted events will take place, so we do not have the opportunity to blame her for having made a false prediction, although we might have the chance to praise her for having made a true prediction. Her prediction contrasts with the astronomer's prediction. The astronomer specifies when the next solar eclipse will happen, so we have both the chance to blame her for having made a false prediction and the chance to praise her for having made a true prediction. The pessimist's prediction remains unvirtuous until she specifies when scientific revolutions will occur. This critical point applies no less to the selectivist's prediction.

Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism

Metaphysica, 2021

Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic pro... more Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism.

In Defense of Religious Practicalism

European Journal of Science and Theology, 2021

Religious fictionalism holds that religious sentences are false, that religious practitioners acc... more Religious fictionalism holds that religious sentences are false, that religious practitioners accept rather than believe religious sentences, and that it is justifiable for them to act on religious sentences. I develop an alternative to religious fictionalism, which I call "religious practicalism." It holds that we do not know whether religious sentences are true or false, that religious practitioners believe rather than merely accept religious sentences, and that it is justifiable for them to act on religious sentences. I argue that religious practicalism has intellectual, moral, and practical advantages over religious fictionalism.

On the Argument from Double Spaces: A Reply to Moti Mizrahi

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2021

Van Fraassen infers the truth of the contextual theory from his observation that it has passed a ... more Van Fraassen infers the truth of the contextual theory from his observation that it has passed a crucial test. Mizrahi infers the comparative truth of our best theories from his observation that they are more successful than their competitors. Their inferences require, according to the argument from double spaces, the prior belief that it is more likely that their target theories were pulled out from the T-space than from the O-space. The T-space is the logical space of unconceived theories whose appearances agree with their realities; the O-space is the logical space of unconceived theories whose appearances may agree or disagree with their realities.

The Appearance and the Reality of a Scientific Theory

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2020

Scientific realists claim that the best of successful rival theories is (approximately) true. Rel... more Scientific realists claim that the best of successful rival theories is (approximately) true. Relative realists object that we cannot make the absolute judgment that a theory is successful, and that we can only make the relative judgment that it is more successful than its competitor. I argue that this objection is undermined by the cases in which empirical equivalents are successful. Relative realists invoke the argument from a bad lot to undermine scientific realism and to support relative realism. In response, I construct the argument from double spaces. It is similar to the argument from a bad lot, but threatens many philosophical inferences, including relative realists' inference from comparative success to comparative truth.

Replies to Healey’s Comments Regarding van Fraassen’s Positions

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2020

Healey (2019a) makes four comments on my (Park, 2019a) objections to van Fraassen's positions. Th... more Healey (2019a) makes four comments on my (Park, 2019a) objections to van Fraassen's positions. The four comments concern the issues of whether 'disbelief' is appropriate or inappropriate to characterize van Fraassen's position, what the relationship between a theory and models is for van Fraassen, whether he believes or not that a theory is empirically adequate, and whether destructive empiricism is tenable or not. I reply to those comments in this paper.

Formulational vs. Epistemological Debates Concerning Scientific Realism

A formulational debate is a debate over whether certain definitions of scientific realism and ant... more A formulational debate is a debate over whether certain definitions of scientific realism and antirealism are useful or useless. By contrast, an epistemological debate is a debate over whether we have sufficient evidence for scientific realism and antirealism defined in a certain manner. I argue that Hilary Putnam's definitions of scientific realism and antirealism are more useful than Bas van Fraassen's definitions of scientific realism and constructive empiricism because Putnam's definitions can generate both formulational and epistemological debates, whereas van Fraassen's can generate only formulational debates.

Constructive Empiricism in a Social World: Reply to Richard Healey

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2019

Constructive empiricism implies that if van Fraassen does not believe that scientific theories an... more Constructive empiricism implies that if van Fraassen does not believe that scientific theories and his positive philosophical theories, including his contextual theory of explanation, are empirically adequate, he cannot accept them, and hence he cannot use them for scientific and philosophical purposes. Moreover, his epistemic colleagues, who embrace epistemic reciprocalism, would not believe that his positive philosophical theories are empirically adequate. This epistemic disadvantage comes with practical disadvantages in a social world.

Surrealism Is Not an Alternative to Scientific Realism

Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2019

Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that... more Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that T is true. Surrealism and scientific realism give different explanations of why T is empirically adequate. According to surrealism, T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. According to scientific realism, T is empirically adequate because it is true. I argue that the surrealist explanation merely clarifies the concept of empirical adequacy, whereas the realist explanation makes an inductive inference about T. Therefore, the surrealist explanation is a conceptual one, whereas the realist explanation is an empirical one, and the former is not an alternative to the latter.

Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2019

The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the ... more The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén, 2016). I argue that Dellsén's criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.

How to Formulate Scientific Realism and Antirealism

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2019

The wider the gap between rivaling positions, the more there can be debates between rivaling inte... more The wider the gap between rivaling positions, the more there can be debates between rivaling interlocutors. The gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the Prussian conception of rationality is wider than the gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the English conception of rationality. Therefore, scientific realists and antirealists should choose the former over the latter as the framework of their debate.

Critiques of Axiological Realism and Surrealism Forthcoming in Acta Analytica

Acta Analytica, 2019

Lyons's (2003, 2018) axiological realism holds that science pursues true theories. I object that ... more Lyons's (2003, 2018) axiological realism holds that science pursues true theories. I object that despite its name, it is a variant of scientific antirealism, and is susceptible to all the problems with scientific antirealism. Lyons (2003, 2018) also advances a variant of surrealism as an alternative to the realist explanation for success. I object that it does not give rise to understanding because it is an ad hoc explanans and because it gives a conditional explanation. Lyons might use axiological realism to account for the success of a theory. I object that some alternative axiological explanations are better than the axiological realist explanation, and that the axiological realist explanation is teleological. Finally, I argue that Putnam's realist position is more elegant than Lyons's.

In Defense of Realism and Selectivism from Lyons's Objections

Foundations of Science, 2019

Lyons (2016, 2017, 2018) formulates Laudan's (1981) historical objection to scientific realism as... more Lyons (2016, 2017, 2018) formulates Laudan's (1981) historical objection to scientific realism as a modus tollens. I present a better formulation of Laudan's objection, and then argue that Lyons's formulation is supererogatory. Lyons rejects scientific realism (Putnam, 1975) on the grounds that some successful past theories were (completely) false. I reply that scientific realism is not the categorical hypothesis that all successful scientific theories are (approximately) true, but rather the statistical hypothesis that most successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. Lyons rejects selectivism (Kitcher, 1993; Psillos, 1999) on the grounds that some working assumptions were (completely) false in the history of science. I reply that selectivists would say not that all working assumptions are (approximately) true, but rather that most working assumptions are (approximately) true.

How to Overcome Antirealists’ Objections to Scientific Realism

Axiomathes, 2019

Van Fraassen contends that there is no argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve a succes... more Van Fraassen contends that there is no argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve a successful theory, T. I object that this contention places upon him the burden of showing that scientific antirealists’ favorite arguments, such as the pessimistic induction, do not rationally compel us to disbelieve T. Van Fraassen uses the English view of rationality to rationally disbelieve T. I argue that realists can use it to rationally believe T, despite scientific antirealists’ favorite arguments against T.

The Exemplar Approach to Science and Religion

Symposion, 2019

We can judge whether some activities are scientific or religious, depending on how similar they a... more We can judge whether some activities are scientific or religious, depending on how similar they are to exemplar scientific activities or to exemplar religious activities, even if we cannot specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for science and religion. The absence of the demarcation between science and religion does not justify the school policy of teaching the creationist hypothesis that God created the universe any more than it justifies the religious policy of teaching evolutionary theory, quantum mechanics, and the Big Bang theory in religious institutions.

Philosophers and Scientists Are Social Epistemic Agents

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2018

This paper is a response paper to book reviews. Summary: Philosophers and scientists are social e... more

Embracing Scientific Realism

This book provides philosophers of science with new theoretical resources for making their own co... more This book provides philosophers of science with new theoretical resources for making their own contributions to the scientific realism debate. Readers will encounter old and new arguments for and against scientific realism. They will also be given useful tips for how to provide influential formulations of scientific realism and antirealism. Finally, they will see how scientific realism relates to scientific progress, scientific understanding, mathematical realism, and scientific practice.