Papers by Pierdaniele Giaretta
Rivista Di Estetica, 2004
Rivista Di Estetica, 2008
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Rivista Di Estetica, 2003
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In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell dice che "per comprendere un nome si deve avere... more In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell dice che "per comprendere un nome si deve avere conoscenza diretta del particolare di cui esso è un nome, e si deve inoltre sapere che si tratta del nome di quel particolare" ([1], p.35). La condizione "si deve inoltre sapere che si tratta del nome di quel particolare" può essere generalizzata come segue: se un'espressione E sta per un'entità M, si deve sapere che E sta per M. Verosimilmente, Russell, o meglio un certo Russell, avrebbe potuto accettare questa generalizzazione. La clausola che viene aggiunta al fine di caratterizzare la comprensione di un'espressione E sembra implicare che la comprensione di E richieda la conoscenza di una proposizione, la proposizione che E sta per l'entità significata. Ne seguirebbe che al fine di comprendere un enunciato, dovrebbero essere riconosciute come vere alcune proposizioni, diverse da quella espressa dall'enunciato. Una tale conoscenza non potrebbe essere...
Grazer Philosophische Studien
Stewart Shapiro and John Myhill tried to reproduce some features of the intuitionistic mathematic... more Stewart Shapiro and John Myhill tried to reproduce some features of the intuitionistic mathematics within certain formal intensional theories of classical mathematics. Basically they introduced a knowledge operator and restricted the ways of referring to numbers and to finite hereditary sets. The restrictions are very interesting, both because they allow us to keep substitutivity of identicals notwithstanding the presence of an epistemic operator and, especially, because such restrictions allow us to see, by contrast, which ways of reference are not compatible with the simultaneous maintenance of substitutivity of identicals and the classical notions of truth and knowledge. In this paper the difference between the restricted and the unrestricted kind of reference is put in relation with Russell's ideas on naming and it is argued that the latter as well is compatible with a certain Russellian conception of the understanding of sentences. Then it is discussed whether and how numbe...
The aim of this paper is to refine, integrate and apply the methodology of OntoClean. Three aspec... more The aim of this paper is to refine, integrate and apply the methodology of OntoClean. Three aspects are taken into account; two of them concern main ideas of OntoClean, the third one is a study of a particular important application. The first section deals with the topic of identity: formal constraints on identity criteria, com-patibility and identity among identity criteria. The second section deals with rigidity, dependence and existence. The final section investigates how meta-property criteria can be applied to the notion of artifact.
Logique et Analyse
The so-called paradox of knowability is usually regarded as questioning the principle that all tr... more The so-called paradox of knowability is usually regarded as questioning the principle that all truth is knowable (knowability principle). In this paper we examine the connection of the principle of knowability with other principles (epistemic versions of the disjunction property) which concern the relationships between knowledge of a disjunction and knowledge of the disjuncts, and between knowledge of an existentially quantified sentence and knowledge of one of its instances. Some epistemic versions of the disjunction property are apparently weaker than the knowability principle. Still one of them seems to have paradoxical, or at least not easily acceptable, consequences as well. This puzzling result is diagnosed as depending on the association of a strongly intensional view of propositions with the impredicative way in which they are conceived and dealt with. If correct, the diagnosis directly applies to the paradox of knowability as well.
ABSTRACT First, language and axioms of Church's paper 'Comparison of Russell&... more ABSTRACT First, language and axioms of Church's paper 'Comparison of Russell's Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with that of Tarski' are slightly modified and a version of the Liar paradox tentatively reconstructed. An obvious natural solution of the paradox leads to a hierarchy of truth predicates which is of a different kind from the one defined by Church: it depends on the enlargement of the semantical vocabulary and its levels do not differ in the ramified-type-theoretical sense. Second, two attempts are made in order to justify the Russellian, and perhaps Churchian, idea that language should not be fragmented beyond what is required by type distinctions. After all, because of reducibility, which seems to allow a semantics without propositions, this comes out to be possible only at the cost of resorting to two disputable theses.
Between Logic and Reality, 2011
ABSTRACT A theory of temporal mereology is formulated in which the principles of existence and of... more ABSTRACT A theory of temporal mereology is formulated in which the principles of existence and of uniqueness of composition hold. The theory is consistent both with a three-dimensionalist ontology and with the change of parts, that is, with the view that at least one object has distinct parts at distinct times. Some interesting consequences of the theory joined with the change of parts, taken as an axiom, are proven. It is usually held that certain well-known ontological puzzles must be solved either by adopting a four-dimensionalist ontology or by restricting some mereological principles. Here a solution to those puzzles is stated, which allows to keep all mereological principles in their generality, without adopting a four-dimensionalist ontology. The solution is achieved by denying the persistence of some of the entities involved, along the “Chrysippean” lines advocated by M. Burke and M. Rea. Although good reasons for this move are provided, some problems of the solution are also highlighted and tentatively answered.
Sistemi intelligenti, 2007
Gli enunciati condizionali, che hanno la forma «se..., allora...», sono un dibattuto oggetto di s... more Gli enunciati condizionali, che hanno la forma «se..., allora...», sono un dibattuto oggetto di studio della logica, della filosofia della logica e della psicologia del pensiero. La ricerca in queste tre aree si è sviluppata secondo linee diverse che raramente si sono intersecate. In particolare sono state scarse le connessioni tra la ricerca svolta in ambito logico o logico-filosofico e la ricerca psicocognitiva.
Dialectica, 2005
In the unpublished work Theory of Knowledge† a complex is assumed to be “anything analyzable, any... more In the unpublished work Theory of Knowledge† a complex is assumed to be “anything analyzable, any- thing which has constituents” (p. 79), and analysis is presented as the “discovery of the constituents and the manner of combination of a given complex” (p. 119). The notion of complex is linked in various ways with the notions of relating relation, logical form and proposition, taken as a linguistic expression provided with meaning. This paper mainly focuses on these notions, on their links and, more widely, on the role of logical form, by offering a new way of understanding what Russell was doing in TK as concerns the logical-ontological matter of this manuscript. In particular, a new account of Russell's theory of judgment will be given, by taking a stand with respect to the main accounts already given, and it will be argued for the presence in TK of a notion of type different from the one applied to propositional functions in ML and PM.
The word "ontology" has recently gained a good popularity within the knowledge engineering commun... more The word "ontology" has recently gained a good popularity within the knowledge engineering community. However, its meaning tends to remain a bit vague, as the term is used in very different ways. Limiting our attention to the various proposals made in the current debate in AI, we isolate a number of interpretations, which in our opinion deserve a suitable clarification. We elucidate the implications of such various interpretations, arguing for the need of clear terminological choices regarding the technical use of terms like "ontology", "conceptualization" and "ontological commitment". After some comments on the use "Ontology" (with the capital "o") as a term which denotes a philosophical discipline, we analyse the possible confusion between an ontology intended as a particular conceptual framework at the knowledge level and an ontology intended as a concrete artifact at the symbol level, to be used for a given purpose. A crucial point in this clarification effort is the careful analysis of Gruber' s definition of an ontology as a specification of a conceptualization.
Obiettivo del lavoro è quello di fonire un chiarimento della nozione di criterio d'identità. S'in... more Obiettivo del lavoro è quello di fonire un chiarimento della nozione di criterio d'identità. S'intende sostenere, in negativo, che i criteri d'identità (1) non sono esplicativi dell'identità, (2) non forniscono un metodo per decidere la verità degli eunciati d'identità e (3) non hanno una funzione di legittimazione ontologica. In positivo, si sostiene che (4) i criteri d'identità possono essere informativi ed a posteriori.
Dialectica, 2005
The aim of this note is to discuss the general form and role of identity criteria. We have taken ... more The aim of this note is to discuss the general form and role of identity criteria. We have taken two readings into consideration which express two different functions of identity criteria. The first expresses the epistemic function whilst the second deals with the ontological function. We argue that there are several problems related to the specification of both these functions. As a consequence, we conclude that identity criteria are not necessary to provide ontological legitimacy.
We focus in this paper on some meta-level ontological distinctions among unary predicates, like t... more We focus in this paper on some meta-level ontological distinctions among unary predicates, like those between concepts and assertional properties. Three are the main contributions of this work, mostly based on a revisitation of philosophical (and linguistic) literature in the perspective of knowledge representation. The first is a formal notion of ontological commitment, based on a modal logic endowed with mereological and topological primitives. The second is a formal account of Strawson's distinction between sortal and non-sortal predicates. Assertional properties like red belong to the latter category, while the former category is further refined by distinguishing substantial predicates (corresponding to types like person) from non-substantial predicates (corresponding to roles like student). The third technical contribution is definition of countability which exploits the topological notion of connection to capture the intended semantics of unary predicates.
Formalizing the ontological commitment of a logical language means offering a way to specify the ... more Formalizing the ontological commitment of a logical language means offering a way to specify the intended meaning of its vocabulary by constraining the set of its models, giving explicit information about the intended nature of the modelling primitives and their a priori relationships. We present here a formal definition of ontological commitment which aims to capture the very basic ontological assumptions about the intended domain, related to issues such as identity and internal structure. To tackle such issues, a modal framework endowed with mereo-topological primitives has been adopted. The paper is mostly based on a revisitation of philosophical (and linguistic) literature in the perspective of knowledge representation.
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Papers by Pierdaniele Giaretta