Papers by Maurita J . Harney
The Philosophical Review, Apr 1, 1987
To say that thought is intentional is to say that thought is directed to some object. Objects to ... more To say that thought is intentional is to say that thought is directed to some object. Objects to which thought is directed are problematic: unlike the objects of physical acts-like hittingthey need not exist in reality: I may think of a unicorn, or imagine a centaur, even though such objects do not exist. However, in most cases my thoughts are directed to existing objects: I may think of President Carter or I may envy Mrs Thatcher. In such cases the
Springer eBooks, 1994
To some, the topic of AI and Creativity (like the topic of ‘machine thinking’) might sound like a... more To some, the topic of AI and Creativity (like the topic of ‘machine thinking’) might sound like a contradiction in terms. For creativity in thinking and other activities, as commonly understood, requires us to withdraw the constraints implicit in rules and rational appraisal. But what could be more rational or rule-bound than the model of the mind and cognition on which AI is founded? The implicit connection here, between creativity and ‘irrationalism’, owes something to Sigmund Freud, who saw creativity as the link between art and play. Both are activities pursued for their own sake, and both involve the suspension of rational principles: “The creative writer does much the same as the child at play. He creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously—that is, which he invests with large amounts of emotion—while separating it sharply from reality.”1 There is no reason to suppose that creativity in science is any different. It is identified as that initial phase in scientific inquiry when the principles of rational evaluation and assessment are suspended and a bold conjecture or intuitive guess is made. It is that phase prior to the process of testing by means of the rational principles of deduction and induction.
Sophia studies in cross-cultural philosophy of traditions and cultures, 2019
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this p... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Dec 1, 1985
RefDoc Bienvenue - Welcome. Refdoc est un service / is powered by. ...
Studies in Cognitive Systems, 1994
To some, the topic of AI and Creativity (like the topic of ‘machine thinking’) might sound like a... more To some, the topic of AI and Creativity (like the topic of ‘machine thinking’) might sound like a contradiction in terms. For creativity in thinking and other activities, as commonly understood, requires us to withdraw the constraints implicit in rules and rational appraisal. But what could be more rational or rule-bound than the model of the mind and cognition on which AI is founded? The implicit connection here, between creativity and ‘irrationalism’, owes something to Sigmund Freud, who saw creativity as the link between art and play. Both are activities pursued for their own sake, and both involve the suspension of rational principles: “The creative writer does much the same as the child at play. He creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously—that is, which he invests with large amounts of emotion—while separating it sharply from reality.”1 There is no reason to suppose that creativity in science is any different. It is identified as that initial phase in scientific inquiry when the principles of rational evaluation and assessment are suspended and a bold conjecture or intuitive guess is made. It is that phase prior to the process of testing by means of the rational principles of deduction and induction.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1983
Perception and the Inhuman Gaze: Perspectives from Philosophy, Phenomenology, and the Sciences Ed. A. Daly, F. Cummins, J. Jardine, D. Moran. New York: Routledge, 109-127, 2020
'The Gaze' as a dimension of visual perception focuses attention on the perceived rather than the... more 'The Gaze' as a dimension of visual perception focuses attention on the perceived rather than the per-ceiver, and underlines the idea that the 'object' of perception must be understood relationally, and as primarily affective. This contrasts with the Cartesian-derived view based on an underlying separation of subject and object which makes it possible to adopt a 'spectator' view of knowledge. This paper explores aspects of the origins and consequences of these contrasting views showing the importance of Merleau-Ponty's Umweltian-inspired notion of embodied and enactive intentionality in reconceptu-alising the view of nature and of science that is dictated by the spectator view.
Considering Religions, Rights and Bioethics: Memorial Volume for Max Charlesworth, ed. P.Wong, S. Bloor, P. Hutchings, P. Bilimoria. Springer, pp139-153, , 2019
If there is a common theme through the rich diversity of Max Charlesworth's academic life and wor... more If there is a common theme through the rich diversity of Max Charlesworth's academic life and works, it is the quest to understand human action as meaningful, significant and subject to interpretation rather than reducible to the explanatory techniques of positivistic science. This orientation is summed up in the philosophical concept of intentionality. Intentionality is a key notion for continental philosophers whose ideas formed the subject-matter of Max's legendary course in 'Contemporary European Philosophy' at Melbourne University and later, of the foundation philosophy programs at Deakin University. The origins of the concept of intentionality are to be found in mediaeval philosophy-another of Max's teaching areas, and a commitment to intentionality is deeply implicit in his engagement with the religious and the spiritual as well as with ethics. In this essay I trace the changing conceptions of intentionality in recent philosophy and in doing so, indicate developments within the continental philosophical tradition and its shifting relations with the analytical tradition in Australian philosophy.
Biosemiotics, 2020
Achievement Award for 2019
Biosemiotics, 2019
Established at the annual meeting of the International
Biosemiotics, 2018
Annual Award for Achievement in Biosemiotics
For a New Naturalism, ed. Arran Gare and Wayne Hudson, 2017
Merleau-Ponty's later " ontology of nature " presents an opportunity to reconsider the project of... more Merleau-Ponty's later " ontology of nature " presents an opportunity to reconsider the project of naturalizing phenomenology. This kind of naturalism is one that includes rather than excludes notions of meaning and intentionality, whilst at the same time avoiding the traps of the idealism/empiricism duality. I argue that the ideas of American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), although not himself a phenomenologist, might make a significant contribution to such a project. Peirce's notion of the sign as a triadic unity sees meaning or significance de-coupled from the mind and instead integrated into the study of natural processes. Biosemiotics which articulates and extends this idea provides a point of intersection between Peirce's broader philosophy and Merleau-Ponty's later works, most notably his theme of animality as the logos of the sensible world. I further suggest that a Peircean-informed phenomenological naturalism can serve as a basis for a critique of representationalism, which is implicit in many mainstream analytical attempts at naturalizing mind and cognition. It does this by exposing the limitations of the reductionist, Cartesian-derived dyadic assumptions of these attempts, particularly as these are revealed in the information processing model of mind. * * *
Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015
Phenomenology since Husserl has always had a problematic relationship with empirical science. In ... more Phenomenology since Husserl has always had a problematic relationship with empirical science. In its early articulations, there was Husserl's rejection of ‘the scientific attitude’, Merleau-Ponty's distancing of the scientifically-objectified self, and Heidegger's critique of modern science. These suggest an antipathy to science and to its methods of explaining the natural world. Recent developments in neuroscience have opened new opportunities for an engagement between phenomenology and cognitive science and through this, a re-thinking of science and its hidden assumptions more generally. This is so partly because of the shortcomings of conventional mechanistically-conceived science in dealing with complex and dynamic phenomena such as climate change, brain plasticity, the behaviour of collectives, the dynamics of various microbiological processes, etc. But it is also due to recent phenomenological scholarship focussed on the ‘embodied’ phenomenology of Husserl's Ideen II and Merleau Ponty's later ontology of nature which have helped to extend the insights of phenomenology beyond the narrowly ‘human’ to an understanding of nature (which includes the human) more generally. Thus recontextualised, phenomenology is well placed to examine some of the assumptions that give rise to the reductionism and associated scientism which has characterised conventional science in its approach to the study of natural processes. In light of this, it might be suggested that the ‘anti-science’ of early articulations of phenomenology is more a hostility to the underlying assumptions of science as conventionally understood than to science itself e that it is scientism rather than science that is targeted. In this paper, I aim to show how a phenomenological naturalism might be seen as a necessary step towards the development of a non-reductionist and non-scientistic approach to scientific inquiry. A key to this is a reconceptualization of nature as inclusive of meanings and of mind. It is a conception developed by Merleau-Ponty, especially in his later ontology of nature, and one that is shared by American pragmatist philosopher of science, C.S. Peirce (1839e1914). For both philosophers, meaning must be understood in terms of an ontology which is relational rather than atomistic, and dynamic or processual rather than static and substance-based. For Merleau-Ponty this is an experientially-derived ontology; for Peirce it is a more conceptually-based one. In this paper, I explore this connection between these two philosophers in two stages. The first is by reference to Peirce's theory of signs or semiotics. More specifically, I look at the application of this theory to the study of biological processes as developed in Peirce-inspired biosemiotics. In the light of this, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty's account of intentional relations in nature might be articulated as semiotic relations, and can serve as a philosophical basis for a non-reductive biological science. I then turn to questions relating to the ontology of nature. I explore Merleau-Ponty's experientially-based “ontology of flesh” and Peirce's distinctive form of naturalism to show affinities at this ontological level. These affinities consist in commitments to a reality that includes possibility, meaning, temporality, and final causation e that is, an ontology which is far more inclusive than that of conventional positivistic science. Peirce's broader scientific metaphysics enables us to extend Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological naturalism beyond the biological to the physical sciences. Whilst Merleau-Ponty's ontology of nature provides the experiential basis necessary for a critique of scientism, Peirce establishes the relevance of that ontology for a re-conceived empirical science.
The Philosophy of C.S.Peirce – a ‘continental’ perspective. Abstract.
American philosopher, Char... more The Philosophy of C.S.Peirce – a ‘continental’ perspective. Abstract.
American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is something of an enigma in philosophical circles. Although popular and influential in some analytical circles, he is arguably more relevant, and his ideas more congenial to, thinkers in the continental tradition. Peirce himself seems to have been indifferent to the growing phenomenological movement in Europe and critical of Husserl. However, in this paper, I argue that Peirce’s philosophy has a very rich contribution to make to continental philosophy, especially as it has evolved in recent years. I focus specifically on the themes of mind, nature, and cognition, showing how Peirce’s ideas on these topics can further illuminate, and be illuminated by, recent work on the phenomenological philosophy of the later Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.
Maurita Harney
Honorary Senior Fellow in Philosophy
The University of Melbourne
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia
Abstract: Re-Naturing Creativity.
The concept of creativity in some of its popular contemporary g... more Abstract: Re-Naturing Creativity.
The concept of creativity in some of its popular contemporary guises is plagued with confusions and ambiguities. In this paper, I suggest that the source of many of these difficulties is to be found in the uncritical acceptance of an anthropocentrism which privileges culture over nature, and art over science, and which ‘psychologises’ human creativity at the expense of developing a relevant and coherent philosophy of creativity.
Underlying this anthropocentrism is a particular view of nature associated with pre-Enlightenment thinking whereby nature was understood in terms of the machine metaphor and as such drained of the creativity which for earlier philosophers was intrinsic to the concept of nature. Whilst so-called ‘idealist’ philosophers such as Schelling, Peirce, Bergson, and Whitehead have preserved and extended the idea of creativity as operative in nature, they have for the most part done so at a metaphysical or cosmological level, and it is not always easy to see how these broader theories connect with our questions about human creativity. For the ancients, nature was equated with life or living things, and this prompts us to consider whether a re-naturing of creativity is better served by a study of biological rather than cosmological processes in nature. Recent research in non-Cartesian and embodiment philosophies can provide a rich resource for this line of inquiry.
My aim is to explore the idea of creativity in nature, where nature is conceived not in opposition to culture, mind, the arts, but rather as the very basis from which these arise and from which the concept of human creativity derives. When creativity is ‘naturalized’ or ‘re-natured’ in this way, new and sometimes surprising avenues of philosophical inquiry are opened up. The intersubjective dimension is emphasised, imitation is seen to have a role, and the primacy of the visual is challenged by a shift of focus to music and dance as exemplars of human creativity. Through this exploration, I hope to suggest how a genuinely philosophical approach to human creativity might be developed and contribute to a re-conceptualisation of the relationship between the arts and sciences.
Special issue: Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics, and Phenomenological Philosophy, edited by Plamen Simeonov, Arran Gare and Steven Rosen,, Dec 2015
Phenomenology since Husserl has always had a problematic relationship with empirical science. In ... more Phenomenology since Husserl has always had a problematic relationship with empirical science. In its
early articulations, there was Husserl's rejection of ‘the scientific attitude’, Merleau-Ponty's distancing of
the scientifically-objectified self, and Heidegger's critique of modern science. These suggest an antipathy
to science and to its methods of explaining the natural world. Recent developments in neuroscience have
opened new opportunities for an engagement between phenomenology and cognitive science and
through this, a re-thinking of science and its hidden assumptions more generally. This is so partly
because of the shortcomings of conventional mechanistically-conceived science in dealing with complex
and dynamic phenomena such as climate change, brain plasticity, the behaviour of collectives, the dynamics
of various microbiological processes, etc. But it is also due to recent phenomenological scholarship
focussed on the ‘embodied’ phenomenology of Husserl's Ideen II and Merleau Ponty's later
ontology of nature which have helped to extend the insights of phenomenology beyond the narrowly
‘human’ to an understanding of nature (which includes the human) more generally. Thus recontextualised,
phenomenology is well placed to examine some of the assumptions that give rise to
the reductionism and associated scientism which has characterised conventional science in its approach
to the study of natural processes. In light of this, it might be suggested that the ‘anti-science’ of early
articulations of phenomenology is more a hostility to the underlying assumptions of science as
conventionally understood than to science itself e that it is scientism rather than science that is targeted.
In this paper, I aim to show how a phenomenological naturalism might be seen as a necessary step
towards the development of a non-reductionist and non-scientistic approach to scientific inquiry. A key
to this is a reconceptualization of nature as inclusive of meanings and of mind. It is a conception
developed by Merleau-Ponty, especially in his later ontology of nature, and one that is shared by
American pragmatist philosopher of science, C.S. Peirce (1839e1914). For both philosophers, meaning
must be understood in terms of an ontology which is relational rather than atomistic, and dynamic or
processual rather than static and substance-based. For Merleau-Ponty this is an experientially-derived
ontology; for Peirce it is a more conceptually-based one. In this paper, I explore this connection between
these two philosophers in two stages. The first is by reference to Peirce's theory of signs or semiotics.
More specifically, I look at the application of this theory to the study of biological processes as
developed in Peirce-inspired biosemiotics. In the light of this, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty's account of
intentional relations in nature might be articulated as semiotic relations, and can serve as a philosophical
basis for a non-reductive biological science. I then turn to questions relating to the ontology of nature. I
explore Merleau-Ponty's experientially-based “ontology of flesh” and Peirce's distinctive form of naturalism
to show affinities at this ontological level. These affinities consist in commitments to a reality that
includes possibility, meaning, temporality, and final causation e that is, an ontology which is far more
inclusive than that of conventional positivistic science. Peirce's broader scientific metaphysics enables us
to extend Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological naturalism beyond the biological to the physical sciences.
Whilst Merleau-Ponty's ontology of nature provides the experiential basis necessary for a critique of
scientism, Peirce establishes the relevance of that ontology for a re-conceived empirical science.
… philosophy: dwelling on the landscapes of …, Jan 1, 2007
Uploads
Papers by Maurita J . Harney
American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is something of an enigma in philosophical circles. Although popular and influential in some analytical circles, he is arguably more relevant, and his ideas more congenial to, thinkers in the continental tradition. Peirce himself seems to have been indifferent to the growing phenomenological movement in Europe and critical of Husserl. However, in this paper, I argue that Peirce’s philosophy has a very rich contribution to make to continental philosophy, especially as it has evolved in recent years. I focus specifically on the themes of mind, nature, and cognition, showing how Peirce’s ideas on these topics can further illuminate, and be illuminated by, recent work on the phenomenological philosophy of the later Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.
Maurita Harney
Honorary Senior Fellow in Philosophy
The University of Melbourne
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia
The concept of creativity in some of its popular contemporary guises is plagued with confusions and ambiguities. In this paper, I suggest that the source of many of these difficulties is to be found in the uncritical acceptance of an anthropocentrism which privileges culture over nature, and art over science, and which ‘psychologises’ human creativity at the expense of developing a relevant and coherent philosophy of creativity.
Underlying this anthropocentrism is a particular view of nature associated with pre-Enlightenment thinking whereby nature was understood in terms of the machine metaphor and as such drained of the creativity which for earlier philosophers was intrinsic to the concept of nature. Whilst so-called ‘idealist’ philosophers such as Schelling, Peirce, Bergson, and Whitehead have preserved and extended the idea of creativity as operative in nature, they have for the most part done so at a metaphysical or cosmological level, and it is not always easy to see how these broader theories connect with our questions about human creativity. For the ancients, nature was equated with life or living things, and this prompts us to consider whether a re-naturing of creativity is better served by a study of biological rather than cosmological processes in nature. Recent research in non-Cartesian and embodiment philosophies can provide a rich resource for this line of inquiry.
My aim is to explore the idea of creativity in nature, where nature is conceived not in opposition to culture, mind, the arts, but rather as the very basis from which these arise and from which the concept of human creativity derives. When creativity is ‘naturalized’ or ‘re-natured’ in this way, new and sometimes surprising avenues of philosophical inquiry are opened up. The intersubjective dimension is emphasised, imitation is seen to have a role, and the primacy of the visual is challenged by a shift of focus to music and dance as exemplars of human creativity. Through this exploration, I hope to suggest how a genuinely philosophical approach to human creativity might be developed and contribute to a re-conceptualisation of the relationship between the arts and sciences.
early articulations, there was Husserl's rejection of ‘the scientific attitude’, Merleau-Ponty's distancing of
the scientifically-objectified self, and Heidegger's critique of modern science. These suggest an antipathy
to science and to its methods of explaining the natural world. Recent developments in neuroscience have
opened new opportunities for an engagement between phenomenology and cognitive science and
through this, a re-thinking of science and its hidden assumptions more generally. This is so partly
because of the shortcomings of conventional mechanistically-conceived science in dealing with complex
and dynamic phenomena such as climate change, brain plasticity, the behaviour of collectives, the dynamics
of various microbiological processes, etc. But it is also due to recent phenomenological scholarship
focussed on the ‘embodied’ phenomenology of Husserl's Ideen II and Merleau Ponty's later
ontology of nature which have helped to extend the insights of phenomenology beyond the narrowly
‘human’ to an understanding of nature (which includes the human) more generally. Thus recontextualised,
phenomenology is well placed to examine some of the assumptions that give rise to
the reductionism and associated scientism which has characterised conventional science in its approach
to the study of natural processes. In light of this, it might be suggested that the ‘anti-science’ of early
articulations of phenomenology is more a hostility to the underlying assumptions of science as
conventionally understood than to science itself e that it is scientism rather than science that is targeted.
In this paper, I aim to show how a phenomenological naturalism might be seen as a necessary step
towards the development of a non-reductionist and non-scientistic approach to scientific inquiry. A key
to this is a reconceptualization of nature as inclusive of meanings and of mind. It is a conception
developed by Merleau-Ponty, especially in his later ontology of nature, and one that is shared by
American pragmatist philosopher of science, C.S. Peirce (1839e1914). For both philosophers, meaning
must be understood in terms of an ontology which is relational rather than atomistic, and dynamic or
processual rather than static and substance-based. For Merleau-Ponty this is an experientially-derived
ontology; for Peirce it is a more conceptually-based one. In this paper, I explore this connection between
these two philosophers in two stages. The first is by reference to Peirce's theory of signs or semiotics.
More specifically, I look at the application of this theory to the study of biological processes as
developed in Peirce-inspired biosemiotics. In the light of this, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty's account of
intentional relations in nature might be articulated as semiotic relations, and can serve as a philosophical
basis for a non-reductive biological science. I then turn to questions relating to the ontology of nature. I
explore Merleau-Ponty's experientially-based “ontology of flesh” and Peirce's distinctive form of naturalism
to show affinities at this ontological level. These affinities consist in commitments to a reality that
includes possibility, meaning, temporality, and final causation e that is, an ontology which is far more
inclusive than that of conventional positivistic science. Peirce's broader scientific metaphysics enables us
to extend Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological naturalism beyond the biological to the physical sciences.
Whilst Merleau-Ponty's ontology of nature provides the experiential basis necessary for a critique of
scientism, Peirce establishes the relevance of that ontology for a re-conceived empirical science.
American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is something of an enigma in philosophical circles. Although popular and influential in some analytical circles, he is arguably more relevant, and his ideas more congenial to, thinkers in the continental tradition. Peirce himself seems to have been indifferent to the growing phenomenological movement in Europe and critical of Husserl. However, in this paper, I argue that Peirce’s philosophy has a very rich contribution to make to continental philosophy, especially as it has evolved in recent years. I focus specifically on the themes of mind, nature, and cognition, showing how Peirce’s ideas on these topics can further illuminate, and be illuminated by, recent work on the phenomenological philosophy of the later Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.
Maurita Harney
Honorary Senior Fellow in Philosophy
The University of Melbourne
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia
The concept of creativity in some of its popular contemporary guises is plagued with confusions and ambiguities. In this paper, I suggest that the source of many of these difficulties is to be found in the uncritical acceptance of an anthropocentrism which privileges culture over nature, and art over science, and which ‘psychologises’ human creativity at the expense of developing a relevant and coherent philosophy of creativity.
Underlying this anthropocentrism is a particular view of nature associated with pre-Enlightenment thinking whereby nature was understood in terms of the machine metaphor and as such drained of the creativity which for earlier philosophers was intrinsic to the concept of nature. Whilst so-called ‘idealist’ philosophers such as Schelling, Peirce, Bergson, and Whitehead have preserved and extended the idea of creativity as operative in nature, they have for the most part done so at a metaphysical or cosmological level, and it is not always easy to see how these broader theories connect with our questions about human creativity. For the ancients, nature was equated with life or living things, and this prompts us to consider whether a re-naturing of creativity is better served by a study of biological rather than cosmological processes in nature. Recent research in non-Cartesian and embodiment philosophies can provide a rich resource for this line of inquiry.
My aim is to explore the idea of creativity in nature, where nature is conceived not in opposition to culture, mind, the arts, but rather as the very basis from which these arise and from which the concept of human creativity derives. When creativity is ‘naturalized’ or ‘re-natured’ in this way, new and sometimes surprising avenues of philosophical inquiry are opened up. The intersubjective dimension is emphasised, imitation is seen to have a role, and the primacy of the visual is challenged by a shift of focus to music and dance as exemplars of human creativity. Through this exploration, I hope to suggest how a genuinely philosophical approach to human creativity might be developed and contribute to a re-conceptualisation of the relationship between the arts and sciences.
early articulations, there was Husserl's rejection of ‘the scientific attitude’, Merleau-Ponty's distancing of
the scientifically-objectified self, and Heidegger's critique of modern science. These suggest an antipathy
to science and to its methods of explaining the natural world. Recent developments in neuroscience have
opened new opportunities for an engagement between phenomenology and cognitive science and
through this, a re-thinking of science and its hidden assumptions more generally. This is so partly
because of the shortcomings of conventional mechanistically-conceived science in dealing with complex
and dynamic phenomena such as climate change, brain plasticity, the behaviour of collectives, the dynamics
of various microbiological processes, etc. But it is also due to recent phenomenological scholarship
focussed on the ‘embodied’ phenomenology of Husserl's Ideen II and Merleau Ponty's later
ontology of nature which have helped to extend the insights of phenomenology beyond the narrowly
‘human’ to an understanding of nature (which includes the human) more generally. Thus recontextualised,
phenomenology is well placed to examine some of the assumptions that give rise to
the reductionism and associated scientism which has characterised conventional science in its approach
to the study of natural processes. In light of this, it might be suggested that the ‘anti-science’ of early
articulations of phenomenology is more a hostility to the underlying assumptions of science as
conventionally understood than to science itself e that it is scientism rather than science that is targeted.
In this paper, I aim to show how a phenomenological naturalism might be seen as a necessary step
towards the development of a non-reductionist and non-scientistic approach to scientific inquiry. A key
to this is a reconceptualization of nature as inclusive of meanings and of mind. It is a conception
developed by Merleau-Ponty, especially in his later ontology of nature, and one that is shared by
American pragmatist philosopher of science, C.S. Peirce (1839e1914). For both philosophers, meaning
must be understood in terms of an ontology which is relational rather than atomistic, and dynamic or
processual rather than static and substance-based. For Merleau-Ponty this is an experientially-derived
ontology; for Peirce it is a more conceptually-based one. In this paper, I explore this connection between
these two philosophers in two stages. The first is by reference to Peirce's theory of signs or semiotics.
More specifically, I look at the application of this theory to the study of biological processes as
developed in Peirce-inspired biosemiotics. In the light of this, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty's account of
intentional relations in nature might be articulated as semiotic relations, and can serve as a philosophical
basis for a non-reductive biological science. I then turn to questions relating to the ontology of nature. I
explore Merleau-Ponty's experientially-based “ontology of flesh” and Peirce's distinctive form of naturalism
to show affinities at this ontological level. These affinities consist in commitments to a reality that
includes possibility, meaning, temporality, and final causation e that is, an ontology which is far more
inclusive than that of conventional positivistic science. Peirce's broader scientific metaphysics enables us
to extend Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological naturalism beyond the biological to the physical sciences.
Whilst Merleau-Ponty's ontology of nature provides the experiential basis necessary for a critique of
scientism, Peirce establishes the relevance of that ontology for a re-conceived empirical science.
Abstract: This paper is about the intentionality of perception - the idea that perception is always perceiving of something, that it is object-directed, or about something and hence is meaningful. But focus, here, on what it feels like to be looked at. I.e., a particular kind of intentional object. I focus on M-P’s account of intentionality as embodied and suggest that this is best understood in terms of a phil of nature rather than standard approaches which start with a phil of mind or cognition, The problem with the latter is that it tends to import a number of Cartesian-derived assumptions.
There is a tension between two interpretations of the intentionality of perception – the phenomenological approach which emphasises the reciprocity or connectedness of subject and object (as in the Piccinini work), and ‘scientific’ approach associated with the Cartesian-derived ‘spectator’ view of knowledge, and the idealised observer, both predicated on an attempt to dichotomise subject and object, perceiver and perceived, knower and known. This view presupposes a commitment to the idea that subject and object are discrete and determinate entities, locatable in space and time, which exist separately (as partes extra partes) and only come into relation by way of externally imposed relations.
Early attempts to naturalise phenomenology were motivated by the prospect of a rapprochement between phenomenology and empirical cognitive science, with the expectation of mutual enlightenment and, more optimistically the closing of the ‘explanatory gap.’ However, these attempts did little to disturb the underlying reductionist and scientistic assumptions of empirical science.
Merleau Ponty’s later ontology of nature extends the insights of phenomenology beyond the narrowly human to a focus on nature. This is, however, a conception of nature that includes notions such as intentionality, meaning, affordance, and reciprocity. It is a conception of nature that pace Schelling includes humans as both products and creators of processes in nature. It is thus a conception of nature at odds with prevailing views, and one that challenges the hegemony of reductionist, neo-positivist science.
In this paper, I argue that Peircean biosemiotics has a crucial role to play in the development of a phenomenological naturalism reconceived in this way. Peirce’s notion of the sign can be seen as a way of articulating the relational ontology underlying Merleau-Ponty’s conception of nature when we draw on the insights of biosemiotics in developing a new science of the living world. Merleau-Ponty’s relational ontology has its origins in the Umweltian meaning-relations of his earlier work, with its notions of affordance, attunement, and bodily intentionality. It is further developed in his exploration of the reciprocities inherent in ‘the flesh of the world’ as exemplified in the touching/touched relation, and also in his idea of “animality as the logos of the sensible world.” Biosemiotics demonstrates that the relations in Merleau-Ponty’s reconceived nature are irreducibly triadic, that meanings have a reality independent of any Cartesian mind, and that meaning relations can be represented semiotically in a non-reductionist way. This does not mean jettisoning the accepted laws of empirical science, but rather re-contextualising them, for example, within a much richer account of causation.
Biosemiotics might well be seen as the point of convergence between a phenomenological naturalism and those emerging conceptions of natural science (labelled ‘endoscience’) which are being developed largely in response to the shortcomings of conventional mechanistically-conceived science in dealing with complex, dynamic, and emergent phenomena. These new conceptions of science call for a philosophical naturalism which presents an alternative to those existing forms still premised on outmoded dualistic and atomistic views of nature.
https://biosemiotics2015.wordpress.com/program/
American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is something of an enigma in philosophical circles. Although popular and influential in some analytical circles, he is arguably more relevant, and his ideas more congenial to, thinkers in the continental tradition. Peirce himself seems to have been indifferent to the growing phenomenological movement in Europe and critical of Husserl. However, in this paper, I argue that Peirce’s philosophy has a very rich contribution to make to continental philosophy, especially as it has evolved in recent years. I focus specifically on the themes of mind, nature, and cognition, showing how Peirce’s ideas on these topics can further illuminate, and be illuminated by, recent work on the phenomenological philosophy of the later Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.
Seminar series: “The Associative Unconscious” accredited by Group Relations Australia and co-taught with Professor Susan Long. October – November 2014
In this course we aim to introduce you to some key themes in Peirce’s philosophy, including his metaphysics and evolutionary cosmogony, his logic as semiotic (the theory of signs), his views on mind, nature and cognition, his ‘pragmaticism,’ and his philosophy of inquiry. Whilst this course is designed to present Peirce’s philosophy in its own right, the themes and ideas are selected and presented in a way that emphasises their intersection with some key approaches in continental philosophy.
As this is an introductory course, the emphasis will be on ideas and themes in Peirce’s writing rather than a close textual analysis. You will find that his ideas are incredibly fertile, opening up paths of inquiry into a vast range of inter-connected ideas and approaches in the arts and sciences.
(“A Guess at the Riddle” – the reference is to the riddle of the sphinx - is the title of one of Peirce’s works.)
Details of Lecture Topics:
1. Introduction: overview of Peirce’s philosophy and the historical context of his work; shared themes and concerns with continental philosophers; the nature of inquiry; abduction as logical inference and as method of inquiry.
2. Peirce’s theory of signs: the irreducibly triadic structure of the sign; modes of association and the taxonomy of signs; epistemological and semantic implications; biosemiotics and naturalism.
3. Peirce’s metaphysics – the categories of firstness, secondness, thirdness; evolutionary cosmogony; notions of synechism; tychism
4. mind and matter; Peirce’s views on mind, self and consciousness;
5. belief, truth, reality; Peirce’s pragmaticism; his place within the philosophical traditions.
The key notion of sign, here, is that of American philosopher, C. S. Peirce (1839-1914) for whom the sign is not a dyadic relation of sign and object but rather a triadic relation of sign-vehicle/object/interpretant. In Peirce’s philosophy, ‘meaning’ or ‘sign’ is de-coupled from mind and mentality. Signs have an autonomy - they are part of nature, not a product of mind - and, according to Peirce, they are all-pervasive in the natural world.
Besides Peirce, precursors to modern biosemiotics include ecologist Jakob von Uexküll, Gregory Bateson, and Thomas Sebeok who used the term ‘biosemiotics’ in relation to his theories of human and animal communication. Subsequent contributors to biosemiotics as a field of research include a number of biologists, most notably Danish scholar, Jesper Hoffmeyer. Hoffmeyer’s studies of ‘the life of signs in the universe’ have been a major impetus in the development of biosemiotics as a genuine alternative to reductionist and mechanistic approaches in biology and other areas of scientific inquiry.
Recent studies have deepened and extended the research field of biosemiotics, and have generated debates both within biosemiotics (e.g., about the defensibility of the nature/culture dichotomy, about the role of language) and about the status and aims of biosemiotics as a theoretical framework for the study of living things, as a philosophy of nature or for some, like geneticist Marcello Barbieri, as a sub-discipline of biology.
In this course, our focus is on the philosophical dimension of biosemiotics. This means a study of (a) C.S.Peirce’s notion of the sign and its seminal role in biosemiotics; (b) other aspects of Peirce’s epistemology and metaphysics which inform or illuminate a biosemiotic conception of nature, particularly in relation to the concepts of mind, nature, causation, evolutionary processes, and agency; (c) links between biosemiotics and other philosophical ideas and schools of thought including those of Whitehead, Bergson, and the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. http://www.mscp.org.au