Drafts by Gabriel Vacariu
Bucharest University Press, 2010
Content
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. ... more Content
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
Bucharest University Press, 2008
3.2.2. The principle of conceptual containment ........................... 116
3.3.3. The physica... more 3.2.2. The principle of conceptual containment ........................... 116
3.3.3. The physical human subject or the “I” ............................... 119
3.4. The hyperverse and its EDWs – the antimetaphysical
foundation of the EDWs perspective ........................................... 150
Part II. Applications
Chapter 4. Applications to some notions from philosophy of mind .. 159
4.1. Levels and reduction vs. emergence ............................................. 160
4.2. Qualia, Kant and the “I” ............................................................... 181
4.3. Mental causation and supervenience ............................................ 190
Chapter 5. Applications to some notions from cognitive science ...... 200
5.1. Computationalism ........................................................................ 200
5.2. Connectionism .............................................................................. 211
5.3. The dynamical system approach .................................................. 223
5.4. Robotics ........................................................................................ 232
5.5. Dichotomies concerning the notion of mental representation
and processing .............................................................................. 243
5.6. The EDWs perspective and some key elements in cognitive
science .......................................................................................... 249
5.7. The relation between key elements and some philosophical
distinctions ................................................................................... 264
5.8. Cognitive neuroscience ................................................................ 267
5.9. The status of any living entity ...................................................... 277
Chapter 6. Applications to some notions from philosophy of
science and science ............................................................................ 281
6.1. A glance at logical positivism ...................................................... 285
6.2. Carnap’s linguistic frameworks .................................................... 289
6.3. Carnap vs. Gödel or syntactic vs. semantic .................................. 292
6.4. Carnap vs. Quine or rational reconstruction vs. naturalized
epistemology ................................................................................ 295
6.5. Quine’s ontological relativity ....................................................... 296
6.6. Goodman’s relativity .................................................................... 298
6.7. Putnam and the rejection of the “thing-in-itself” .......................... 299
6.8. Friedman’s relative constitutive a priori principles....................... 301
6.9. Some notions from quantum mechanics ....................................... 305
6.10. The status of the external non-living epistemologically different
entities ....................................................................................... 343
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 361
References .............................................................................................. 369
Bucharest University Press, 2010
Content
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. ... more Content
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
Bucharest University Press, 2010
Content
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. ... more Content
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
Bucharest University Press, 2021
CONTENT
Introduction ............................................................................... more CONTENT
Introduction .................................................................................. 9
1. The unexpected: “Epistemologically Different Worlds” .......... 15
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 15
1.2 Definitions .......................................................................... 16
1.3 Propositions for its
.............................................................. 18
1.4 Propositions for Its
and being ............................................ 24
1.5 The hyperverse ................................................................... 30
2. A general view on cognitive neuroscience................................ 37
3. Optimism for localization and the “mind reading”................... 58
3.1 Bechtel’s optimism ............................................................. 58
3.2 Gallant’s laboratory work................................................... 67
3.3 Other optimistic works ....................................................... 75
4. Skepticism in cognitive neuroscience....................................... 81
4.1 Hardcastle’s skepticism ...................................................... 81
4.2 Uttal’s skepticism ............................................................... 88
5. Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) of fMRI and local
field potentials (LFPs)............................................................. 107
6. The localization problem (segmentation vs. integration) ......... 126
7. The binding problem ................................................................ 138
7.1 Introduction ....................................................................... 138
7.2 The “Feature-Integration Theory” (FIT)............................. 146
7.3 The synchrony or temporal coding theory (temporal binding). 153
7.3.1 Oscillations – a general framework ....................... 153
7.3.2 More details about frequency bands, activated
neural areas and cognitive functions ........................ 160
8
7.3.3 Gamma range in visual cognition ............................. 168
7.3.4 Communication among neural areas through
synchronized oscillations.......................................... 177
7.3.5 The main critics for temporal coding hypothesis... 187
8. Perception and object recognition ........................................... 194
8.1 Perception and object recognition.................................... 194
8.2 A few words about other notions in cognitive
neuroscience .................................................................... 210
9. Space and the mind................................................................... 218
10. Crossmodal interactions ......................................................... 244
11. Holism in cognitive neuroscience........................................... 254
11.1 The parts-whole relationship ........................................... 254
11.2 Raichle’s default network............................................... 269
11.3 Conscious and unconscious mental states...................... 278
12. Fingelkurts’ approach or the status of cognitive
neuroscience........................................................................... 293
Conclusion: The status of cognitive neuroscience:
“No ontology landscape”..................................... 317
Bucharest University Press, 2010
Content
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. ... more Content
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
I call this book Hypermetaphysics just because it is not about the metaphysics of “world”/Univers... more I call this book Hypermetaphysics just because it is not about the metaphysics of “world”/Universe, it is not even about the metaphysics of EDWs (“epistemologically different worlds”), but mainly about the hypercorrespondences between the EW0 (Hypernothing) and the EW1a-n (these EDWs being the first EDWs which appeared in hypercorrespondences to the EW0). This hypermetaphysics involves the main notion of this book: the EW0 (or the “Hypernothing”) which does not have any ontology but a hyperontology which hypercorresponded to the first EDWs that appeared in the hypercorrespondences to the EW0.
In Part I, in Chapter 1, I will introduce the main ideas about the EDWs perspective. (These ideas have been published in my previous works.) In Chapter 2, I will introduce Hypermetaphysics: this chapter containes new ideas about the hypercorrespondences between the EW0 and the first EDWs, the EW1a-n (which appeared in different “places”, in different “periods”). However, I emphasize here that, in this work, I have changed some major ideas from my previous works from my EDWs perspective: for instance, I rejected the idea of “antimatter” (or “the EW-1” from my previous works). In Chapter 3, I introduce some ideas that have been published in my previous works (2022, for instance) regarding the hyperontology of EDWs (but including the major challenge: the rejection of “antimatter”). In Chapter 4, I introduced the main ideas from Friedman’s articles (2009 and 2012) and I applied his “scheme” regarding the “apriori relativized knowledge” for a scientific theory and the change/revolution of paradigm in science to my EDWs perspective.
In Part II, I investigate some (more or less) anti-reductionist approaches: Gell-Mann, Spinoza-Velmans, and Heil. I emphasize even here that all anti-reductionist approaches had been created within the unicorn world until I published my article in 2005.
In Part III, related to Kuhn’s notion of “paradigm”, I indicate what kind of “paradigmatic revolution” I have realized through discovering the EDWs within the scientific and philosophical revolutions and changes. I emphasize that my EDWs perspective has been the greatest change in the history of human thinking (including the main sciences, physics, cognitive neuroscience and philosophy) and this is the reason I call it the first “hyper-paradigm”.
Domnul G. continua aventurile sale: de data asta, un Balaur il inghite pe domnul G. si vedem ce s... more Domnul G. continua aventurile sale: de data asta, un Balaur il inghite pe domnul G. si vedem ce se intampla cu el in interiorul acestui fioros Balaur…
The main ideas of the EDWs perspective are in Gabriel Vacariu’s PhD thesis posted online by UNSW ... more The main ideas of the EDWs perspective are in Gabriel Vacariu’s PhD thesis posted online by UNSW (Australia) in 2007!!! I have realized the GREATEST discovery in the history of human knowledge: the EDWs! With discovering the EDWs, I have changed everything in Philosophy, Physics and Cognitive Neuroscience! This has been the main reason, so many people have published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas, many years I published my first works!
UNBELIEVABLE, many (hundreds) “great” or small thinkers did the same thing in 2006-2007 and later: they published the same ideas, UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas from 2002-2005! They believe they would be considered co-authors of the same new framework of thinking. They did not know that many “professors” would do the same thing: they plagiarized my ideas and they hurry up to published their work as soon as possible (in 2006-2007, depending when they discovered my article 2005). So, in the same 2 years, many people “discovered” the same new framework of thinking, the EDWs perspective, each of them did not think that there would be so many other people doing the same thing, that is, many people “discovered” the same new framework (the greatest challenge in the history of human thinking!) in the same period! Such coincidences (the discovery of the EDWs in the same two years!!!) are quite IMPOSSIBLE!! This is the reason nobody quoted my name, but nobody quoted any name who PLAGIARIZED my ideas… In 2006-2007, I was wondering why nobody quote my name, but in fact, they plagiarized my ideas. Nobody discovered this framework of thinking 2500 years, and in 2-3 years, many people discovered it!!!! IMPOSSIBLE!!!! There were some "professors" who published articles/chapters very close to Bohr's complementarity, Dirac, de Broglie's dualism before 2005 (for instance Carlo Rovelli 1996 or Ladyman), but their works were constructed within the "unicorn world" (Universe/world), therefore, these works had nothing in common with the EDWs perspective!!!! In reality, all of them plagiarized my ideas! It was like many people composed Beethoven Fifth’s Symphony, claiming that they never listen Beethoven! Who would be so stupid to believe them?
The main ideas of the EDWs perspective are in Gabriel Vacariu’s PhD thesis posted online by UNSW ... more The main ideas of the EDWs perspective are in Gabriel Vacariu’s PhD thesis posted online by UNSW (Australia) in 2007!!! I have realized the GREATEST discovery in the history of human knowledge: the EDWs! With discovering the EDWs, I have changed everything in Philosophy, Physics and Cognitive Neuroscience! This has been the main reason, so many people have published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas, many years I published my first works!
UNBELIEVABLE, many (hundreds) “great” or small thinkers did the same thing in 2006-2007 and later: they published the same ideas, UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas from 2002-2005! They believe they would be considered co-authors of the same new framework of thinking. They did not know that many “professors” would do the same thing: they plagiarized my ideas and they hurry up to published their work as soon as possible (in 2006-2007, depending when they discovered my article 2005). So, in the same 2 years, many people “discovered” the same new framework of thinking, the EDWs perspective, each of them did not think that there would be so many other people doing the same thing, that is, many people “discovered” the same new framework (the greatest challenge in the history of human thinking!) in the same period! Such coincidences (the discovery of the EDWs in the same two years!!!) are quite IMPOSSIBLE!! This is the reason nobody quoted my name, but nobody quoted any name who PLAGIARIZED my ideas… In 2006-2007, I was wondering why nobody quote my name, but in fact, they plagiarized my ideas. Nobody discovered this framework of thinking 2500 years, and in 2-3 years, many people discovered it!!!! IMPOSSIBLE!!!! There were some "professors" who published articles/chapters very close to Bohr's complementarity, Dirac, de Broglie's dualism before 2005 (for instance Carlo Rovelli 1996 or Ladyman), but their works were constructed within the "unicorn world" (Universe/world), therefore, these works had nothing in common with the EDWs perspective!!!! In reality, all of them plagiarized my ideas! It was like many people composed Beethoven Fifth’s Symphony, claiming that they never listen Beethoven! Who would be so stupid to believe them?
(2023) Bibliography my books 2007-2023
Gabriel Vacariu (2023), Books: only covers and contents
(0October 2023 to 2014) The UNBELIEVABLE similarities between the ideas of some people (2006-2016) and my ideas (2002-2008) in physics (quantum mechanics, cosmology), cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and philosophy (this manuscript would require a REVOLUTION in international academy en..., 2023
Unbelievable similar ideas
New book Gabriel Vacariu (2023), Hypermetaphysics, Amazon (posted on March 2023) https:// kdp.ama... more New book Gabriel Vacariu (2023), Hypermetaphysics, Amazon (posted on March 2023) https:// kdp.amazon.com/en_US/bookshelf?publishedId=AH8YWJEB6F0T2 I call this book Hypermetaphysics just because it is not about the metaphysics of "world"/Universe, it is not even about the metaphysics of EDWs ("epistemologically different worlds"), but mainly about the hypercorrespondences between the EW0 (Hypernothing) and the EW1a-n (these EDWs being the first EDWs which appeared in hypercorrespondences to the EW0). This hypermetaphysics involves the main notion of this book: the EW0 (or the "Hypernothing") which does not have any ontology but a hyperontology which hypercorresponded to the first EDWs that appeared in the hypercorrespondences to the EW0.
In this paper, I do not investigate Al-Khalili’s book, but only certain ideas that appear in this... more In this paper, I do not investigate Al-Khalili’s book, but only certain ideas that appear in this book, ideas that are quite similar to my ideas published long time ago. I do not accuse Al-Khalili of plagiarizing my ideas. Anyway, many of these ideas have been published by thousands of people until now.
In this book, I deal with the first EW, the Hypernothing or the EW0. I emphasize that I do not h... more In this book, I deal with the first EW, the Hypernothing or the EW0. I emphasize that I do not have any idea about that EW0 since I have no knowledge about the EW1. Even having certain knowledge about an EW, it is quite difficult to draw something about the previous EDW because of the main rule of this perspective: one EW does not exist for any EDW. I emphasize here that I will introduce certain rational speculations about the EW0. Within the EDWs perspective, the answer to the question “Why there is something than nothing?” depends on the viewpoint of answering. (See the answer to this question in this work, below)
Cursul va contine patru parti pe urmatoarele filme si lucrarile: I. Andrei Tarkovski: “Solaris”, ... more Cursul va contine patru parti pe urmatoarele filme si lucrarile: I. Andrei Tarkovski: “Solaris”, “Calauza”, “Nostalghia”, “Sacrificiul” - Friedrich Nietzsche si “eterna reintoarcere” - Mircea Eliade si “eterna reintoarcere” II. Wong Kar-wai: “In the mood for love”, “2046” III. Cristi Puiu: “Sieranevada” IV. Constantin Brancusi: Ansamblul de la Targu Jiu + sculpturile principale (Pasarea in zbor, Mlle Pogany, etc.)
Papers by Gabriel Vacariu
COLEGIUL DE REDACŢIE
The first part of this article contains certain elements of the epistemologically different world... more The first part of this article contains certain elements of the epistemologically different worlds perspective that focus the idea that the I or human subjectivity is an EW corresponding to the brain and body. The second part shows that Bechtels‟ s notion of mechanism is, in ...
The UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas between Theise and Menas’ ideas (2016) and my ideas (2002-2008) in... more The UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas between Theise and Menas’ ideas (2016) and my ideas (2002-2008) in Physics and Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy (the mind-brain problem, quantum mechanics, etc.) (2016) Theise D. Neil (Department of Pathology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA) and Kafatos C. Menas (bDepartment of Medicine, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA; cSchmid College of Science & Technology, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA) (2016), REVIEW - Fundamental awareness: A framework for integrating science, philosophy and metaphysics, in COMMUNICATIVE & INTEGRATIVE BIOLOGY, 2016, VOL. 9, NO. 3, e1155010 (19 pages), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2016.1155010 A friend of mine indicated me the strike similarities between Theise and Kafatos’ ideas in their book (Fundamental awareness: A framework for integrating science, philosophy and metaphysics) and my ideas in 2002-20008! I do not have access to this book, but I investigate...
I investigate the UNBELIEVABLE similarities between the ideas of Oreshkov et al. and my ideas. In... more I investigate the UNBELIEVABLE similarities between the ideas of Oreshkov et al. and my ideas. In fact, their framework (the ontological background) is UNBELIEVABLE similar to my EDWs perspective
Uploads
Drafts by Gabriel Vacariu
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
3.3.3. The physical human subject or the “I” ............................... 119
3.4. The hyperverse and its EDWs – the antimetaphysical
foundation of the EDWs perspective ........................................... 150
Part II. Applications
Chapter 4. Applications to some notions from philosophy of mind .. 159
4.1. Levels and reduction vs. emergence ............................................. 160
4.2. Qualia, Kant and the “I” ............................................................... 181
4.3. Mental causation and supervenience ............................................ 190
Chapter 5. Applications to some notions from cognitive science ...... 200
5.1. Computationalism ........................................................................ 200
5.2. Connectionism .............................................................................. 211
5.3. The dynamical system approach .................................................. 223
5.4. Robotics ........................................................................................ 232
5.5. Dichotomies concerning the notion of mental representation
and processing .............................................................................. 243
5.6. The EDWs perspective and some key elements in cognitive
science .......................................................................................... 249
5.7. The relation between key elements and some philosophical
distinctions ................................................................................... 264
5.8. Cognitive neuroscience ................................................................ 267
5.9. The status of any living entity ...................................................... 277
Chapter 6. Applications to some notions from philosophy of
science and science ............................................................................ 281
6.1. A glance at logical positivism ...................................................... 285
6.2. Carnap’s linguistic frameworks .................................................... 289
6.3. Carnap vs. Gödel or syntactic vs. semantic .................................. 292
6.4. Carnap vs. Quine or rational reconstruction vs. naturalized
epistemology ................................................................................ 295
6.5. Quine’s ontological relativity ....................................................... 296
6.6. Goodman’s relativity .................................................................... 298
6.7. Putnam and the rejection of the “thing-in-itself” .......................... 299
6.8. Friedman’s relative constitutive a priori principles....................... 301
6.9. Some notions from quantum mechanics ....................................... 305
6.10. The status of the external non-living epistemologically different
entities ....................................................................................... 343
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 361
References .............................................................................................. 369
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
Introduction .................................................................................. 9
1. The unexpected: “Epistemologically Different Worlds” .......... 15
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 15
1.2 Definitions .......................................................................... 16
1.3 Propositions for its
.............................................................. 18
1.4 Propositions for Its
and being ............................................ 24
1.5 The hyperverse ................................................................... 30
2. A general view on cognitive neuroscience................................ 37
3. Optimism for localization and the “mind reading”................... 58
3.1 Bechtel’s optimism ............................................................. 58
3.2 Gallant’s laboratory work................................................... 67
3.3 Other optimistic works ....................................................... 75
4. Skepticism in cognitive neuroscience....................................... 81
4.1 Hardcastle’s skepticism ...................................................... 81
4.2 Uttal’s skepticism ............................................................... 88
5. Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) of fMRI and local
field potentials (LFPs)............................................................. 107
6. The localization problem (segmentation vs. integration) ......... 126
7. The binding problem ................................................................ 138
7.1 Introduction ....................................................................... 138
7.2 The “Feature-Integration Theory” (FIT)............................. 146
7.3 The synchrony or temporal coding theory (temporal binding). 153
7.3.1 Oscillations – a general framework ....................... 153
7.3.2 More details about frequency bands, activated
neural areas and cognitive functions ........................ 160
8
7.3.3 Gamma range in visual cognition ............................. 168
7.3.4 Communication among neural areas through
synchronized oscillations.......................................... 177
7.3.5 The main critics for temporal coding hypothesis... 187
8. Perception and object recognition ........................................... 194
8.1 Perception and object recognition.................................... 194
8.2 A few words about other notions in cognitive
neuroscience .................................................................... 210
9. Space and the mind................................................................... 218
10. Crossmodal interactions ......................................................... 244
11. Holism in cognitive neuroscience........................................... 254
11.1 The parts-whole relationship ........................................... 254
11.2 Raichle’s default network............................................... 269
11.3 Conscious and unconscious mental states...................... 278
12. Fingelkurts’ approach or the status of cognitive
neuroscience........................................................................... 293
Conclusion: The status of cognitive neuroscience:
“No ontology landscape”..................................... 317
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
In Part I, in Chapter 1, I will introduce the main ideas about the EDWs perspective. (These ideas have been published in my previous works.) In Chapter 2, I will introduce Hypermetaphysics: this chapter containes new ideas about the hypercorrespondences between the EW0 and the first EDWs, the EW1a-n (which appeared in different “places”, in different “periods”). However, I emphasize here that, in this work, I have changed some major ideas from my previous works from my EDWs perspective: for instance, I rejected the idea of “antimatter” (or “the EW-1” from my previous works). In Chapter 3, I introduce some ideas that have been published in my previous works (2022, for instance) regarding the hyperontology of EDWs (but including the major challenge: the rejection of “antimatter”). In Chapter 4, I introduced the main ideas from Friedman’s articles (2009 and 2012) and I applied his “scheme” regarding the “apriori relativized knowledge” for a scientific theory and the change/revolution of paradigm in science to my EDWs perspective.
In Part II, I investigate some (more or less) anti-reductionist approaches: Gell-Mann, Spinoza-Velmans, and Heil. I emphasize even here that all anti-reductionist approaches had been created within the unicorn world until I published my article in 2005.
In Part III, related to Kuhn’s notion of “paradigm”, I indicate what kind of “paradigmatic revolution” I have realized through discovering the EDWs within the scientific and philosophical revolutions and changes. I emphasize that my EDWs perspective has been the greatest change in the history of human thinking (including the main sciences, physics, cognitive neuroscience and philosophy) and this is the reason I call it the first “hyper-paradigm”.
UNBELIEVABLE, many (hundreds) “great” or small thinkers did the same thing in 2006-2007 and later: they published the same ideas, UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas from 2002-2005! They believe they would be considered co-authors of the same new framework of thinking. They did not know that many “professors” would do the same thing: they plagiarized my ideas and they hurry up to published their work as soon as possible (in 2006-2007, depending when they discovered my article 2005). So, in the same 2 years, many people “discovered” the same new framework of thinking, the EDWs perspective, each of them did not think that there would be so many other people doing the same thing, that is, many people “discovered” the same new framework (the greatest challenge in the history of human thinking!) in the same period! Such coincidences (the discovery of the EDWs in the same two years!!!) are quite IMPOSSIBLE!! This is the reason nobody quoted my name, but nobody quoted any name who PLAGIARIZED my ideas… In 2006-2007, I was wondering why nobody quote my name, but in fact, they plagiarized my ideas. Nobody discovered this framework of thinking 2500 years, and in 2-3 years, many people discovered it!!!! IMPOSSIBLE!!!! There were some "professors" who published articles/chapters very close to Bohr's complementarity, Dirac, de Broglie's dualism before 2005 (for instance Carlo Rovelli 1996 or Ladyman), but their works were constructed within the "unicorn world" (Universe/world), therefore, these works had nothing in common with the EDWs perspective!!!! In reality, all of them plagiarized my ideas! It was like many people composed Beethoven Fifth’s Symphony, claiming that they never listen Beethoven! Who would be so stupid to believe them?
UNBELIEVABLE, many (hundreds) “great” or small thinkers did the same thing in 2006-2007 and later: they published the same ideas, UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas from 2002-2005! They believe they would be considered co-authors of the same new framework of thinking. They did not know that many “professors” would do the same thing: they plagiarized my ideas and they hurry up to published their work as soon as possible (in 2006-2007, depending when they discovered my article 2005). So, in the same 2 years, many people “discovered” the same new framework of thinking, the EDWs perspective, each of them did not think that there would be so many other people doing the same thing, that is, many people “discovered” the same new framework (the greatest challenge in the history of human thinking!) in the same period! Such coincidences (the discovery of the EDWs in the same two years!!!) are quite IMPOSSIBLE!! This is the reason nobody quoted my name, but nobody quoted any name who PLAGIARIZED my ideas… In 2006-2007, I was wondering why nobody quote my name, but in fact, they plagiarized my ideas. Nobody discovered this framework of thinking 2500 years, and in 2-3 years, many people discovered it!!!! IMPOSSIBLE!!!! There were some "professors" who published articles/chapters very close to Bohr's complementarity, Dirac, de Broglie's dualism before 2005 (for instance Carlo Rovelli 1996 or Ladyman), but their works were constructed within the "unicorn world" (Universe/world), therefore, these works had nothing in common with the EDWs perspective!!!! In reality, all of them plagiarized my ideas! It was like many people composed Beethoven Fifth’s Symphony, claiming that they never listen Beethoven! Who would be so stupid to believe them?
Papers by Gabriel Vacariu
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
3.3.3. The physical human subject or the “I” ............................... 119
3.4. The hyperverse and its EDWs – the antimetaphysical
foundation of the EDWs perspective ........................................... 150
Part II. Applications
Chapter 4. Applications to some notions from philosophy of mind .. 159
4.1. Levels and reduction vs. emergence ............................................. 160
4.2. Qualia, Kant and the “I” ............................................................... 181
4.3. Mental causation and supervenience ............................................ 190
Chapter 5. Applications to some notions from cognitive science ...... 200
5.1. Computationalism ........................................................................ 200
5.2. Connectionism .............................................................................. 211
5.3. The dynamical system approach .................................................. 223
5.4. Robotics ........................................................................................ 232
5.5. Dichotomies concerning the notion of mental representation
and processing .............................................................................. 243
5.6. The EDWs perspective and some key elements in cognitive
science .......................................................................................... 249
5.7. The relation between key elements and some philosophical
distinctions ................................................................................... 264
5.8. Cognitive neuroscience ................................................................ 267
5.9. The status of any living entity ...................................................... 277
Chapter 6. Applications to some notions from philosophy of
science and science ............................................................................ 281
6.1. A glance at logical positivism ...................................................... 285
6.2. Carnap’s linguistic frameworks .................................................... 289
6.3. Carnap vs. Gödel or syntactic vs. semantic .................................. 292
6.4. Carnap vs. Quine or rational reconstruction vs. naturalized
epistemology ................................................................................ 295
6.5. Quine’s ontological relativity ....................................................... 296
6.6. Goodman’s relativity .................................................................... 298
6.7. Putnam and the rejection of the “thing-in-itself” .......................... 299
6.8. Friedman’s relative constitutive a priori principles....................... 301
6.9. Some notions from quantum mechanics ....................................... 305
6.10. The status of the external non-living epistemologically different
entities ....................................................................................... 343
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 361
References .............................................................................................. 369
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
Introduction .................................................................................. 9
1. The unexpected: “Epistemologically Different Worlds” .......... 15
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 15
1.2 Definitions .......................................................................... 16
1.3 Propositions for its
.............................................................. 18
1.4 Propositions for Its
and being ............................................ 24
1.5 The hyperverse ................................................................... 30
2. A general view on cognitive neuroscience................................ 37
3. Optimism for localization and the “mind reading”................... 58
3.1 Bechtel’s optimism ............................................................. 58
3.2 Gallant’s laboratory work................................................... 67
3.3 Other optimistic works ....................................................... 75
4. Skepticism in cognitive neuroscience....................................... 81
4.1 Hardcastle’s skepticism ...................................................... 81
4.2 Uttal’s skepticism ............................................................... 88
5. Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) of fMRI and local
field potentials (LFPs)............................................................. 107
6. The localization problem (segmentation vs. integration) ......... 126
7. The binding problem ................................................................ 138
7.1 Introduction ....................................................................... 138
7.2 The “Feature-Integration Theory” (FIT)............................. 146
7.3 The synchrony or temporal coding theory (temporal binding). 153
7.3.1 Oscillations – a general framework ....................... 153
7.3.2 More details about frequency bands, activated
neural areas and cognitive functions ........................ 160
8
7.3.3 Gamma range in visual cognition ............................. 168
7.3.4 Communication among neural areas through
synchronized oscillations.......................................... 177
7.3.5 The main critics for temporal coding hypothesis... 187
8. Perception and object recognition ........................................... 194
8.1 Perception and object recognition.................................... 194
8.2 A few words about other notions in cognitive
neuroscience .................................................................... 210
9. Space and the mind................................................................... 218
10. Crossmodal interactions ......................................................... 244
11. Holism in cognitive neuroscience........................................... 254
11.1 The parts-whole relationship ........................................... 254
11.2 Raichle’s default network............................................... 269
11.3 Conscious and unconscious mental states...................... 278
12. Fingelkurts’ approach or the status of cognitive
neuroscience........................................................................... 293
Conclusion: The status of cognitive neuroscience:
“No ontology landscape”..................................... 317
Introduction ...................................................................... 9
1. The hyperverse versus the “unicorn-world” ................. 15
1.1 The oldest paradigm of human thinking: the unicornworld .......................................................................... 15
1.2 The Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) ...... 16
2. The “I” as an epistemological world .............................. 31
2.1 The physical human subject ......................................... 31
2.2 Llinas' view regarding the brain, the body and the
external world .............................................................. 43
2.3 The human subjectivity or the “I” as an EW ............... 55
2.4 The principle of “correspondence” within the EDWs
perspective ................................................................... 67
2.5 Frith’s approach to the mind-body problem and the
EDWs perspective ........................................................ 73
3. The surrealistic “extension of the mind” ....................... 90
3.1 Clark’s robots and the EDWs ...................................... 90
3.2 Clark’s strong “embodied cognition” .......................... 108
3.3 One attack against Clark’s position: the “couplingconstitution fallacy” ..................................................... 118
3.4 Gestures and thoughts .................................................. 124
3.5 Noë’s “sensorimotor dependencies” and Clark’s
“hybrid” model ............................................................ 130
4. Representations, “emulators”, and Descartes’ ghost ... 144
4.1 Grush’s new Cartesian framework .............................. 144
4.2 Wheeler and the “Cartesian psychology” .................... 156
8
5. “Mental mechanisms” and the phantoms of levels ......... 164
5.1 Bechtel’s notion of “mechanism” ................................ 164
5.2 Decomposability and localization of the mechanisms . 179
5.3 “What is it like to be a cell?” ....................................... 199
5.4 What fMRI “decomposition” and “localization” are
good for? ...................................................................... 214
5.5 The self, its “freedom” and “dignity” .......................... 220
6. “Molecules and cells” versus cognition and life .............. 223
6.1 Bickle’s “molecular and cellular cognition” approach . 223
6.2 Cells and life in Kauffman’s theory of complexity ..... 239
7. Matter in the hyperverse ................................................... 260
7.1 Particles vs. fields (waves) ........................................... 263
7.2 Gravity and Newton vs. Einstein ................................. 277
7.3 Other problematic notions from physics ...................... 283
7.4 The hyperspace versus the hyperverse ......................... 302
Conclusion .............................................................................. 314
Reference ................................................................................ 321
In Part I, in Chapter 1, I will introduce the main ideas about the EDWs perspective. (These ideas have been published in my previous works.) In Chapter 2, I will introduce Hypermetaphysics: this chapter containes new ideas about the hypercorrespondences between the EW0 and the first EDWs, the EW1a-n (which appeared in different “places”, in different “periods”). However, I emphasize here that, in this work, I have changed some major ideas from my previous works from my EDWs perspective: for instance, I rejected the idea of “antimatter” (or “the EW-1” from my previous works). In Chapter 3, I introduce some ideas that have been published in my previous works (2022, for instance) regarding the hyperontology of EDWs (but including the major challenge: the rejection of “antimatter”). In Chapter 4, I introduced the main ideas from Friedman’s articles (2009 and 2012) and I applied his “scheme” regarding the “apriori relativized knowledge” for a scientific theory and the change/revolution of paradigm in science to my EDWs perspective.
In Part II, I investigate some (more or less) anti-reductionist approaches: Gell-Mann, Spinoza-Velmans, and Heil. I emphasize even here that all anti-reductionist approaches had been created within the unicorn world until I published my article in 2005.
In Part III, related to Kuhn’s notion of “paradigm”, I indicate what kind of “paradigmatic revolution” I have realized through discovering the EDWs within the scientific and philosophical revolutions and changes. I emphasize that my EDWs perspective has been the greatest change in the history of human thinking (including the main sciences, physics, cognitive neuroscience and philosophy) and this is the reason I call it the first “hyper-paradigm”.
UNBELIEVABLE, many (hundreds) “great” or small thinkers did the same thing in 2006-2007 and later: they published the same ideas, UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas from 2002-2005! They believe they would be considered co-authors of the same new framework of thinking. They did not know that many “professors” would do the same thing: they plagiarized my ideas and they hurry up to published their work as soon as possible (in 2006-2007, depending when they discovered my article 2005). So, in the same 2 years, many people “discovered” the same new framework of thinking, the EDWs perspective, each of them did not think that there would be so many other people doing the same thing, that is, many people “discovered” the same new framework (the greatest challenge in the history of human thinking!) in the same period! Such coincidences (the discovery of the EDWs in the same two years!!!) are quite IMPOSSIBLE!! This is the reason nobody quoted my name, but nobody quoted any name who PLAGIARIZED my ideas… In 2006-2007, I was wondering why nobody quote my name, but in fact, they plagiarized my ideas. Nobody discovered this framework of thinking 2500 years, and in 2-3 years, many people discovered it!!!! IMPOSSIBLE!!!! There were some "professors" who published articles/chapters very close to Bohr's complementarity, Dirac, de Broglie's dualism before 2005 (for instance Carlo Rovelli 1996 or Ladyman), but their works were constructed within the "unicorn world" (Universe/world), therefore, these works had nothing in common with the EDWs perspective!!!! In reality, all of them plagiarized my ideas! It was like many people composed Beethoven Fifth’s Symphony, claiming that they never listen Beethoven! Who would be so stupid to believe them?
UNBELIEVABLE, many (hundreds) “great” or small thinkers did the same thing in 2006-2007 and later: they published the same ideas, UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas from 2002-2005! They believe they would be considered co-authors of the same new framework of thinking. They did not know that many “professors” would do the same thing: they plagiarized my ideas and they hurry up to published their work as soon as possible (in 2006-2007, depending when they discovered my article 2005). So, in the same 2 years, many people “discovered” the same new framework of thinking, the EDWs perspective, each of them did not think that there would be so many other people doing the same thing, that is, many people “discovered” the same new framework (the greatest challenge in the history of human thinking!) in the same period! Such coincidences (the discovery of the EDWs in the same two years!!!) are quite IMPOSSIBLE!! This is the reason nobody quoted my name, but nobody quoted any name who PLAGIARIZED my ideas… In 2006-2007, I was wondering why nobody quote my name, but in fact, they plagiarized my ideas. Nobody discovered this framework of thinking 2500 years, and in 2-3 years, many people discovered it!!!! IMPOSSIBLE!!!! There were some "professors" who published articles/chapters very close to Bohr's complementarity, Dirac, de Broglie's dualism before 2005 (for instance Carlo Rovelli 1996 or Ladyman), but their works were constructed within the "unicorn world" (Universe/world), therefore, these works had nothing in common with the EDWs perspective!!!! In reality, all of them plagiarized my ideas! It was like many people composed Beethoven Fifth’s Symphony, claiming that they never listen Beethoven! Who would be so stupid to believe them?
3.3.3. The physical human subject or the “I” ............................... 119
3.4. The hyperverse and its EDWs – the antimetaphysical
foundation of the EDWs perspective ........................................... 150
Part II. Applications
Chapter 4. Applications to some notions from philosophy of mind .. 159
4.1. Levels and reduction vs. emergence ............................................. 160
4.2. Qualia, Kant and the “I” ............................................................... 181
4.3. Mental causation and supervenience ............................................ 190
Chapter 5. Applications to some notions from cognitive science ...... 200
5.1. Computationalism ........................................................................ 200
5.2. Connectionism .............................................................................. 211
5.3. The dynamical system approach .................................................. 223
5.4. Robotics ........................................................................................ 232
5.5. Dichotomies concerning the notion of mental representation
and processing .............................................................................. 243
5.6. The EDWs perspective and some key elements in cognitive
science .......................................................................................... 249
5.7. The relation between key elements and some philosophical
distinctions ................................................................................... 264
5.8. Cognitive neuroscience ................................................................ 267
5.9. The status of any living entity ...................................................... 277
Chapter 6. Applications to some notions from philosophy of
science and science ............................................................................ 281
6.1. A glance at logical positivism ...................................................... 285
6.2. Carnap’s linguistic frameworks .................................................... 289
6.3. Carnap vs. Gödel or syntactic vs. semantic .................................. 292
6.4. Carnap vs. Quine or rational reconstruction vs. naturalized
epistemology ................................................................................ 295
6.5. Quine’s ontological relativity ....................................................... 296
6.6. Goodman’s relativity .................................................................... 298
6.7. Putnam and the rejection of the “thing-in-itself” .......................... 299
6.8. Friedman’s relative constitutive a priori principles....................... 301
6.9. Some notions from quantum mechanics ....................................... 305
6.10. The status of the external non-living epistemologically different
entities ....................................................................................... 343
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 361
References .............................................................................................. 369
1. The “Epistemologically Different Worlds”
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Definitions
1.3 Propositions for its
1.4 Propositions for Its
and being
1.5 The hyperverse
2. A general view on cognitive neuroscience
2.1 A few general notions of cognitive neuroscience
2.2 An actual overview on cognitive neuroscience
2.3 The Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast
imaging of fMRI and local field potentials (LFPs)
3. The localization problem (segmentation vs. integration)
4. The binding problem and its best approach, the synchrony
or the temporal coding theory (temporal binding)
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The synchrony or temporal coding theory (temporal
binding), the general framework
4.3 More details about frequency bands, activated neural
areas and cognitive functions
4.4 Gamma range in visual cognition
4.5 The main criticism against the temporal coding
hypothesis
5. Perception, self, and the external world for certain
(cognitive) neuroscientists
5.1 Perception and object recognition
5.2 Llinás’ approach (neuroscience) to the brain, the body,
the self and the external world
5.3 Libet and Frith’s approach (cognitive neuroscience) to
the mind-body problem and the EDWs perspective
5.4 Damasio’s approach (neuroscience) notion of self
6. Multisensory integration
7. Holism and default network in cognitive neuroscience
7.1 The parts-whole relationship in cognitive neuroscience
7.2 Raichle’s default network
7.3 Bechtel’s recent work on endogenous brain activity
7.4 More information on the “default network” and on
“mind wandering”
7.5 Conscious and unconscious mental states
8. Optimism about localization and “mind reading”
8.1 Bechtel’s optimism
8.2 The work of Gallant’s laboratory
8.2.1 Introduction
8.2.2 Nishimoto et al. (2011): “Reconstructing visual
experiences from brain activity evoked by
natural movies”
8.2.3 Huth et al. (2012): “A continuous semantic space
describes the representation of thousands of
object and action categories across the human
brain”
8.2.4 Stansbury et al. (2013): “Natural scene statistics
account for the representation of scene
categories in human visual cortex”
8.2.5 Çukur et al. (2013a and 2013b): “Attention during
natural vision warps semantic representation
across the human brain” (with the fusiform face
area as an example)
8.3 Other optimistic works
9. Skepticism in cognitive neuroscience
9.1 Hardcastle’s skepticism
9.2 Uttal’s realism
9.3 Image versus propositional representations and
modularity in cognitive neuroscience
Conclusion
References
Introduction ....................................................................................... 9
Part I
Chapter 1 The unexpected: “Epistemologically different worlds”..... 15
1.1 Introduction ................................................................. 15
1.2 Definitions .................................................................. 16
1.3 Propositions for its....................................................... 18
1.4 Propositions for Its and being ..................................... 24
1.5 The hyperverse ............................................................ 30
Part II
Chapter 2 Spatial cognition................................................................ 39
2.1 Introduction - general notions...................................... 39
2.2 Retinotopic maps ......................................................... 50
2.3 Spatial navigation and cognitive maps......................... 54
2.4 Hippocampus, grid cells, head direction cells, border
cells, and other technical elements regarding spatial
cognition..................................................................... 75
2.5 Egocentric and allocentric representations, frames of
reference, and integration ........................................... 93
2.6 Endurance problem, abstract space, “perceptual
filling” and “panoramic view”.................................... 103
2.7 Parallel space, sensory modal interactions, color,
language, visual mental imagery and visual perception.. 130
Chapter 3 The best achievements in cognitive neuroscience today:
the fMRI experiments of Gallant’s team ........................... 147
3.1 Introduction.................................................................. 147
3.2 Nishimoto et al. (2011): “Reconstructing visual
experiences from brain activity evoked by natural
movies”....................................................................... 150
3.3 Huth et al. (2012): “A continuous semantic space
describes the representation of thousands of object
and action categories across the human brain” ........... 155
3.4 Stansbury et al. (2013): “Natural scene statistics
account for the representation of scene categories in
human visual cortex” .................................................. 158
3.5 Çukur et al. (2013a and 2013b): “Attention during
natural vision warps semantic representation across
the human brain” (and fusiform face area as example 161
8 Gabriel Vacariu
Chapter 4 Multisensory integration.................................................... 164
Chapter 5 Endogenous brain activity and default mode network....... 197
5.1 Bechtel’s recent work on endogenous brain activity.... 197
5.2 More information about default network and mind
wandering ................................................................... 204
5.3 Few words about consciousness in cognitive neuroscience 223
5.4 Rakover’s “methodological dualism”: the methodological
differences between natural sciences (physics) and
(cognitive) psychology ............................................... 227
Chapter 6 Molecules, oscillations, and cognition............................... 235
6.1 Bickle’s microneuronal level and cognition ................ 235
6.2 Molecular coherence and cognition ............................. 258
6.3 About consciousness ................................................... 269
Conclusion.......................................................................................... 273
Part III
Chapter 7 The hyperontological foundations of Einstein’s theory of
relativity............................................................................. 281
7.1 Introduction................................................................ 281
7.2 The special theory of relativity ................................... 286
7.3 The general theory of relativity .................................. 301
7.4 Few words about quantum mechanics ........................ 309
7.5 The results of BICEP2 (March 2014) about Big Bang,
gravitational waves and inflation................................ 313
7.6 Conclusion.................................................................. 322
Appendix “Did Markus Gabriel (Bonn University) plagiarize my
ideas?” ............................................................................................... 327
1. The “epistemologically different worlds” perspective ................... 327
2. The unbelievable coincidence: two individuals elaborated the same
new framework of thinking in the same decade! ........................... 330
3. Markus Gabriel’s TED clip ........................................................... 332
4. Markus Gabriel’s book: “Why the world does not exist” (2013) .. 335
5. Remarks about the UNBELIEVABLE similarities between the
EDWs perspective and Markus Gabriel’s ideas: Markus Gabriel
does not offer any serious argument for the ideas that are so similar
with my ideas!................................................................................ 340
6. Conclusion..................................................................................... 345
Bibliography....................................................................................... 349
3.3.3. The physical human subject or the “I” ............................... 119
3.4. The hyperverse and its EDWs – the antimetaphysical
foundation of the EDWs perspective ........................................... 150
Part II. Applications
Chapter 4. Applications to some notions from philosophy of mind .. 159
4.1. Levels and reduction vs. emergence ............................................. 160
4.2. Qualia, Kant and the “I” ............................................................... 181
4.3. Mental causation and supervenience ............................................ 190
Chapter 5. Applications to some notions from cognitive science ...... 200
5.1. Computationalism ........................................................................ 200
5.2. Connectionism .............................................................................. 211
5.3. The dynamical system approach .................................................. 223
5.4. Robotics ........................................................................................ 232
5.5. Dichotomies concerning the notion of mental representation
and processing .............................................................................. 243
5.6. The EDWs perspective and some key elements in cognitive
science .......................................................................................... 249
5.7. The relation between key elements and some philosophical
distinctions ................................................................................... 264
5.8. Cognitive neuroscience ................................................................ 267
5.9. The status of any living entity ...................................................... 277
Chapter 6. Applications to some notions from philosophy of
science and science ............................................................................ 281
6.1. A glance at logical positivism ...................................................... 285
6.2. Carnap’s linguistic frameworks .................................................... 289
6.3. Carnap vs. Gödel or syntactic vs. semantic .................................. 292
6.4. Carnap vs. Quine or rational reconstruction vs. naturalized
epistemology ................................................................................ 295
6.5. Quine’s ontological relativity ....................................................... 296
6.6. Goodman’s relativity .................................................................... 298
6.7. Putnam and the rejection of the “thing-in-itself” .......................... 299
6.8. Friedman’s relative constitutive a priori principles....................... 301
6.9. Some notions from quantum mechanics ....................................... 305
6.10. The status of the external non-living epistemologically different
entities ....................................................................................... 343
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 361
References .............................................................................................. 369