... I suggest that it employs the concepts expressed by our ordinary verbs of perception and appe... more ... I suggest that it employs the concepts expressed by our ordinary verbs of perception and appearance, verbs like see, looks, hear, smell, and so on. ... Our ordinary verbs of perception and appearance, it will be said, are ambiguous. ...
According to Gupta, there is a difficulty facing any attempt to answer this question. The difficu... more According to Gupta, there is a difficulty facing any attempt to answer this question. The difficulty has to do with the following phenomenon. The impact that any particular experience has on what the experiencing subject is entitled to believe will depend upon the concepts, ...
... LXVII, No. 2, September 2003 Skepticism, Contextualism, and ... as a way of spelling out the ... more ... LXVII, No. 2, September 2003 Skepticism, Contextualism, and ... as a way of spelling out the contextualism, we can reject Schiffer’s sugges- tion. ...
British Journal for The Philosophy of Science, 2008
Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the on... more Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evidence has these two epistemic powers? I argue that various proposed accounts of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set cannot answer this question. I then propose an alternative account of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set.
... LXVI, No. 1, January 2003 Contextualism and the Problem of the External World ... Such “conte... more ... LXVI, No. 1, January 2003 Contextualism and the Problem of the External World ... Such “contextualism” in epistemology may by now be all too familiar. ...
In his recent Knowledge and its Limits , Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental sta... more In his recent Knowledge and its Limits , Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no "luminous" mental states. His argument depends on a "safety" requirement on knowledge, that one's confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one interpretation it is obviously true but useless to his argument, and on the other interpretation it is false.
... I suggest that it employs the concepts expressed by our ordinary verbs of perception and appe... more ... I suggest that it employs the concepts expressed by our ordinary verbs of perception and appearance, verbs like see, looks, hear, smell, and so on. ... Our ordinary verbs of perception and appearance, it will be said, are ambiguous. ...
According to Gupta, there is a difficulty facing any attempt to answer this question. The difficu... more According to Gupta, there is a difficulty facing any attempt to answer this question. The difficulty has to do with the following phenomenon. The impact that any particular experience has on what the experiencing subject is entitled to believe will depend upon the concepts, ...
... LXVII, No. 2, September 2003 Skepticism, Contextualism, and ... as a way of spelling out the ... more ... LXVII, No. 2, September 2003 Skepticism, Contextualism, and ... as a way of spelling out the contextualism, we can reject Schiffer’s sugges- tion. ...
British Journal for The Philosophy of Science, 2008
Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the on... more Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evidence has these two epistemic powers? I argue that various proposed accounts of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set cannot answer this question. I then propose an alternative account of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set.
... LXVI, No. 1, January 2003 Contextualism and the Problem of the External World ... Such “conte... more ... LXVI, No. 1, January 2003 Contextualism and the Problem of the External World ... Such “contextualism” in epistemology may by now be all too familiar. ...
In his recent Knowledge and its Limits , Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental sta... more In his recent Knowledge and its Limits , Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no "luminous" mental states. His argument depends on a "safety" requirement on knowledge, that one's confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one interpretation it is obviously true but useless to his argument, and on the other interpretation it is false.
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