Papers by Sara Ahbel-Rappe
The Reception of Greek Ethics in Late Antiquity and Byzantium, 2021
Crossing the Stream, Leaving the Cave: Buddhist-Platonist Philosophical Inquiries, 2024
Chapter for a forthcoming book edited by Amber Carpenter and Pierre Julien Hartier, Crossing the ... more Chapter for a forthcoming book edited by Amber Carpenter and Pierre Julien Hartier, Crossing the Stream, Leaving the Cave: Buddhist-Platonist Philosophical Inquiries
Soul Matters, 2023
A reading of Apuleius' Golden Ass as a study of Plato's Phaedrus
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 2014
Professor d’Hoine claims that Proclus assigns a specific ontological function to the Form of Like... more Professor d’Hoine claims that Proclus assigns a specific ontological function to the Form of Likeness in his Commentary on the Parmenides. According to d’Hoine, for Proclus, each individual must, qua individual striving to imitate the form, present a difference; this difference or unlikeness of one member of a coordinate kind to another, the plurality of participants in a Form, is Form’s by the Form of Unlikeness. And in a similar way, the Form of Likeness then guarantees the imitation of the Form by the particular. I try to show that in other passages in Proclus’ oeuvre, likeness extends to include many more relationships than the Forms instantiation as a material particular. Hence, Likeness is not confined to this specific ontological function.
Introduction: Exegesis in Late antique Platonism Damascius (ca. 462-538) was head of the Platonic... more Introduction: Exegesis in Late antique Platonism Damascius (ca. 462-538) was head of the Platonic Academy at Athens in 529 when the Christian Emperor Justinian issued a decree that banned the teaching of philosophy in that city. Damascius lectured or composed commentaries on Plato's dialogues in keeping with the Neoplatonic curriculum developed in the third century under the influence of Iamblichus. There are traces of or references to commentaries on the Alcibiades, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Sophist, Timaeus, Laws I and II, Republic, Philebus, and Parmenides. Of these, the Commentary on the Parmenides was written by Damascius himself, while the Alcibiades commentary survives as quotations in a commentary by Olympiodorus. The Phaedo and Philebus commentaries survive in the form of reports "apo phones," or lecture notes from a series given by Damascius. These lectures, or sets of lecture notes, like the Commentary on the Parmenides, are based entirely on a now lost commentary of the same name by Proclus, which is alluded to in the PH. According to this anecdote, Marinus showed Isidore his own Commentary on the Philebus, whereupon Isidore told him that Proclus' commentary would suffice. Its subject, according to the Neoplatonic curriculum, is the Good, and in particular, the Good that belongs to sentient beings. My topic addresses a lemma in Damascius' own Lectures on the Philebus that evidently responds to the interpretation of Proclus. We have independent evidence for the Proclean exegesis from remarks in Proclus' Platonic Theology, a text that we shall discuss shortly. In addition to the Lectures on the Philebus, Damascius discusses the Philebus interpretation extensively in his major work, the Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles, which treats the initial principles of Neoplatonic metaphysics. Starting with the Ineffable, Damascius here addresses the One, followed by the three Henads or aspects of the One (One-All, All-One, and the Unified), and finally, the intelligible world, whose apex is the Unified, or Being. Being introduces the Intelligible Triads, whose arrangement is the subject of the last part of the book. Damascius uses nomenclature of varied provenance to describe these same structures, framing his own doctrines in terms of Platonic, Pythagorean, and Chaldean equivalents. Thus the three Henads can also be described as Limit, Unlimited and Mixed, or as Monad, Dyad, and Many. The Problems and Solutions exhibits a thorough-going critique of Proclean metaphysics, starting with ET Proposition 11, (all that exists proceeds from a single cause), going on to pose problems concerning the status of the primary henads, proceeding to critique the Proclean triadic view of procession and reversion, and severely undermining the status of intellectual reversion in establishing being as the intelligible object. Damascius investigates the internal contradictions lurking within the theory of descent as a whole, showing that similarity of effect and cause is vitiated in the case of processions where one order
draft only for a forthcoming volume
Abstract
This paper explores the striking coincidences between bureaucratic literature such as Jo... more Abstract
This paper explores the striking coincidences between bureaucratic literature such as John Lydus’ On the Magistracies of Rome or the Notitia Dignitatum and the bureaucratic delineations that characterize texts of Proclus such as the Elements of Theology or the Platonic Theology. We meet in Proclus a taxonomic approach to epistemology itself, one in which the ordering power of the mind is projected on a cosmic level, in terms that must at least remind us of the delegation of power that we see in the governmental deployment of imperium, the right of command. In order to pursue this line of comparison, I compare a prominent form of knowledge-making in the fourth through sixth centuries CE, appearing in texts that enumerate lists, ranks, offices, and power dynamics, with the metaphysical schemata of Proclus. Rather than asking about the direction of influence, this paper will instead seek to understand the epistemological implications of Proclus’ metaphysical taxonomy.
Page 1. Page 2. Page 3. SOCRATES: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED Page 4. Continuum Guides for ... Holo... more Page 1. Page 2. Page 3. SOCRATES: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED Page 4. Continuum Guides for ... Holowchak Page 5. SOCRATES: A GUIDE FOR THEPERPLEXED SARA AHBEL-RAPPE Page 6. Continuum International ...
A Companion to Plato, 2006
Page 1. 434 sara ahbel-rappe 29 Plato's Influence on Jewish, Christian, and Islamic ... more Page 1. 434 sara ahbel-rappe 29 Plato's Influence on Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Philosophy SARA AHBEL-RAPPE Introduction: Plato in Late Antiquity In order to understand the influence of Plato on the formation ...
A Companion to the Roman Empire, 2006
Philosophical developments in the Roman Empire deeply influenced how we conceive of Ancient Greek... more Philosophical developments in the Roman Empire deeply influenced how we conceive of Ancient Greek philosophy today. In the high empire Hellenistic philosophy (especially Stoicism) was immensely popular, but increasingly revitalized forms of Aristotelian and Platonic philosophies came to dominate the intellectual field. In particular, it was the scholastic reading of the treatises and dialogues, the advent of the exegetical tradition, that resulted in an almost scriptural status accorded to the works of Aristotle and Plato (Tarrant 2000; J. Barnes 1993; Sedley 1997b). Ironically, for those who associate the Roman Empire with Hellenistic philosophy, it was precisely at this time that the Hellenistic schools began to be eclipsed. These centuries saw the resurgence of Aristotle's school, of Pythagoreanism, and of course, the development of Middle Platonism (Dillon 1977), followed by Neoplatonism. There were also revelatory traditions of a multiethnic origin, including the Hermetica, the Chaldean Oracles, and Philo's particularly Jewish brand of Stoic Platonism. Because the Roman Empire embraced a world whose intellectual aspirations always returned to Greek as the language of choice, we shall see that the majority of the philosophers in this period wrote in Greek. There were few Latin exceptions, of course: the Stoic Seneca, the Platonist Calcidius, and the novelist and author of a Platonist handbook, Apuleius of Madaura (perhaps only marginally an original philosopher). More typical are the Latin writers who chose to write in Greek though they lived in Rome or were themselves Roman. Marcus Aurelius wrote his Meditations in Greek and other native Italians such as Musonius Rufus wrote in Greek as well (Inwood 1995; Sedley 1997c; M. Griffin 1992, 1997a). Our period gives birth to mottos that sound anything but self-evident to the modern ear. Numenius (a second-century Pythagorean from Syria) quips, ''what is Plato but a Moses who
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1998
Classical World, 2008
ABSTRACT Reshotko’s book makes the bold claim that “Socrates was not a moral philosopher.” Instea... more ABSTRACT Reshotko’s book makes the bold claim that “Socrates was not a moral philosopher.” Instead, he was a theorist who discovered one fundamental fact about the structure of human motivation. All human beings seek their own happiness, whether or not they are aware of it. Socrates does not offer any prescriptive universal moral principles, but he does offer a descriptive and exhaustive theory of value, according to which all things belong to one of three ranks: the Good (happiness and, in an other-generated way, virtue), the Bad (misery), and the neither-good-nor-bad (every other thing and every other state of affairs that is not either of the former). Yet along with his insight into the nature of human motivation, Socrates can offer all persons a reason to be seriously concerned with the good of others: harming someone results in making him worse; worse people in turn are more likely to harm others and thus defeat one’s overall end, which is to pursue one’s own happiness. Therefore, virtue and happiness are not identical; happiness is the ultimate goal of life, but because it is impossible to secure happiness without knowledge of the good, without taking into account the well-being of others, and without pursuing virtue, then virtue is necessary for the happy life. Part one (chs. 2–4) constitutes a description and defense of Socrates’ theory of desire. All desire is for the good, and what Socrates means by this must be disambiguated; it is not desire for the apparent good, but for the actual good. Thus there is a link between a person’s desire and good objects or states of affairs in the world toward which desire ubiquitously drives. In order to understand this theory of motivation, we need to see that by good, Socrates means whatever situation or action most benefits the agent. Therefore, Reshotko is a proponent of Penner’s, Vlastos’, and Irwin’s thesis concerning Socratic ethics, that Socrates is a psychological eudaimonist. For Socrates, according to this thesis, it is impossible for an individual to be motivated to do anything other than what is in the agent’s interest. Nevertheless, Socrates also believes that harming another never benefits an agent and that benefiting others is never inconsistent with pursuing self-interest. Why is this the case? To harm another results in making that victim a worse person. The person who is harmed will therefore be likely to be less virtuous and therefore more likely to harm others. Such people make bad companions and have no place in the happy life. Therefore, the prudent person, in pursuing self-interest, avoids harming and also benefits others. Finally, beliefs about what is best for the agent provide the only source of motivation for action. Therefore, all action is rational (“weakness of will” is impossible); in this sense, Socratic eudaimonism is complemented by Socratic intellectualism. In part two (chs. 5–6) Reshotko goes on to present Socrates’ system of values: the good, the bad, and the neither good-nor-bad. Every single object and every single action fall under the third, broadest category. Reshotko explains that when it comes to goods, some are conditional, and some are unconditional. Also, some goods are self-generated and some goods are other-generated. All objects and actions are conditional, other-generated goods. Happiness is the only unconditional good and it is the only self-generated good. Virtue, by contrast, is an unconditional good, but it is other-generated (it is only valuable because it leads to happiness). Misery is the only unconditional and self-generated bad, whereas ignorance (vice) is an unconditional but other-generated evil. Part three (chs. 7–9) explores the relationship between virtue, knowledge, and happiness. According to Reshotko, there is a nomological relationship between knowledge and happiness. Since knowledge and knowledge alone allows us to control what happens to us, the only way to become happy is to have knowledge. People try to become knowledgeable (and this is the same as to say that they become virtuous) in order to become as happy as possible. Chapter 8, in some ways the most contentious and certainly the most original chapter in the book...
Philosophy in Late Antiquity, 2004
Page 1. Philosophy in Late Antiquity Andrew Smith Routledge Taylor & Francis Croup Page 2. Pa... more Page 1. Philosophy in Late Antiquity Andrew Smith Routledge Taylor & Francis Croup Page 2. Page 3. ... Page 4. Page 5. PHILOSOPHY IN LATE ANTIQUITY Some of the most significant cultural achievements of Late Antiquity lie in the domains of philosophy and religion. ...
Gorgias 468 c2-6, Socrates speaking: "Therefore we do not want simply to slaughter or banish from... more Gorgias 468 c2-6, Socrates speaking: "Therefore we do not want simply to slaughter or banish from cities or appropriate wealth, but rather if they prove beneficial, then we do want to commit these acts, whereas if they prove harmful, we do not want to commit them. For as you say, we want things that are good; we do not want what is neither good nor bad, nor do we want what is bad." Gorgias d1-6: "If we make these agreements, then when someone, whether a despot or a politician, kills a man or banishes him from his city or appropriates his wealth, imagining it to be more advantageous for him, whereas in fact, it turns out to be more harmful for him, still this person is doing what seems best to him, does he not?" Polus: "Yes" Socrates: "Therefore is he also doing what he wants, since these acts are in fact harmful?" Protagoras 358c6-d4, Socrates speaking: "Therefore, is it not the case," I said, "that no one advances toward bad things voluntarily, or toward what he imagines as bad? To go after what one believes to be bad, instead of the good, is not, it seems, in human nature and when one is compelled to choose between two evils, no one will choose the greater when he might choose the less." Meno: 77d7-78a8, Socrates speaking: "Isn't it clear that these people, that is, those who don't recognize evils for what they are, don't desire evil but what they thought was good, whereas in actuality it is evil; Hence, those who do not recognize evil yet imagine it go be good clearly desire the good?" Meno: "Yes, they at least probably do desire the good." Socrates: "Now as for those whom you describe as desiring evils in the belief that they do harm to their possessor, surely they know that they will be harmed by evils?" Meno: "They must." Socrates: "And don't they believe that whoever is harmed, to the extent that he is harmed, is miserable?" Meno: "they must believe this as well." Socrates: "And that the miserable are unhappy?" Meno: "I certainly think so." Socrates: "Well, is there anyone who wants to be wretched and unhappy?" Meno: "Not in my view, Socrates." Socrates: "Therefore, no one wants what is bad, since no one wants to be in this condition. Since what is it to be wretched other than desiring bad things and obtaining them?" Euthydemus 278e3-279a1, Socrates speaking "Do we human beings all wish to do well? Or perhaps this question is one of those that I just now feared was ridiculous? For it is foolish, no doubt, even to ask such things. What human being does not want to do well?" "Not a single one," said Clinias.
JPT, 2021
Vlad's Damascius et l'Ineffable is a welcome addition to a growing body of work1 dedicated to the... more Vlad's Damascius et l'Ineffable is a welcome addition to a growing body of work1 dedicated to the exploration of Damasicus' Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles (Aporiai kai Luseis Peri Proton Archon, henceforth PA2). Scholars have generally recognized how unusual the PA is compared to Damascius' Platonic Commentaries, in its singular interrogation of the language of metaphysics.3 The subtitle of Vlad's book, "Récit de l'impossible 1 In addition to Vlad's 2019 book, we can note the appearance in 2012 of Métry-Tresson, L'aporie ou l'expérience des limites de la pensée dans le Péri archôn de Damaskios. These works that focus more on Damascius' interrogation of the subject of knowledge are now joined by Jonathan Greig's 2021 Brill book The First Principle in Late Neoplatonism, an exploration of the metaphysics of Proclus and Damasicus. 2 Vlad's book, in French, utilizes what she calls "modified" translations of Combès in the critical edition, 1986-1991. Traité des premiers principes. 3 vols. Text edited by L. G. Westerink, translation by J. Combès. Paris. For the purposes of this review, I will utilize my own English translations of the original Greek text, as found in Ahbel-Rappe, Damascius Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles. OUP 2010.
The Reception of Greek Ethics in Late Antiquity and Byzantium, 2021
Abstract: In this chapter, I show how the contemplative ethics of Neoplatonism repurposes Classic... more Abstract: In this chapter, I show how the contemplative ethics of Neoplatonism repurposes Classical and Hellenistic
ethics, advancing a new distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom. The Classical and Hellenistic contrast
between the bios praktikos and its attendant virtue phronesis, and the bios theoretikos together with its attendant virtue
sophia, informs a half millennium or more of ethical thinking. In the discourse surrounding the competing value of
these ethical registers, the practical life and the contemplative life, both ancient philosophers and their modern
exegetes approach the theoretical life with trepidation, as if a certain amount of apology is owed for the practical limits
of contemplative ethics. But such anxiety as to how the life of theoria can be valorised from the point of view of
ordinary virtue, is out of place when it comes to understanding the ethics of Plotinus and of Porphyry, at least in the
Enneads and in the Sententiae. There is an important place for the practical life, if by practical we understand the
development of the capacity for contemplation. As such, the practical side of this ethics is a form of mind training or
even, an ethics of concentration. Its complement, wisdom, theoretical virtue, or Sophia, consists in insight, or
knowledge of the nature of the real, together with realisation of the true self of the practitioner.
Overview of Socratic Ignorance and Platonic Knowledge
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Papers by Sara Ahbel-Rappe
This paper explores the striking coincidences between bureaucratic literature such as John Lydus’ On the Magistracies of Rome or the Notitia Dignitatum and the bureaucratic delineations that characterize texts of Proclus such as the Elements of Theology or the Platonic Theology. We meet in Proclus a taxonomic approach to epistemology itself, one in which the ordering power of the mind is projected on a cosmic level, in terms that must at least remind us of the delegation of power that we see in the governmental deployment of imperium, the right of command. In order to pursue this line of comparison, I compare a prominent form of knowledge-making in the fourth through sixth centuries CE, appearing in texts that enumerate lists, ranks, offices, and power dynamics, with the metaphysical schemata of Proclus. Rather than asking about the direction of influence, this paper will instead seek to understand the epistemological implications of Proclus’ metaphysical taxonomy.
ethics, advancing a new distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom. The Classical and Hellenistic contrast
between the bios praktikos and its attendant virtue phronesis, and the bios theoretikos together with its attendant virtue
sophia, informs a half millennium or more of ethical thinking. In the discourse surrounding the competing value of
these ethical registers, the practical life and the contemplative life, both ancient philosophers and their modern
exegetes approach the theoretical life with trepidation, as if a certain amount of apology is owed for the practical limits
of contemplative ethics. But such anxiety as to how the life of theoria can be valorised from the point of view of
ordinary virtue, is out of place when it comes to understanding the ethics of Plotinus and of Porphyry, at least in the
Enneads and in the Sententiae. There is an important place for the practical life, if by practical we understand the
development of the capacity for contemplation. As such, the practical side of this ethics is a form of mind training or
even, an ethics of concentration. Its complement, wisdom, theoretical virtue, or Sophia, consists in insight, or
knowledge of the nature of the real, together with realisation of the true self of the practitioner.
This paper explores the striking coincidences between bureaucratic literature such as John Lydus’ On the Magistracies of Rome or the Notitia Dignitatum and the bureaucratic delineations that characterize texts of Proclus such as the Elements of Theology or the Platonic Theology. We meet in Proclus a taxonomic approach to epistemology itself, one in which the ordering power of the mind is projected on a cosmic level, in terms that must at least remind us of the delegation of power that we see in the governmental deployment of imperium, the right of command. In order to pursue this line of comparison, I compare a prominent form of knowledge-making in the fourth through sixth centuries CE, appearing in texts that enumerate lists, ranks, offices, and power dynamics, with the metaphysical schemata of Proclus. Rather than asking about the direction of influence, this paper will instead seek to understand the epistemological implications of Proclus’ metaphysical taxonomy.
ethics, advancing a new distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom. The Classical and Hellenistic contrast
between the bios praktikos and its attendant virtue phronesis, and the bios theoretikos together with its attendant virtue
sophia, informs a half millennium or more of ethical thinking. In the discourse surrounding the competing value of
these ethical registers, the practical life and the contemplative life, both ancient philosophers and their modern
exegetes approach the theoretical life with trepidation, as if a certain amount of apology is owed for the practical limits
of contemplative ethics. But such anxiety as to how the life of theoria can be valorised from the point of view of
ordinary virtue, is out of place when it comes to understanding the ethics of Plotinus and of Porphyry, at least in the
Enneads and in the Sententiae. There is an important place for the practical life, if by practical we understand the
development of the capacity for contemplation. As such, the practical side of this ethics is a form of mind training or
even, an ethics of concentration. Its complement, wisdom, theoretical virtue, or Sophia, consists in insight, or
knowledge of the nature of the real, together with realisation of the true self of the practitioner.
Draft of a paper still needing work