Drafts by Nebojsa Nash Jocic
Supporting my argument that The Birth of Tragedy can be used as a template for better understand... more Supporting my argument that The Birth of Tragedy can be used as a template for better understanding Nietzsche’s later ideas, I will further analyse the central themes of BT, which permeate throughout Nietzsche’s work. I will then focus on the view that Nietzsche abandoned the early position that illusion is necessary for life affirmation (Reginster, 2008) in his later work. I will argue that, on the contrary, Nietzsche retained the necessity of artistic illusion (established in BT) for life affirmation throughout his corpus.
In this paper, I aim to argue that both Jesus and Nietzsche advocated for individual perfection. ... more In this paper, I aim to argue that both Jesus and Nietzsche advocated for individual perfection. While Friedrich Nietzsche is commonly associated with embracing perfectionism, particularly with the concept of the Ubermensh (Over Man), I contend that Jesus also sought perfectionism and did not merely offer an egalitarian approach. Contrary to the notion that Jesus died on the cross solely to save all of us, I propose that his sacrifice was meant to demonstrate how to live a perfected 1 life. However, throughout history, the Church has presented a different interpretation, creating a moral framework that deviates from Jesus's original message. To bolster my argument, I will draw upon relevant verses from the Gospels in The New Testament 2 and quote Nietzsche's thoughts from his corpus. My focus will be on Nietzsche's relation to Jesus rather than his views on the Christian dogma that emerged after Jesus's death. The nature of parables, which form the basis of Jesus's teachings in NT, allows for diverse interpretations. I will endeavour to connect the dots and shed light on the possible hidden messages in Jesus's teachings and interpret Nietzsche's aphorisms and metaphors in a similar manner. In this exploration of Jesus and Nietzsche's philosophies, I aim to reveal the underlying similarities in their perspectives on individual perfection. By delving into their writings and teachings, I hope to offer a nuanced understanding of their messages and uncover the common threads that unite their philosophies.
DA LI JE ŠOPENHAUEROV PESIMIZAM ODRŽIV?
U ovom eseju ću se pozabaviti pesimizmom Artura Šopenhau... more DA LI JE ŠOPENHAUEROV PESIMIZAM ODRŽIV?
U ovom eseju ću se pozabaviti pesimizmom Artura Šopenhauera (Arthur Schopenhauer), koji kulminira u njegovom mišljenju da život nije vredan življenja, i da bi za nas bilo bolje da ga negiramo umesto da ga afirmišemo1. Ja ću pokušati da dokažem da Šopnhauerov pesimizam nije održiv, i da se ruši na sopstvenim tvrdnjama. U prvom delu ću analizirati važnost patnje kao centralne tačke Šopnhauerovog pesimizma. Za Šopnhauera, suština sveta, koju on naziva voljom, predstavlja neprekidno i slepo stremljenje koje se materijalizuje u organskom i neorganskom svetu2. Volja, koju on isto nazva i voljom za životom, nas neprestano pokreće iz jedne želje u drugu i ostavlja nas bez odmora u konstantnom stanju potrebe, što po njemu izaziva patnju. Ja ću negirati njegovu tvrdnju da je samo patnja pozitivne prirode, dok je sreća uvek negativne prirode. Po Šopenhaueru, retki momente sreće koju doživljavamo, sastoje se samo u odsustvu patnje, što sreću čini negativnom. Ja ću se takođe pozabaviti i njegovom tvrdnjom da je apsolutna sreća nemoguća i krtikovaću tu ideju kao veoma slab argument odbrane pesimizma.
U drugom delu ću se fokusirati na Šopenhauerovu upotrebu pojmova bola i patnje. Kako se čini da ih on koristi koekstenzivno, ja ću dokazati da se bol i patnja ne mogu upotrebljavati koekstenzivno.
U trećem delu ću razmotriti Šopenhauerovu tvrdnju da svet ima moralno značenje. Zbog neizbežne patnje, po Šopenhaueru, naš jedini moralni izbor je da negiramo patnju time što ćemo negirati želje, a time i sam život. To za njega predstavlja skriveno moralno značenje sveta i života, do koga se jedino može stići putem filozofije.
U čevrtom delu ću se osvrnuti na važnost estetskog doživljaja, koji po Šopenhaueru predstavlja dokaz da se možemo osloboditi volje (a time i patnje) i da se kratki periodi u kojima smo oslobođeni volje mogu postići. Kao za Emanel Kanta (Immanuel Kant), i za Šopenhauera estetski dozivljaj mora biti nezainteresovan, nenameran i nikada promišljen. Pošto se naše promišljene aktivnosti baziraju na znanju pokrenutom principom praktičnog razuma (za sve mora postojati razlog) koji funkcioniše na bazi naših urođenih kategorija vremena, prostora i uzročnosti, a koje se odnose samo na fenomenalni svet, ideje koje su suština esteskog iskustva ne mogu se razumeti takvim znanjem. Takve ideje se mogu doseći samo objektivnim znanjem genija, koji u procesu umetničkog stvaranja, napušta svoju individualnost i kompletno se distancira od fenomenalnog sveta, i na taj način stiže do ideje objekta na koji se fokusira zahvaljujući svojoj genijalnosti a ne razumu.
U zadnjem odeljku elaboriraću saosećanje (compassion), koje nam, po Šopenhaueru, može pomoći da prevaziđemo patnju. Odričući se sebičnosti preko saosećanja, možemo se identifikovati sa patnjom drugih i razumeti da smo na taj način jednaki sa njima. To će nam, kako uči Šopenhauer, pomoći da shvatimo da je naša individualnost glavni uzrok patnje, i podstreknuti nas da prevaziđemo patnju kroz saosećanje. Moja kritika će se sastojati u tome da saosećanje ne moze biti odvojeno od ličnog interesa, i kao takvo još uvek zahteva snažno prisustvo volje. Takođe ću dokazati da je asketizam, kao ultimativni pokušaj prevazilaženja patnje, suprotan saosećanju.
Nebojsa Nash Jocic
NIETZSCHE'S RESPONSE TO SCHOPENHAUER
'One repays a teacher badly if one alw... more Nebojsa Nash Jocic
NIETZSCHE'S RESPONSE TO SCHOPENHAUER
'One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil.' (Nietzsche, Z, I, 22)
Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy had a significant impact on Nietzsche's philosophical development. On a few occasions, Nietzsche has openly acknowledged Schopenhauer's influence, and as he states: 'And so today I shall remember one of the teachers and taskmasters of whom I can boast, Arthur Schopenhauer' (UM, III, 1).2 Also, Nietzsche says: '… my first and only teacher, the great Arthur Schopenhauer' (HH, Preface, 1)
In this essay, I will look into Arthur Schopenhauer's pessimism, which culminates in the view tha... more In this essay, I will look into Arthur Schopenhauer's pessimism, which culminates in the view that since life is not worth living, it is better for us to deny it than try to affirm it.1 I will argue that his pessimism is not sustainable, and that it fails on its own propositions.
In section 1, I will look at the importance of suffering as the central point in Schopenhauer’s pessimism. For Schopenhauer, the essence of the world, which he calls will, is a never-ending, blind and purposeless striving that objectifies itself in the organic and inorganic world. Will, which can also be called the will to live, is constantly driving us from one desire to another, leaving us almost without rest in the constant state of need, hence suffering. I will argue against his position that only suffering is of a positive nature, while happiness can only be negative. According to Schopenhauer, the rare moments of happiness we experience consist only in the absence of suffering. I will also look into his view that absolute happiness is impossible to achieve and question this statement as a weak argument for pessimism.
Section 2 will focus on Schopenhauer’s use of the concepts of pain and suffering. As it seems that he uses them as co-extensive terms, I will explain why they are not co-extensive.
In section 3, I will discuss Schopenhauer’s view that the world has a moral meaning. Because of inevitable suffering, according to Schopenhauer, our only moral solution to the problem of suffering will be to deny suffering, consequently, life itself. And this is, for him, the hidden moral meaning of the world that only philosophy can uncover.
In section 4, I will look at the importance of aesthetic experience, which for Schopenhauer, represents the proof that the will can be abandoned and that the short periods of liberation from the will/suffering can be reached. As for Kant, for Schopenhauer, the aesthetic experience must be purposeless and unintentional and never contemplated or purposeful. Since our contemplated activities belong to the knowledge driven by the principle of practical reason that operates on the basis of our innate categories of time, space and causality and is related only to the phenomenal world, ideas that are the essence of artistic experience cannot be grasped by such knowledge. They can only be contemplated by objective knowledge by genius, who, in the process of artistic creation, abandons his individuality and disconnects from the phenomenal world completely, grasping the idea of a perceived object purely by its rare gift and not by reason.
In the final section, I will look at compassion, which can help us overcome suffering, according to Schopenhauer. By abandoning our selfishness through compassion, we can identify with the suffering of others and understand that we are the same as others. That will help us comprehend that our individuality is the main cause of suffering and trigger our attempt to overcome suffering through compassion. I will argue that compassion cannot be devoid of self-interest and, as such, still requires a strong presence of the will. I will also show why asceticism is, as the ultimate attempt to completely redeem suffering, antipodal to compassion.
Thesis Chapters by Nebojsa Nash Jocic
multiculturalism and liberal values, 2015
I always had an impression that a single sentence uttered by Dr. Martin Luther King can be used ... more I always had an impression that a single sentence uttered by Dr. Martin Luther King can be used as the main principle for describing the liberal democracy: ‘I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their character.’ The emphasis in his quote is clearly on two important points: multiculturalism (colour of their skin) and liberal values (content of their character).
As many states have paraded multiculturalism as their first headline in establishing the trust of the electorate by announcing that the equality of different races, religions and cultures is their priority, I will argue that not enough has been done to bring them together in the homogenous and cohesive community. I will argue that calling those different racial, religious and cultural groups minorities is a wrong approach. The concept minority automatically suggests that there is a majority, as those two opposites co-substantiate one another. Although there can be a ‘healthy balance’ or unity between majority and minority (in reality or thought), when political emphasis is one the majority, the unity can be easily broken (it even further empowers the meaning of concept minority by evoking the fact that minority is always outnumbered and outvoted). The term minority can arouse feelings of weakness, marginalisation and humiliation. Instead I will call these different groups comprehensive groups. I will argue that achieving only co-existence of different comprehensive groups in the society is not enough to bring them under the ambarella of unity and cohesion. Instead I will argue that integration of different comprehensive groups represents more important task for the societal cohesion. Co-existence does not mean integration or unity; it is often culpable for misunderstanding, blame and animosity among comprehensive groups. And for that reason co-existence has to be protected but very stringent laws which keep comprehensive groups away from each other, not closer. It is the fear from the law that makes co-existence sustainable, not understanding and friendship of different groups that is the only way that can lead to complete integration. By integration I discern mutual understanding of different comprehensive groups that will help them to become closer to each other under the cover of liberal democratic society which guaranties their freedom and prosperity. Integration does not mean abandoning the traditions and cultural identity of comprehensive groups, but in accepting differences of others enriching their own and bonding together into the society that belongs to all equally.
Regarding the second important point in Dr. King’s quote, liberal values as the content of one’s character, more is to be said.
In this dissertation I will argue that multiculturalism is not only sustainable in a liberal society but that a society based on liberal values is the only place where multiculturalism can fully prosper, meaning that all cultural groups are free and equal and have the same rights and duties, without one dominating another. The fundamental values, on which liberal societies are built, such as individual freedom, equality and autonomy, have allowed equal treatment for all individuals as well as comprehensive groups whose doctrines include the full system of values according to which people should live their lives. Comprehensive groups may be religious, moral or philosophical and can also have opposing views on a good life. Some communitarian political philosophers, as well as some liberals, argue that liberal society cannot accommodate equal treatment for all individuals and comprehensive groups and that in fact, liberal society restricts their freedom. This is why some have insisted on different factors that matter more to social unity such as nationalism, patriotism, special rights for some groups etc. But, to offer freedom and equal rights to all individuals, liberal society cannot allow unrestricted, absolute freedom to all comprehensive groups, since that will mean compromising the same values on which it is built. No other political type of society has ever offered as much equality and prosperity to all different cultural groups within it, as liberal society does. Throughout history, there have been examples of multicultural states where it was a regular practice that a single ‘official’ or preferred culture or religion dominated all the others. It was a common practice of different empires, monarchies, republics, dictatorial and communist regimes. One culture and way of life or one religion has always been ‘official’, and therefore dominant whilst others have been suppressed, even outlawed, and have witnessed their members being expelled or prosecuted. In non-liberal societies, historically and even in this day and age, non-dominant cultural groups could have only existed under the conditions of oppression and marginalisation.
In the following three chapters, I will develop the argument by starting with liberal values as the pillars of liberal society. Thanks to liberal values such as freedom and equality, and especially autonomy, different cultural groups can be fully open to all individuals who will voluntarily decide which community or association they will join and follow their teachings or way of life.
Explaining the development of liberal values through political philosophy in the first chapter, I will discuss the liberal theories of John Locke (often credited as the founder of liberalism), Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Friedrich Hayek.
In the second chapter, I will introduce communitarian views and their criticisms of some liberal values. As communitarians insist on the community’s value over the individuals, their criticisms are directed mainly towards the individual autonomy. I will then discuss the issue of special rights demanded for different comprehensive groups (Iris Marion Young and Bhikhu Parekh), the criticism of Rawls’ theory of person (Michael Sandel), the defence of a nation (Roger Scruton), nationalism (David Miller) and patriotism (Alasdair MacIntyre) as opposites of the fundamentals of liberal society.
In the third chapter I will present the defence of liberalism and prove that multiculturalism can only fully prosper in a liberal society. As Rawls suggested in his early work, what we aim for ourselves should be always allowed to everyone else. This means that that political freedom, free choice of religion and other comprehensive doctrines should be allowed to all as essential attributes of free and equal individuals. What is often happening is that cultural groups demand special rights in order to increase their powers over their members, therefore avoiding the liberal laws being implemented over the group regarding specific issues. I will also question the nature and validity of special rights and their purpose and necessity in a liberal society. I will support my thesis with John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Brian Barry and Amy Guttmann’s views.
The world as a community of societies is definitely going in the direction foreseen by liberal philosophers rather than their critics. Purely ethnic societies don’t exist anymore in the developed world. Multiculturalism was a simply unavoidable consequence of the industrial revolution, expansion of the world trade and global economics. Free transport of goods, people and ideas is not wishful thinking anymore, but rather the reality of a modern world. Progress has no national feelings, patriotic bondage or religious dominance. The world in which humanity expresses its potentials has changed the landscape of pragmatic and romantic political theorists. Empires have collapsed, dictators have failed, and democracy has created new political conditions in which people as individuals have found their place and justified the current national and ever-increasing global politics. Politics that are not justified by the majority of citizens and cultural groups will undoubtedly fail. In order to be justified they have to be liberal. They have to guarantee freedom and equality to all, regardless of their religious, philosophical, moral or other doctrines.
THE WORLD AS AN AESTHETIC PHENOMENON: THE FOUNDATION OF NIETZSCHE'S, 2023
The World as an Aesthetic Phenomenon-The Foundation of Nietzsche's Ethics" Nietzsche's first book... more The World as an Aesthetic Phenomenon-The Foundation of Nietzsche's Ethics" Nietzsche's first book, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), was his attempt to revitalise modern German culture using the example of pre-Socratic Greek culture. Although widely accepted as the first stage of his philosophical development, I argue that BT is much more than that and can be used as the template for understanding Nietzsche's later work. I find that a few of Nietzsche's major ideas that sprouted in BT, and then permeated throughout his philosophical
In this paper, contrary to popular academic belief, I will argue that The Birth of Tragedy1 repre... more In this paper, contrary to popular academic belief, I will argue that The Birth of Tragedy1 represents an apotheosis of a unique type of individual, or in other words, a celebration of distinctive individuality. Nietzsche's celebration of the unique type of individual in BT is in complete contrast to Schopenhauer's repudiation of life. To strengthen my argument, I will first analyse the view that BT is a pessimistic book according to which the destruction of individuality, as was the case with Schopenhauer’s pessimism of life-denial, is its central message. Contrary to this view, I will then present the view that the individual plays a much more important role in BT and that BT is not about the destruction of the individual but rather about the creation of a unique type of individual capable of justifying life.
Filozofija Artura Šopenhauera (Arthur Schopenahuer) je imala ogroman uticaj na razvoj filozofskog... more Filozofija Artura Šopenhauera (Arthur Schopenahuer) je imala ogroman uticaj na razvoj filozofskog razvoja Fridriha Ničea (Friedrich Nietzsche). Niče je otvoreno priznao Šopenhauerovo uticaj; kao što sam kaže: 'Ja ću se danas setiti jednog od najvećih učitelja lidera kojim mogu da se pohvalim, Artura Šopenhauera' (UM, III, 1)2. Niče takođe kaže:'… moj prvi i jedini učitelj, veliki Artur Šopenhauer' (HH, Predgovor, 1)3. U sledećem citatu mladi Niče govori o ogromnom uticaju koji je osetio kada se prvi put došao u kontakt sa Šopenhauerovom filozofijom: Ja ne znam koji mi je demon šapnuo: 'Ponesi ovu knjigu kući'. Kako i da je, bilo je protiv mog običaja da izbegavam brzo kupovanje knjiga. Kada sam stigao kući, bacio sam se na kraj sofe sa bogatstvom koje sam kupio, i dozvolio tom energetskom, mračnom geniju da počne da radi na meni. Svaki pročitani red urlao je odricanjem, negacijom, rezignacijom, i ja sam u njima video ogledalo u kome se ogledao svet, život, i sopstveni um u zastrašujućem bljesku. Ovde, jedno puno, nezainteresovano oko umetnosti me je gledalo, ovde sam video bolest i izlečenje, izgnanstvo i utočištvo, pakao i raj. (Janaway, 1998, str. 16)4
In this paper I will argue that The Birth of Tragedy is not a pessimistic book. If it is a pessi... more In this paper I will argue that The Birth of Tragedy is not a pessimistic book. If it is a pessimistic book, my argument would not be valid because Nietzsche has later developed anti pessimistic teachings such as Amor Fati, eternal recurrence and the will to power. As I have argued in the earlier writings, (Nietzsche’s Response to Schopenhauer) BT can be understood as a template for Nietzsche’s later work, rather than just the early phase during which he, according to Julian Young, completely succumbs to Schopenhauer’s pessimism. As he asserts: ‘The Birth incorporates without modification Schopenhauer’s metaphysics’ (1992, p. 26, emphasis mine) . I will prove that the message of BT is very different from that of Schopenhauer’s. To do this, I will show how BT reflects Nietzsche’s position that life is worth living and opposes Schopenhauer’s pessimism and life denial. If I am right, this chapter will prove, contrary to the view propounded by Young that Nietzsche could not escape life-denying pessimism in BT, that BT is the beginning of Nietzsche’s development of the teaching of life affirmation and also the will to power.
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Drafts by Nebojsa Nash Jocic
U ovom eseju ću se pozabaviti pesimizmom Artura Šopenhauera (Arthur Schopenhauer), koji kulminira u njegovom mišljenju da život nije vredan življenja, i da bi za nas bilo bolje da ga negiramo umesto da ga afirmišemo1. Ja ću pokušati da dokažem da Šopnhauerov pesimizam nije održiv, i da se ruši na sopstvenim tvrdnjama. U prvom delu ću analizirati važnost patnje kao centralne tačke Šopnhauerovog pesimizma. Za Šopnhauera, suština sveta, koju on naziva voljom, predstavlja neprekidno i slepo stremljenje koje se materijalizuje u organskom i neorganskom svetu2. Volja, koju on isto nazva i voljom za životom, nas neprestano pokreće iz jedne želje u drugu i ostavlja nas bez odmora u konstantnom stanju potrebe, što po njemu izaziva patnju. Ja ću negirati njegovu tvrdnju da je samo patnja pozitivne prirode, dok je sreća uvek negativne prirode. Po Šopenhaueru, retki momente sreće koju doživljavamo, sastoje se samo u odsustvu patnje, što sreću čini negativnom. Ja ću se takođe pozabaviti i njegovom tvrdnjom da je apsolutna sreća nemoguća i krtikovaću tu ideju kao veoma slab argument odbrane pesimizma.
U drugom delu ću se fokusirati na Šopenhauerovu upotrebu pojmova bola i patnje. Kako se čini da ih on koristi koekstenzivno, ja ću dokazati da se bol i patnja ne mogu upotrebljavati koekstenzivno.
U trećem delu ću razmotriti Šopenhauerovu tvrdnju da svet ima moralno značenje. Zbog neizbežne patnje, po Šopenhaueru, naš jedini moralni izbor je da negiramo patnju time što ćemo negirati želje, a time i sam život. To za njega predstavlja skriveno moralno značenje sveta i života, do koga se jedino može stići putem filozofije.
U čevrtom delu ću se osvrnuti na važnost estetskog doživljaja, koji po Šopenhaueru predstavlja dokaz da se možemo osloboditi volje (a time i patnje) i da se kratki periodi u kojima smo oslobođeni volje mogu postići. Kao za Emanel Kanta (Immanuel Kant), i za Šopenhauera estetski dozivljaj mora biti nezainteresovan, nenameran i nikada promišljen. Pošto se naše promišljene aktivnosti baziraju na znanju pokrenutom principom praktičnog razuma (za sve mora postojati razlog) koji funkcioniše na bazi naših urođenih kategorija vremena, prostora i uzročnosti, a koje se odnose samo na fenomenalni svet, ideje koje su suština esteskog iskustva ne mogu se razumeti takvim znanjem. Takve ideje se mogu doseći samo objektivnim znanjem genija, koji u procesu umetničkog stvaranja, napušta svoju individualnost i kompletno se distancira od fenomenalnog sveta, i na taj način stiže do ideje objekta na koji se fokusira zahvaljujući svojoj genijalnosti a ne razumu.
U zadnjem odeljku elaboriraću saosećanje (compassion), koje nam, po Šopenhaueru, može pomoći da prevaziđemo patnju. Odričući se sebičnosti preko saosećanja, možemo se identifikovati sa patnjom drugih i razumeti da smo na taj način jednaki sa njima. To će nam, kako uči Šopenhauer, pomoći da shvatimo da je naša individualnost glavni uzrok patnje, i podstreknuti nas da prevaziđemo patnju kroz saosećanje. Moja kritika će se sastojati u tome da saosećanje ne moze biti odvojeno od ličnog interesa, i kao takvo još uvek zahteva snažno prisustvo volje. Takođe ću dokazati da je asketizam, kao ultimativni pokušaj prevazilaženja patnje, suprotan saosećanju.
NIETZSCHE'S RESPONSE TO SCHOPENHAUER
'One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil.' (Nietzsche, Z, I, 22)
Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy had a significant impact on Nietzsche's philosophical development. On a few occasions, Nietzsche has openly acknowledged Schopenhauer's influence, and as he states: 'And so today I shall remember one of the teachers and taskmasters of whom I can boast, Arthur Schopenhauer' (UM, III, 1).2 Also, Nietzsche says: '… my first and only teacher, the great Arthur Schopenhauer' (HH, Preface, 1)
In section 1, I will look at the importance of suffering as the central point in Schopenhauer’s pessimism. For Schopenhauer, the essence of the world, which he calls will, is a never-ending, blind and purposeless striving that objectifies itself in the organic and inorganic world. Will, which can also be called the will to live, is constantly driving us from one desire to another, leaving us almost without rest in the constant state of need, hence suffering. I will argue against his position that only suffering is of a positive nature, while happiness can only be negative. According to Schopenhauer, the rare moments of happiness we experience consist only in the absence of suffering. I will also look into his view that absolute happiness is impossible to achieve and question this statement as a weak argument for pessimism.
Section 2 will focus on Schopenhauer’s use of the concepts of pain and suffering. As it seems that he uses them as co-extensive terms, I will explain why they are not co-extensive.
In section 3, I will discuss Schopenhauer’s view that the world has a moral meaning. Because of inevitable suffering, according to Schopenhauer, our only moral solution to the problem of suffering will be to deny suffering, consequently, life itself. And this is, for him, the hidden moral meaning of the world that only philosophy can uncover.
In section 4, I will look at the importance of aesthetic experience, which for Schopenhauer, represents the proof that the will can be abandoned and that the short periods of liberation from the will/suffering can be reached. As for Kant, for Schopenhauer, the aesthetic experience must be purposeless and unintentional and never contemplated or purposeful. Since our contemplated activities belong to the knowledge driven by the principle of practical reason that operates on the basis of our innate categories of time, space and causality and is related only to the phenomenal world, ideas that are the essence of artistic experience cannot be grasped by such knowledge. They can only be contemplated by objective knowledge by genius, who, in the process of artistic creation, abandons his individuality and disconnects from the phenomenal world completely, grasping the idea of a perceived object purely by its rare gift and not by reason.
In the final section, I will look at compassion, which can help us overcome suffering, according to Schopenhauer. By abandoning our selfishness through compassion, we can identify with the suffering of others and understand that we are the same as others. That will help us comprehend that our individuality is the main cause of suffering and trigger our attempt to overcome suffering through compassion. I will argue that compassion cannot be devoid of self-interest and, as such, still requires a strong presence of the will. I will also show why asceticism is, as the ultimate attempt to completely redeem suffering, antipodal to compassion.
Thesis Chapters by Nebojsa Nash Jocic
As many states have paraded multiculturalism as their first headline in establishing the trust of the electorate by announcing that the equality of different races, religions and cultures is their priority, I will argue that not enough has been done to bring them together in the homogenous and cohesive community. I will argue that calling those different racial, religious and cultural groups minorities is a wrong approach. The concept minority automatically suggests that there is a majority, as those two opposites co-substantiate one another. Although there can be a ‘healthy balance’ or unity between majority and minority (in reality or thought), when political emphasis is one the majority, the unity can be easily broken (it even further empowers the meaning of concept minority by evoking the fact that minority is always outnumbered and outvoted). The term minority can arouse feelings of weakness, marginalisation and humiliation. Instead I will call these different groups comprehensive groups. I will argue that achieving only co-existence of different comprehensive groups in the society is not enough to bring them under the ambarella of unity and cohesion. Instead I will argue that integration of different comprehensive groups represents more important task for the societal cohesion. Co-existence does not mean integration or unity; it is often culpable for misunderstanding, blame and animosity among comprehensive groups. And for that reason co-existence has to be protected but very stringent laws which keep comprehensive groups away from each other, not closer. It is the fear from the law that makes co-existence sustainable, not understanding and friendship of different groups that is the only way that can lead to complete integration. By integration I discern mutual understanding of different comprehensive groups that will help them to become closer to each other under the cover of liberal democratic society which guaranties their freedom and prosperity. Integration does not mean abandoning the traditions and cultural identity of comprehensive groups, but in accepting differences of others enriching their own and bonding together into the society that belongs to all equally.
Regarding the second important point in Dr. King’s quote, liberal values as the content of one’s character, more is to be said.
In this dissertation I will argue that multiculturalism is not only sustainable in a liberal society but that a society based on liberal values is the only place where multiculturalism can fully prosper, meaning that all cultural groups are free and equal and have the same rights and duties, without one dominating another. The fundamental values, on which liberal societies are built, such as individual freedom, equality and autonomy, have allowed equal treatment for all individuals as well as comprehensive groups whose doctrines include the full system of values according to which people should live their lives. Comprehensive groups may be religious, moral or philosophical and can also have opposing views on a good life. Some communitarian political philosophers, as well as some liberals, argue that liberal society cannot accommodate equal treatment for all individuals and comprehensive groups and that in fact, liberal society restricts their freedom. This is why some have insisted on different factors that matter more to social unity such as nationalism, patriotism, special rights for some groups etc. But, to offer freedom and equal rights to all individuals, liberal society cannot allow unrestricted, absolute freedom to all comprehensive groups, since that will mean compromising the same values on which it is built. No other political type of society has ever offered as much equality and prosperity to all different cultural groups within it, as liberal society does. Throughout history, there have been examples of multicultural states where it was a regular practice that a single ‘official’ or preferred culture or religion dominated all the others. It was a common practice of different empires, monarchies, republics, dictatorial and communist regimes. One culture and way of life or one religion has always been ‘official’, and therefore dominant whilst others have been suppressed, even outlawed, and have witnessed their members being expelled or prosecuted. In non-liberal societies, historically and even in this day and age, non-dominant cultural groups could have only existed under the conditions of oppression and marginalisation.
In the following three chapters, I will develop the argument by starting with liberal values as the pillars of liberal society. Thanks to liberal values such as freedom and equality, and especially autonomy, different cultural groups can be fully open to all individuals who will voluntarily decide which community or association they will join and follow their teachings or way of life.
Explaining the development of liberal values through political philosophy in the first chapter, I will discuss the liberal theories of John Locke (often credited as the founder of liberalism), Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Friedrich Hayek.
In the second chapter, I will introduce communitarian views and their criticisms of some liberal values. As communitarians insist on the community’s value over the individuals, their criticisms are directed mainly towards the individual autonomy. I will then discuss the issue of special rights demanded for different comprehensive groups (Iris Marion Young and Bhikhu Parekh), the criticism of Rawls’ theory of person (Michael Sandel), the defence of a nation (Roger Scruton), nationalism (David Miller) and patriotism (Alasdair MacIntyre) as opposites of the fundamentals of liberal society.
In the third chapter I will present the defence of liberalism and prove that multiculturalism can only fully prosper in a liberal society. As Rawls suggested in his early work, what we aim for ourselves should be always allowed to everyone else. This means that that political freedom, free choice of religion and other comprehensive doctrines should be allowed to all as essential attributes of free and equal individuals. What is often happening is that cultural groups demand special rights in order to increase their powers over their members, therefore avoiding the liberal laws being implemented over the group regarding specific issues. I will also question the nature and validity of special rights and their purpose and necessity in a liberal society. I will support my thesis with John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Brian Barry and Amy Guttmann’s views.
The world as a community of societies is definitely going in the direction foreseen by liberal philosophers rather than their critics. Purely ethnic societies don’t exist anymore in the developed world. Multiculturalism was a simply unavoidable consequence of the industrial revolution, expansion of the world trade and global economics. Free transport of goods, people and ideas is not wishful thinking anymore, but rather the reality of a modern world. Progress has no national feelings, patriotic bondage or religious dominance. The world in which humanity expresses its potentials has changed the landscape of pragmatic and romantic political theorists. Empires have collapsed, dictators have failed, and democracy has created new political conditions in which people as individuals have found their place and justified the current national and ever-increasing global politics. Politics that are not justified by the majority of citizens and cultural groups will undoubtedly fail. In order to be justified they have to be liberal. They have to guarantee freedom and equality to all, regardless of their religious, philosophical, moral or other doctrines.
U ovom eseju ću se pozabaviti pesimizmom Artura Šopenhauera (Arthur Schopenhauer), koji kulminira u njegovom mišljenju da život nije vredan življenja, i da bi za nas bilo bolje da ga negiramo umesto da ga afirmišemo1. Ja ću pokušati da dokažem da Šopnhauerov pesimizam nije održiv, i da se ruši na sopstvenim tvrdnjama. U prvom delu ću analizirati važnost patnje kao centralne tačke Šopnhauerovog pesimizma. Za Šopnhauera, suština sveta, koju on naziva voljom, predstavlja neprekidno i slepo stremljenje koje se materijalizuje u organskom i neorganskom svetu2. Volja, koju on isto nazva i voljom za životom, nas neprestano pokreće iz jedne želje u drugu i ostavlja nas bez odmora u konstantnom stanju potrebe, što po njemu izaziva patnju. Ja ću negirati njegovu tvrdnju da je samo patnja pozitivne prirode, dok je sreća uvek negativne prirode. Po Šopenhaueru, retki momente sreće koju doživljavamo, sastoje se samo u odsustvu patnje, što sreću čini negativnom. Ja ću se takođe pozabaviti i njegovom tvrdnjom da je apsolutna sreća nemoguća i krtikovaću tu ideju kao veoma slab argument odbrane pesimizma.
U drugom delu ću se fokusirati na Šopenhauerovu upotrebu pojmova bola i patnje. Kako se čini da ih on koristi koekstenzivno, ja ću dokazati da se bol i patnja ne mogu upotrebljavati koekstenzivno.
U trećem delu ću razmotriti Šopenhauerovu tvrdnju da svet ima moralno značenje. Zbog neizbežne patnje, po Šopenhaueru, naš jedini moralni izbor je da negiramo patnju time što ćemo negirati želje, a time i sam život. To za njega predstavlja skriveno moralno značenje sveta i života, do koga se jedino može stići putem filozofije.
U čevrtom delu ću se osvrnuti na važnost estetskog doživljaja, koji po Šopenhaueru predstavlja dokaz da se možemo osloboditi volje (a time i patnje) i da se kratki periodi u kojima smo oslobođeni volje mogu postići. Kao za Emanel Kanta (Immanuel Kant), i za Šopenhauera estetski dozivljaj mora biti nezainteresovan, nenameran i nikada promišljen. Pošto se naše promišljene aktivnosti baziraju na znanju pokrenutom principom praktičnog razuma (za sve mora postojati razlog) koji funkcioniše na bazi naših urođenih kategorija vremena, prostora i uzročnosti, a koje se odnose samo na fenomenalni svet, ideje koje su suština esteskog iskustva ne mogu se razumeti takvim znanjem. Takve ideje se mogu doseći samo objektivnim znanjem genija, koji u procesu umetničkog stvaranja, napušta svoju individualnost i kompletno se distancira od fenomenalnog sveta, i na taj način stiže do ideje objekta na koji se fokusira zahvaljujući svojoj genijalnosti a ne razumu.
U zadnjem odeljku elaboriraću saosećanje (compassion), koje nam, po Šopenhaueru, može pomoći da prevaziđemo patnju. Odričući se sebičnosti preko saosećanja, možemo se identifikovati sa patnjom drugih i razumeti da smo na taj način jednaki sa njima. To će nam, kako uči Šopenhauer, pomoći da shvatimo da je naša individualnost glavni uzrok patnje, i podstreknuti nas da prevaziđemo patnju kroz saosećanje. Moja kritika će se sastojati u tome da saosećanje ne moze biti odvojeno od ličnog interesa, i kao takvo još uvek zahteva snažno prisustvo volje. Takođe ću dokazati da je asketizam, kao ultimativni pokušaj prevazilaženja patnje, suprotan saosećanju.
NIETZSCHE'S RESPONSE TO SCHOPENHAUER
'One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil.' (Nietzsche, Z, I, 22)
Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy had a significant impact on Nietzsche's philosophical development. On a few occasions, Nietzsche has openly acknowledged Schopenhauer's influence, and as he states: 'And so today I shall remember one of the teachers and taskmasters of whom I can boast, Arthur Schopenhauer' (UM, III, 1).2 Also, Nietzsche says: '… my first and only teacher, the great Arthur Schopenhauer' (HH, Preface, 1)
In section 1, I will look at the importance of suffering as the central point in Schopenhauer’s pessimism. For Schopenhauer, the essence of the world, which he calls will, is a never-ending, blind and purposeless striving that objectifies itself in the organic and inorganic world. Will, which can also be called the will to live, is constantly driving us from one desire to another, leaving us almost without rest in the constant state of need, hence suffering. I will argue against his position that only suffering is of a positive nature, while happiness can only be negative. According to Schopenhauer, the rare moments of happiness we experience consist only in the absence of suffering. I will also look into his view that absolute happiness is impossible to achieve and question this statement as a weak argument for pessimism.
Section 2 will focus on Schopenhauer’s use of the concepts of pain and suffering. As it seems that he uses them as co-extensive terms, I will explain why they are not co-extensive.
In section 3, I will discuss Schopenhauer’s view that the world has a moral meaning. Because of inevitable suffering, according to Schopenhauer, our only moral solution to the problem of suffering will be to deny suffering, consequently, life itself. And this is, for him, the hidden moral meaning of the world that only philosophy can uncover.
In section 4, I will look at the importance of aesthetic experience, which for Schopenhauer, represents the proof that the will can be abandoned and that the short periods of liberation from the will/suffering can be reached. As for Kant, for Schopenhauer, the aesthetic experience must be purposeless and unintentional and never contemplated or purposeful. Since our contemplated activities belong to the knowledge driven by the principle of practical reason that operates on the basis of our innate categories of time, space and causality and is related only to the phenomenal world, ideas that are the essence of artistic experience cannot be grasped by such knowledge. They can only be contemplated by objective knowledge by genius, who, in the process of artistic creation, abandons his individuality and disconnects from the phenomenal world completely, grasping the idea of a perceived object purely by its rare gift and not by reason.
In the final section, I will look at compassion, which can help us overcome suffering, according to Schopenhauer. By abandoning our selfishness through compassion, we can identify with the suffering of others and understand that we are the same as others. That will help us comprehend that our individuality is the main cause of suffering and trigger our attempt to overcome suffering through compassion. I will argue that compassion cannot be devoid of self-interest and, as such, still requires a strong presence of the will. I will also show why asceticism is, as the ultimate attempt to completely redeem suffering, antipodal to compassion.
As many states have paraded multiculturalism as their first headline in establishing the trust of the electorate by announcing that the equality of different races, religions and cultures is their priority, I will argue that not enough has been done to bring them together in the homogenous and cohesive community. I will argue that calling those different racial, religious and cultural groups minorities is a wrong approach. The concept minority automatically suggests that there is a majority, as those two opposites co-substantiate one another. Although there can be a ‘healthy balance’ or unity between majority and minority (in reality or thought), when political emphasis is one the majority, the unity can be easily broken (it even further empowers the meaning of concept minority by evoking the fact that minority is always outnumbered and outvoted). The term minority can arouse feelings of weakness, marginalisation and humiliation. Instead I will call these different groups comprehensive groups. I will argue that achieving only co-existence of different comprehensive groups in the society is not enough to bring them under the ambarella of unity and cohesion. Instead I will argue that integration of different comprehensive groups represents more important task for the societal cohesion. Co-existence does not mean integration or unity; it is often culpable for misunderstanding, blame and animosity among comprehensive groups. And for that reason co-existence has to be protected but very stringent laws which keep comprehensive groups away from each other, not closer. It is the fear from the law that makes co-existence sustainable, not understanding and friendship of different groups that is the only way that can lead to complete integration. By integration I discern mutual understanding of different comprehensive groups that will help them to become closer to each other under the cover of liberal democratic society which guaranties their freedom and prosperity. Integration does not mean abandoning the traditions and cultural identity of comprehensive groups, but in accepting differences of others enriching their own and bonding together into the society that belongs to all equally.
Regarding the second important point in Dr. King’s quote, liberal values as the content of one’s character, more is to be said.
In this dissertation I will argue that multiculturalism is not only sustainable in a liberal society but that a society based on liberal values is the only place where multiculturalism can fully prosper, meaning that all cultural groups are free and equal and have the same rights and duties, without one dominating another. The fundamental values, on which liberal societies are built, such as individual freedom, equality and autonomy, have allowed equal treatment for all individuals as well as comprehensive groups whose doctrines include the full system of values according to which people should live their lives. Comprehensive groups may be religious, moral or philosophical and can also have opposing views on a good life. Some communitarian political philosophers, as well as some liberals, argue that liberal society cannot accommodate equal treatment for all individuals and comprehensive groups and that in fact, liberal society restricts their freedom. This is why some have insisted on different factors that matter more to social unity such as nationalism, patriotism, special rights for some groups etc. But, to offer freedom and equal rights to all individuals, liberal society cannot allow unrestricted, absolute freedom to all comprehensive groups, since that will mean compromising the same values on which it is built. No other political type of society has ever offered as much equality and prosperity to all different cultural groups within it, as liberal society does. Throughout history, there have been examples of multicultural states where it was a regular practice that a single ‘official’ or preferred culture or religion dominated all the others. It was a common practice of different empires, monarchies, republics, dictatorial and communist regimes. One culture and way of life or one religion has always been ‘official’, and therefore dominant whilst others have been suppressed, even outlawed, and have witnessed their members being expelled or prosecuted. In non-liberal societies, historically and even in this day and age, non-dominant cultural groups could have only existed under the conditions of oppression and marginalisation.
In the following three chapters, I will develop the argument by starting with liberal values as the pillars of liberal society. Thanks to liberal values such as freedom and equality, and especially autonomy, different cultural groups can be fully open to all individuals who will voluntarily decide which community or association they will join and follow their teachings or way of life.
Explaining the development of liberal values through political philosophy in the first chapter, I will discuss the liberal theories of John Locke (often credited as the founder of liberalism), Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Friedrich Hayek.
In the second chapter, I will introduce communitarian views and their criticisms of some liberal values. As communitarians insist on the community’s value over the individuals, their criticisms are directed mainly towards the individual autonomy. I will then discuss the issue of special rights demanded for different comprehensive groups (Iris Marion Young and Bhikhu Parekh), the criticism of Rawls’ theory of person (Michael Sandel), the defence of a nation (Roger Scruton), nationalism (David Miller) and patriotism (Alasdair MacIntyre) as opposites of the fundamentals of liberal society.
In the third chapter I will present the defence of liberalism and prove that multiculturalism can only fully prosper in a liberal society. As Rawls suggested in his early work, what we aim for ourselves should be always allowed to everyone else. This means that that political freedom, free choice of religion and other comprehensive doctrines should be allowed to all as essential attributes of free and equal individuals. What is often happening is that cultural groups demand special rights in order to increase their powers over their members, therefore avoiding the liberal laws being implemented over the group regarding specific issues. I will also question the nature and validity of special rights and their purpose and necessity in a liberal society. I will support my thesis with John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Brian Barry and Amy Guttmann’s views.
The world as a community of societies is definitely going in the direction foreseen by liberal philosophers rather than their critics. Purely ethnic societies don’t exist anymore in the developed world. Multiculturalism was a simply unavoidable consequence of the industrial revolution, expansion of the world trade and global economics. Free transport of goods, people and ideas is not wishful thinking anymore, but rather the reality of a modern world. Progress has no national feelings, patriotic bondage or religious dominance. The world in which humanity expresses its potentials has changed the landscape of pragmatic and romantic political theorists. Empires have collapsed, dictators have failed, and democracy has created new political conditions in which people as individuals have found their place and justified the current national and ever-increasing global politics. Politics that are not justified by the majority of citizens and cultural groups will undoubtedly fail. In order to be justified they have to be liberal. They have to guarantee freedom and equality to all, regardless of their religious, philosophical, moral or other doctrines.