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John Ostrowick

University of Cape Town, Philosophy, Alumnus

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HdipEd, PhD

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Main past areas of philosophical research: Libet experiment and replications; philosophy of mind; Dennett; Free-will; Existence of God; Jesus Myth hypothesis.

Current areas of work: fake news, conspiracy theories, psychology of self-efficacy, futurism.

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Papers by John Ostrowick

Answering Libet's Critics

Unpublished presentation at a conference, 2014

Libet (1985) argued that free-will is threatened by his discovery that the RP (readiness potentia... more Libet (1985) argued that free-will is threatened by his discovery that the RP (readiness potential) measured on an EEG, ramps up as much as 0.8 seconds before any action occurs, and around 0.35 seconds before any conscious mental awareness of choice occurs. Libet claimed that this shows that the brain seems to unconsciously initiate action. Hence, since we typically take it that free choice is conscious, Libet’s work seems to pose a threat to free- will. Näätänen (1985: 549), Keller and Heckhausen (1990, in Libet, 1992: 214) and Pockett et al. (2007: 250-252) have replicated this study. Moreover, recent work by Soon et al. (2008) and Bode et al. (2011), using fMRI, also confirm Libet’s results, finding even longer lead times before action — up to several seconds (Bode et al., 2011: 1, Soon et al., 2008: 4-6). Now, many philosophers have objected to this work. In this paper, I will try to show that these objections do not succeed, and that this evidence does seem to show that we lack free-will. The paper gives a brief response to the question of long-term decisions.

Moral risks and government policy in South Africa in the context of 4IR

South African Journal of Philosophy, 2021

South Africa, amongst other nations in Africa, most notably Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda, is aiming ... more South Africa, amongst other nations in Africa, most notably Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda, is aiming to take a lead in implementation of policy intended to address the challenges represented by the Fourth Industrial Revolution. We take the South African Constitution’s Bill of Rights as our guide on the moral obligations of the government, from the logic of both consequentialist and deontological moral frameworks. With this in mind, we consider whether the South African government’s initiatives involve moral risks, in virtue of neglecting some threats posed by new technologies. In particular, we identify biological technologies — specifically Transhumanist technologies — as posing special risks, and argue that we need to balance the need for dignity, equality and privacy, which the technologies seem to threaten, against the promise of flourishing that the technologies seem to offer.

Network Booting versus hard disks: Costs and Implications

Proceedings of Conference for IT in Tertiary Education, 2004

In the African context, it does not necessarily make sense to spend large amounts of money on pro... more In the African context, it does not necessarily make sense to spend large amounts of money on proprietary computing solutions when low cost solutions exist. This paper explores the experiences we have had in our University implementing both network-booting and hard disk- booting Linux systems. Most Linux systems boot from hard disk. Our system, one of the few in the world, boots mainly from ethernet, completely without hard disks. We are not aware of any such system of this scale; we have approximately 200 computers using this system. We discuss cost implications, maintenance issues, usability issues, and performance issues. We have found that in terms of both hardware and software costs, this is the cheapest possible solution. In terms of maintenance, the initial investment is high, but once the system is established, it is extremely quick to add another client computer. In terms of usability, the variety of Open Source software now available renders the system highly usable for both our specialised needs as well as day-to-day computing. The primary difficulty we experienced was around performance. We found that performance statistics varied greatly and were highly susceptible to the number of users on the system, the number of servers, how the server load was distributed, the software networking configuration, and the protocols used. In particular, we found that dividing the server load up, carefully, had the single biggest impact on the system performance. Another factor which severely impacted the performance was overall network load as determined by the protocols and network software configuration. A well-configured client computer in a lightly-loaded server environment could boot in about 30 seconds. A poorly-configured client in a busy environment could take half an hour. Hard disk boot time performance is typically of the order of slightly under one minute. Thus, in optimal circumstances, network booting is faster than hard disk, whereas in sub-optimal circumstances the performance is worse. We believe that the maintenance overhead and cost savings make the solution viable, but, for smaller sites, we recommend against our solution and advocate a hard disk based solution.

A Scientific Model of Pantheism

South African Journal of Philosophy

Given the scientific possibility of Boltzmann Brains, and the theory from philosophy of mind know... more Given the scientific possibility of Boltzmann Brains, and the theory from philosophy of mind known as Functionalism, it is quite possible to construct a model of pantheism which is not as implausible as restricted theism or traditional models of pantheism. The aim of this article is to explain how this might work, but also to say why, in the end, it will not do the same job as restricted theism, even if it turned out to be true. The article does not aim to defend its premises, such as pantheism or functionalism, in more than a cursory way; the conclusions of the article are tentative and conditional: if functionalism is true, then physicalist pantheism may be true.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02580136.2016.1209922

What is Chaos and How is it Relevant for Philosophy of Mind?

This paper argues, in agreement with Neuringer, Beggs and others, that if we wish to scientifical... more This paper argues, in agreement with Neuringer, Beggs and others, that if we wish to scientifically characterise human choice we have to work with a probabilistic or chaos- derived model. This has a number of implications for philosophy of mind. Firstly, it is in theory possible to describe human behaviour with some form of law-like equation; it’s just a matter of figuring out what equation best captures the states of our central nervous system. Secondly, it means that our choices are not random but are chaotic: deterministic, but just hard to predict due to internal complexity. According to the current research, our actions are most likely caused by ‘precipitated avalanches’ of neural activity, which are difficult to predict due to chaos.

Free ePrints here. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02580136.2015.1064587

Does Evolution Really Threaten Religion?

Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, Issue 146 July 2013 pages 79-103, Jul 2013

Many proponents of the Abrahamic religions assume that the Theory of Evolution is ipso facto oppo... more Many proponents of the Abrahamic religions assume that the Theory of Evolution is ipso facto opposed to religion, and therefore, since religion derives from scripture, which is the divinely inspired word of an infallible God, the Theory of Evolution must be false. This paper argues that not only is this view incorrect, but that religion can be helped by accepting the Theory of Evolution. The paper will present a specific variety of the Problem of Evil known as Rowe’s ‘E2’, and try to show why existing responses to it fail. The paper argues, however, that Rowe’s E2 can be answered by the Theory of Evolution.

Can Bayes’Theorem, given the evidence of this universe, be used to support theism?

Given ht as the hypothesis of theism, hm as the hypothesis of materialism, and e as the evidence ... more Given ht as the hypothesis of theism, hm as the hypothesis of materialism, and e as the evidence of a complex life-bearing universe, Swinburne presents these arguments in his "The Existence of God" (2004): (1) That this ordered universe is a priori improbable (2004, p49, p150, 1991, p304 et seq.), given the stringent requirements for life (cf. Leslie, 2000, p12), and the Second Law of Thermodynamics (Giancoli, p396); (2) That this universe’s structure is evidence for theism, and that theism therefore explains this universe. Swinburne argues that that because P(e| ht) > P(e| hm), it follows that P(ht |e) > P(hm |e). (3) A theistic explanation for the universe is more probable because it is simpler. Therefore it is more likely that God exists than not. As I have addressed (3) in a prior paper, this paper will address the Bayesian argument that Swinburne offers in (2) — i.e. that P(e| ht) > P(e). I draw a number of conclusions, most pertinently, that Hacking's Total Probability Rule (TPR), for cases of mutually exclusive hypotheses [ht v hm] and evidence e entails that any h can only be confirmed if P(e|~h) is low. I also conclude that if we follow TPR for Swinburne's argument, we achieve the result that theism is at best slightly improbable, or equiprobable with materialism.

Is Theism a Simple, and hence Probable, Explanation for the Universe?

Richard Swinburne, in his The Existence of God (2004), presents a cosmological argument in defenc... more Richard Swinburne, in his The Existence of God (2004), presents a cosmological argument in defence of theism (Swinburne, 1991, p119, p135). God, Swinburne argues, is more likely to bring about an ordered universe than other states (ibid., p144, p299). To defend this view, Swinburne presents the following arguments: (1) That this ordered universe is a priori improbable (2004, p49, p150, 1991, p304 et seq.), given the stringent requirements for life (cf. also Leslie, 2000, p12), and the Second Law of Thermodynamics (Giancoli, p396); (2) That it seems as if this ordered universe can be explained by theism; (3) A theistic explanation for the universe is more probable because it is a simple explanation. To this end, Swinburne makes use of Bayes’ Theorem. Symbolically, this claim can be represented as (e) for the evidence of the existence of a complex universe, and (h) for a hypothesis. Swinburne’s argument is that theism has a higher prior probability, P(h(theism)) > P(h(materialism)), since theism is simpler than materialism. He concludes that P(e|h(theism)) > P(e|h(materialism)). In this paper I will address only this argument (3) above, and defend the view that it is false: theism is not simpler than materialism, nor it is more probably true. I conclude that theism is less probable than materialism, expressed by P(h(theism)) < P(h(materialism)) : 2/N(2n+1) < 1/n, where N is the number of possible universes and n the number of entities in existence.

The Timing Experiments of Libet and Grey Walter

The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett... more The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett) provide evidence that our actions are caused by non-conscious brain events beyond our conscious awareness. Normally, we assume that our conscious choices lead us to do things. If these researchers have interpreted their evidence correctly, it may be that we lack free-will, for we could not control a non-conscious brain state. Libet however provides evidence that agents can “change their minds” just before performing some action. He felt that this was the elbow-room for free-will. But it may be inconsistent for him to suggest this, since his evidence indicates that there is no room for conscious choice. In this paper we discuss these results and various objections to the interpretation of the work.

Whether We Have Free-Will and Whether It Matters

There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some diff... more There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about why people still want free-will.

Christian National Education

This document is posted here for historical reasons to give greater access to people searching fo... more This document is posted here for historical reasons to give greater access to people searching for this topic. It is the canonical document called Die Beleid (the policy), which defined the Christian National Education policy of the apartheid state. In it we see how racism and Christianity were used to justify inferior education for colonised citizens of South Africa.

Answering Libet's Critics

Unpublished presentation at a conference, 2014

Libet (1985) argued that free-will is threatened by his discovery that the RP (readiness potentia... more Libet (1985) argued that free-will is threatened by his discovery that the RP (readiness potential) measured on an EEG, ramps up as much as 0.8 seconds before any action occurs, and around 0.35 seconds before any conscious mental awareness of choice occurs. Libet claimed that this shows that the brain seems to unconsciously initiate action. Hence, since we typically take it that free choice is conscious, Libet’s work seems to pose a threat to free- will. Näätänen (1985: 549), Keller and Heckhausen (1990, in Libet, 1992: 214) and Pockett et al. (2007: 250-252) have replicated this study. Moreover, recent work by Soon et al. (2008) and Bode et al. (2011), using fMRI, also confirm Libet’s results, finding even longer lead times before action — up to several seconds (Bode et al., 2011: 1, Soon et al., 2008: 4-6). Now, many philosophers have objected to this work. In this paper, I will try to show that these objections do not succeed, and that this evidence does seem to show that we lack free-will. The paper gives a brief response to the question of long-term decisions.

Moral risks and government policy in South Africa in the context of 4IR

South African Journal of Philosophy, 2021

South Africa, amongst other nations in Africa, most notably Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda, is aiming ... more South Africa, amongst other nations in Africa, most notably Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda, is aiming to take a lead in implementation of policy intended to address the challenges represented by the Fourth Industrial Revolution. We take the South African Constitution’s Bill of Rights as our guide on the moral obligations of the government, from the logic of both consequentialist and deontological moral frameworks. With this in mind, we consider whether the South African government’s initiatives involve moral risks, in virtue of neglecting some threats posed by new technologies. In particular, we identify biological technologies — specifically Transhumanist technologies — as posing special risks, and argue that we need to balance the need for dignity, equality and privacy, which the technologies seem to threaten, against the promise of flourishing that the technologies seem to offer.

Network Booting versus hard disks: Costs and Implications

Proceedings of Conference for IT in Tertiary Education, 2004

In the African context, it does not necessarily make sense to spend large amounts of money on pro... more In the African context, it does not necessarily make sense to spend large amounts of money on proprietary computing solutions when low cost solutions exist. This paper explores the experiences we have had in our University implementing both network-booting and hard disk- booting Linux systems. Most Linux systems boot from hard disk. Our system, one of the few in the world, boots mainly from ethernet, completely without hard disks. We are not aware of any such system of this scale; we have approximately 200 computers using this system. We discuss cost implications, maintenance issues, usability issues, and performance issues. We have found that in terms of both hardware and software costs, this is the cheapest possible solution. In terms of maintenance, the initial investment is high, but once the system is established, it is extremely quick to add another client computer. In terms of usability, the variety of Open Source software now available renders the system highly usable for both our specialised needs as well as day-to-day computing. The primary difficulty we experienced was around performance. We found that performance statistics varied greatly and were highly susceptible to the number of users on the system, the number of servers, how the server load was distributed, the software networking configuration, and the protocols used. In particular, we found that dividing the server load up, carefully, had the single biggest impact on the system performance. Another factor which severely impacted the performance was overall network load as determined by the protocols and network software configuration. A well-configured client computer in a lightly-loaded server environment could boot in about 30 seconds. A poorly-configured client in a busy environment could take half an hour. Hard disk boot time performance is typically of the order of slightly under one minute. Thus, in optimal circumstances, network booting is faster than hard disk, whereas in sub-optimal circumstances the performance is worse. We believe that the maintenance overhead and cost savings make the solution viable, but, for smaller sites, we recommend against our solution and advocate a hard disk based solution.

A Scientific Model of Pantheism

South African Journal of Philosophy

Given the scientific possibility of Boltzmann Brains, and the theory from philosophy of mind know... more Given the scientific possibility of Boltzmann Brains, and the theory from philosophy of mind known as Functionalism, it is quite possible to construct a model of pantheism which is not as implausible as restricted theism or traditional models of pantheism. The aim of this article is to explain how this might work, but also to say why, in the end, it will not do the same job as restricted theism, even if it turned out to be true. The article does not aim to defend its premises, such as pantheism or functionalism, in more than a cursory way; the conclusions of the article are tentative and conditional: if functionalism is true, then physicalist pantheism may be true.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02580136.2016.1209922

What is Chaos and How is it Relevant for Philosophy of Mind?

This paper argues, in agreement with Neuringer, Beggs and others, that if we wish to scientifical... more This paper argues, in agreement with Neuringer, Beggs and others, that if we wish to scientifically characterise human choice we have to work with a probabilistic or chaos- derived model. This has a number of implications for philosophy of mind. Firstly, it is in theory possible to describe human behaviour with some form of law-like equation; it’s just a matter of figuring out what equation best captures the states of our central nervous system. Secondly, it means that our choices are not random but are chaotic: deterministic, but just hard to predict due to internal complexity. According to the current research, our actions are most likely caused by ‘precipitated avalanches’ of neural activity, which are difficult to predict due to chaos.

Free ePrints here. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02580136.2015.1064587

Does Evolution Really Threaten Religion?

Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, Issue 146 July 2013 pages 79-103, Jul 2013

Many proponents of the Abrahamic religions assume that the Theory of Evolution is ipso facto oppo... more Many proponents of the Abrahamic religions assume that the Theory of Evolution is ipso facto opposed to religion, and therefore, since religion derives from scripture, which is the divinely inspired word of an infallible God, the Theory of Evolution must be false. This paper argues that not only is this view incorrect, but that religion can be helped by accepting the Theory of Evolution. The paper will present a specific variety of the Problem of Evil known as Rowe’s ‘E2’, and try to show why existing responses to it fail. The paper argues, however, that Rowe’s E2 can be answered by the Theory of Evolution.

Can Bayes’Theorem, given the evidence of this universe, be used to support theism?

Given ht as the hypothesis of theism, hm as the hypothesis of materialism, and e as the evidence ... more Given ht as the hypothesis of theism, hm as the hypothesis of materialism, and e as the evidence of a complex life-bearing universe, Swinburne presents these arguments in his "The Existence of God" (2004): (1) That this ordered universe is a priori improbable (2004, p49, p150, 1991, p304 et seq.), given the stringent requirements for life (cf. Leslie, 2000, p12), and the Second Law of Thermodynamics (Giancoli, p396); (2) That this universe’s structure is evidence for theism, and that theism therefore explains this universe. Swinburne argues that that because P(e| ht) > P(e| hm), it follows that P(ht |e) > P(hm |e). (3) A theistic explanation for the universe is more probable because it is simpler. Therefore it is more likely that God exists than not. As I have addressed (3) in a prior paper, this paper will address the Bayesian argument that Swinburne offers in (2) — i.e. that P(e| ht) > P(e). I draw a number of conclusions, most pertinently, that Hacking's Total Probability Rule (TPR), for cases of mutually exclusive hypotheses [ht v hm] and evidence e entails that any h can only be confirmed if P(e|~h) is low. I also conclude that if we follow TPR for Swinburne's argument, we achieve the result that theism is at best slightly improbable, or equiprobable with materialism.

Is Theism a Simple, and hence Probable, Explanation for the Universe?

Richard Swinburne, in his The Existence of God (2004), presents a cosmological argument in defenc... more Richard Swinburne, in his The Existence of God (2004), presents a cosmological argument in defence of theism (Swinburne, 1991, p119, p135). God, Swinburne argues, is more likely to bring about an ordered universe than other states (ibid., p144, p299). To defend this view, Swinburne presents the following arguments: (1) That this ordered universe is a priori improbable (2004, p49, p150, 1991, p304 et seq.), given the stringent requirements for life (cf. also Leslie, 2000, p12), and the Second Law of Thermodynamics (Giancoli, p396); (2) That it seems as if this ordered universe can be explained by theism; (3) A theistic explanation for the universe is more probable because it is a simple explanation. To this end, Swinburne makes use of Bayes’ Theorem. Symbolically, this claim can be represented as (e) for the evidence of the existence of a complex universe, and (h) for a hypothesis. Swinburne’s argument is that theism has a higher prior probability, P(h(theism)) > P(h(materialism)), since theism is simpler than materialism. He concludes that P(e|h(theism)) > P(e|h(materialism)). In this paper I will address only this argument (3) above, and defend the view that it is false: theism is not simpler than materialism, nor it is more probably true. I conclude that theism is less probable than materialism, expressed by P(h(theism)) < P(h(materialism)) : 2/N(2n+1) < 1/n, where N is the number of possible universes and n the number of entities in existence.

The Timing Experiments of Libet and Grey Walter

The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett... more The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett) provide evidence that our actions are caused by non-conscious brain events beyond our conscious awareness. Normally, we assume that our conscious choices lead us to do things. If these researchers have interpreted their evidence correctly, it may be that we lack free-will, for we could not control a non-conscious brain state. Libet however provides evidence that agents can “change their minds” just before performing some action. He felt that this was the elbow-room for free-will. But it may be inconsistent for him to suggest this, since his evidence indicates that there is no room for conscious choice. In this paper we discuss these results and various objections to the interpretation of the work.

Whether We Have Free-Will and Whether It Matters

There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some diff... more There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about why people still want free-will.

Christian National Education

This document is posted here for historical reasons to give greater access to people searching fo... more This document is posted here for historical reasons to give greater access to people searching for this topic. It is the canonical document called Die Beleid (the policy), which defined the Christian National Education policy of the apartheid state. In it we see how racism and Christianity were used to justify inferior education for colonised citizens of South Africa.