Economics

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching up with richer ones. We analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth: public investment can be distorted in favor of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose a dynamic model where households vote for the composition of public spending, subject to an incentive constraint reflecting individuals’ choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. In equilibrium, the structure of public investment is determined by the predatory technology and the distribution of political power. Among different regimes, the model shows a possible scenario of distortion without corruption in which there is no effective corruption but the possibility of corruption still distorts the allocation of public investment. We test the implications of the model on a set of countries using a two-stage least squares estimation. We find that developing countries ...

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and i...

Developing countries increasingly use biometric identification technology in hopes of improving the reliability of administrative information and delivering social services more efficiently. This paper exploits the random placement of biometric tracking devices in tuberculosis treatment centers in urban slums across four Indian states to measure their effects both on disease control and on the quality of health records. The devices record health worker attendance and patient adherence to treatment, and they automatically generate prompts to follow up with patients who miss doses. Combining data from patient and health worker surveys, independent field visits, and government registers, we first find that patients enrolled at biometric-equipped centers are 25 percent less likely to interrupt treatment-an improvement driven by increased attendance and efforts by health workers and greater treatment adherence by patients. Second, biometric tracking decreases data forgery: it reduces overreporting of patient numbers in both NGO data and government registers and underreporting of treatment interruptions. Third, the impact of biometric tracking is sustained over time and it decreases neither health worker satisfaction nor patient satisfaction. Overall, our results suggest biometric tracking technology is both an effective and sustainable way to improve the state's capacity to deliver healthcare in challenging areas.

Utilizing a randomized experiment in rural Rajasthan, India, we evaluate the effectiveness of an education program aimed to increase girls' retention, enrollment and learning. While enrollment and community sensitization were specifically aimed at promoting girls education, the learning component of the program involved and targeted boys and girls equally. Approximately 230 primary schools were randomly assigned to the program or to a control and we evaluate the effect after two years of program implementation. We find moderate gains in retention and enrollment after one year of the program, primarily among girls who are most likely to be disadvantaged. After the completion of the second year of the program, we find large gains in learning in Hindi, English, and Math, equivalent to approximately one additional year of schooling with no significant difference in learning across gender. As this program scales up across the state of Rajasthan, we examine the effectiveness of the Educate Girls programs. In particular, through a randomized experiment in which approximately 100 primary schools were randomly chosen as program schools, we compare retention, enrollment, and test scores among boys and girls with approximately 100 control schools. We examine which types of students benefit from the program. We address several main research questions: 1) Given the focus of Educate Girls as a whole, do boys also benefit from the general programmatic activities and from the CLT program-which is not gender specific? 2) If the enrollment drive and emphasis on retention are effective in attracting vulnerable (female) students-potentially increasing class size with lower ability students, what is the net impact of the CLT program on overall test scores? Using rich student-level data over two years and the randomized design, we are able to address these questions without the usual causal concerns that come from analysis with cross-sectional data. In accordance with the program design, we find a gender gap reduction in enrollment and retention, while learning improvements are similar for boys and girls. II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA A. Research Design As part of the rollout of the Educate Girls program into a new district in 2011, 100 villages were selected to be included in the impact evaluation-this included villages located in four administrative blocks of the district (Ahore, Jalore, Jaswantpura and Sayla). Prior to program implementation, rural villages with at least one government primary school were randomly selected; the final participating sample consists of a total of leaving 98 villages which were evenly and randomly divided between treatment and control villages. Randomization was stratified by school size. Because many villages have more than one primary school, our total sample consists of 230 primary schools, of which 117 are assigned to treatment and 113 are assigned to control (Table 1, Panel A). The program was implemented during the 2011/2012 academic year (Running from July 2011 until April 2012) focusing the CLT activities on students in grades three, four, and five. The program continued the next academic year (2012/2013), also focusing on those who were in grades three, four, and five during that academic year. We present results from data available from the second year of the program-2012/2013. B. Data Data for this study were collected from a variety of sources. First, enrollment registers of pupils in grades three, four, and five from each school were collected at the beginning of the 2011/2012 academic school year. Data in the registers include limited information about each student's gender, age, caste and tribe.

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

Je tiens tout d'abord à remercier Mathilde Maurel pour la confiance qu'elle m'a accordée tout au long de ces recherches, pour sa relecture attentive, ses conseils et son soutien. David de la Croix, qui a contribué à un chapitre de cette thèse, a suivi la plupart de mes travaux, stimulé ma réflexion et a toujours été très encourageant. Je tiens à l'en remercier particulièrement. Je remercie également l'Université Catholique de Louvain où j'ai pu avancer mes recherches pendant un mois. Je suis très reconnaissante envers les participants de l'enquête sur les entreprises du Maghreb sans qui ce projet n'aurait pu être mené à bien. Mes discussions, en particulier avec Fahmi et Boris, ont été très enrichissantes pour ma recherche sur le sujet. Je remercie Nicolas Ponty et François Zoundi qui ont encadré mes travaux au Burkina Faso ainsi que les institutions qui m'ont accueillie durant plus de deux mois : le PNUD et le Ministère des Finances et du Budget. Les relectures attentives et encourageantes de Claire, Florian, François, José, Julie, Irène, Lucile, Marcel, Thomas et Tom m'ont été très précieux, je les en remercie sincèrement, ainsi que Catherine pour son aide sur une partie de la traduction. J'ai une pensée affectueuse pour mes proches, dont la confiance et le soutien ont m'ont toujours été d'un grand secours. L'émulation et la bonne humeur au sein de l'équipe du ROSES m'ont beaucoup aidée durant ces années.