In this paper, I am concerned with the question of whether love is, or can possibly be, moral. I ... more In this paper, I am concerned with the question of whether love is, or can possibly be, moral. I argue that, although love is, in some important respects, in conflict with morality, it can nevertheless be thought to comprise a fundamentally moral phenomenon. I begin, in Section I, by spelling out the conflict between love and morality. I suggest that this conflict primarily has to do with the fact that love makes us partial to the interests of those we love, whereas morality requires that we accord equal weight to everyone’s interests. In Section II, I survey attempts to resolve the conflict by way of rethinking either the partiality of love or the impartiality of morality. In Sections III and IV, I argue that, although inescapably partial, love can nevertheless be moral, if it is understood as essentially involving an altruistic concern for another person’s well-being. If love is altruistic, it is moral for two reasons: because it constitutes a remarkable overcoming of self-interest, and because it involves a dedication to caring about and promoting another’s well-being which is morally supererogatory. As I concede in Section IV, showing that love is altruistic does nothing to resolve the conflict between love and morality, since this leaves the partiality of love (and the impartiality of morality) intact. However, I suggest that, if love essentially involves, or is constituted by, a selfless concern for another being, it has undeniable moral value, even if it is also, due to its partiality, in conflict with morality.
In this paper, I examine the extent to which empathy, conceived of as other-oriented perspective-... more In this paper, I examine the extent to which empathy, conceived of as other-oriented perspective-taking, can facilitate intersubjective understanding. I start from the assumption that empathy is capable of providing understanding of other people’s mental states and affective experiences (Section I). I demonstrate that, in order to supply such understanding, empathy must be construed as the outcome of perspective-taking processes, and I distinguish between two such processes: self-oriented and other-oriented perspective-taking (Section II). Other-oriented perspective-taking is thought to be better at accounting for the differences between target and observer, and thus superior to self-oriented perspective-taking in facilitating intersubjective understanding. Hence commentators suggest that empathy should be conceived of in terms of other-oriented perspective-taking. In this paper, I challenge the suggestion that other-oriented perspective-taking can facilitate accurate intersubjective understanding. I argue that the differences between target and observer are much more difficult to account for than proponents of other-oriented perspective-taking suppose. First, ‘errors of omission’, social and psychological biases, and the implicit character of certain facts about the target, increase the likelihood of those differences escaping the target’s attention (Section III). Secondly, even if the observer is aware of all the relevant differences, she cannot always account for them in her simulation of the target’s state (Section IV). These observations indicate that other-oriented perspective-taking is hardly superior to self-oriented perspective-taking in providing intersubjective understanding. As a result, it may be necessary to revise our notion of empathy as a phenomenon which facilitates interpersonal understanding.
This paper aims to resolve the inconsistencies found in Aristotle’s account of the self-sufficien... more This paper aims to resolve the inconsistencies found in Aristotle’s account of the self-sufficiency of happiness and its dependency on other people. I present these inconsistencies in Section I, and then propose a solution. I suggest that the key to untangling the issue is Aristotle’s construal of happiness as a property that the agent has intrinsically. This entails that the agent’s happiness cannot be had in virtue of her relationship with others, and that others cannot constitute the sources of her happiness; but it does allow that others can play a more rudimentary role in one’s happiness, in setting the context for its exercise. I articulate this proposal in Section II, where I also illustrate how it can be used to accommodate Aristotle’s conflicting comments on the dependency of the agent’s happiness on others. In Section III, I demonstrate that my proposal can also reconcile Aristotle’s conflicting comments on the self-sufficiency of the agent’s happiness.
In this paper, I discuss Plato’s account of mimetic production in the Sophist, and use this accou... more In this paper, I discuss Plato’s account of mimetic production in the Sophist, and use this account to draw some potentially interesting insights about Plato’s conception of the role and nature of philosophy. In Sections I and II, I elucidate Plato’s account of artistic and sophistic mimetic production, with particular attention to the role that the artist’s and sophist’s audience plays in each. In Section III, I suggest that a specific implication of this account raises a problem for philosophy, where the latter is conceived as an enterprise which purports to put us in mind of the truth. However, I suggest that Plato’s understanding of the role of philosophy, and possibly his views on how it should be done, render his own philosophical project immune to this problem.
In Book I of the Treatise, Hume advances his famous account of the self as a mere series of perce... more In Book I of the Treatise, Hume advances his famous account of the self as a mere series of perceptions, and argues that our conception of the self as something which persists and remains identical through time is mistaken and confused. Nevertheless, as evidenced by his distinction between personal identity ‘as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves’, he does not fail to recognise the self’s involvement in our emotional lives, and the fact that it is something in which we take concern. It is now commonly thought that this additional dimension of personal identity is explored in Book II of the Treatise. My interest in this paper is Hume’s account of personal identity as it regards the passions, and, in particular, in his account of the self as an object of concern. My question is whether, given his rejection of persistence and identity through time, Hume is in a position to make sense of self-concern, understood as ‘a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures’. I begin, in Section I, by outlining Hume’s views on personal identity, and considering some of what he has to say about self-concern. In Section II, I flesh out the problem of self-concern in the Treatise, and present Hume’s implied solution to it. In Section III, I consider whether this solution succeeds, focusing on Hume’s ability to accommodate the distinctively first-personal character of self-concern. I argue that, although Hume faces deep problems in this regard, some of these may be solved by appeal to the phenomenon of sympathy.
In this paper, I discuss Bernard Williams’ account of respect in ‘The Idea of Equality’ (1973), a... more In this paper, I discuss Bernard Williams’ account of respect in ‘The Idea of Equality’ (1973), and assess the adequacy of this account for capturing the respect-worthiness of radically cognitively disabled persons. Respect can take a number of forms: we may respect someone for their opinion, for being excellent at their job, or because they are our boss. Here, I am concerned with the notion of ‘respect for persons’. Such a notion is invoked, for example, when one declares that even a terrible criminal ought not to be humiliated, because, despite everything she has done, she is still a person and hence ought to be respected. Pronouncements like these assume that there is something intrinsically valuable about being a person (Margalit 1999: 67-69), and that anyone who is a person is thereby owed a fundamental kind of respect regardless of who she is, what capacities she has, what she has done, etc. (Dillon 2007: 206). In Section I, I introduce Williams’ account of respect, focusing on Carl Cranor’s (1975, 1983) reading of Williams as putting forth a conception of respect as identification. I illustrate that this account of respect is implausible, and that it cannot vindicate the respect-worthiness of the radically cognitively disabled. In Section II, I propose a different reading of Williams, on which identification turns out to play a much less central role in respect than Cranor’s interpretation suggests. In Section III, I suggest that, on my proposed reading, Williams’ conception of respect is in an overall better position to accommodate the respect-worthiness of the radically cognitively disabled.
In this essay, I explore the way in which the Dadaists used photomontage to critique the politics... more In this essay, I explore the way in which the Dadaists used photomontage to critique the politics of the Weimar Republic, focusing on John Heartfield and George Grosz's photomontage on the cover of 'Everyone His Own Football', and Hannah Höch's 'Dada Panorama' and 'Heads of State'. In particular, I explore the way in which these artists used elements of femininity and techniques of feminization to accomplish a witty but sharp political critique.
The intellectual landscape of the previous century was engaged in a radical tendency, exhibited b... more The intellectual landscape of the previous century was engaged in a radical tendency, exhibited by several key figures such as Foucault, Derrida and Hall, to deconstruct traditional beliefs about personal and cultural identity. The philosophically and intuitively sanctioned view of identity as essential, eternal and immutable was relentlessly attacked by the discursive methods of these theorists and by the field of culture theory that employed them, and identity came to be seen as an ever-changing and historically contingent phenomenon. Meanwhile, these views were and continue to be fervently explored through the medium of film, mainly by black artists who deeply relate to issues of identity and difference through their personal diasporic experiences. John Akomfrah's 'The Unfinished Conversation' (2012) constitutes a recent, fascinating negotiation of identity and difference. The film takes the life of culture theorist Stuart Hall as a point of departure, conducting a cinematic translation of Hall's own empirical and theoretical journey through identity and difference. Here, I argue that 'The Unfinished Conversation' negotiates identity and difference in the discursive terms which predominantly occupied the intellectual landscape of the previous century. I illustrate that the film proceeds in two different stages, the primitive and the transformative, which correspond to two crucially different ways in which Hall was empirically and theoretically related to identity and difference in his life. I argue that Akomfrah reflects Hall's relation to identity and difference at each of these stages by adopting an analogous stance to the norms of the documentary genre and to traditional beliefs about the historical archive. I demonstrate that, in the primitive stage, Akomfrah observes the norms of documentary and leaves traditional views about the accuracy of historical archive unchallenged, in order to reflect Hall's essentialist opinions; and that in the transformative stage he meticulously attacks those norms and opinions in order to reflect the process of the deconstruction of identity.
In this paper, I am concerned with the question of whether love is, or can possibly be, moral. I ... more In this paper, I am concerned with the question of whether love is, or can possibly be, moral. I argue that, although love is, in some important respects, in conflict with morality, it can nevertheless be thought to comprise a fundamentally moral phenomenon. I begin, in Section I, by spelling out the conflict between love and morality. I suggest that this conflict primarily has to do with the fact that love makes us partial to the interests of those we love, whereas morality requires that we accord equal weight to everyone’s interests. In Section II, I survey attempts to resolve the conflict by way of rethinking either the partiality of love or the impartiality of morality. In Sections III and IV, I argue that, although inescapably partial, love can nevertheless be moral, if it is understood as essentially involving an altruistic concern for another person’s well-being. If love is altruistic, it is moral for two reasons: because it constitutes a remarkable overcoming of self-interest, and because it involves a dedication to caring about and promoting another’s well-being which is morally supererogatory. As I concede in Section IV, showing that love is altruistic does nothing to resolve the conflict between love and morality, since this leaves the partiality of love (and the impartiality of morality) intact. However, I suggest that, if love essentially involves, or is constituted by, a selfless concern for another being, it has undeniable moral value, even if it is also, due to its partiality, in conflict with morality.
In this paper, I examine the extent to which empathy, conceived of as other-oriented perspective-... more In this paper, I examine the extent to which empathy, conceived of as other-oriented perspective-taking, can facilitate intersubjective understanding. I start from the assumption that empathy is capable of providing understanding of other people’s mental states and affective experiences (Section I). I demonstrate that, in order to supply such understanding, empathy must be construed as the outcome of perspective-taking processes, and I distinguish between two such processes: self-oriented and other-oriented perspective-taking (Section II). Other-oriented perspective-taking is thought to be better at accounting for the differences between target and observer, and thus superior to self-oriented perspective-taking in facilitating intersubjective understanding. Hence commentators suggest that empathy should be conceived of in terms of other-oriented perspective-taking. In this paper, I challenge the suggestion that other-oriented perspective-taking can facilitate accurate intersubjective understanding. I argue that the differences between target and observer are much more difficult to account for than proponents of other-oriented perspective-taking suppose. First, ‘errors of omission’, social and psychological biases, and the implicit character of certain facts about the target, increase the likelihood of those differences escaping the target’s attention (Section III). Secondly, even if the observer is aware of all the relevant differences, she cannot always account for them in her simulation of the target’s state (Section IV). These observations indicate that other-oriented perspective-taking is hardly superior to self-oriented perspective-taking in providing intersubjective understanding. As a result, it may be necessary to revise our notion of empathy as a phenomenon which facilitates interpersonal understanding.
This paper aims to resolve the inconsistencies found in Aristotle’s account of the self-sufficien... more This paper aims to resolve the inconsistencies found in Aristotle’s account of the self-sufficiency of happiness and its dependency on other people. I present these inconsistencies in Section I, and then propose a solution. I suggest that the key to untangling the issue is Aristotle’s construal of happiness as a property that the agent has intrinsically. This entails that the agent’s happiness cannot be had in virtue of her relationship with others, and that others cannot constitute the sources of her happiness; but it does allow that others can play a more rudimentary role in one’s happiness, in setting the context for its exercise. I articulate this proposal in Section II, where I also illustrate how it can be used to accommodate Aristotle’s conflicting comments on the dependency of the agent’s happiness on others. In Section III, I demonstrate that my proposal can also reconcile Aristotle’s conflicting comments on the self-sufficiency of the agent’s happiness.
In this paper, I discuss Plato’s account of mimetic production in the Sophist, and use this accou... more In this paper, I discuss Plato’s account of mimetic production in the Sophist, and use this account to draw some potentially interesting insights about Plato’s conception of the role and nature of philosophy. In Sections I and II, I elucidate Plato’s account of artistic and sophistic mimetic production, with particular attention to the role that the artist’s and sophist’s audience plays in each. In Section III, I suggest that a specific implication of this account raises a problem for philosophy, where the latter is conceived as an enterprise which purports to put us in mind of the truth. However, I suggest that Plato’s understanding of the role of philosophy, and possibly his views on how it should be done, render his own philosophical project immune to this problem.
In Book I of the Treatise, Hume advances his famous account of the self as a mere series of perce... more In Book I of the Treatise, Hume advances his famous account of the self as a mere series of perceptions, and argues that our conception of the self as something which persists and remains identical through time is mistaken and confused. Nevertheless, as evidenced by his distinction between personal identity ‘as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves’, he does not fail to recognise the self’s involvement in our emotional lives, and the fact that it is something in which we take concern. It is now commonly thought that this additional dimension of personal identity is explored in Book II of the Treatise. My interest in this paper is Hume’s account of personal identity as it regards the passions, and, in particular, in his account of the self as an object of concern. My question is whether, given his rejection of persistence and identity through time, Hume is in a position to make sense of self-concern, understood as ‘a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures’. I begin, in Section I, by outlining Hume’s views on personal identity, and considering some of what he has to say about self-concern. In Section II, I flesh out the problem of self-concern in the Treatise, and present Hume’s implied solution to it. In Section III, I consider whether this solution succeeds, focusing on Hume’s ability to accommodate the distinctively first-personal character of self-concern. I argue that, although Hume faces deep problems in this regard, some of these may be solved by appeal to the phenomenon of sympathy.
In this paper, I discuss Bernard Williams’ account of respect in ‘The Idea of Equality’ (1973), a... more In this paper, I discuss Bernard Williams’ account of respect in ‘The Idea of Equality’ (1973), and assess the adequacy of this account for capturing the respect-worthiness of radically cognitively disabled persons. Respect can take a number of forms: we may respect someone for their opinion, for being excellent at their job, or because they are our boss. Here, I am concerned with the notion of ‘respect for persons’. Such a notion is invoked, for example, when one declares that even a terrible criminal ought not to be humiliated, because, despite everything she has done, she is still a person and hence ought to be respected. Pronouncements like these assume that there is something intrinsically valuable about being a person (Margalit 1999: 67-69), and that anyone who is a person is thereby owed a fundamental kind of respect regardless of who she is, what capacities she has, what she has done, etc. (Dillon 2007: 206). In Section I, I introduce Williams’ account of respect, focusing on Carl Cranor’s (1975, 1983) reading of Williams as putting forth a conception of respect as identification. I illustrate that this account of respect is implausible, and that it cannot vindicate the respect-worthiness of the radically cognitively disabled. In Section II, I propose a different reading of Williams, on which identification turns out to play a much less central role in respect than Cranor’s interpretation suggests. In Section III, I suggest that, on my proposed reading, Williams’ conception of respect is in an overall better position to accommodate the respect-worthiness of the radically cognitively disabled.
In this essay, I explore the way in which the Dadaists used photomontage to critique the politics... more In this essay, I explore the way in which the Dadaists used photomontage to critique the politics of the Weimar Republic, focusing on John Heartfield and George Grosz's photomontage on the cover of 'Everyone His Own Football', and Hannah Höch's 'Dada Panorama' and 'Heads of State'. In particular, I explore the way in which these artists used elements of femininity and techniques of feminization to accomplish a witty but sharp political critique.
The intellectual landscape of the previous century was engaged in a radical tendency, exhibited b... more The intellectual landscape of the previous century was engaged in a radical tendency, exhibited by several key figures such as Foucault, Derrida and Hall, to deconstruct traditional beliefs about personal and cultural identity. The philosophically and intuitively sanctioned view of identity as essential, eternal and immutable was relentlessly attacked by the discursive methods of these theorists and by the field of culture theory that employed them, and identity came to be seen as an ever-changing and historically contingent phenomenon. Meanwhile, these views were and continue to be fervently explored through the medium of film, mainly by black artists who deeply relate to issues of identity and difference through their personal diasporic experiences. John Akomfrah's 'The Unfinished Conversation' (2012) constitutes a recent, fascinating negotiation of identity and difference. The film takes the life of culture theorist Stuart Hall as a point of departure, conducting a cinematic translation of Hall's own empirical and theoretical journey through identity and difference. Here, I argue that 'The Unfinished Conversation' negotiates identity and difference in the discursive terms which predominantly occupied the intellectual landscape of the previous century. I illustrate that the film proceeds in two different stages, the primitive and the transformative, which correspond to two crucially different ways in which Hall was empirically and theoretically related to identity and difference in his life. I argue that Akomfrah reflects Hall's relation to identity and difference at each of these stages by adopting an analogous stance to the norms of the documentary genre and to traditional beliefs about the historical archive. I demonstrate that, in the primitive stage, Akomfrah observes the norms of documentary and leaves traditional views about the accuracy of historical archive unchallenged, in order to reflect Hall's essentialist opinions; and that in the transformative stage he meticulously attacks those norms and opinions in order to reflect the process of the deconstruction of identity.
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spelling out the conflict between love and morality. I suggest that this conflict primarily has to do with the fact that love makes us partial to the interests of those we love, whereas morality requires that we accord equal weight to everyone’s interests. In Section II, I survey attempts to resolve the conflict by way of rethinking either the partiality of love or the impartiality of morality. In Sections III and IV, I argue that, although inescapably partial, love can nevertheless be moral, if it is understood as essentially involving an altruistic concern for another person’s well-being. If love is altruistic, it is moral for two reasons: because it constitutes a remarkable overcoming of self-interest, and because it involves a dedication to caring about and promoting another’s well-being which is morally supererogatory. As I concede in Section IV, showing that love is altruistic does nothing to resolve the conflict between love and morality, since this leaves the partiality of love (and the impartiality of morality) intact. However, I suggest that, if love essentially involves, or is constituted by, a selfless concern for another being, it has undeniable moral value, even if it is also, due to its partiality, in conflict with morality.
In this paper, I challenge the suggestion that other-oriented perspective-taking can facilitate accurate intersubjective understanding. I argue that the differences between target and observer are much more difficult to account for than proponents of other-oriented perspective-taking suppose. First, ‘errors of omission’, social and psychological biases, and the implicit character of certain facts about the target, increase the likelihood of those differences escaping the target’s attention (Section III). Secondly, even if the observer is aware of all the relevant differences, she cannot always account for them in her simulation of the target’s state (Section IV).
These observations indicate that other-oriented perspective-taking is hardly superior to self-oriented perspective-taking in providing intersubjective understanding. As a result, it may be necessary to revise our notion of empathy as a phenomenon which facilitates interpersonal understanding.
My interest in this paper is Hume’s account of personal identity as it regards the passions, and, in particular, in his account of the self as an object of concern. My question is whether, given his rejection of persistence and identity through time, Hume is in a position to make sense of self-concern, understood as ‘a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures’. I begin, in Section I, by outlining Hume’s views on personal identity, and considering some of what he has to say about self-concern. In Section II, I flesh out the problem of self-concern in the Treatise, and present Hume’s implied solution to it. In Section III, I consider whether this solution succeeds, focusing on Hume’s ability to accommodate the distinctively first-personal character of self-concern. I argue that, although Hume faces deep problems in this regard, some of these may be solved by appeal to the phenomenon of sympathy.
Respect can take a number of forms: we may respect someone for their opinion, for being excellent at their job, or because they are our boss. Here, I am concerned with the notion of ‘respect for persons’. Such a notion is invoked, for example, when one declares that even a terrible criminal ought not to be humiliated, because, despite everything she has done, she is still a person and hence ought to be respected. Pronouncements like these assume that there is something intrinsically valuable about being a person (Margalit 1999: 67-69), and that anyone who is a person is thereby owed a fundamental kind of respect regardless of who she is, what capacities she has, what she has done, etc. (Dillon 2007: 206).
In Section I, I introduce Williams’ account of respect, focusing on Carl Cranor’s (1975, 1983) reading of Williams as putting forth a conception of respect as identification. I illustrate that this account of respect is implausible, and that it cannot vindicate the respect-worthiness of the radically cognitively disabled. In Section II, I propose a different reading of Williams, on which identification turns out to play a much less central role in respect than Cranor’s interpretation suggests. In Section III, I suggest that, on my proposed reading, Williams’ conception of respect is in an overall better position to accommodate the respect-worthiness of the radically cognitively disabled.
spelling out the conflict between love and morality. I suggest that this conflict primarily has to do with the fact that love makes us partial to the interests of those we love, whereas morality requires that we accord equal weight to everyone’s interests. In Section II, I survey attempts to resolve the conflict by way of rethinking either the partiality of love or the impartiality of morality. In Sections III and IV, I argue that, although inescapably partial, love can nevertheless be moral, if it is understood as essentially involving an altruistic concern for another person’s well-being. If love is altruistic, it is moral for two reasons: because it constitutes a remarkable overcoming of self-interest, and because it involves a dedication to caring about and promoting another’s well-being which is morally supererogatory. As I concede in Section IV, showing that love is altruistic does nothing to resolve the conflict between love and morality, since this leaves the partiality of love (and the impartiality of morality) intact. However, I suggest that, if love essentially involves, or is constituted by, a selfless concern for another being, it has undeniable moral value, even if it is also, due to its partiality, in conflict with morality.
In this paper, I challenge the suggestion that other-oriented perspective-taking can facilitate accurate intersubjective understanding. I argue that the differences between target and observer are much more difficult to account for than proponents of other-oriented perspective-taking suppose. First, ‘errors of omission’, social and psychological biases, and the implicit character of certain facts about the target, increase the likelihood of those differences escaping the target’s attention (Section III). Secondly, even if the observer is aware of all the relevant differences, she cannot always account for them in her simulation of the target’s state (Section IV).
These observations indicate that other-oriented perspective-taking is hardly superior to self-oriented perspective-taking in providing intersubjective understanding. As a result, it may be necessary to revise our notion of empathy as a phenomenon which facilitates interpersonal understanding.
My interest in this paper is Hume’s account of personal identity as it regards the passions, and, in particular, in his account of the self as an object of concern. My question is whether, given his rejection of persistence and identity through time, Hume is in a position to make sense of self-concern, understood as ‘a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures’. I begin, in Section I, by outlining Hume’s views on personal identity, and considering some of what he has to say about self-concern. In Section II, I flesh out the problem of self-concern in the Treatise, and present Hume’s implied solution to it. In Section III, I consider whether this solution succeeds, focusing on Hume’s ability to accommodate the distinctively first-personal character of self-concern. I argue that, although Hume faces deep problems in this regard, some of these may be solved by appeal to the phenomenon of sympathy.
Respect can take a number of forms: we may respect someone for their opinion, for being excellent at their job, or because they are our boss. Here, I am concerned with the notion of ‘respect for persons’. Such a notion is invoked, for example, when one declares that even a terrible criminal ought not to be humiliated, because, despite everything she has done, she is still a person and hence ought to be respected. Pronouncements like these assume that there is something intrinsically valuable about being a person (Margalit 1999: 67-69), and that anyone who is a person is thereby owed a fundamental kind of respect regardless of who she is, what capacities she has, what she has done, etc. (Dillon 2007: 206).
In Section I, I introduce Williams’ account of respect, focusing on Carl Cranor’s (1975, 1983) reading of Williams as putting forth a conception of respect as identification. I illustrate that this account of respect is implausible, and that it cannot vindicate the respect-worthiness of the radically cognitively disabled. In Section II, I propose a different reading of Williams, on which identification turns out to play a much less central role in respect than Cranor’s interpretation suggests. In Section III, I suggest that, on my proposed reading, Williams’ conception of respect is in an overall better position to accommodate the respect-worthiness of the radically cognitively disabled.