Articles by Matías Bascuñán
CR: The New Centennial Review, 2023
This essay offers a new reading of Hobbes's Leviathan by arguing that Hobbes seeks to overcome th... more This essay offers a new reading of Hobbes's Leviathan by arguing that Hobbes seeks to overcome the predicament that practically every theory of sovereignty faces —i.e., to provide meaning and justifications for a form of power whose very essence consists in dispensing with both meaning and justifications— by turning his own text on sovereignty into a sovereign text through an intricate strategy of self-reading. More specifically, drawing on Hobbes’s theory of legal interpretation in Chapter 26 (“Of Civill Lawes”), as well as on two striking reading scenes found in the famous “Introduction” and at the end of Part II of Leviathan, I aim to show that Hobbes’s book stages the characteristically sovereign resistance to reading (or, what amounts to the same, the monopolization of interpretation) it describes as a condition sine qua non for the success of its theory of sovereignty. What emerges from this identification of the text with its object is an understanding of Leviathan as a language that strives to secure its legibility by intertwining theory and power—or, in Hobbes’s terms, veritas and authoritas. Consequently, it is a text that can be said to aspire to the status of a veritable “political science.” If Leviathan stands out as one of the most compelling and authoritative expositions of sovereignty in the history of political thought, it is arguably because it has effectively performed on its readers the sovereign power over interpretation it describes in its chapter devoted to civil laws. For who would deny that, among other things, Leviathan is also an extraordinary display of rhetorical power? That said, highlighting the strategy behind Leviathan’s self-reading in this manner already suggests that Hobbes’s text is far from exhausted by it. By extension, it also suggests that the concept of sovereignty Leviathan advances and presupposes founders. This is due to the absence of a successful monopoly over reading in both instances. If so, then the very fabric of Hobbes’s text, if I can speak thus, renders legible something that can only upset the classical philosophical conception of sovereignty, namely: that sovereignty must compromise itself and indeed fail to function. In this particular case, the co-implication of failure and success flows from the fact that sovereignty must rely on language to legislate, which is precisely why, as we will see, it strives to exert absolute control over interpretation. The same goes for Leviathan’s mechanics of self-reading.
Síntesis. Revista de filosofía, 2022
This article explores the performative effects of reading in Diego Fernández's "La justa medida d... more This article explores the performative effects of reading in Diego Fernández's "La justa medida de una distancia. Benjamin y el romanticismo de Jena". It suggests that Fernández's book presents a version of reading that is coherent with its own interpretative practice, which breaks with the Romantic notion of immanent critique as presented by Walter Benjamin in his 1919 dissertation, all the while retrieving key features of Benjamin's understanding of objetive or formal irony. Ultimately, the article claims that Fernández's book stages the act of reading as a response to the illegible exposure of every text to the indeterminacy of an outside.
Res publica. Revista de historia de las ideas políticas, 2022
Tomando como punto de partida la coimplicación que J. Lezra identifica entre instituciones fuerte... more Tomando como punto de partida la coimplicación que J. Lezra identifica entre instituciones fuertes y la producción psíquico-política de un yo soberano fantasmático, este ensayo explora el vínculo entre poder soberano, representación e imaginación. Para tal fin, se sugieren y analizan algunas intersecciones entre las obras de Lezra y L. Marin. Con ello, se busca mostrar que el republicanismo salvaje de Lezra se desvía de la línea discursiva de la metafísica de la subjetividad así como de las teorías políticas tradicionales de la representación soberana, que van desde el contractualismo hasta la teología política. Se propone, en fin, que la inscripción política de los aspectos aleatorios y efímeros de la materia realizada por Lezra, en línea con lo que Louis Althusser llamó “corriente subterránea del materialismo del encuentro”, así como su identificación del terror en el corazón mismo de la república moderna, transforman lo que entendemos por republicanismo democrático, tanto conceptual como institucionalmente, al impugnar la captura de la imaginación por parte de la representación y la soberanía.
Revista de Humanidades, 2020
En un texto precrítico de 1763, Kant arguye que “el concepto de posición o de postura [Position o... more En un texto precrítico de 1763, Kant arguye que “el concepto de posición o de postura [Position oder Setzung] es completamente simple e idéntico con el del ser”. En estas líneas, Werner Hamacher identifica la fórmula que cifra a la metafísica moderna como “ontoteseología” —es decir, la determinación del ser como posición, posicionamiento o tesis—. Como demuestra Hamacher, la ontoteseología esconde una aporía inconfesable y originaria: la aporía de la posición. Esta aporía implica una inconsistencia estructural —que sugiero llamar inconsistesis— que no solo afecta a la subjetividad trascendental sino también al concepto de soberanía. La inconsistesis soberana es el objeto de este artículo. Para abordarlo, se específica la difícil lógica de la inconsistesis con recurso al análisis que Hamacher lleva a cabo del acto lingüístico de “prometer” como premisa (paradójica) del posicionamiento en general; paradójica porque la promesa solo posibilita el acto posicionante al interrumpirlo. En vista del carácter lingüístico de la posición y de su aporía, se propone leer la inconsistesis soberana a la luz de la noción de “justicia lingüística” (Sprachgerechtigkeit) que Hamacher moviliza en su interpretación de la filosofía política de Hobbes.
In a precritical text of 1763, Kant argues that “the concept of position or positing [Position oder Setzung] is completely simple and is the same as the concept of Being”. In these lines, Werner Hamacher identifies the formula that defines modern metaphysics as “ontotheseology,” i.e., the determination of being as position, positing, or thesis. As Hamacher demonstrates, ontotheseology conceals an unconfessable and originary aporia—the aporia of positing. Since this aporia responds to a structural inconsistency, the article proposes to designate it as inconsisthesis. The central claim of the article is that inconsisthesis affects not only transcendental subjectivity but also the concept of sovereignty. Sovereign inconsithesis is, accordingly, the subject of this article. To address it, I flesh out the difficult logic of inconsisthesis by turning to Hamacher’s account of the linguistic act of “promising,” which he conceives as the (paradoxical) premise of positing in general—paradoxical, since promising only makes possible a positing act by interrupting it. In light of the linguistic character that Hamacher assigns to both positing and its aporia, the article pursues sovereign inconsisthesis in the notion of “linguistic justice” (Sprachgerechtigkeit) that Hamacher mobilizes in his reading of Hobbes’s political philosophy.
Política común. A Journal of Thought, 2019
In the second year of his last seminar, The Beast and the Sovereign, Jacques Derrida is explicit ... more In the second year of his last seminar, The Beast and the Sovereign, Jacques Derrida is explicit about how sovereignty is at work in Heidegger’s thought, particularly with respect to Heidegger’s use of the word Walten, which Derrida reads as a self-emerging and originary violence that exceeds the purview of theologico-political sovereignty in the direction of an “ontological super-sovereignty, at the source of the ontological difference.” However, little attention has been paid to how sovereignty might figure in Derrida’s first sustained engagement with Heidegger’s work during his 1964-65 seminar given at ENS, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History. The tendency, instead, has been to privilege questions that play a more explicit and central role in Derrida’s exposition, such as historicity and metaphoricity. My hypothesis in this essay is that Derrida’s reading of Being and Time in his early seminar shows that Heidegger incurs in a series of gestures that late in his life Derrida wouldn’t have failed to identify with sovereign ipseity.
To substantiate this hypothesis, I take a cue from session four of the seminar, where Derrida claims that Heidegger’s privileging of Dasein at the beginning of the existential analytic happens as a “decree.” To the extent that some of the fundamental structures of Dasein can be read as a self-referential recounting of the philosophical operation of Being and Time, one is drawn to suspect that the sovereignty of Heidegger’s decree will also be staged in the existential analytic. Following this suspicion, I trace Derrida’s characterization of Dasein in session four as a “text,” and more specifically, as the “first letter to Being.” This leads me to sessions seven and eight of the seminar, where Derrida retrieves the motif of Dasein’s textuality (or “texturology”) and situates Entschlossenheit (resolute decision) within the horizon of metaphysics. In doing so, Derrida allows us to think of Entschlossenheit as the site where the power to say “I”—i.e., sovereign self-reference —emerges in Being and Time, all the while opening Sichüberlieferung (autotransmission), “texturology,” and “autoaffection” to the structural passivity of historicity that ruins (Dasein’s) sovereign ipseity.
Diacritics, 2017
Can we think of a politics oriented by neither truth, nor morals, nor any kind of ideal and norma... more Can we think of a politics oriented by neither truth, nor morals, nor any kind of ideal and normative end? In other words, can we think of politics without having to draw on teleological patterns at all (the most exemplary version of which is, perhaps, the “Kantian Idea”), and consider it, instead, as what always upsets the orientations it enables? In Scatter 1, Geoffrey Bennington opens up the chance for thinking politics otherwise than teleologically by affirming its irreducible finitude and contingency—what he calls “the politics of politics” and which one could rephrase as a “politics (un)worthy of the name.” Through readings of Foucault, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and Derrida, Bennington challenges the traditional role of truth and decision in political philosophy by launching a scatter of their “dignity” that resists and deviates from any teleological arrangement. In doing so, Bennington shows that politics begins as teleology fails. Hence, Scatter 1 invites one to think of politics as something ineluctably exposed to the coming of the event beyond any transcendental anticipation, and of “scatter,” accordingly, as standing in solidarity with what in his late work Derrida calls “democracy to come.” In light of this, this article claims that “scatter” also entails a deconstructive retrieval of “freedom,” that is, a heteronomous freedom that assumes its finitude and that thereby breaks with any of its teleological versions. In other words, “scatter,” this article argues, deploys a freedom (un)worthy of the name. My wager is that in Scatter 1 such thinking of freedom comes to the fore in Bennington’s understanding of “reading,” which is precisely the operation that allows him to “scatter” the “dignity” of the tradition that his book conjures.
KEY WORDS: scatter, teleology, dignity, reading, decision, deconstruction, freedom.
Book Chapters by Matías Bascuñán
Jacques Derrida, el arte de leer, eds. Bascuñán, M. & Rossello, D., Buenos Aires: Katz Editores, 2023
28931 Móstoles-Madrid www.katzeditores.com * Este volumen forma parte de los los proyectos FONDEC... more 28931 Móstoles-Madrid www.katzeditores.com * Este volumen forma parte de los los proyectos FONDECYT regular Nº 1220403 y FONDECYT de posdoctorado Nº 3210444. ** Nota bene: Todas las referencias bibliográficas a los escritos de Jacques Derrida en este volumen remiten a la paginación de su versión original en francés, después de lo cual se indica, de existir, la paginación de su traducción al castellano. [N. de los E.
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Articles by Matías Bascuñán
In a precritical text of 1763, Kant argues that “the concept of position or positing [Position oder Setzung] is completely simple and is the same as the concept of Being”. In these lines, Werner Hamacher identifies the formula that defines modern metaphysics as “ontotheseology,” i.e., the determination of being as position, positing, or thesis. As Hamacher demonstrates, ontotheseology conceals an unconfessable and originary aporia—the aporia of positing. Since this aporia responds to a structural inconsistency, the article proposes to designate it as inconsisthesis. The central claim of the article is that inconsisthesis affects not only transcendental subjectivity but also the concept of sovereignty. Sovereign inconsithesis is, accordingly, the subject of this article. To address it, I flesh out the difficult logic of inconsisthesis by turning to Hamacher’s account of the linguistic act of “promising,” which he conceives as the (paradoxical) premise of positing in general—paradoxical, since promising only makes possible a positing act by interrupting it. In light of the linguistic character that Hamacher assigns to both positing and its aporia, the article pursues sovereign inconsisthesis in the notion of “linguistic justice” (Sprachgerechtigkeit) that Hamacher mobilizes in his reading of Hobbes’s political philosophy.
To substantiate this hypothesis, I take a cue from session four of the seminar, where Derrida claims that Heidegger’s privileging of Dasein at the beginning of the existential analytic happens as a “decree.” To the extent that some of the fundamental structures of Dasein can be read as a self-referential recounting of the philosophical operation of Being and Time, one is drawn to suspect that the sovereignty of Heidegger’s decree will also be staged in the existential analytic. Following this suspicion, I trace Derrida’s characterization of Dasein in session four as a “text,” and more specifically, as the “first letter to Being.” This leads me to sessions seven and eight of the seminar, where Derrida retrieves the motif of Dasein’s textuality (or “texturology”) and situates Entschlossenheit (resolute decision) within the horizon of metaphysics. In doing so, Derrida allows us to think of Entschlossenheit as the site where the power to say “I”—i.e., sovereign self-reference —emerges in Being and Time, all the while opening Sichüberlieferung (autotransmission), “texturology,” and “autoaffection” to the structural passivity of historicity that ruins (Dasein’s) sovereign ipseity.
KEY WORDS: scatter, teleology, dignity, reading, decision, deconstruction, freedom.
Book Chapters by Matías Bascuñán
Books by Matías Bascuñán
Book Reviews by Matías Bascuñán
Translations by Matías Bascuñán
Conference Presentations by Matías Bascuñán
Papers by Matías Bascuñán
In a precritical text of 1763, Kant argues that “the concept of position or positing [Position oder Setzung] is completely simple and is the same as the concept of Being”. In these lines, Werner Hamacher identifies the formula that defines modern metaphysics as “ontotheseology,” i.e., the determination of being as position, positing, or thesis. As Hamacher demonstrates, ontotheseology conceals an unconfessable and originary aporia—the aporia of positing. Since this aporia responds to a structural inconsistency, the article proposes to designate it as inconsisthesis. The central claim of the article is that inconsisthesis affects not only transcendental subjectivity but also the concept of sovereignty. Sovereign inconsithesis is, accordingly, the subject of this article. To address it, I flesh out the difficult logic of inconsisthesis by turning to Hamacher’s account of the linguistic act of “promising,” which he conceives as the (paradoxical) premise of positing in general—paradoxical, since promising only makes possible a positing act by interrupting it. In light of the linguistic character that Hamacher assigns to both positing and its aporia, the article pursues sovereign inconsisthesis in the notion of “linguistic justice” (Sprachgerechtigkeit) that Hamacher mobilizes in his reading of Hobbes’s political philosophy.
To substantiate this hypothesis, I take a cue from session four of the seminar, where Derrida claims that Heidegger’s privileging of Dasein at the beginning of the existential analytic happens as a “decree.” To the extent that some of the fundamental structures of Dasein can be read as a self-referential recounting of the philosophical operation of Being and Time, one is drawn to suspect that the sovereignty of Heidegger’s decree will also be staged in the existential analytic. Following this suspicion, I trace Derrida’s characterization of Dasein in session four as a “text,” and more specifically, as the “first letter to Being.” This leads me to sessions seven and eight of the seminar, where Derrida retrieves the motif of Dasein’s textuality (or “texturology”) and situates Entschlossenheit (resolute decision) within the horizon of metaphysics. In doing so, Derrida allows us to think of Entschlossenheit as the site where the power to say “I”—i.e., sovereign self-reference —emerges in Being and Time, all the while opening Sichüberlieferung (autotransmission), “texturology,” and “autoaffection” to the structural passivity of historicity that ruins (Dasein’s) sovereign ipseity.
KEY WORDS: scatter, teleology, dignity, reading, decision, deconstruction, freedom.