We propose that methods from the study of category-based induction can be used to test the accura... more We propose that methods from the study of category-based induction can be used to test the accuracy of theories of moral judgment. We had participants rate the likelihood that a person would engage in a variety of actions, given information about a previous behavior. From these likelihood ratings, we extracted a hierarchical, taxonomic model of how moral violations relate to each other (Study 1). We then tested the descriptive adequacy of this model against an alternative model inspired by Moral Foundations Theory, using classic tasks from induction research (Studies 2a and 2b), and using a measure of confirmation, which accounts for the baseline frequency of these violations (Study 3). Lastly, we conducted focused tests of combinations of violations where the models make differing predictions (Study 4). This research provides new insight into how people represent moral concepts, connecting classic methods from cognitive science with contemporary themes in moral psychology.
The use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) elicits widespread normative opposition, yet little... more The use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) elicits widespread normative opposition, yet little research has investigated what underlies these judgments. We examine this question comprehensively, across 13 studies. We first test the hypothesis that opposition to PED use cannot be fully accounted for by considerations of fairness. We then test the influence of 10 other potential drivers of opposition in an exploratory manner. We find that health risks for the user and rules and laws prohibiting use of anabolic steroids reliably affect normative judgments. Next, we test whether these patterns generalize to a different PED—cognitive-enhancement drugs. Finally, we sketch a framework for understanding these results, borrowing from Social Domain Theory (e.g., Turiel, 1983). We argue that PED use exemplifies a class of violations with properties of moral, conventional, and prudential offenses. This research sheds light on a widespread, but understudied, normative judgment, and illustrates the utility of exploratory methods.
I present a novel way to conceptualize Turiel and colleagues' Social Domain Theory (SDT), and Hai... more I present a novel way to conceptualize Turiel and colleagues' Social Domain Theory (SDT), and Haidt and colleagues' Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), as theories of how concepts of moral violations are mentally represented. I argue that SDT is best viewed as a theory of the features that are associated with concepts of moral violations, including wrongness, generalizability across cultures, and intrinsic harmfulness, and that MFT, in contrast, is best viewed as a theory of individual differences in what kinds of acts are categorized as moral violations (i.e., of category membership). This perspective generates a novel prediction: the same individual difference variables that predict variation in moral values according to MFT should predict ascription of the features predicted by SDT. That is, judgments of wrongness, generalizability, and intrinsic harmfulness should covary with the same predictors as do endorsed moral values, specifically, political orientation and analytic thinking. Three studies supported this hypothesis.
Morality, sociability, and competence are distinct dimensions in person perception. We argue that... more Morality, sociability, and competence are distinct dimensions in person perception. We argue that a person’s morality informs us about their likely intentions, whereas their competence and sociability inform us about the likelihood that they will fulfill those intentions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that whereas morality would be considered unconditionally positive, sociability and competence would be highly positive only in moral others, and would be less positive in immoral others. Using exploratory factor analyses, Studies 1a and 1b distinguished evaluations of morality and sociability. Studies 2 to 5 then showed that sociability and competence are evaluated positively contingent on morality—Study 2 demonstrated this phenomenon, while the remaining studies explained it (Study 3), generalized it (Studies 3-5), and ruled out an alternative explanation for it (Study 5). Study 6 showed that the positivity of morality traits is independent of other morality traits. These results support a functionalist account of these dimensions of person perception.
The role of emotion in moral judgment is currently a topic of much debate in moral psychology. O... more The role of emotion in moral judgment is currently a topic of much debate in moral psychology. One specific claim made by many researchers is that irrelevant feelings of disgust can amplify the severity of moral condemnation. Numerous studies have found this effect, but there have also been several published failures to replicate this effect. Clarifying this issue would inform important theoretical debates between rival accounts of moral judgment. We meta-analyzed all available studies, published and unpublished, that experimentally manipulated incidental disgust prior to or concurrent with a moral judgment task (k = 50). We found that there is evidence for a small amplification effect of disgust (d = .11), which is strongest for gustatory/olfactory modes of disgust induction. However, there is also some suggestion of publication bias in this literature, and when this is accounted for, the effect disappears entirely (d = -.01). Moreover, prevalent confounds mean that the effect size that we estimate is best interpreted as an upper bound on the size of the amplification effect. The results of this meta-analysis argue against strong claims about the causal role of affect in moral judgment and suggest a need for new, more rigorous research on this topic.
Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow... more Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow, deliberative thinking with the utilitarian disposition and fast, automatic thinking with the deontological disposition. However, evidence for the reflective utilitarian hypothesis—the hypothesized link between utilitarian judgment and individual differences in the capacity for rational reflection (gauged here by the Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT; Frederick, 2005]) has been inconsistent and difficult to interpret in light of several design flaws. In two studies aimed at addressing some of the flaws, we found robust evidence for a reflective minimalist hypothesis—high CRT performers’ tendency to regard utility-optimizing acts as largely a matter of personal prerogative, permissible both to perform and to leave undone. This relationship between CRT and the “minimalist” orientation remained intact after controlling for age, sex, trait affect, social desirability, and educational attainment. No significant association was found between CRT and the strict utilitarian response pattern or CRT and the strict deontological response pattern, nor did we find any significant association between CRT and willingness to act in the utility-optimizing manner. However, we found an inverse association between empathic concern and a willingness to act in the utility-optimizing manner, but there was no comparable association between empathic concern and the deontological judgment pattern. Theoretical, methodological, and normative implications of the findings are discussed.
The CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) stipulates that, cross-culturally,... more The CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) stipulates that, cross-culturally, people feel anger for violations of autonomy, contempt for violations of community, and disgust for violations of divinity. Although the disgustdivinity link has received some measure of empirical support, the results have been difficult to interpret in light of several conceptual and design flaws. Taking a revised methodological approach, including use of newly validated (Study 1), pathogen-free violations of the divinity code, we found (Study 2) little evidence of disgust-related phenomenology (nausea, gagging, loss of appetite) or action tendency (desire to move away), but much evidence of anger-linked desire to retaliate, as a major component of individuals’ projected response to “pure” (pathogen-free) violations of the divinity code. Study 3 replicated these results using faces in lieu of words as a dependent measure. Concordant findings emerged from an archival study (Study 4) examining the aftermath of a real-life sacred violation—the burning of Korans by U.S. military personnel. Study 5 further corroborated these results using continuous measures based on everyday emotion terms and new variants of the divinity—pure scenarios featuring sacrilegious acts committed by a theologically irreverent member of one’s own group rather than an ideologically opposed member of another group. Finally, a supplemental study found the anger-dominant attribution pattern to remain intact when the impious act being judged was the judge’s own. Based on these and related results, we posit anger to be the principal emotional response to moral transgressions irrespective of the normative content involved.
Two studies examined the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection (CRT... more Two studies examined the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection (CRT) and the tendency to accord genuinely moral (non-conventional) status to a range of counter-normative acts — that is, to treat such acts as wrong regardless of existing social opinion or norms. We contrasted social violations that are intrinsically harmful to others (e.g., fraud, thievery) with those that are not (e.g., wearing pajamas to work and engaging in consensual acts of sexual intimacy with an adult sibling). Our key hypothesis was that more reflective (higher CRT) individuals would tend to moralize selectively — treating only intrinsically harmful acts as genuinely morally wrong — whereas less reflective (lower CRT) individuals would moralize more indiscriminately. We found clear support for this hypothesis in a large and ideologically diverse sample of American adults. The predicted associations were not fully accounted for by the subjects’ political orientation, sensitivity to gut feelings, gender, age, educational attainment, or their placement on a sexual moralsspecific measure of social conservatism. Our studies are the first to demonstrate that, in addition to modulating the intensity of moral condemnation, reflection may also play a key role in setting the boundaries of the moral domain as such
Do people think of the value of all human lives as equivalent irrespective of age? Affirmations o... more Do people think of the value of all human lives as equivalent irrespective of age? Affirmations of the equal value of all human lives are culturally prominent, yet much evidence points to the fact that the young are often prioritized over the old in life-and-death decision-making contexts. Studies 1–3 aimed to reconcile this tension by showing that although individuals are seen as more equal with respect to negative rights not to be harmed or killed (though not completely equal), they are seen as less equal with respect to positive rights to be aided or saved. Age exerts a large and systematic impact on decisions about who to save and about whose death is more tragic, suggesting that individuals are seen as possessing differing amounts of contingent value. These initial studies also yielded the novel finding that, although children are prioritized over adults, older children are often prioritized over younger children. Study 4 replicated this finding with a think-aloud methodology; the study showed that the preference for older children appears to be driven by their having had more invested in their lives, their better developed social relations, and their greater understanding of death. Studies 5a–5c demonstrated the independent causal effects of each of these variables on judgments of life’s value. Finally, in Studies 6 and 7, mediation methods were used to show that older children’s more meaningful social relations primarily explain the greater value of older than of younger children. These findings have implications for bioethics and medical policy.
Entities that possess moral standing can be wronged and deserve our moral consideration. Past per... more Entities that possess moral standing can be wronged and deserve our moral consideration. Past perspectives on the folk psychology of moral standing have focused exclusively on the role of “patiency” (the capacity to experience pain or pleasure) and “agency” (usually defined and operationalized in terms of intelligence or cognitive ability). We contend that harmfulness (i.e., having a harmful vs. benevolent disposition) is an equally if not more important determinant of moral standing. We provide support for this hypothesis across four studies using non-human animals as targets. We show that the effect of harmfulness on attributions of moral standing is independent from patiency and intelligence (Studies 1–2), that this effect pertains specifically to an animal’s harmful disposition rather than its capacity to act upon this disposition (Study 3), and that it primarily reflects a parochial concern for human welfare in particular (Study 4). Our findings highlight an important, overlooked dimension in the psychology of moral standing that has implications for real-world decisions that affect non-human animals. Our findings also help clarify the conditions under which people perceive patiency and agency as related versus truly independent dimensions.
Recent research has shown that religious individuals are much more resistant to utilitarian modes... more Recent research has shown that religious individuals are much more resistant to utilitarian modes of thinking than their less religious counterparts, but the reason for this is not clear. We propose that a meta-ethical belief that morality is rooted in inviolable divine commands (i.e., endorsement of Divine Command Theory) may help explain this finding. We present a novel 20-item scale measuring a belief that morality is founded on divine authority. The scale shows good internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. Study 1 found that this scale fully mediated the relationship that various religiosity measures had with a deontological thinking style in our sample of American adults. It also accounted for the link between religiosity and social conservative values. Furthermore, the relationship between the scale and these outcome variables held after statistically controlling for variables related to actively open-minded thinking and the Big Five. Study 2 replicated the results using naturalistic moral dilemmas that placed deontological and utilitarian concerns in conflict, and showed that the results of Study 1 cannot be explained by differences in moral foundations (e.g., concern for authority more generally) or differences in the perceived function of rules. Quite the contrary, endorsement of the divine origins of morality fully mediated the relationship religiosity had with the so-called “binding” foundations (i.e., Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity). Our findings highlight the importance of meta-ethical beliefs for understanding individual differences in moral judgment.
We propose that methods from the study of category-based induction can be used to test the accura... more We propose that methods from the study of category-based induction can be used to test the accuracy of theories of moral judgment. We had participants rate the likelihood that a person would engage in a variety of actions, given information about a previous behavior. From these likelihood ratings, we extracted a hierarchical, taxonomic model of how moral violations relate to each other (Study 1). We then tested the descriptive adequacy of this model against an alternative model inspired by Moral Foundations Theory, using classic tasks from induction research (Studies 2a and 2b), and using a measure of confirmation, which accounts for the baseline frequency of these violations (Study 3). Lastly, we conducted focused tests of combinations of violations where the models make differing predictions (Study 4). This research provides new insight into how people represent moral concepts, connecting classic methods from cognitive science with contemporary themes in moral psychology.
The use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) elicits widespread normative opposition, yet little... more The use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) elicits widespread normative opposition, yet little research has investigated what underlies these judgments. We examine this question comprehensively, across 13 studies. We first test the hypothesis that opposition to PED use cannot be fully accounted for by considerations of fairness. We then test the influence of 10 other potential drivers of opposition in an exploratory manner. We find that health risks for the user and rules and laws prohibiting use of anabolic steroids reliably affect normative judgments. Next, we test whether these patterns generalize to a different PED—cognitive-enhancement drugs. Finally, we sketch a framework for understanding these results, borrowing from Social Domain Theory (e.g., Turiel, 1983). We argue that PED use exemplifies a class of violations with properties of moral, conventional, and prudential offenses. This research sheds light on a widespread, but understudied, normative judgment, and illustrates the utility of exploratory methods.
I present a novel way to conceptualize Turiel and colleagues' Social Domain Theory (SDT), and Hai... more I present a novel way to conceptualize Turiel and colleagues' Social Domain Theory (SDT), and Haidt and colleagues' Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), as theories of how concepts of moral violations are mentally represented. I argue that SDT is best viewed as a theory of the features that are associated with concepts of moral violations, including wrongness, generalizability across cultures, and intrinsic harmfulness, and that MFT, in contrast, is best viewed as a theory of individual differences in what kinds of acts are categorized as moral violations (i.e., of category membership). This perspective generates a novel prediction: the same individual difference variables that predict variation in moral values according to MFT should predict ascription of the features predicted by SDT. That is, judgments of wrongness, generalizability, and intrinsic harmfulness should covary with the same predictors as do endorsed moral values, specifically, political orientation and analytic thinking. Three studies supported this hypothesis.
Morality, sociability, and competence are distinct dimensions in person perception. We argue that... more Morality, sociability, and competence are distinct dimensions in person perception. We argue that a person’s morality informs us about their likely intentions, whereas their competence and sociability inform us about the likelihood that they will fulfill those intentions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that whereas morality would be considered unconditionally positive, sociability and competence would be highly positive only in moral others, and would be less positive in immoral others. Using exploratory factor analyses, Studies 1a and 1b distinguished evaluations of morality and sociability. Studies 2 to 5 then showed that sociability and competence are evaluated positively contingent on morality—Study 2 demonstrated this phenomenon, while the remaining studies explained it (Study 3), generalized it (Studies 3-5), and ruled out an alternative explanation for it (Study 5). Study 6 showed that the positivity of morality traits is independent of other morality traits. These results support a functionalist account of these dimensions of person perception.
The role of emotion in moral judgment is currently a topic of much debate in moral psychology. O... more The role of emotion in moral judgment is currently a topic of much debate in moral psychology. One specific claim made by many researchers is that irrelevant feelings of disgust can amplify the severity of moral condemnation. Numerous studies have found this effect, but there have also been several published failures to replicate this effect. Clarifying this issue would inform important theoretical debates between rival accounts of moral judgment. We meta-analyzed all available studies, published and unpublished, that experimentally manipulated incidental disgust prior to or concurrent with a moral judgment task (k = 50). We found that there is evidence for a small amplification effect of disgust (d = .11), which is strongest for gustatory/olfactory modes of disgust induction. However, there is also some suggestion of publication bias in this literature, and when this is accounted for, the effect disappears entirely (d = -.01). Moreover, prevalent confounds mean that the effect size that we estimate is best interpreted as an upper bound on the size of the amplification effect. The results of this meta-analysis argue against strong claims about the causal role of affect in moral judgment and suggest a need for new, more rigorous research on this topic.
Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow... more Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow, deliberative thinking with the utilitarian disposition and fast, automatic thinking with the deontological disposition. However, evidence for the reflective utilitarian hypothesis—the hypothesized link between utilitarian judgment and individual differences in the capacity for rational reflection (gauged here by the Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT; Frederick, 2005]) has been inconsistent and difficult to interpret in light of several design flaws. In two studies aimed at addressing some of the flaws, we found robust evidence for a reflective minimalist hypothesis—high CRT performers’ tendency to regard utility-optimizing acts as largely a matter of personal prerogative, permissible both to perform and to leave undone. This relationship between CRT and the “minimalist” orientation remained intact after controlling for age, sex, trait affect, social desirability, and educational attainment. No significant association was found between CRT and the strict utilitarian response pattern or CRT and the strict deontological response pattern, nor did we find any significant association between CRT and willingness to act in the utility-optimizing manner. However, we found an inverse association between empathic concern and a willingness to act in the utility-optimizing manner, but there was no comparable association between empathic concern and the deontological judgment pattern. Theoretical, methodological, and normative implications of the findings are discussed.
The CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) stipulates that, cross-culturally,... more The CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) stipulates that, cross-culturally, people feel anger for violations of autonomy, contempt for violations of community, and disgust for violations of divinity. Although the disgustdivinity link has received some measure of empirical support, the results have been difficult to interpret in light of several conceptual and design flaws. Taking a revised methodological approach, including use of newly validated (Study 1), pathogen-free violations of the divinity code, we found (Study 2) little evidence of disgust-related phenomenology (nausea, gagging, loss of appetite) or action tendency (desire to move away), but much evidence of anger-linked desire to retaliate, as a major component of individuals’ projected response to “pure” (pathogen-free) violations of the divinity code. Study 3 replicated these results using faces in lieu of words as a dependent measure. Concordant findings emerged from an archival study (Study 4) examining the aftermath of a real-life sacred violation—the burning of Korans by U.S. military personnel. Study 5 further corroborated these results using continuous measures based on everyday emotion terms and new variants of the divinity—pure scenarios featuring sacrilegious acts committed by a theologically irreverent member of one’s own group rather than an ideologically opposed member of another group. Finally, a supplemental study found the anger-dominant attribution pattern to remain intact when the impious act being judged was the judge’s own. Based on these and related results, we posit anger to be the principal emotional response to moral transgressions irrespective of the normative content involved.
Two studies examined the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection (CRT... more Two studies examined the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection (CRT) and the tendency to accord genuinely moral (non-conventional) status to a range of counter-normative acts — that is, to treat such acts as wrong regardless of existing social opinion or norms. We contrasted social violations that are intrinsically harmful to others (e.g., fraud, thievery) with those that are not (e.g., wearing pajamas to work and engaging in consensual acts of sexual intimacy with an adult sibling). Our key hypothesis was that more reflective (higher CRT) individuals would tend to moralize selectively — treating only intrinsically harmful acts as genuinely morally wrong — whereas less reflective (lower CRT) individuals would moralize more indiscriminately. We found clear support for this hypothesis in a large and ideologically diverse sample of American adults. The predicted associations were not fully accounted for by the subjects’ political orientation, sensitivity to gut feelings, gender, age, educational attainment, or their placement on a sexual moralsspecific measure of social conservatism. Our studies are the first to demonstrate that, in addition to modulating the intensity of moral condemnation, reflection may also play a key role in setting the boundaries of the moral domain as such
Do people think of the value of all human lives as equivalent irrespective of age? Affirmations o... more Do people think of the value of all human lives as equivalent irrespective of age? Affirmations of the equal value of all human lives are culturally prominent, yet much evidence points to the fact that the young are often prioritized over the old in life-and-death decision-making contexts. Studies 1–3 aimed to reconcile this tension by showing that although individuals are seen as more equal with respect to negative rights not to be harmed or killed (though not completely equal), they are seen as less equal with respect to positive rights to be aided or saved. Age exerts a large and systematic impact on decisions about who to save and about whose death is more tragic, suggesting that individuals are seen as possessing differing amounts of contingent value. These initial studies also yielded the novel finding that, although children are prioritized over adults, older children are often prioritized over younger children. Study 4 replicated this finding with a think-aloud methodology; the study showed that the preference for older children appears to be driven by their having had more invested in their lives, their better developed social relations, and their greater understanding of death. Studies 5a–5c demonstrated the independent causal effects of each of these variables on judgments of life’s value. Finally, in Studies 6 and 7, mediation methods were used to show that older children’s more meaningful social relations primarily explain the greater value of older than of younger children. These findings have implications for bioethics and medical policy.
Entities that possess moral standing can be wronged and deserve our moral consideration. Past per... more Entities that possess moral standing can be wronged and deserve our moral consideration. Past perspectives on the folk psychology of moral standing have focused exclusively on the role of “patiency” (the capacity to experience pain or pleasure) and “agency” (usually defined and operationalized in terms of intelligence or cognitive ability). We contend that harmfulness (i.e., having a harmful vs. benevolent disposition) is an equally if not more important determinant of moral standing. We provide support for this hypothesis across four studies using non-human animals as targets. We show that the effect of harmfulness on attributions of moral standing is independent from patiency and intelligence (Studies 1–2), that this effect pertains specifically to an animal’s harmful disposition rather than its capacity to act upon this disposition (Study 3), and that it primarily reflects a parochial concern for human welfare in particular (Study 4). Our findings highlight an important, overlooked dimension in the psychology of moral standing that has implications for real-world decisions that affect non-human animals. Our findings also help clarify the conditions under which people perceive patiency and agency as related versus truly independent dimensions.
Recent research has shown that religious individuals are much more resistant to utilitarian modes... more Recent research has shown that religious individuals are much more resistant to utilitarian modes of thinking than their less religious counterparts, but the reason for this is not clear. We propose that a meta-ethical belief that morality is rooted in inviolable divine commands (i.e., endorsement of Divine Command Theory) may help explain this finding. We present a novel 20-item scale measuring a belief that morality is founded on divine authority. The scale shows good internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. Study 1 found that this scale fully mediated the relationship that various religiosity measures had with a deontological thinking style in our sample of American adults. It also accounted for the link between religiosity and social conservative values. Furthermore, the relationship between the scale and these outcome variables held after statistically controlling for variables related to actively open-minded thinking and the Big Five. Study 2 replicated the results using naturalistic moral dilemmas that placed deontological and utilitarian concerns in conflict, and showed that the results of Study 1 cannot be explained by differences in moral foundations (e.g., concern for authority more generally) or differences in the perceived function of rules. Quite the contrary, endorsement of the divine origins of morality fully mediated the relationship religiosity had with the so-called “binding” foundations (i.e., Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity). Our findings highlight the importance of meta-ethical beliefs for understanding individual differences in moral judgment.
Uploads
Papers by Justin Landy
feel anger for violations of autonomy, contempt for violations of community, and disgust for violations
of divinity. Although the disgustdivinity link has received some measure of empirical support, the
results have been difficult to interpret in light of several conceptual and design flaws. Taking a revised
methodological approach, including use of newly validated (Study 1), pathogen-free violations of the
divinity code, we found (Study 2) little evidence of disgust-related phenomenology (nausea, gagging, loss
of appetite) or action tendency (desire to move away), but much evidence of anger-linked desire to
retaliate, as a major component of individuals’ projected response to “pure” (pathogen-free) violations of
the divinity code. Study 3 replicated these results using faces in lieu of words as a dependent measure.
Concordant findings emerged from an archival study (Study 4) examining the aftermath of a real-life
sacred violation—the burning of Korans by U.S. military personnel. Study 5 further corroborated these
results using continuous measures based on everyday emotion terms and new variants of the divinity—pure
scenarios featuring sacrilegious acts committed by a theologically irreverent member of one’s own group
rather than an ideologically opposed member of another group. Finally, a supplemental study found the
anger-dominant attribution pattern to remain intact when the impious act being judged was the judge’s
own. Based on these and related results, we posit anger to be the principal emotional response to moral
transgressions irrespective of the normative content involved.
to accord genuinely moral (non-conventional) status to a range of counter-normative acts — that is, to treat such acts as
wrong regardless of existing social opinion or norms. We contrasted social violations that are intrinsically harmful to
others (e.g., fraud, thievery) with those that are not (e.g., wearing pajamas to work and engaging in consensual acts of
sexual intimacy with an adult sibling). Our key hypothesis was that more reflective (higher CRT) individuals would tend
to moralize selectively — treating only intrinsically harmful acts as genuinely morally wrong — whereas less reflective
(lower CRT) individuals would moralize more indiscriminately. We found clear support for this hypothesis in a large and
ideologically diverse sample of American adults. The predicted associations were not fully accounted for by the subjects’
political orientation, sensitivity to gut feelings, gender, age, educational attainment, or their placement on a sexual moralsspecific
measure of social conservatism. Our studies are the first to demonstrate that, in addition to modulating the intensity
of moral condemnation, reflection may also play a key role in setting the boundaries of the moral domain as such
their less religious counterparts, but the reason for this is not clear. We propose that a meta-ethical belief that morality
is rooted in inviolable divine commands (i.e., endorsement of Divine Command Theory) may help explain this finding.
We present a novel 20-item scale measuring a belief that morality is founded on divine authority. The scale shows
good internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. Study 1 found that this scale fully mediated the
relationship that various religiosity measures had with a deontological thinking style in our sample of American adults.
It also accounted for the link between religiosity and social conservative values. Furthermore, the relationship between
the scale and these outcome variables held after statistically controlling for variables related to actively open-minded
thinking and the Big Five. Study 2 replicated the results using naturalistic moral dilemmas that placed deontological
and utilitarian concerns in conflict, and showed that the results of Study 1 cannot be explained by differences in moral
foundations (e.g., concern for authority more generally) or differences in the perceived function of rules. Quite the
contrary, endorsement of the divine origins of morality fully mediated the relationship religiosity had with the so-called
“binding” foundations (i.e., Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity). Our findings highlight the importance of meta-ethical
beliefs for understanding individual differences in moral judgment.
feel anger for violations of autonomy, contempt for violations of community, and disgust for violations
of divinity. Although the disgustdivinity link has received some measure of empirical support, the
results have been difficult to interpret in light of several conceptual and design flaws. Taking a revised
methodological approach, including use of newly validated (Study 1), pathogen-free violations of the
divinity code, we found (Study 2) little evidence of disgust-related phenomenology (nausea, gagging, loss
of appetite) or action tendency (desire to move away), but much evidence of anger-linked desire to
retaliate, as a major component of individuals’ projected response to “pure” (pathogen-free) violations of
the divinity code. Study 3 replicated these results using faces in lieu of words as a dependent measure.
Concordant findings emerged from an archival study (Study 4) examining the aftermath of a real-life
sacred violation—the burning of Korans by U.S. military personnel. Study 5 further corroborated these
results using continuous measures based on everyday emotion terms and new variants of the divinity—pure
scenarios featuring sacrilegious acts committed by a theologically irreverent member of one’s own group
rather than an ideologically opposed member of another group. Finally, a supplemental study found the
anger-dominant attribution pattern to remain intact when the impious act being judged was the judge’s
own. Based on these and related results, we posit anger to be the principal emotional response to moral
transgressions irrespective of the normative content involved.
to accord genuinely moral (non-conventional) status to a range of counter-normative acts — that is, to treat such acts as
wrong regardless of existing social opinion or norms. We contrasted social violations that are intrinsically harmful to
others (e.g., fraud, thievery) with those that are not (e.g., wearing pajamas to work and engaging in consensual acts of
sexual intimacy with an adult sibling). Our key hypothesis was that more reflective (higher CRT) individuals would tend
to moralize selectively — treating only intrinsically harmful acts as genuinely morally wrong — whereas less reflective
(lower CRT) individuals would moralize more indiscriminately. We found clear support for this hypothesis in a large and
ideologically diverse sample of American adults. The predicted associations were not fully accounted for by the subjects’
political orientation, sensitivity to gut feelings, gender, age, educational attainment, or their placement on a sexual moralsspecific
measure of social conservatism. Our studies are the first to demonstrate that, in addition to modulating the intensity
of moral condemnation, reflection may also play a key role in setting the boundaries of the moral domain as such
their less religious counterparts, but the reason for this is not clear. We propose that a meta-ethical belief that morality
is rooted in inviolable divine commands (i.e., endorsement of Divine Command Theory) may help explain this finding.
We present a novel 20-item scale measuring a belief that morality is founded on divine authority. The scale shows
good internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. Study 1 found that this scale fully mediated the
relationship that various religiosity measures had with a deontological thinking style in our sample of American adults.
It also accounted for the link between religiosity and social conservative values. Furthermore, the relationship between
the scale and these outcome variables held after statistically controlling for variables related to actively open-minded
thinking and the Big Five. Study 2 replicated the results using naturalistic moral dilemmas that placed deontological
and utilitarian concerns in conflict, and showed that the results of Study 1 cannot be explained by differences in moral
foundations (e.g., concern for authority more generally) or differences in the perceived function of rules. Quite the
contrary, endorsement of the divine origins of morality fully mediated the relationship religiosity had with the so-called
“binding” foundations (i.e., Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity). Our findings highlight the importance of meta-ethical
beliefs for understanding individual differences in moral judgment.