Books by Genia Schönbaumsfeld
Cambridge Elements Series, 2023
Wittgenstein published next to nothing on the philosophy of
religion and yet his conception of re... more Wittgenstein published next to nothing on the philosophy of
religion and yet his conception of religious belief has been both
enormously influential and hotly contested. In the contemporary
literature, Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a
non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. This Element shows that all of
these readings are misguided and seriously at odds, not just with what
Wittgenstein says about religious belief, but with his entire later
philosophy. This Element also argues that Wittgenstein presents us with
an important ‘third way’ of understanding religious belief – one that
does not fall into the trap of either assimilating religious beliefs to
ordinary empirical beliefs or seeking to reduce them to the expression
of certain attitudes.
The Illusion of Doubt confronts one of the most important questions
in philosophy and beyond: wha... more The Illusion of Doubt confronts one of the most important questions
in philosophy and beyond: what can we know? The radical sceptic’s answer is ‘not very much’ if we cannot prove that we are not subject to (possibly permanent) deception. For centuries philosophers have been impressed by the radical sceptic’s move, but this book shows that the
radical sceptical problem turns out to be an illusion created by a mistaken picture of our evidential situation. This means that we don’t need to answer the radical sceptical problem ‘head on’, but rather to undermine the philosophical assumptions that it depends on. For without these assumptions, radical scepticism collapses all by itself. This result is highly significant, as it manages to dissolve one of the most intractable philosophical problems that has bedevilled some of the greatest minds until the present day.
Die Arbeit veranschaulicht anhand der Argumente von Kant, Strawson und Davidson, daß vier Kriteri... more Die Arbeit veranschaulicht anhand der Argumente von Kant, Strawson und Davidson, daß vier Kriterien für Transzendentalität identifiziert werden können: ein Reductio des skeptischen Zweifels, die Ablehnung einer Schema/Inhalt-Distinktion, die Etablierung ...
Papers by Genia Schönbaumsfeld
Synthese, 2024
Although academic work on conspiracy theory has taken off in the last two decades, both in other ... more Although academic work on conspiracy theory has taken off in the last two decades, both in other disciplines as well as in epistemology, the similarities between global sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories have not been the focus of attention. The main reason for this lacuna probably stems from the fact that most philosophers take radical scepticism very seriously, while, for the most part, regarding ‘conspiracy thinking’ as epistemically defective. Defenders of conspiracy theory, on the other hand, tend not to be that interested in undermining radical scepticism, since their primary goal is to save conspiracy theories from the charges of irrationality. In this paper, I argue that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories exhibit importantly similar features, which raises a serious dilemma for the ‘orthodox’ view that holds that while we must respond to radical scepticism, global conspiracy theories can just be dismissed. For, if, as I will show, both scenarios can be seen to be epistemically on a par, then either radical sceptical scenarios are as irrational as global conspiracy theories or neither type of scenario is intrinsically irrational. I argue for the first option by introducing a distinction between ‘local’ and ‘global’ sceptical scenarios and showing how this distinction maps onto contemporary debates concerning how best to understand the notion of a ‘conspiracy theory’. I demonstrate that, just as in the case of scepticism, ‘local’ conspiracies are, at least in principle, detectable and, hence, epistemically unproblematic, while global conspiracy theories, like radical scepticism, are essentially invulnerable to any potential counterevidence. This renders them theoretically vacuous and idle, as everything and nothing is compatible with what these ‘theories’ assert. I also show that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories face the self-undermining problem: As soon as global unreliability is posited, the ensuing radical doubt swallows its children – the coherence of the sceptic’s proposal or the conspiracy theorist’s preferred conspiracy. I conclude that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories are indeed partners in crime and should, therefore, be regarded as equally dubious.
Practices of Truth in Philosophy: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, 2023
Radical scepticism is the thought that we might know nothing about the so-called 'external' world... more Radical scepticism is the thought that we might know nothing about the so-called 'external' worldeither what it is like or whether it exists. Most contemporary epistemological proposals are concessive to scepticism in that they grant to the sceptic that unless we can demonstrate that we are not massively deceived, we can, at best, have knowledge of how things appear to us. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, thinks that radical scepticism is an illusion. My paper has two main aims: 1) to explain why Wittgenstein believes this; 2) to show that Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that it makes sense to 'ground' the background does not imply that Wittgenstein is a friend of anti-realism. Rather, Wittgenstein is endorsing a 'realism without empiricism'a modest form of realism that eschews various empiricist dogmas, such as the Reasons Identity Thesis-the thought that one's perceptual reasons in both the good epistemic case and the bad one are the same and can never give one access to how things actually are. This will enable us to see why accepting that what stands fast cannot itself be either true or false, does not threaten to undermine our epistemic practices.
Topoi, 2023
This paper aims to motivate a scepticism about scepticism in contemporary epistemology. I present... more This paper aims to motivate a scepticism about scepticism in contemporary epistemology. I present the sceptic with a dilemma: On one parsing of the BIV (brain-in-a-vat) scenario, the second premise in a closure-based sceptical argument will turn out false, because the scenario is refutable; on another parsing, the scenario collapses into incoherence, because the sceptic cannot even save the appearances. I discuss three different ways of cashing out the BIV scenario: 'Recent Envatment' (RE), 'Lifelong Envatment' (LE) and 'Nothing But Envatment' (NBE). I show that RE scenarios are a kind of 'local' sceptical scenario that does not pose a significant threat to the possibility of perceptual knowledge as such. I then go on to consider the more radical (or global) LE and NBE scenarios, which do undermine the possibility of perceptual knowledge of an 'external' world by positing that it is conceivable that one has always been envatted and, hence, trapped in a 'global' illusion. I start by assuming that we could be in such a scenario (LE or NBE) and then spell out what we would need to presuppose for such scenarios to be capable of being actual. Drawing on some central insights from Wittgenstein's antiprivate language considerations, I show that the truth of a global scepticism would presuppose the possibility of a private 'vat-language', a notion that cannot be rendered coherent. But, if so, then neither can the sceptical scenarios that presuppose such a conception.
Ryan Kemp (ed.), Cambridge Critical Guide to Either/Or, 2023
In Either/Or I, the aesthete, A, gives us the following diagnosis of his predicament: ‘I think I ... more In Either/Or I, the aesthete, A, gives us the following diagnosis of his predicament: ‘I think I have the courage to doubt everything; I think I have the courage to fight everything. But I do not have the courage to know anything, nor to possess, to own anything’ (E/O I 45). In this paper, I explore A’s fascinating claim that knowledge requires courage by way of juxtaposing the aesthetic life with Cartesian sceptical doubt. I show that just as the Cartesian doubter seeks refuge from radical scepticism in the safety of introspective knowledge – what is directly present to consciousness – so the aesthete seeks solace in the moment and what is sensuously present to him. Both methods ultimately prove ineffective and spurious, however: Cartesian introspection imprisons us in a mental cage with no beyond, just as aestheticism holds us captive in a self-spun world where our self dissolves. Consequently, what both the aesthete and the Cartesian need to do is to develop the strength to confront and overcome the anxieties that have motivated the flight from ‘the outer’ (the flight from the world) in the first place.
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion, 2021
This entry offers a brief overview of some of the main themes in early and later Wittgenstein's c... more This entry offers a brief overview of some of the main themes in early and later Wittgenstein's conception of religious belief. It also responds to some of the most frequently made objections to later Wittgenstein's views on religious language.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2022
It is generally thought that if introspective distinguishability (ID) were available, it would pr... more It is generally thought that if introspective distinguishability (ID) were available, it would provide an answer to scepticism about perceptual knowledge by enabling us to tell the difference between a good case perceptual experience and a bad kind. This paper challenges this common assumption by showing that even if ID were available, it would not advance our case against scepticism. The conclusion to draw from this result is not to concede to scepticism, however, but rather to give up on the idea that ID is required for knowledge. For if perception with ID turns out to get us no further than perception without ID, then the rational thing to do is to realize that the putative presence (or absence) of ID is a red herring in the debate about scepticism and can make no difference to the question of whether or not perceptual knowledge is possible.
Matthew Jope, Duncan Pritchard (eds), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure, 2021
Conceptions of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology tend to be scepticism-driven. That... more Conceptions of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology tend to be scepticism-driven. That is to say, epistemologists implicitly (or explicitly) take the sceptical problem as a point of departure and then formulate a notion of perceptual grounds that, right from the start, makes serious concessions to scepticism. This constitutes, in effect, a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach – the resulting view is whatever one might be left with after the sceptic (or our sceptical alter ego) has done her work. But if that is the strategy, then it is not surprising that the outcome, to put it in Dretske’s memorable words, is that ‘philosophy is a business where one learns to live with spindly brown grass in one’s own yard because neighbouring yards are in even worse shape'. In this paper, I want to argue that to take such an approach is a mistake. We should rather proceed the opposite way. In other words, we should begin with a conception of perceptual reasons that fits the facts and our ordinary intuitions, and then explore what the ramifications for scepticism might be. We should not, ab initio, cede the high-ground to the sceptic and let her dictate the terms of engagement.
Essays on the philosophy of Wittgenstein, 2010
An ever-widening rift divides the world of Wittgenstein studies. Located on one side of the debat... more An ever-widening rift divides the world of Wittgenstein studies. Located on one side of the debate are the self-declared 'resolute readers' 1 who cleave to some version of what James Conant (2007) calls 'Mono-Wittgensteiniansim'-the idea that, roughly speaking, early and later Wittgenstein were up to the same thing: namely, offering a therapy that will cure us of the illusion of meaning something where we really mean nothing. Located on the other side are what the resolute like to call the 'standard readers' 2 , who believe, first, that although there is some continuity in places, there is significant discontinuity between early Wittgenstein and his later self, and, second, that later Wittgenstein aimed at more than mere therapy. 'Resolute readings' initially started life as a radical new approach to Wittgenstein's early work: first presented by Cora Diamond and James Conant 3 , they gained currency as an attempt to save the Tractatus from ending in self-contradiction. But the debate has not remained Tractatuscentred. As Conant points out in a recent paper: 'issues parallel to those which arise in the interpretation of the Tractatus arise in connection with the interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work as well' (2004, 168). Stephen Mulhall, in his latest book, Wittgenstein's Private Language, concurs-taking his cue from the aforementioned paper by Conant, Mulhall (2007) offers the first sustained attempt at providing a 'resolute' reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations 4. 1 The term 'resolute reading' was coined by Warren Goldfarb (1997). 2 Hutchinson (2007, 693) calls them 'elucidatory' readers.
Sceptical Invariantism Reconsidered, 2020
In The Illusion of Doubt I developed an account of Wittgensteinian ‘hinge propositions’ within th... more In The Illusion of Doubt I developed an account of Wittgensteinian ‘hinge propositions’ within the context of a wider diagnostic anti-sceptical strategy that showed that radical scepticism is an illusion generated by a prior endorsement of a Cartesian picture of our evidential situation that we have no good independent reason to accept. This strategy was bolstered by Wittgenstein’s insights that a ‘global’ doubt is not a doubt, and the very idea of a ‘global validation’ of all our epistemic practices taken together incoherent. My interpretation of those propositions that must ‘stand fast’ if epistemic enquiry is to be possible, however, is quite different from those currently available in the literature. For, according to most hinge epistemologists , ‘hinges’ are basically certain, but cannot be known. Conversely, proponents of what I call a ‘quasi-epistemic’ reading contend that hinges can be known, though knowledge claims about them are trivial. I, on the other hand, propose that ‘hinge propositions’, although they ‘stand fast’, can neither be known, nor are they certain in the ordinary sense, since, doubt, in respect to them, is ‘logically excluded’. In order better to understand what this means, I distinguish between a ‘logical’ and an epistemic sense of ‘to know’: where the expression of uncertainty is senseless, but no further grounds can be given, we are dealing with a purely ‘logical’ use of ‘to know’; where it is possible to be wrong or uncertain, but reasons for correctness can be given, we are dealing with the ordinary, ‘epistemic’ sense. As we shall see in this chapter, this distinction does important philosophical work, as it enables us to fulfil three desiderata usually thought impossible to fulfil together, namely, the joint avoidance of 1) epistemic contextualism , 2) denials of closure, 3) concessions to radical scepticism.
Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2019
Radical scepticism is the contention that little or no knowledge of one's 'external' surroundings... more Radical scepticism is the contention that little or no knowledge of one's 'external' surroundings might be possible. Most modern forms of scepticism have their roots in René Descartes' Meditations which first advocated a method of 'radical doubt': imagining, for the sake of argument, that all one's beliefs are false in the hope of finding some indubitable ones that will survive this acid test. Descartes employs three types of argument in order to motivate scepticism about one's beliefs: an argument from perceptual illusion; the dreaming argument; and the evil demon scenario. The argument from perceptual illusion exploits the idea that our senses sometimes mislead use .g. a straight stick appears bent in water; a square tower will appear round from afar-thus inviting the thought that perception, our main route to knowledge of the world, might not be fully reliable. The dreaming argument is a form of 'indistinguishability argument' (see §2) that trades on the impossibility of phenomenologically distinguishing a waking experience from a dreaming experience merely by attending to the 'qualitative feel' of the experience itself. The conclusion seems to be that if one cannot so distinguish, one can never know that one is not dreaming. But if one cannot know that one is not dreaming, one cannot have ordinary knowledge of the world, as one must be certain that one really has knowledge as opposed to 'dream-knowledge' (compare Stroud 1984; Wright 2002). The evil demon argument is a radicalization of the dreaming argument: Descartes asks us to imagine an all-powerful mind that is constantly deceiving us, so that whatever we believe, it turns out to be false. If we cannot rule out that we might be the victims of such a scenario, we cannot, it seems, know anything.
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2020
The Illusion of Doubt shows that radical scepticism is an illusion generated by a Cartesian pictu... more The Illusion of Doubt shows that radical scepticism is an illusion generated by a Cartesian picture of our evidential situation-the view that my epistemic grounds in both the 'good' and the 'bad' cases must be the same. It is this picture which issues both a standing invitation to radical scepticism and ensures that there is no way of getting out of it while agreeing to the sceptic's terms. The sceptical problem cannot, therefore, be answered 'directly'. Rather, the assumptions that give rise to it, need to be undermined. These include the notion that radical scepticism can be motivated by the 'closure' principle for knowledge, that the 'Indistinguishability Argument' renders the Cartesian conception compulsory, that the 'New Evil Genius Thesis' is coherent, and the demand for a 'global validation' of our epistemic practices makes sense. Once these dogmas are undermined, the path is clear for a 'realism without empiricism' that allows us to re-establish unmediated contact with the objects and persons in our environment which an illusion of doubt had threatened to put forever beyond our cognitive grasp.
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2020
In this paper I respond to the objections and comments made by Ranalli, Williams, and Moyal-Sharr... more In this paper I respond to the objections and comments made by Ranalli, Williams, and Moyal-Sharrock, participants in a symposium on my book on scepticism called The Illusion of Doubt.
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2019
This introduction provides an overview of the content of the papers published in the special issu... more This introduction provides an overview of the content of the papers published in the special issue on epistemic vice and forms of scepticism.
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2019
The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven les... more The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not, as potential knowers, just passive recipients of a passing show of putatively veridical information, we also actively need to put ourselves in the way of it by learning to resist certain forms of epistemic temptation: the Cartesian thought that we could be ‘imprisoned’ within our own representations, and, hence permanently ‘out of touch’ with an ‘external’ world, and the Reasons Identity Thesis, which has us believe that whether we are in the good case or in the bad case, our epistemic grounds are the same.
New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism (ed. Doyle, Milburn, Pritchard), 2019
In this chapter I argue that the ideal that Wittgenstein puts forward in Remarks on the Foundatio... more In this chapter I argue that the ideal that Wittgenstein puts forward in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics – what one might call ‘realism without empiricism’ – is a form of disjunctivism, where disjunctivism is just the philosophical name for our ordinary thought that perception provides us with knowledge of our environment in the good case. I argue that such a conception may look like a substantial philosophical theory, but that this is only because adherence to a bad picture – what I call the Cartesian picture of our evidential situation – has turned our ordinary, pre-theoretical notion into something that seems dubious and epistemologically inflated. To someone who rejects this picture, on the other hand, disjunctivism is just the name philosophers give to our ordinary way of thinking about the world. If my reading is correct, Wittgenstein was not only one of the first proponents of a disjunctivist view, he also gives us good reasons to resist its converse, the Reasons Identity Thesis (the thought that even in the good case my perceptual reasons can be no better than in the bad case), which one might call the fourth or last dogma of empiricism.
European Journal of Philosophy
One of the most intractable issues in Kierkegaard scholarship continues to be the question of wha... more One of the most intractable issues in Kierkegaard scholarship continues to be the question of what one is to make of the relation between infinite resignation and faith in Fear and Trembling. Most commentators follow Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author in claiming that progression to faith is a "linear" process that requires infinite resignation as a first step. The problem with such a reading is that it leads to paradox: It seems to require attributing to the "knight of faith" two inconsistent belief-attitudes simultaneously-on the one hand, the willingness to resign one's heart's desires (infinite resignation) and, on the other, the conviction that one will somehow receive back what one has resigned. But this is a confused way of thinking about faith. I will show that faith's alleged paradoxicality is only apparent and that the element of resignation that constitutes an aspect of it actually bears some striking similarities to what the aesthete has in mind when he speaks, in Either/Or, of throwing hope overboard in order to make possible a truly artistic way of life. Hence, on my interpretation, the knight of faith does not need to adopt two contradictory attitudes at the same time (or constantly to "annul" one of them), but must rather practice a form of spiritual discipline in many ways analogous to the aesthete's endeavour to become a "poet of possibility."
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Books by Genia Schönbaumsfeld
religion and yet his conception of religious belief has been both
enormously influential and hotly contested. In the contemporary
literature, Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a
non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. This Element shows that all of
these readings are misguided and seriously at odds, not just with what
Wittgenstein says about religious belief, but with his entire later
philosophy. This Element also argues that Wittgenstein presents us with
an important ‘third way’ of understanding religious belief – one that
does not fall into the trap of either assimilating religious beliefs to
ordinary empirical beliefs or seeking to reduce them to the expression
of certain attitudes.
in philosophy and beyond: what can we know? The radical sceptic’s answer is ‘not very much’ if we cannot prove that we are not subject to (possibly permanent) deception. For centuries philosophers have been impressed by the radical sceptic’s move, but this book shows that the
radical sceptical problem turns out to be an illusion created by a mistaken picture of our evidential situation. This means that we don’t need to answer the radical sceptical problem ‘head on’, but rather to undermine the philosophical assumptions that it depends on. For without these assumptions, radical scepticism collapses all by itself. This result is highly significant, as it manages to dissolve one of the most intractable philosophical problems that has bedevilled some of the greatest minds until the present day.
Papers by Genia Schönbaumsfeld
religion and yet his conception of religious belief has been both
enormously influential and hotly contested. In the contemporary
literature, Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a
non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. This Element shows that all of
these readings are misguided and seriously at odds, not just with what
Wittgenstein says about religious belief, but with his entire later
philosophy. This Element also argues that Wittgenstein presents us with
an important ‘third way’ of understanding religious belief – one that
does not fall into the trap of either assimilating religious beliefs to
ordinary empirical beliefs or seeking to reduce them to the expression
of certain attitudes.
in philosophy and beyond: what can we know? The radical sceptic’s answer is ‘not very much’ if we cannot prove that we are not subject to (possibly permanent) deception. For centuries philosophers have been impressed by the radical sceptic’s move, but this book shows that the
radical sceptical problem turns out to be an illusion created by a mistaken picture of our evidential situation. This means that we don’t need to answer the radical sceptical problem ‘head on’, but rather to undermine the philosophical assumptions that it depends on. For without these assumptions, radical scepticism collapses all by itself. This result is highly significant, as it manages to dissolve one of the most intractable philosophical problems that has bedevilled some of the greatest minds until the present day.
I show that recent envatment arguments (the ‘local’ variety) work similarly
to arguments from perceptual illusion and that neither of them are able, by
themselves, to get us ‘global’ scepticism. Consequently, motivating the radical
sceptical idea that all of our perceptual beliefs might be false is harder than it
looks.
widespread local error is conceivable, we cannot, in the end, make sense
of the radical sceptical idea that all our perceptual beliefs might be false—
that no one has, as it were, ever been in touch with an ‘external world’ at
all. To this end, I will show that an asymmetry exists between local and
global sceptical scenarios, such that the possibility of local error does not
imply that global error must also be possible. Instead, we will see that
what gives rise to the radical sceptical problem is an unquestioned acceptance
of the New Evil Genius Thesis—the notion that I and my
envatted counterpart share the same perceptual experiences, even though
my benighted twin has never had any contact with an ‘external’ reality.
Although most contemporary epistemologists take net for granted, I will
show that it cannot, ultimately, be rendered intelligible, and, consequently,
that neither can the global sceptical scenario that depends on it.
While the ancient sceptics regarded scepticism about knowledge as a way of life, philosophers from Descartes to the present day have viewed it primarily as an intellectual problem that requires only a theoretical solution. The aim of this conference is to challenge this contention by focussing on the ‘existential’ dimension of doubt – i.e. the way in which sceptical problems affect the whole person. For example, Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard, has proposed that doubt and anxiety are intrinsically linked, and, hence, that doubt may not just be an epistemic vice (if it is one), but also a character failing that consists in a refusal to confront (and to try and overcome) certain forms of angst, such as, for instance, a refusal to face up to the radical contingency and fragility of the (human) world and to take refuge in a ‘scapegoating’ scenario, where super-powerful, hidden agents are to blame: Descartes’ Evil Demon, on the one hand, or, say, a ‘Deep State’ controlling our actions, on the other. The conference aims to explore these issues from a number of different philosophical perspectives (both Kierkegaardian and non-Kierkegaardian) and to bring together Kierkegaard scholars and epistemologists, working in both theoretical and applied areas of the subject.