Alisher Ilkhamov
Alisher Ilkhamov is the director of Central Asia Due Diligence (CADD), a non-profit organization registered in the United Kingdom. From 1999 to 2001 he ran the first in Uzbekistan private public opinion research company, "Expert", after which, until 2004, directed the Open Society Institute – Uzbekistan, then moved to London to continue his work with the Open Society Foundation’s Eurasia Program, wherein he ran the program work on Uzbekistan and lately, since 2014, the anti-corruption thematic portfolio. After having worked with OSF for more than 17 years he left it in November 2021 to establish his own organization.
CADD's mission is to promote good governance, political and economic development, as well as national sovereignty and regional security in the post-Soviet Central Asia, by using state-of-the-art policy research and analysis.
Alisher is the author of 100+ publications on development, nation-state building, nationalism, governance, anti-corruption and human rights in post-Soviet Uzbekistan and Central Asia. His Scopus h-index is 7.
CADD's mission is to promote good governance, political and economic development, as well as national sovereignty and regional security in the post-Soviet Central Asia, by using state-of-the-art policy research and analysis.
Alisher is the author of 100+ publications on development, nation-state building, nationalism, governance, anti-corruption and human rights in post-Soviet Uzbekistan and Central Asia. His Scopus h-index is 7.
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Papers by Alisher Ilkhamov
My commentary on the recently published US State Department report on the investment climate in Uzbekistan. It is noted that the report offers a thorough, comprehensive and objective analysis/ At the same time, it will not be sufficient for foreign investors to understand the situation in the country in terms of prospects and risks for investment. That is because the report focuses mainly on the legal system of Uzbekistan, while the main problem in this country is the lack of the rule of law due to the persisting practice of patronage in public administration and the lack of independence of justice. Analysis of the legal system must be complemented by consideration of the established practice in the field of foreign investments, considering how laws are actually enforced and the extent to which investors can rely on the legal mechanisms in this country to protect their property rights, instead of seeking deals behind the doors with decision makers.
The article is published in Russian, but the English version is coming soon.
В своих воспоминаниях автор охватывает период протяженностью примерно в полстолетия, начиная с его первого студенческого опыта, когда до развала Советского Союза было еще далеко, а эпоха Перестройки еще не наступила. Далее внимание переключается на пост-советский период. С точки зрения охвата тем, оригинальной тут является попытка дать их некую панораму. Обзор тем включает в себя следующее:
усиление социальной стратификации в постсоветский период;
появление категории «новых бедных»;
сложность изучения бюджетов семей в условиях Узбекистана;
анализ структурных изменений в аграрном секторе;
система принудительного труда в хлопковом секторе страны;
проблемы коррупции и возвращения украденных активов в страну;
и наконец, остающиеся институциональные преграды для экономического роста страны и привлечения иностранных инвестиций.
In his reminiscences, the author covers a period spanning roughly half a century, starting from his initial student experiences when the collapse of the Soviet Union was still far off, and the era of Perestroika had not yet arrived. Subsequently, attention shifted to the post-Soviet period. In terms of thematic coverage, the author offers a panorama of subjects of his interest, as follows:
• Sharp social stratification in the post-Soviet period;
• Emergence of the class of "new poor";
• Complexity of studying family budgets in Uzbekistan;
• Policy changes in Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector;
• The system of forced labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton sector;
• Issues of corruption and repatriation of stolen assets back to the country;
• Finally, lingering institutional barriers to the economic growth of the country and attracting foreign investments.
The main point is that the system of cotton-textile clusters created from above by the government of Uzbekistan has nothing to do with a free market economy, at least with the conditions of free and fair market competition. This system still remains command, as it was under Islam Karimov, while private textile companies, including those with foreign capital, simply fit into the framework of this command economy and play by its rules, combining the privileges of monopolists in each agricultural district with administrative power.
1. Миф о подавляющей поддержке Владимира Путина и войны в Украине российским населением и госаппаратом полностью развеян. Восстание показало отсутствие подлинной общественной поддержки режима, несмотря на то, что предыдущие данные опросов вроде бы говорили о широком одобрении.
2. Доктрина гибридных войн, принятая режимом Путина на вооружение в 2013 году и реализованная с привлечением ЧВК «Вагнер», полностью потерпела крах. Правительство вряд ли повторит эту стратегию после подведения итогов мятежа.
3. Мятеж серьезно подорвал авторитет и легитимность Путина, побудив его искать убежища в Казахстане и Узбекистане. Предполагается, что в будущем, при аналогичном политическом кризисе он может снова обратиться к этим странам за убежищем. Однако это поднимет вопрос о том, будут ли при этом эти страны и другие союзники России выполнять ордер Международного уголовного суда на арест Путина, а если нет, то приведет ли это их к серьезному репутационному ущербу и международным санкциям.
1. The myth of overwhelming support for Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine by the Russian population and state apparatus has been entirely dispelled. The rebellion revealed a lack of genuine public backing for the regime, despite previous claims of widespread approval.
2. The doctrine of hybrid wars, adopted by the Putin regime in 2013 and implemented with the involvement of the Wagner PMC, has completely collapsed. The government is unlikely to repeat this strategy after the mutiny attempt.
3. The mutiny severely undermined Putin's authority and legitimacy, prompting him to seek asylum in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It is suggested that in a future political crisis, he may approach these countries again for refuge. However, this would raise the issue of whether they would comply with the ICC warrant for Putin's arrest, potentially leading to reputational damage, if they fail to comply with the international law.
Подробнее об этом в предлагаемой статье.
(The Russian version is coming)
My commentary on the recently published US State Department report on the investment climate in Uzbekistan. It is noted that the report offers a thorough, comprehensive and objective analysis/ At the same time, it will not be sufficient for foreign investors to understand the situation in the country in terms of prospects and risks for investment. That is because the report focuses mainly on the legal system of Uzbekistan, while the main problem in this country is the lack of the rule of law due to the persisting practice of patronage in public administration and the lack of independence of justice. Analysis of the legal system must be complemented by consideration of the established practice in the field of foreign investments, considering how laws are actually enforced and the extent to which investors can rely on the legal mechanisms in this country to protect their property rights, instead of seeking deals behind the doors with decision makers.
The article is published in Russian, but the English version is coming soon.
В своих воспоминаниях автор охватывает период протяженностью примерно в полстолетия, начиная с его первого студенческого опыта, когда до развала Советского Союза было еще далеко, а эпоха Перестройки еще не наступила. Далее внимание переключается на пост-советский период. С точки зрения охвата тем, оригинальной тут является попытка дать их некую панораму. Обзор тем включает в себя следующее:
усиление социальной стратификации в постсоветский период;
появление категории «новых бедных»;
сложность изучения бюджетов семей в условиях Узбекистана;
анализ структурных изменений в аграрном секторе;
система принудительного труда в хлопковом секторе страны;
проблемы коррупции и возвращения украденных активов в страну;
и наконец, остающиеся институциональные преграды для экономического роста страны и привлечения иностранных инвестиций.
In his reminiscences, the author covers a period spanning roughly half a century, starting from his initial student experiences when the collapse of the Soviet Union was still far off, and the era of Perestroika had not yet arrived. Subsequently, attention shifted to the post-Soviet period. In terms of thematic coverage, the author offers a panorama of subjects of his interest, as follows:
• Sharp social stratification in the post-Soviet period;
• Emergence of the class of "new poor";
• Complexity of studying family budgets in Uzbekistan;
• Policy changes in Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector;
• The system of forced labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton sector;
• Issues of corruption and repatriation of stolen assets back to the country;
• Finally, lingering institutional barriers to the economic growth of the country and attracting foreign investments.
The main point is that the system of cotton-textile clusters created from above by the government of Uzbekistan has nothing to do with a free market economy, at least with the conditions of free and fair market competition. This system still remains command, as it was under Islam Karimov, while private textile companies, including those with foreign capital, simply fit into the framework of this command economy and play by its rules, combining the privileges of monopolists in each agricultural district with administrative power.
1. Миф о подавляющей поддержке Владимира Путина и войны в Украине российским населением и госаппаратом полностью развеян. Восстание показало отсутствие подлинной общественной поддержки режима, несмотря на то, что предыдущие данные опросов вроде бы говорили о широком одобрении.
2. Доктрина гибридных войн, принятая режимом Путина на вооружение в 2013 году и реализованная с привлечением ЧВК «Вагнер», полностью потерпела крах. Правительство вряд ли повторит эту стратегию после подведения итогов мятежа.
3. Мятеж серьезно подорвал авторитет и легитимность Путина, побудив его искать убежища в Казахстане и Узбекистане. Предполагается, что в будущем, при аналогичном политическом кризисе он может снова обратиться к этим странам за убежищем. Однако это поднимет вопрос о том, будут ли при этом эти страны и другие союзники России выполнять ордер Международного уголовного суда на арест Путина, а если нет, то приведет ли это их к серьезному репутационному ущербу и международным санкциям.
1. The myth of overwhelming support for Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine by the Russian population and state apparatus has been entirely dispelled. The rebellion revealed a lack of genuine public backing for the regime, despite previous claims of widespread approval.
2. The doctrine of hybrid wars, adopted by the Putin regime in 2013 and implemented with the involvement of the Wagner PMC, has completely collapsed. The government is unlikely to repeat this strategy after the mutiny attempt.
3. The mutiny severely undermined Putin's authority and legitimacy, prompting him to seek asylum in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It is suggested that in a future political crisis, he may approach these countries again for refuge. However, this would raise the issue of whether they would comply with the ICC warrant for Putin's arrest, potentially leading to reputational damage, if they fail to comply with the international law.
Подробнее об этом в предлагаемой статье.
(The Russian version is coming)
After that discussion, I decided to develop this topic further. On April 6, I posted here the draft article for discussion, which elicited 306 views and a number of comments, as of April 16. After then, April 16, I updated the paper and published in Central Asia Due Diligence, https://cenasiaduediligence.uk/is-putins-regime-nazi/, the director of which I am, and also posted it on Academia.edu in the section of published works. To avoid confusions, I’m substituting the draft earlier posted in this section by the final version, so the same version is available for reading on all online platforms
What is new in the current version? I’ve added the review of available literature on the subject and updated the section titled “Distinctions”.
Abstract: In this essay, the evolution of Putin's views, from his neo-imperial and anti-Western statements to his formulation of a neo-Nazi ideological doctrine, is considered. This doctrine has apparently brought him to a decision to launch a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. I compare his doctrine with the key parameters of the ideologies of the past Italian fascism and German Nazism. The conclusion of this comparison is the confirmation of my earlier statement that the Putin regime, in its late evolution, can indeed be considered a new kind and form of neo-Nazism. There is nothing unexpected about this conclusion. Today, many observers call this regime fascist. Still, it is most often just a figure of speech, a pejorative term as a reaction to the atrocities and genocide that the Russian military is committing in Ukraine. This article attempts to substantiate the same conclusion but does that by an effort to meet the standards of impartial analysis of Putin's views.