“同品”是印度推理理論的重要概念之一，是因三相理論必要的構成要素。國內因明學界爭論多年的“除宗有法”問題就與同品究竟為何的問題密切相關。在這場論爭中，學者們多將視野投向了陳那法稱的推理體系究竟是... more “同品”是印度推理理論的重要概念之一，是因三相理論必要的構成要素。國內因明學界爭論多年的“除宗有法”問題就與同品究竟為何的問題密切相關。在這場論爭中，學者們多將視野投向了陳那法稱的推理體系究竟是歸納還是演繹的問題之上，但卻很少嚴肅考察同品的定義，存在著對同品的誤解，甚至有時為了彌補因為對這一概念的誤解而造成的理論衝突，論爭者不得不引入越來越多的形式邏輯或數理邏輯的理論，形成了愈加繁冗的研究樣態。本文以同品定義為考察對象，選取佛教因明量論文獻，大致按照成書順序依次討論它們關於同品的定義，指出《入正理論》《正理門論》玄奘譯本的模糊性，以及除內遍充論外，佛教量論對同品的定義應為“由於所證性質上的共通性，或通過所證性質這一共通性，與主題相似的事物是同品”。同時指出，在內遍充論之外的佛教量論中，同品不包含作為宗有法的主題。直到十一世紀寶藏寂論師建立的內遍充論，才將同品視為所有擁有所證性質的事物。
Dignāga is the master of the epistemological school of Buddhism. After him, Buddhist philosophy a... more Dignāga is the master of the epistemological school of Buddhism. After him, Buddhist philosophy accelerated into the era of pramāṇa. In the midst of this trend, the 6th century Madhyamaka philosopher Candrakīrti made a rare criticism of Dignāga's pramāṇa theory in his Prasannapadā. This case in the history of Indian Buddhism has been studied extensively. However, due to a number of flaws and academic prejudices, the previous studies have not given a simple, clear, and reasonable explanation of this important Buddhist philosophical controversy. Therefore, this paper will examine the details of the debate between Candrakīrti and Dignāga on the basis of an analysis of the Prasannapadā, in order to clarify Candrakīrti's complex position on pramāṇa. Briefly, this paper argues that the main disagreement between Candrakīrti and Dignāga is not over the ultimate truth and the conventional status of pramāṇa, but rather over the question of how to establish pramāṇa in conventional expressions. Candrakīrti criticizes Dignāga's theory of pramāṇa not for the purpose of destroying it, but for the purpose of defending conventional pramāṇa.
The general consensus in the field of Buddhist studies is that the terms “biaoquan” and “zhequan”... more The general consensus in the field of Buddhist studies is that the terms “biaoquan” and “zhequan” are a pair of Buddhist philosophical concepts often used to designate two diametrically opposed forms of rhetoric. The former term constitutes its affirmative statement, while the latter defines a fact in negative terms—known in Christian theology as cataphatic and apophatic uses of language, respectively. Looking at the terms for which biaoquan and zhequan initially served as translations, especially in Xuanzang’s works, it would seem that these two concepts have not always appeared as a related pair representing the above-mentioned affirmative–negative dichotomy. The former could designate both affirmation (*vidhi) as well as the general activity of speech, syllables, and words (nāma). In the case of zhequan, it corresponds, in different texts, to the three Indian Buddhist concepts of negation (*pratiṣedha, *vyāvṛtti, *nivṛtti), implicative negation (paryudāsa), and exclusion of other...
The general consensus in the field of Buddhist studies is that the terms “biaoquan” and “zhequan”... more The general consensus in the field of Buddhist studies is that the terms “biaoquan” and “zhequan” are a pair of Buddhist philosophical concepts often used to designate two diametrically opposed forms of rhetoric. The former term constitutes its affirmative statement, while the latter defines a fact in negative terms—known in Christian theology as cataphatic and apophatic uses of language, respectively. Looking at the terms for which biaoquan and zhequan initially served as translations, especially in Xuanzang’s works, it would seem that these two concepts have not always appeared as a related pair representing the above-mentioned affirmative–negative dichotomy. The former could designate both affirmation (*vidhi) as well as the general activity of speech, syllables, and words (nāma). In the case of zhequan, it corresponds, in different texts, to the three Indian Buddhist concepts of negation (*pratiṣedha, *vyāvṛtti, *nivṛtti), implicative negation (paryudāsa), and exclusion of others (anyāpoha), with each use of the term “zhequan” carrying a different set of meanings and associated doctrines. Indeed, in various texts, the concept of zhequan might be opposed to the concept of biaoquan (*vidhi *sadhana) or opposed to pure negation (prasajya), or it might be applied on its own with no opposing concept. However, as Chinese Buddhism continued to develop throughout the Tang, biaoquan and zhequan came to be firmly associated and popularized as a pair of opposites. Looking at the doctrinal as well as the translation history of these two terms, this paper focuses on how they were used as a pair of opposing philosophical concepts, followed by an analysis of the profound influence of these two concepts on Chinese Buddhism.
Inside the palm-leaf manuscript of the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (ZX0617-ZB20) preserved in the Tib... more Inside the palm-leaf manuscript of the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (ZX0617-ZB20) preserved in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, one leaf of the Saṃghāṭasūtra has been identified. Inspired by Oskar von Hinüber's recent publication of the Sanskrit editio maior of the Saṃghāṭasūtra, we decided to publish our research on this newly identified leaf. The present paper will provide the codicological description and a diplomatic transcription of this leaf.
The prasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum) and prasaṅgaviparyaya (reversion from the prasaṅga’s statemen... more The prasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum) and prasaṅgaviparyaya (reversion from the prasaṅga’s statement by means of the contraposition) are an important group of argumentation methods in Buddhist epistemology. Studies on them have been mostly focused on the interpretations of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their later scholars, with occasional attention to Bhāviveka, a Madhyamaka scholar. It is well known that the prasaṅga was a means of argument relied upon by Mādhyamikas, especially by Candrakīrti, later known as a * Prāsaṅgika. However, it is surprising that the previous studies have generally overlooked Candrakīrti in their examination of the prasaṅga and the prasaṅgaviparyaya, despite the fact that Candrakīrti reshaped the meaning of the prasaṅga with the theory of the three kinds of inferences, namely inferences accepted by self, by others and by both. This paper, based on an analysis of the text of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, points out that both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti inherited Dignāga’s practice of using the prasaṅgaviparyaya to justify the legitimacy of the prasaṅga; however, they differ in that the former, just like Dignāga, regards the proof of the prasaṅgaviparyaya as an inference accepted by both, while the latter regards it as an inference accepted by others. This is the key difference between Candrakīrti and his sources of thought, Dignāga and Bhāviveka, as well as Dharmakīrti and his successors.
佛教量论中的“非限定说”是一种关于如何确认知识真伪的学说。该学说认为，人类一般知识的真有些是自律的，有些是他律的。本文以寂护、莲花戒论师的《摄真实论》及其《细疏》为中心，考察“非限定说”的理论背... more 佛教量论中的“非限定说”是一种关于如何确认知识真伪的学说。该学说认为，人类一般知识的真有些是自律的，有些是他律的。本文以寂护、莲花戒论师的《摄真实论》及其《细疏》为中心，考察“非限定说”的理论背景与细节。本文认为，佛教的“非限定说”是法称“量是非不一致的认识”定义与弥漫差派鸠摩利罗自律真学说的妥协产物。
四句分别，即关于某一议题的四项选择，以及通过或肯定或否定四项选择而构成的一种论法。由于四句分别在形式上违背排中律等基本的逻辑原则，引起现代学者的广泛关注。但这些先行研究普遍存在着：（一）过分倚重... more 四句分别，即关于某一议题的四项选择，以及通过或肯定或否定四项选择而构成的一种论法。由于四句分别在形式上违背排中律等基本的逻辑原则，引起现代学者的广泛关注。但这些先行研究普遍存在着：（一）过分倚重逻辑学的知识与视角，缺少从印度本土的因明学视角的考察；（二）笼统地处理四句分别的用例，缺少对相关文本细节的重视，等诸多问题。为了回应这些问题，本文以《中论》《明句论》第二十五章中的四句分别为考察对象，得出如下结论：存在着针对四句分别各项的一些固定解释模式，但这些模式并不能推广到所有的四句分别用例中；其次，《中论》《明句论》对四句分别的各项给予了多元的词意诠释，这些诠释已经超出了逻辑学的适用范围。因此，并非所有的四句分别都可以被形式化。
During a recent investigation of palm-leaf manuscripts of the Tibetan Autonomous Region conducted... more During a recent investigation of palm-leaf manuscripts of the Tibetan Autonomous Region conducted by Professor Zhang Meifang, several new Sanskrit manuscripts were discovered, among which Nāgārjuna’s Sūtrasamuccaya (SS) was identified. Being an anthology of mainly Mahāyānasūtras, the SS is important for the study of early Mahāyāna concepts. The Sanskrit text of the SS had long been considered lost, except for some Sanskrit fragments. The text of the SS was previously only available in Chinese and Tibetan translations. Our discovery is an incomplete bundle of the SS consisting of about 35 leaves. Unfortunately, many of the leaves became stuck together over the centuries and now, among all these leaves, only a portion, the folios 90b–97a, is currently available to scholars. This paper intends to introduce the outcome of a preliminary study and transcription of this manuscript of the SS.
活跃于六七世纪的印度中观派论师月称，在《明句论》一书中，批评了清辨论师所采用的自立比量。其中，月称所用技巧与汉传因明自他共三比量之说非常接近。对比此二者，可以为我们理解月称思想与汉传因明的起源提... more 活跃于六七世纪的印度中观派论师月称，在《明句论》一书中，批评了清辨论师所采用的自立比量。其中，月称所用技巧与汉传因明自他共三比量之说非常接近。对比此二者，可以为我们理解月称思想与汉传因明的起源提供有益的视角与材料。本文在分析月称《明句论》梵文本的基础上，着重考察自他共三比量视角下月称思想的样态，进而得出如下结论：月称归谬论法的核心是“他比量”；他认为清辨的自立比量只是一种“自比量”，不具备能破的功能；月称所用技巧更为质朴、简洁，与汉传因明中的三比量说的复杂形成了鲜明对比。因此，月称之说可能代表了三比量发展的较早阶段，为我们了解三比量说乃至汉传因明的起源和发展提供了珍贵的原始资料。
The Three Kinds of Inferences Found in Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā Abstract: The 6th-7th century Buddhist scholar Candrakīrti is well-known for his justifications for the Buddhapālita’s prasaṅga argumentative method and his severe criticisms toward Bhāvi-veka’s independent probative inference, which he provided in the first chapter of Prasannapadā (PsP). Because of his great influence over Tibetan Buddhism, this section of PsP has been re-peatedly studied since the discovery and publication of PsP. However, previous studies have rarely noted that the technique Candrakīrti utilized for his justifications or critiques is highly similar to the famous “three -inferences -theory” in Kuiji’s (窥基) “Great Commentary on Nyāyapraveśa”, namely the inference accepted by oneself (自比量), by others (他比量), and by both (共比量). This paper aims to analyze Candrakīrti’s related passages using the three -inferences -theory in order to reveal why Candrakīrti abandoned Dignāga’s rigid requirement of the common acceptance (共许决定) for an inference. It is reasonable to conclude that Can-drakīrti’s justifications for Buddhapālita and critiques toward Bhāviveka can be understood through the three -inferences -theory.
印度学仏教学研究 (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies), 2018
Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā(PsP) is the only complete Sanskrit commentary on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhy... more Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā(PsP) is the only complete Sanskrit commentary on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā(MMK). As a commentary on MMK, PsP cites the verses of MMK sequentially. This paper calls this kind of MMK's verses as the “basic verses”. Besides them, in order to explain a certain thought or idea, Candrakīrti also freely cites MMK's verses as his āgama. Among them, some MMK's verses contain different readings from the basic ones. This paper names them as “variant verses”. This paper will collect all the variant verses cited in PsP, compare them with six Sanskrit manuscripts, and discuss the possible causes of them.
A brief study on the theory of "not-uttering a single word" in Tathāgataguhyasūtra(《如来秘密经》or 《宝积经... more A brief study on the theory of "not-uttering a single word" in Tathāgataguhyasūtra(《如来秘密经》or 《宝积经·密迹金刚力士会》).
An Annotated Chinese Translation of Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā Chap.II, published in 《唯识研究》第五辑,... more An Annotated Chinese Translation of Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā Chap.II, published in 《唯识研究》第五辑, 2017（forthcoming）.
“同品”是印度推理理論的重要概念之一，是因三相理論必要的構成要素。國內因明學界爭論多年的“除宗有法”問題就與同品究竟為何的問題密切相關。在這場論爭中，學者們多將視野投向了陳那法稱的推理體系究竟是... more “同品”是印度推理理論的重要概念之一，是因三相理論必要的構成要素。國內因明學界爭論多年的“除宗有法”問題就與同品究竟為何的問題密切相關。在這場論爭中，學者們多將視野投向了陳那法稱的推理體系究竟是歸納還是演繹的問題之上，但卻很少嚴肅考察同品的定義，存在著對同品的誤解，甚至有時為了彌補因為對這一概念的誤解而造成的理論衝突，論爭者不得不引入越來越多的形式邏輯或數理邏輯的理論，形成了愈加繁冗的研究樣態。本文以同品定義為考察對象，選取佛教因明量論文獻，大致按照成書順序依次討論它們關於同品的定義，指出《入正理論》《正理門論》玄奘譯本的模糊性，以及除內遍充論外，佛教量論對同品的定義應為“由於所證性質上的共通性，或通過所證性質這一共通性，與主題相似的事物是同品”。同時指出，在內遍充論之外的佛教量論中，同品不包含作為宗有法的主題。直到十一世紀寶藏寂論師建立的內遍充論，才將同品視為所有擁有所證性質的事物。
Dignāga is the master of the epistemological school of Buddhism. After him, Buddhist philosophy a... more Dignāga is the master of the epistemological school of Buddhism. After him, Buddhist philosophy accelerated into the era of pramāṇa. In the midst of this trend, the 6th century Madhyamaka philosopher Candrakīrti made a rare criticism of Dignāga's pramāṇa theory in his Prasannapadā. This case in the history of Indian Buddhism has been studied extensively. However, due to a number of flaws and academic prejudices, the previous studies have not given a simple, clear, and reasonable explanation of this important Buddhist philosophical controversy. Therefore, this paper will examine the details of the debate between Candrakīrti and Dignāga on the basis of an analysis of the Prasannapadā, in order to clarify Candrakīrti's complex position on pramāṇa. Briefly, this paper argues that the main disagreement between Candrakīrti and Dignāga is not over the ultimate truth and the conventional status of pramāṇa, but rather over the question of how to establish pramāṇa in conventional expressions. Candrakīrti criticizes Dignāga's theory of pramāṇa not for the purpose of destroying it, but for the purpose of defending conventional pramāṇa.
The general consensus in the field of Buddhist studies is that the terms “biaoquan” and “zhequan”... more The general consensus in the field of Buddhist studies is that the terms “biaoquan” and “zhequan” are a pair of Buddhist philosophical concepts often used to designate two diametrically opposed forms of rhetoric. The former term constitutes its affirmative statement, while the latter defines a fact in negative terms—known in Christian theology as cataphatic and apophatic uses of language, respectively. Looking at the terms for which biaoquan and zhequan initially served as translations, especially in Xuanzang’s works, it would seem that these two concepts have not always appeared as a related pair representing the above-mentioned affirmative–negative dichotomy. The former could designate both affirmation (*vidhi) as well as the general activity of speech, syllables, and words (nāma). In the case of zhequan, it corresponds, in different texts, to the three Indian Buddhist concepts of negation (*pratiṣedha, *vyāvṛtti, *nivṛtti), implicative negation (paryudāsa), and exclusion of other...
The general consensus in the field of Buddhist studies is that the terms “biaoquan” and “zhequan”... more The general consensus in the field of Buddhist studies is that the terms “biaoquan” and “zhequan” are a pair of Buddhist philosophical concepts often used to designate two diametrically opposed forms of rhetoric. The former term constitutes its affirmative statement, while the latter defines a fact in negative terms—known in Christian theology as cataphatic and apophatic uses of language, respectively. Looking at the terms for which biaoquan and zhequan initially served as translations, especially in Xuanzang’s works, it would seem that these two concepts have not always appeared as a related pair representing the above-mentioned affirmative–negative dichotomy. The former could designate both affirmation (*vidhi) as well as the general activity of speech, syllables, and words (nāma). In the case of zhequan, it corresponds, in different texts, to the three Indian Buddhist concepts of negation (*pratiṣedha, *vyāvṛtti, *nivṛtti), implicative negation (paryudāsa), and exclusion of others (anyāpoha), with each use of the term “zhequan” carrying a different set of meanings and associated doctrines. Indeed, in various texts, the concept of zhequan might be opposed to the concept of biaoquan (*vidhi *sadhana) or opposed to pure negation (prasajya), or it might be applied on its own with no opposing concept. However, as Chinese Buddhism continued to develop throughout the Tang, biaoquan and zhequan came to be firmly associated and popularized as a pair of opposites. Looking at the doctrinal as well as the translation history of these two terms, this paper focuses on how they were used as a pair of opposing philosophical concepts, followed by an analysis of the profound influence of these two concepts on Chinese Buddhism.
Inside the palm-leaf manuscript of the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (ZX0617-ZB20) preserved in the Tib... more Inside the palm-leaf manuscript of the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (ZX0617-ZB20) preserved in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, one leaf of the Saṃghāṭasūtra has been identified. Inspired by Oskar von Hinüber's recent publication of the Sanskrit editio maior of the Saṃghāṭasūtra, we decided to publish our research on this newly identified leaf. The present paper will provide the codicological description and a diplomatic transcription of this leaf.
The prasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum) and prasaṅgaviparyaya (reversion from the prasaṅga’s statemen... more The prasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum) and prasaṅgaviparyaya (reversion from the prasaṅga’s statement by means of the contraposition) are an important group of argumentation methods in Buddhist epistemology. Studies on them have been mostly focused on the interpretations of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their later scholars, with occasional attention to Bhāviveka, a Madhyamaka scholar. It is well known that the prasaṅga was a means of argument relied upon by Mādhyamikas, especially by Candrakīrti, later known as a * Prāsaṅgika. However, it is surprising that the previous studies have generally overlooked Candrakīrti in their examination of the prasaṅga and the prasaṅgaviparyaya, despite the fact that Candrakīrti reshaped the meaning of the prasaṅga with the theory of the three kinds of inferences, namely inferences accepted by self, by others and by both. This paper, based on an analysis of the text of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, points out that both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti inherited Dignāga’s practice of using the prasaṅgaviparyaya to justify the legitimacy of the prasaṅga; however, they differ in that the former, just like Dignāga, regards the proof of the prasaṅgaviparyaya as an inference accepted by both, while the latter regards it as an inference accepted by others. This is the key difference between Candrakīrti and his sources of thought, Dignāga and Bhāviveka, as well as Dharmakīrti and his successors.
佛教量论中的“非限定说”是一种关于如何确认知识真伪的学说。该学说认为，人类一般知识的真有些是自律的，有些是他律的。本文以寂护、莲花戒论师的《摄真实论》及其《细疏》为中心，考察“非限定说”的理论背... more 佛教量论中的“非限定说”是一种关于如何确认知识真伪的学说。该学说认为，人类一般知识的真有些是自律的，有些是他律的。本文以寂护、莲花戒论师的《摄真实论》及其《细疏》为中心，考察“非限定说”的理论背景与细节。本文认为，佛教的“非限定说”是法称“量是非不一致的认识”定义与弥漫差派鸠摩利罗自律真学说的妥协产物。
四句分别，即关于某一议题的四项选择，以及通过或肯定或否定四项选择而构成的一种论法。由于四句分别在形式上违背排中律等基本的逻辑原则，引起现代学者的广泛关注。但这些先行研究普遍存在着：（一）过分倚重... more 四句分别，即关于某一议题的四项选择，以及通过或肯定或否定四项选择而构成的一种论法。由于四句分别在形式上违背排中律等基本的逻辑原则，引起现代学者的广泛关注。但这些先行研究普遍存在着：（一）过分倚重逻辑学的知识与视角，缺少从印度本土的因明学视角的考察；（二）笼统地处理四句分别的用例，缺少对相关文本细节的重视，等诸多问题。为了回应这些问题，本文以《中论》《明句论》第二十五章中的四句分别为考察对象，得出如下结论：存在着针对四句分别各项的一些固定解释模式，但这些模式并不能推广到所有的四句分别用例中；其次，《中论》《明句论》对四句分别的各项给予了多元的词意诠释，这些诠释已经超出了逻辑学的适用范围。因此，并非所有的四句分别都可以被形式化。
During a recent investigation of palm-leaf manuscripts of the Tibetan Autonomous Region conducted... more During a recent investigation of palm-leaf manuscripts of the Tibetan Autonomous Region conducted by Professor Zhang Meifang, several new Sanskrit manuscripts were discovered, among which Nāgārjuna’s Sūtrasamuccaya (SS) was identified. Being an anthology of mainly Mahāyānasūtras, the SS is important for the study of early Mahāyāna concepts. The Sanskrit text of the SS had long been considered lost, except for some Sanskrit fragments. The text of the SS was previously only available in Chinese and Tibetan translations. Our discovery is an incomplete bundle of the SS consisting of about 35 leaves. Unfortunately, many of the leaves became stuck together over the centuries and now, among all these leaves, only a portion, the folios 90b–97a, is currently available to scholars. This paper intends to introduce the outcome of a preliminary study and transcription of this manuscript of the SS.
活跃于六七世纪的印度中观派论师月称，在《明句论》一书中，批评了清辨论师所采用的自立比量。其中，月称所用技巧与汉传因明自他共三比量之说非常接近。对比此二者，可以为我们理解月称思想与汉传因明的起源提... more 活跃于六七世纪的印度中观派论师月称，在《明句论》一书中，批评了清辨论师所采用的自立比量。其中，月称所用技巧与汉传因明自他共三比量之说非常接近。对比此二者，可以为我们理解月称思想与汉传因明的起源提供有益的视角与材料。本文在分析月称《明句论》梵文本的基础上，着重考察自他共三比量视角下月称思想的样态，进而得出如下结论：月称归谬论法的核心是“他比量”；他认为清辨的自立比量只是一种“自比量”，不具备能破的功能；月称所用技巧更为质朴、简洁，与汉传因明中的三比量说的复杂形成了鲜明对比。因此，月称之说可能代表了三比量发展的较早阶段，为我们了解三比量说乃至汉传因明的起源和发展提供了珍贵的原始资料。
The Three Kinds of Inferences Found in Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā Abstract: The 6th-7th century Buddhist scholar Candrakīrti is well-known for his justifications for the Buddhapālita’s prasaṅga argumentative method and his severe criticisms toward Bhāvi-veka’s independent probative inference, which he provided in the first chapter of Prasannapadā (PsP). Because of his great influence over Tibetan Buddhism, this section of PsP has been re-peatedly studied since the discovery and publication of PsP. However, previous studies have rarely noted that the technique Candrakīrti utilized for his justifications or critiques is highly similar to the famous “three -inferences -theory” in Kuiji’s (窥基) “Great Commentary on Nyāyapraveśa”, namely the inference accepted by oneself (自比量), by others (他比量), and by both (共比量). This paper aims to analyze Candrakīrti’s related passages using the three -inferences -theory in order to reveal why Candrakīrti abandoned Dignāga’s rigid requirement of the common acceptance (共许决定) for an inference. It is reasonable to conclude that Can-drakīrti’s justifications for Buddhapālita and critiques toward Bhāviveka can be understood through the three -inferences -theory.
印度学仏教学研究 (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies), 2018
Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā(PsP) is the only complete Sanskrit commentary on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhy... more Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā(PsP) is the only complete Sanskrit commentary on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā(MMK). As a commentary on MMK, PsP cites the verses of MMK sequentially. This paper calls this kind of MMK's verses as the “basic verses”. Besides them, in order to explain a certain thought or idea, Candrakīrti also freely cites MMK's verses as his āgama. Among them, some MMK's verses contain different readings from the basic ones. This paper names them as “variant verses”. This paper will collect all the variant verses cited in PsP, compare them with six Sanskrit manuscripts, and discuss the possible causes of them.
A brief study on the theory of "not-uttering a single word" in Tathāgataguhyasūtra(《如来秘密经》or 《宝积经... more A brief study on the theory of "not-uttering a single word" in Tathāgataguhyasūtra(《如来秘密经》or 《宝积经·密迹金刚力士会》).
An Annotated Chinese Translation of Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā Chap.II, published in 《唯识研究》第五辑,... more An Annotated Chinese Translation of Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā Chap.II, published in 《唯识研究》第五辑, 2017（forthcoming）.
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Papers by Junqi WANG
The Three Kinds of Inferences Found in Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā
Abstract: The 6th-7th century Buddhist scholar Candrakīrti is well-known for his justifications for the Buddhapālita’s prasaṅga argumentative method and his severe criticisms toward Bhāvi-veka’s independent probative inference, which he provided in the first chapter of Prasannapadā (PsP). Because of his great influence over Tibetan Buddhism, this section of PsP has been re-peatedly studied since the discovery and publication of PsP. However, previous studies have rarely noted that the technique Candrakīrti utilized for his justifications or critiques is highly similar to the famous “three -inferences -theory” in Kuiji’s (窥基) “Great Commentary on Nyāyapraveśa”, namely the inference accepted by oneself (自比量), by others (他比量), and by both (共比量). This paper aims to analyze Candrakīrti’s related passages using the three -inferences -theory in order to reveal why Candrakīrti abandoned Dignāga’s rigid requirement of the common acceptance (共许决定) for an inference. It is reasonable to conclude that Can-drakīrti’s justifications for Buddhapālita and critiques toward Bhāviveka can be understood through the three -inferences -theory.
All suggestions and corrections are welcome.
The Three Kinds of Inferences Found in Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā
Abstract: The 6th-7th century Buddhist scholar Candrakīrti is well-known for his justifications for the Buddhapālita’s prasaṅga argumentative method and his severe criticisms toward Bhāvi-veka’s independent probative inference, which he provided in the first chapter of Prasannapadā (PsP). Because of his great influence over Tibetan Buddhism, this section of PsP has been re-peatedly studied since the discovery and publication of PsP. However, previous studies have rarely noted that the technique Candrakīrti utilized for his justifications or critiques is highly similar to the famous “three -inferences -theory” in Kuiji’s (窥基) “Great Commentary on Nyāyapraveśa”, namely the inference accepted by oneself (自比量), by others (他比量), and by both (共比量). This paper aims to analyze Candrakīrti’s related passages using the three -inferences -theory in order to reveal why Candrakīrti abandoned Dignāga’s rigid requirement of the common acceptance (共许决定) for an inference. It is reasonable to conclude that Can-drakīrti’s justifications for Buddhapālita and critiques toward Bhāviveka can be understood through the three -inferences -theory.
All suggestions and corrections are welcome.