Papers by Tess Dewhurst
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2017
The grounding or motivating intuitions behind internalism and externalism seem to be fundamentall... more The grounding or motivating intuitions behind internalism and externalism seem to be fundamentally at odds. If there is ever to be a viable or satisfying solution to the problem, it must satisfy the grounding intuitions behind both sides of the debate. Duncan Pritchard claims his theory of epistemological disjunctivism (ED) does just this, arguing that it could be the holy grail we have all been waiting for. However, I believe the holy grail is already out there in the form of the theory that knowledge is a mental state (KMS). In this article, I defend the idea the KMS is far better able to satisfy the internalist and externalist intuitions than ED.
The Non-existent Objects of Belief, 2020
When I know something, what is the object of my knowledge? For example, when I know that it is ra... more When I know something, what is the object of my knowledge? For example, when I know that it is raining, what is the thing that I know? The contemporary response is to say that what I know is the proposition “that it is raining”. Propositions are also the objects of belief: when I believe that it is raining, it is the proposition “that it is raining” that I believe. I am a proponent of the more controversial view that the object of my knowledge is the rain itself. I am the subject, and the object is the rain. A problem for this more controversial view is how to make sense of the objects of failed knowledge – when I merely believe that it is raining, for example. The rain itself cannot be the object of my belief if it is not raining – so what can be? In this article I will try to defend my view from this pressing objection: I will argue that it is possible for non-existent objects to be the objects of belief.
The intuition that knowledge is more valuable than true belief generates the value problem in epi... more The intuition that knowledge is more valuable than true belief generates the value problem in epistemology. The aim in this paper is to focus on the intuitive notion of knowledge itself, in the context of the value problem, and to attempt to bring out just what it is that we intuitively judge to be valuable. It seems to me that the value problem brings to the fore certain commitments we have to the intuitive notion of knowledge, which, if we take seriously, reveal that we actually think of knowledge as an irreducible factive mental state.
The grounding or motivating intuitions behind internalism and externalism seem to be fundamentall... more The grounding or motivating intuitions behind internalism and externalism seem to be fundamentally at odds. If there is ever to be a viable or satisfying solution to the problem, it must satisfy the grounding intuitions behind both sides of the debate. Duncan Pritchard claims his theory of epistemological disjunctivism (ED) does just this, arguing that it could be the holy grail we have all been waiting for. However, I believe the holy grail is already out there in the form of the theory that knowledge is a mental state (KMS). In this paper, I defend the idea the KMS is far better able to satisfy the internalist and externalist intuitions than ED. Introduction: One of the most well-known, and most enduring, debates in epistemology is the debate between internalism and externalism. Both sides seem to be motivated by well-founded and intuitively persuasive arguments, and yet finding a satisfactory response to the dilemma has been notoriously difficult. However, Duncan Pritchard has made progress when he defends what he calls the 'holy grail' of epistemology: a conception of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that satisfies both the internalist and externalist intuitions. He calls this position Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED). But I believe that there is another conception of knowledge (more generally) which satisfies both internalist and externalist intuitions, and it is my aim in this paper to show how it does so far more satisfactorily than Pritchard's ED. It is the view that knowledge is a mental state (KMS). KMS is the thesis that knowledge is an irreducible state that is mental, and distinct from belief. It involves a rejection of the common conception of the mental as a purely internal realm. The KMS thesis, as I defend it here, is not a unified theory in the literature. The view can be primarily attributed to Timothy Williamson, from his book 'Knowledge and its Limits',1 but is also defended by Jennifer Nagel,2 and Alexander Bird.3 The metaphysical underpinnings of KMS can be attributed to John McDowell and his rejection of the outer/ inner distinction.4 I present the view as 'disjunctivism about knowledge,' though Williamson is not technically a disjunctivist, and McDowell is not (straight forwardly) a disjunctivist about knowledge.5 However, how KMS differs from ED will become clear, and I do not think that these particulars matter when it comes to the heart of the issue.
Jason Baehr (2011) has argued that the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true b... more Jason Baehr (2011) has argued that the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief is neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently formal to motivate the value problem in epistemology. What he calls the 'guiding intuition' is not completely general: our intuition does not reveal that knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and not strictly formal: the intuition is not merely the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. If he is right, the value problem (as we know it) is not a real problem. I will argue in this paper that he is wrong about the generality claim: knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and yet he is right about the formality claim – there is more to the intuition than just the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. What this amounts to, I will argue, is that there is still a value problem but that the guiding intuition might be able to tell us how to solve it.
Abstract: The aim of this thesis is to offer a response to the question of how it is that a heare... more Abstract: The aim of this thesis is to offer a response to the question of how it is that a hearer can get knowledge from testimony. The project has two main components. The first is to suggest that the obstacle to getting knowledge through testimony (the obstacle of epistemic vulnerability) is one that can be ignored. The second is to set out how it is that mere communication could be sufficient to explain how testimony can be a source of knowledge.
The first component constitutes a proposal to reject the problem of testimony as it is usually conceived. Testimony is often seen to be epistemically distinct and interesting because of the apparent epistemic vulnerability posed by its being an indirect source of knowledge. Viewing the problem in this way has led most epistemologists to set out on a project of justification: the challenge is to explain how it is that hearing an assertion can be sufficient grounds for coming to know what is asserted. Whether one is a reductionist or a non-reductionist, the aim has been to establish that essential link between hear a speaker assert that p, and p’s being true. I will argue that seeing the problem of testimony as one of epistemic vulnerability is only inevitable if one has a particular view of knowledge. If we take knowledge to be a state metaphysically distinct from belief, a state not dependent on its justification to establish it as knowledge, then the indirectness of testimony does not inevitably result in a problem of vulnerability.
The second component constitutes a positive explanation for the possibility of knowledge through testimony. I argue that (rather than seeking to justify our testimony-based beliefs) we ought to try to understand the mechanism whereby knowledge can be made available to a hearer simply by understanding an assertion. In this endeavour, I propose a certain theory of communication, such that understanding a communicative utterance entails coming to recognise the speaker’s actual mental state. If successful communication gives the hearer access to the speaker’s actual mental state, then successful communication can explain how understanding an assertion that p can get a hearer to know that p. I argue that correctly understanding an assertion that p entails coming to know that p. I defend the idea that the institution of communication explains how knowledge through testimony is possible.
The epistemological problem of sincerity in testimony is often approached in the following way: W... more The epistemological problem of sincerity in testimony is often approached in the following way: We, as a matter of fact, accept utterances as sincere. We do so in the face of knowledge that people lie and deceive, and yet we still count these beliefs as good beliefs. Therefore there must be some reason or argument that we can cite in order to justify our acceptance of the sincerity of the speaker. In this thesis I will argue, contra this, that there is no reason, per se, that justifies our acceptance of a speaker’s sincerity: this is because recognition of the obligation to accept the sincerity is a necessary condition on the possibility of communication and interpretation.
In the first three chapters of the thesis I will argue against three of the main approaches to the problem by focusing on what I believe to be the strongest accounts of each: Elizabeth Fricker’s reductionism, Tyler Burge’s non-reductionism, and Paul Faulkner’s trust account of testimony. In the final chapter I will put forward my positive account. I will argue that it is a constitutive rule of language that a speaker be sincere, and then make the further claim, that it is a constitutive rule of interpretation that the hearer take an utterance as sincere. On my account, successful communication does not just depend on a speaker making sincere utterances, but, just as importantly, on the hearer recognising an obligation to take those utterances as being sincere.
South African Journal of Philosophy, Jan 1, 2009
Book Reviews by Tess Dewhurst
Believable Evidence, 2019
Review of Veli Mitova's 'Believable Evidence'.
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Papers by Tess Dewhurst
The first component constitutes a proposal to reject the problem of testimony as it is usually conceived. Testimony is often seen to be epistemically distinct and interesting because of the apparent epistemic vulnerability posed by its being an indirect source of knowledge. Viewing the problem in this way has led most epistemologists to set out on a project of justification: the challenge is to explain how it is that hearing an assertion can be sufficient grounds for coming to know what is asserted. Whether one is a reductionist or a non-reductionist, the aim has been to establish that essential link between hear a speaker assert that p, and p’s being true. I will argue that seeing the problem of testimony as one of epistemic vulnerability is only inevitable if one has a particular view of knowledge. If we take knowledge to be a state metaphysically distinct from belief, a state not dependent on its justification to establish it as knowledge, then the indirectness of testimony does not inevitably result in a problem of vulnerability.
The second component constitutes a positive explanation for the possibility of knowledge through testimony. I argue that (rather than seeking to justify our testimony-based beliefs) we ought to try to understand the mechanism whereby knowledge can be made available to a hearer simply by understanding an assertion. In this endeavour, I propose a certain theory of communication, such that understanding a communicative utterance entails coming to recognise the speaker’s actual mental state. If successful communication gives the hearer access to the speaker’s actual mental state, then successful communication can explain how understanding an assertion that p can get a hearer to know that p. I argue that correctly understanding an assertion that p entails coming to know that p. I defend the idea that the institution of communication explains how knowledge through testimony is possible.
In the first three chapters of the thesis I will argue against three of the main approaches to the problem by focusing on what I believe to be the strongest accounts of each: Elizabeth Fricker’s reductionism, Tyler Burge’s non-reductionism, and Paul Faulkner’s trust account of testimony. In the final chapter I will put forward my positive account. I will argue that it is a constitutive rule of language that a speaker be sincere, and then make the further claim, that it is a constitutive rule of interpretation that the hearer take an utterance as sincere. On my account, successful communication does not just depend on a speaker making sincere utterances, but, just as importantly, on the hearer recognising an obligation to take those utterances as being sincere.
Book Reviews by Tess Dewhurst
The first component constitutes a proposal to reject the problem of testimony as it is usually conceived. Testimony is often seen to be epistemically distinct and interesting because of the apparent epistemic vulnerability posed by its being an indirect source of knowledge. Viewing the problem in this way has led most epistemologists to set out on a project of justification: the challenge is to explain how it is that hearing an assertion can be sufficient grounds for coming to know what is asserted. Whether one is a reductionist or a non-reductionist, the aim has been to establish that essential link between hear a speaker assert that p, and p’s being true. I will argue that seeing the problem of testimony as one of epistemic vulnerability is only inevitable if one has a particular view of knowledge. If we take knowledge to be a state metaphysically distinct from belief, a state not dependent on its justification to establish it as knowledge, then the indirectness of testimony does not inevitably result in a problem of vulnerability.
The second component constitutes a positive explanation for the possibility of knowledge through testimony. I argue that (rather than seeking to justify our testimony-based beliefs) we ought to try to understand the mechanism whereby knowledge can be made available to a hearer simply by understanding an assertion. In this endeavour, I propose a certain theory of communication, such that understanding a communicative utterance entails coming to recognise the speaker’s actual mental state. If successful communication gives the hearer access to the speaker’s actual mental state, then successful communication can explain how understanding an assertion that p can get a hearer to know that p. I argue that correctly understanding an assertion that p entails coming to know that p. I defend the idea that the institution of communication explains how knowledge through testimony is possible.
In the first three chapters of the thesis I will argue against three of the main approaches to the problem by focusing on what I believe to be the strongest accounts of each: Elizabeth Fricker’s reductionism, Tyler Burge’s non-reductionism, and Paul Faulkner’s trust account of testimony. In the final chapter I will put forward my positive account. I will argue that it is a constitutive rule of language that a speaker be sincere, and then make the further claim, that it is a constitutive rule of interpretation that the hearer take an utterance as sincere. On my account, successful communication does not just depend on a speaker making sincere utterances, but, just as importantly, on the hearer recognising an obligation to take those utterances as being sincere.