Isonomía 44 by Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho
Resumen
Desde una perspectiva histórica se intenta aportar elementos que clarifiquen la problem... more Resumen
Desde una perspectiva histórica se intenta aportar elementos que clarifiquen la problemática sobre la mundialización y la confrontación de las culturas jurídicas. Así, por una parte, se ofrece una interrogación acerca de la manera en que se practica la teoría del derecho en el mundo anglosajón y en el continental europeo, lo cual conduce a poner en cuestión su pretensión de universalidad. Por otra parte se analiza y discute el estatus y la pertinencia de ciertas teorías del derecho, como la del legal origins theory, que afirman la superioridad del common law sobre el resto de las culturas jurídicas. Se destaca además la necesidad de introducir la dimensión sociológica para la comprensión del fenómeno jurídico.
Abstract
Departing from a historical viewpoint, the article provides elements intending to clarify the problems associated to globalization and the confrontation between different legal cultures. Thus, on the one hand, there is an inquiry about the ways of doing legal theory in the Anglo world and in continental Europe, casting doubts on their pretense of universality. On the other hand, the article analyzes and discusses the status and pertinence of several legal theories, such as the legal origins theory, which affirm the superiority of the common law over the rest of legal cultures. The need to adopt a sociological perspective for the understanding of legal phenomena is further underlined.
El problema de los desacuerdos jurídicos puede ser planteado de diferentes modos. En una de sus v... more El problema de los desacuerdos jurídicos puede ser planteado de diferentes modos. En una de sus versiones, el problema viene dado porque el positivismo asume que los conceptos jurídicos son criteriológicos, por lo que el desacuerdo entre juristas carece de sentido al ser una disputa meramente verbal. Plunkett y Sundell han ofrecido una respuesta novedosa a esta crítica que sostiene que no hace falta compartir un concepto para discrepar con sentido. En este trabajo analizaré esa respuesta y ofreceré una serie de críticas contra ella.
The problem of legal disagreements can be approached in different ways. On one version, the problem arises because positivism assumes that legal concepts are criteriological, thus conceiving of disagreement among lawyers as pointless and a mere verbal dispute. Plunkett and Sundell have offered a novel response to this criticism, which holds that it is not necessary to share a concept in order to disagree. In this paper I analyze this response and I offer a number of objections against it.
Los procesos democráticos de toma de decisiones (al igual que las restricciones constitucionales ... more Los procesos democráticos de toma de decisiones (al igual que las restricciones constitucionales a la regla de mayoría) pueden ser evaluados por sus resultados, por su valor intrínseco o por una combinación de ambas cosas. Mostraré que analizar a fondo estas alternativas permite sacar a la luz las debilidades más serias en los modos usuales de justificación del constitucionalismo. La fundamentación teórica de la articulación entre democracia y constitucionalismo ha permanecido atrapada en una trampa que busco romper. Concluiré mostrando la necesidad de rebasar los argumentos epistémicos y contra-epistémicos sugiriendo pautas que hasta ahora creo han sido poco ponderadas en la literatura clásica sobre el tema.
Democratic decision-making processes (as well as constitutional limits to majority rule) may be evaluated on the basis of their results, their intrinsic value or a combination of both. I will show that an in-depth analysis of these alternatives uncovers serious weaknesses in the usual models of justification for constitutionalism. The theoretical basis to describe the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism has remained stuck in a trap that I seek to break from. I conclude by showing the need to overcome epistemic and counter-epistemic arguments by proposing standards that I believe have been scarcely considered in the classical literature about this issue.
El artículo analiza algunos aspectos de la concepción de verdad moral que presenta el filósofo ar... more El artículo analiza algunos aspectos de la concepción de verdad moral que presenta el filósofo argentino Carlos Nino. En particular, intentaremos probar dos puntos. En primer lugar, buscaremos mostrar que las concepciones de verdad moral y de democracia deliberativa formuladas por son incompatibles con un idealismo de corte platónico, a diferencia de lo que sostienen algunos análisis teóricos que aquí discutiremos. La postura constructivista que Nino sostiene es lo que impide pensarla desde puntos de vista trascendentes. En segundo lugar, trataremos de mostrar las inconsistencias que conlleva otro aspecto del conocimiento moral que aparece en Nino: el acceso individual a la verdad moral. Para dar cuenta de esto nos ocuparemos de analizar la dimensión del conocimiento moral que nuestro autor presenta.
The article discusses some features of Carlos Nino’s account of moral truth. We will focus on two aspects of this account. First, we will argue against an interpretation according to which Nino’s ideas of moral truth and deliberative democracy resemble a Platonic model. From our point of view Nino’s constructivism impedes the adoption of a transcendent position. Second, we will try to highlight the inconsistencies around the idea of individual access to moral truth. To account this, it will be necessary to focus on Nino’s understanding of moral knowledge.
La democracia, como forma de gobierno, admite su escisión en al menos dos momentos distintos: su ... more La democracia, como forma de gobierno, admite su escisión en al menos dos momentos distintos: su forma antigua y su forma moderna. Un rasgo distintivo de esta última variante -aquella identificada como democracia representativa (moderna)- es la existencia de representantes elegidos por votación popular. Dado esto, se ha sostenido generalmente que el voto y la regla de mayoría son mecanismos “típicamente democráticos”. Sin embargo, ni voto ni regla de mayoría son exclusivos de los sistemas democráticos, de modo que definir la forma que éstos han de tener cuando operan en un sistema democrático constituye uno de los problemas principales de la teoría de la democracia y de ésta en relación con los derechos fundamentales. Este trabajo aborda los problemas invocados por estos planteamientos a partir, sobre todo, de la obra de Norberto Bobbio.
Democracy as a form of government admits its division in at least two different moments: its old form and its modern form. A distinctive trait of the latter version --representative (modern) democracy-- is the presence of representatives elected by popular vote. Given this, it is generally held that vote and majority rule are “typically democratic” mechanisms. However, neither vote nor majority rule are exclusive of democratic systems. Thus, defining how these two mechanisms should operate in a democratic system is one of the main problems of democratic theory in its relation with the study of fundamental rights. This article addresses the problems raised by these questions departing, mainly, from the theory of Norberto Bobbio.
El artículo revisa las aportaciones más trascendentes que Jordi Ferrer ha hecho a la tradición ra... more El artículo revisa las aportaciones más trascendentes que Jordi Ferrer ha hecho a la tradición racionalista de la prueba jurídica y evalúa críticamente el limitado papel que, desde su óptica, le corresponde desempeñar a la epistemología en la discusión general sobre los estándares de prueba apropiados para las distintas ramas del derecho. Más específicamente, se analiza la irrelevancia que Ferrer parece atribuir a dicha disciplina ¬–o el silencio que debe guardar–, respecto del establecimiento del estándar de prueba deseable en materia penal. Se concede que, en efecto, le corresponde al pueblo tomar la decisión de qué estándar implementar. No obstante, se sostiene, ello no impide que la epistemología incida en el proceso de formación de dicha decisión mediante la realización de observaciones, el ofrecimiento de argumentos y la propuesta de metodologías adecuadas, con miras a que aquella se tome en un contexto mejor informado y sea lo más racional posible. Se ilustra esta posición haciendo referencia al proyecto de epistemología jurídica de Larry Laudan.
The paper aims to provide an overview of Jordi Ferrer’s main contributions to the so called rationalist approach to legal proof, and to critically assess one aspect of his thought, which is the limited role that the author seems to attribute to epistemology within the general debate about the most appropriate standards of proof for the legal domain and particularly for the criminal law. The author holds that while it is adequate that the decision about standards of proof be taken by the people’s representatives, this does not prevent (legal) epistemology from influencing the decision-making process by way of advancing arguments, making observations and suggesting methodologies which can make it make it a more informed and rational decision. Larry Laudan’s legal epistemology project is introduced to exemplify this position.
Isonomía 43 by Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho
Este trabajo bosqueja una teoría analítica y realista de la interpretación jurídica. Analítica, e... more Este trabajo bosqueja una teoría analítica y realista de la interpretación jurídica. Analítica, en el sentido que su método es el análisis lógico del lenguaje de los juristas. Realista, en el sentido que, por un lado, sostiene que el derecho es indeterminado y, por otro lado, representa la interpretación desarrollada por los jueces como una actividad intrínsecamente discrecional. En la primera parte, se introducen las distinciones fundamentales entre: interpretación “in abstracto” e interpretación “in concreto”; interpretación cognoscitiva, decisoria, y creativa; interpretación en sentido estricto y construcción jurídica. Esta última distinción tiene una importancia especial: la interpretación en sentido estricto consiste en atribuir significado a un texto normativo, mientras que la construcción jurídica consiste (esencialmente) en formular normas nuevas, que se pretenden implícitas en el sistema jurídico. En la segunda parte, se analizan, en su estructura lógica, las más difundidas técnicas argumentativas por las cuales los juristas suelen justificar sus operaciones interpretativas y constructivas.
This article spells out an analytical and realistic theory of legal interpretation. Analytical, since its method is the logical analysis of jurists’ and judges’ language. Realistic, since it assumes, first, that law is indeterminate and, second, that judicial interpretation is intrinsically discretionary. In the first part, some fundamental distinctions are introduced, namely: “in abstracto” and “in concreto” interpretation; cognitive, adjudicative, and creative interpretation; interpretation strictly understood and juristic construction. The last mentioned distinction, in particular, takes on a special importance.
Aunque la discusión sobre los principios jurídicos encuentra su punto de quiebre con las obras de... more Aunque la discusión sobre los principios jurídicos encuentra su punto de quiebre con las obras de Ronald Dworkin y Robert Alexy, la cuestión reconoce desarrollos anteriores y encuentra una de sus formulaciones más profundas en reacción al pensamiento jurídico positivista de entreguerras. En este trabajo destacamos los aportes del jurista socialdemócrata Hermann Heller a la teoría de las normas que, a diferencia de los que hizo a la teoría del Estado, permanecen en un lugar olvidado. Se reconstruye su concepción del derecho con el fin de mostrar que sus ideas sobre la estructura del sistema jurídico y los fundamentos de los principios jurídicos dan cuenta de la relación entre derecho y poder en los Estados constitucionales modernos y del rol de los jueces en una democracia, al tiempo que resultan precursoras de las que desarrollaría con posterioridad Robert Alexy.
While the debate on legal principles reaches its breaking point with the work of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy, it recognizes previous developments and finds one of its deepest formulations in reaction to Inter-War positivist legal thought. In this work we focus on the contributions of social-democratic jurist Hermann Heller to legal theory which —in contrast to those he made to State theory— remain forgotten. We reconstrict his theory of law to show that his ideas about the structure of legal systems and about the foundations of legal principles explain very well the relationship between law and power in modern constitutional States and the role of judges in a democracy, while simultaenously being a precursor to some of those Robert Alexy would later develop.
El propósito central de este ensayo es mostrar que el debate actual entre el positivismo excluyen... more El propósito central de este ensayo es mostrar que el debate actual entre el positivismo excluyente y el incluyente se alimenta de, al menos, tres ideas equivocadas acerca de la relación entre el lenguaje jurídico y el moral, la vinculación entre la ciencia y la práctica del derecho y la concepción de lo que es una ciencia normativa. Expuestos estos errores, esbozo una propuesta para entender estas relaciones, fundada en la concepción neokantiana-kelseniana de la ciencia jurídica. De esta doctrina derivo que el lenguaje jurídico y la ciencia del derecho son, respectivamente, el fundamento conceptual del discurso moral y de la práctica jurídica. Asimismo, rechazo la definición que ve en el carácter normativo de la ciencia jurídica la presencia de juicios de valor. En consecuencia, el debate entre el positivismo incluyente y el excluyente debe ser abandonado o, al menos, reformado.
The core purpose of this paper is to show that the exclusive-inclusive legal positivism debate is based on at least three erroneous ideas about the relation between legal and moral language, the relations between legal theory and legal practice, and the understanding of what a normative science is. Then, assuming the Neokantian-Kelsenian conception of jurisprudence, I propose the thesis that the legal language and the theory of law are, respectively, the conceptual foundations of moral language and legal practice. I also reject the idea that normative sciences embrace some kind of value-judgments. As a consequence, the debate between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism must be abandoned or, at the least, recasted.
En este artículo exploro algunos de los tópicos vinculados tradicionalmente con el problema de la... more En este artículo exploro algunos de los tópicos vinculados tradicionalmente con el problema de la normatividad del derecho: autonomía, racionalidad, relevancia práctica, razones para la acción y autoridad. Trataré de construir un marco conceptual que refleje la complejidad teórica del problema y las posiciones filosóficas desde los cuales puede ser abordado. Particularmente, me centraré en el análisis de las asunciones filosóficas relacionadas con ciertas posturas y la revisión de su coherencia mutua.
In this paper I explore some of the topics traditionally associated with the problem of normativity of law: autonomy, rationality, practical relevance, reasons for action and authority. I will try to build a conceptual framework that reflects the theoretical complexity of the problem and the philosophical positions from which they can be addressed. Particularly, I will focus on the analysis of the philosophical assumptions related to certain positions and the revision of their mutual coherence.
El problema de la exclusión social -situación de quienes encuentran cerrado el acceso a los biene... more El problema de la exclusión social -situación de quienes encuentran cerrado el acceso a los bienes y servicios que permiten un básico desarrollo de la personalidad- constituye un desafío para la legitimidad del sistema social y las normas penales. Principalmente porque ello supone que en una misma sociedad hay individuos con estatus de persona -ciudadanos "normales", incluidos- y otros que, por estar privados de los derechos asociados al estatus, están total o parcialmente excluidos del mismo. De cara a evitar su instrumentalización penal se propone, en los delitos más conectados con la noción de ciudadanía que con la de dignidad, la atenuación o exclusión de la pena por disminución de la exigibilidad. Si el delito no se explica sólo por déficit de motivación del sujeto, sino también por un déficit de socialización imputable al propio sistema social, lo que tiene lugar es una especie de corresponsabilidad.
The problem of social exclusion -situation of those who are excluded from social goods and services that lead to a basic development of personality- challenges the legitimacy of the social and the criminal system. Mainly because it means that in the same society there are individuals with the status of person -"ordinary", included citizen- and others who, since they are deprived of the rights to fulfill that status, are excluded from it. To avoid treating them as an instrument, especially in offenses connected more to citizenship than to dignity, the article proposes the attenuation or exclusion of punishment, as there is also a diminution of blame-worthiness. Since the offence is not only grounded on a deficit of motivation on the part of the author, but also in a deficit of socialization attributable to the social system itself, there is a sort of co-responsibility of the two in the commission of the offence.
El texto busca ofrecer un marco analítico y comparativo para estudiar en detalle un fenómeno que ... more El texto busca ofrecer un marco analítico y comparativo para estudiar en detalle un fenómeno que hasta hoy ha pasado prácticamente inadvertido: los costos constitucionales de la guerra contra las drogas. En las Américas, las políticas públicas adoptadas en un esfuerzo por suprimir los mercados de drogas ilícitas, han requerido o justificado reformas legales y transformaciones institucionales sustantivas. Estos escenarios son estudiados mediante una categoría que llamamos "costos constitucionales" y se ofrece, como punto de partida de una evaluación potencialmente más amplia, un análisis de los casos de Colombia y México.
This paper seeks to provide an analytic framework for tackling a phenomenon that has gone virtually unnoticed so far: the constitutional costs of the war on drugs. In the Americas, policies adopted and implemented to suppress illicit drug markets have required or justified a battery of significant legal reforms and changes in institutional designs and practices. We analyze these settings through the lenses of a category we have chosen to call "constitutional costs" and develop, as a first step in a potentially wider assessment, an analysis of the Colombian and Mexican cases.
El objeto de este trabajo es el de dar cuenta de las críticas a Kelsen contenidas en el último li... more El objeto de este trabajo es el de dar cuenta de las críticas a Kelsen contenidas en el último libro, todavía inédito, de Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e lógica. Dieci aporie nell'opera di Hans Kelsen, y formular algunas críticas a las tesis sostenidas en él por el propio Ferrajoli. Entre las críticas que el autor considera que cabe dirigir a este respecto a Ferrajoli, las principales afectan al carácter exclusivamente interno de la mirada ferrajoliana sobre el derecho, al carácter siempre opinable, y nunca verdadero o falso, que, según Ferrajoli, tienen los enunciados interpretativos, y a la incompatibilidad que, según el autor, se presenta entre las ambiciones de la teoría ferrajoliana y las limitaciones que a la misma impone su anclaje en el no cognitivismo ético.
The purpose of this paper is to give an account of the critiques that Ferrajoli addresses to Kelsen in his latest -still unpublished- book, Diritto e lógica. Dieci aporie nell'opera di Hans Kelsen, and to make some criticism of the theses held in it by Ferrajoli himself. Major criticisms that the author believes should be addressed in this regard to Ferrajoli affect the purely internal nature of Ferrajoli's approach to the law, the always debatable character, never true or false that, according to Ferrajoli, interpretive statements have, and the incompatibility which, according to the author, exists between the ambitions of Ferrajoli's theory and the limitations imposed on it by its anchoring in ethical non-cognitivism.
Isonomía 42 by Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho
El trabajo reconstruye y analiza críticamente la respuesta de Jeremy Waldron a importantes proble... more El trabajo reconstruye y analiza críticamente la respuesta de Jeremy Waldron a importantes problemas sobre política y derecho, justicia y autoridad. Waldron reivindica al mismo tiempo una tesis no escéptica sobre la existencia los derechos morales-políticos, una tesis escéptica sobre la existencia de procedimientos epistémicos superiores para identificarlos, y una tesis positiva sobre la legitimidad política (mayoritarismo participativo). El trabajo argumenta que su respuesta solo resulta consistente si se añade un cuarto vértice: el presupuesto de "igualdad de agencia y capacidad epistémica" en los portadores de derechos. Pero su introducción requiere abandonar y redefinir dos de los otros elementos, lo que conduce finalmente a las respuestas típicas del deliberativismo epistémico. Las críticas de Waldron a la revisión judicial se reinterpretan sobre esa nueva base.
The article reconstructs and critically analyzes Jeremy Waldron's responses to major problems on law and politics, justice and authority. Waldron claims at the same time a non-skeptical thesis about the existence of moral-political rights, a skeptical thesis about the existence of more accurate epistemic procedures to identify them, and a positive thesis about political legitimacy (participatory majoritarianism). The paper argues that his theory is consistent only if a fourth vertex, implicit in the theory, is added (the "equality of agency and epistemic capacity" of rights-holders). But this explicit addition requires abandoning and redefining two of the other elements, and this eventually conducts us to the typical claims of epistemic deliberativism. Waldron's criticisms to judicial review are reinterpreted on these new grounds.
Hart dedicó poca atención a la regla de adjudicación -lo mismo hizo la literatura especializada. ... more Hart dedicó poca atención a la regla de adjudicación -lo mismo hizo la literatura especializada. El propósito de este escrito consiste en intentar ir más allá de las escasas indicaciones brindadas por Hart sobre el tema de la regla de adjudicación y detallar la función que desempeña en el seno de su concepción del derecho. El método elegido es esencialmente reconstructivo: no se trata de tomar inspiración en Hart para elaborar una noción propia de regla de adjudicación, sino de poner de relieve las potencialidades -aunque también los límites- de este tipo de regla secundaria. Para ello, en primer lugar se profundizan las conexiones entre la regla de adjudicación, por un lado, y la coacción y la interpretación jurídica, por el otro: el objetivo consiste en dibujar la posición teórica de los jueces, que se desprende, en particular, de la investigación de sus (distintas) tareas en relación con los casos dudosos y los casos claros. A continuación, tal postura teórica se somete a crítica; prestando atención, en particular, al problema de la definitividad e infalibilidad de las sentencias, se demuestra cómo Hart consideró la aplicación del derecho de forma demasiado declarativa.
H.L.A. Hart did not pay much attention to the rule of adjudication -and neither did scholars. This paper aims to go beyond what Hart explicitly says about it and to give an account of its role within his concept of law. The perspective will be reconstructive, since the goal is not to develop an original concept of rule of adjudication, inspired on Hart's theory of law, but rather to shed light on the potential -but also the limits- of this kind of secondary rule. Therefore, the article will first explore the interrelation between the rule of adjudication, on the one hand, and coercion and legal interpretation, on the other: the goal is to outline the theoretical position of judges, which becomes clear when analyzing their (different) tasks in easy and hard cases. Then, this position is put under criticism; by examining, in particular, the well-known problem of the infallibility and finality of judicial decisions, it is shown that Hart considered the judicial application of law in a too declarative way.
Discutir con los amigos (aliados, discípulos, adeptos, seguidores, compañeros) es fácil. Es más d... more Discutir con los amigos (aliados, discípulos, adeptos, seguidores, compañeros) es fácil. Es más difícil discutir con quien no comparte nuestros valores íntimos y preciados, con quien ofende nuestras creencias, deshonra nuestra fe y esperanza o se ríe de nuestras opiniones. ¿Cómo se ha de actuar en estos casos? ¿Con la espada y la ira en la mano, la indiferencia y el silencio, o el argumento y la palabra? ¿Y si no se puede ya razonar? ¿Cuando uno topa con el límite insalvable de la impotencia de la razón se ha de acudir entonces a la potencia de la brutalidad? ¿Se puede, en breve, discutir con el "enemigo"? Este trabajo es un intento teorético-filosófico por pensar analíticamente (más allá de lo que al respecto pueda decir la dogmática jurídica), modos de responder a estos interrogantes. Se busca examinar los límites, posibilidades y confines de la libertad de expresión, vista desde una teoría realista de la argumentación y de la pragmática del discurso normativo. Como ejemplos explicativos se toman conflictos generados por los grupos radicales (neonazis, fascistas), las sectas religiosas, los movimientos sociales violentos, entre otros.
Can we rationally speak to someone who offends our beliefs, dishonors our logical faith and laughs at our personal and theoretical opinions? Can we discuss with the enemy (political, ideological or doctrinal enemy...)? This paper is a theoretical-philosophical attempt to think analytically (far beyond the legal dogmatic) about this controversial issue. It explores the limits, possibilities and confines of freedom of speech, from a realistic theory of argumentation and from a pragmatics of normative discourse. It takes as examples the conflicts generated by radical groups of the neo-fascist type, religious sects or violent social movements.
El artículo explora las relaciones entre el derecho, la democracia y el imperativo del trato igua... more El artículo explora las relaciones entre el derecho, la democracia y el imperativo del trato igual, deteniéndose en el desarrollo de nociones como "comunidad política", "actos políticos" o "derechos", y proponiendo un entendimiento específico de los "derechos democráticos" en cuyo contexto el derecho de igual acceso a la protección judicial juega un papel crucial. El análisis combina exploraciones en el plano del lenguaje jurídico dogmático con acometidas filosóficas, filológicas, históricas y sociopolíticas, en consonancia con la idea de que las fuentes históricas (los hechos sociales y su reconocimiento teórico) son las coordenadas que rodean la experiencia jurídica y el juego democrático (donde lo hay).
The article explores the relations between law, democracy and equal treatment, developing in the way the meaning of notions such us "political community", "political acts" or "rights" and setting forth a specific understanding of what could be properly called "democratic rights" in whose context the right to have equal access to judicial protection plays a crucial role. The analysis combines inquiry at the level of legal language with inquiry at the philosophical, philological, historical and sociopolitical levels, in congruence with the idea that historical sources (social facts and their theoretical explanation) are axes that encircle both legal life and the democratic game (where it exists).
El caso Mendez v. Westminster es de suma trascendencia en el desarrollo del dere-cho a la igualda... more El caso Mendez v. Westminster es de suma trascendencia en el desarrollo del dere-cho a la igualdad y la supresión de la segregación racial. El caso propició la modi-ficación de las leyes del Estado de California, aumentando el acceso igualitario de los niños a la educación. Pero sin duda su mayor influencia fue sobre la sentencia del caso Brown v. Board of Education, cuyas directrices se cimentaron en las con-sideraciones y alcances del caso Mendez.
The Mendez v. Westminster case has a very important role in the development of equality rights and the abolition of racial segregation. It influenced legal reform in the State of California, increasing equal access to education. But no doubt its greatest influence was on the Brown v. Board of Education ruling, whose main tenets were grounded on considerations set down in Mendez.
El trabajo reflexiona sobre el concepto de interpretación conforme en el contexto del nuevo model... more El trabajo reflexiona sobre el concepto de interpretación conforme en el contexto del nuevo modelo de control regularidad constitucional en México, a raíz de un importante caso resuelto recientemente por la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, el llamado "caso Asperger", relacionado con el modelo de discapacidad adoptado en el Distrito Federal. El autor argumenta que la Corte yerra en la elección de la herramienta de la interpretación conforme y en su implementación y sostiene que el caso no podía (ni debía) ser resuelto con ella. El autor busca llamar la atención sobre el abuso de esta herramienta argumentativa en la resolución de casos importantes de violación de derechos humanos, señalando que la persecución de un fin legítimo no justifica el descuido en la elección del marco de análisis.
The paper reflects on the concept of interpretation in conformity with the Constitution and the treaties in the context of the new parameters of judicial review in Mexico, in view of a recent Supreme Court ruling, the so-called "Asperger case", which deals with the disability model adopted by Mexico City legislation. The author argues that the Court erred in choosing the aforementioned interpretive tool. He warns about the abuse of this argumentative tool in the resolution of human rights cases and argues that legitimate purposes do not justify neglecting the selection of appropriate analytical frameworks.
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Isonomía 44 by Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho
Desde una perspectiva histórica se intenta aportar elementos que clarifiquen la problemática sobre la mundialización y la confrontación de las culturas jurídicas. Así, por una parte, se ofrece una interrogación acerca de la manera en que se practica la teoría del derecho en el mundo anglosajón y en el continental europeo, lo cual conduce a poner en cuestión su pretensión de universalidad. Por otra parte se analiza y discute el estatus y la pertinencia de ciertas teorías del derecho, como la del legal origins theory, que afirman la superioridad del common law sobre el resto de las culturas jurídicas. Se destaca además la necesidad de introducir la dimensión sociológica para la comprensión del fenómeno jurídico.
Abstract
Departing from a historical viewpoint, the article provides elements intending to clarify the problems associated to globalization and the confrontation between different legal cultures. Thus, on the one hand, there is an inquiry about the ways of doing legal theory in the Anglo world and in continental Europe, casting doubts on their pretense of universality. On the other hand, the article analyzes and discusses the status and pertinence of several legal theories, such as the legal origins theory, which affirm the superiority of the common law over the rest of legal cultures. The need to adopt a sociological perspective for the understanding of legal phenomena is further underlined.
The problem of legal disagreements can be approached in different ways. On one version, the problem arises because positivism assumes that legal concepts are criteriological, thus conceiving of disagreement among lawyers as pointless and a mere verbal dispute. Plunkett and Sundell have offered a novel response to this criticism, which holds that it is not necessary to share a concept in order to disagree. In this paper I analyze this response and I offer a number of objections against it.
Democratic decision-making processes (as well as constitutional limits to majority rule) may be evaluated on the basis of their results, their intrinsic value or a combination of both. I will show that an in-depth analysis of these alternatives uncovers serious weaknesses in the usual models of justification for constitutionalism. The theoretical basis to describe the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism has remained stuck in a trap that I seek to break from. I conclude by showing the need to overcome epistemic and counter-epistemic arguments by proposing standards that I believe have been scarcely considered in the classical literature about this issue.
The article discusses some features of Carlos Nino’s account of moral truth. We will focus on two aspects of this account. First, we will argue against an interpretation according to which Nino’s ideas of moral truth and deliberative democracy resemble a Platonic model. From our point of view Nino’s constructivism impedes the adoption of a transcendent position. Second, we will try to highlight the inconsistencies around the idea of individual access to moral truth. To account this, it will be necessary to focus on Nino’s understanding of moral knowledge.
Democracy as a form of government admits its division in at least two different moments: its old form and its modern form. A distinctive trait of the latter version --representative (modern) democracy-- is the presence of representatives elected by popular vote. Given this, it is generally held that vote and majority rule are “typically democratic” mechanisms. However, neither vote nor majority rule are exclusive of democratic systems. Thus, defining how these two mechanisms should operate in a democratic system is one of the main problems of democratic theory in its relation with the study of fundamental rights. This article addresses the problems raised by these questions departing, mainly, from the theory of Norberto Bobbio.
The paper aims to provide an overview of Jordi Ferrer’s main contributions to the so called rationalist approach to legal proof, and to critically assess one aspect of his thought, which is the limited role that the author seems to attribute to epistemology within the general debate about the most appropriate standards of proof for the legal domain and particularly for the criminal law. The author holds that while it is adequate that the decision about standards of proof be taken by the people’s representatives, this does not prevent (legal) epistemology from influencing the decision-making process by way of advancing arguments, making observations and suggesting methodologies which can make it make it a more informed and rational decision. Larry Laudan’s legal epistemology project is introduced to exemplify this position.
Isonomía 43 by Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho
This article spells out an analytical and realistic theory of legal interpretation. Analytical, since its method is the logical analysis of jurists’ and judges’ language. Realistic, since it assumes, first, that law is indeterminate and, second, that judicial interpretation is intrinsically discretionary. In the first part, some fundamental distinctions are introduced, namely: “in abstracto” and “in concreto” interpretation; cognitive, adjudicative, and creative interpretation; interpretation strictly understood and juristic construction. The last mentioned distinction, in particular, takes on a special importance.
While the debate on legal principles reaches its breaking point with the work of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy, it recognizes previous developments and finds one of its deepest formulations in reaction to Inter-War positivist legal thought. In this work we focus on the contributions of social-democratic jurist Hermann Heller to legal theory which —in contrast to those he made to State theory— remain forgotten. We reconstrict his theory of law to show that his ideas about the structure of legal systems and about the foundations of legal principles explain very well the relationship between law and power in modern constitutional States and the role of judges in a democracy, while simultaenously being a precursor to some of those Robert Alexy would later develop.
The core purpose of this paper is to show that the exclusive-inclusive legal positivism debate is based on at least three erroneous ideas about the relation between legal and moral language, the relations between legal theory and legal practice, and the understanding of what a normative science is. Then, assuming the Neokantian-Kelsenian conception of jurisprudence, I propose the thesis that the legal language and the theory of law are, respectively, the conceptual foundations of moral language and legal practice. I also reject the idea that normative sciences embrace some kind of value-judgments. As a consequence, the debate between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism must be abandoned or, at the least, recasted.
In this paper I explore some of the topics traditionally associated with the problem of normativity of law: autonomy, rationality, practical relevance, reasons for action and authority. I will try to build a conceptual framework that reflects the theoretical complexity of the problem and the philosophical positions from which they can be addressed. Particularly, I will focus on the analysis of the philosophical assumptions related to certain positions and the revision of their mutual coherence.
The problem of social exclusion -situation of those who are excluded from social goods and services that lead to a basic development of personality- challenges the legitimacy of the social and the criminal system. Mainly because it means that in the same society there are individuals with the status of person -"ordinary", included citizen- and others who, since they are deprived of the rights to fulfill that status, are excluded from it. To avoid treating them as an instrument, especially in offenses connected more to citizenship than to dignity, the article proposes the attenuation or exclusion of punishment, as there is also a diminution of blame-worthiness. Since the offence is not only grounded on a deficit of motivation on the part of the author, but also in a deficit of socialization attributable to the social system itself, there is a sort of co-responsibility of the two in the commission of the offence.
This paper seeks to provide an analytic framework for tackling a phenomenon that has gone virtually unnoticed so far: the constitutional costs of the war on drugs. In the Americas, policies adopted and implemented to suppress illicit drug markets have required or justified a battery of significant legal reforms and changes in institutional designs and practices. We analyze these settings through the lenses of a category we have chosen to call "constitutional costs" and develop, as a first step in a potentially wider assessment, an analysis of the Colombian and Mexican cases.
The purpose of this paper is to give an account of the critiques that Ferrajoli addresses to Kelsen in his latest -still unpublished- book, Diritto e lógica. Dieci aporie nell'opera di Hans Kelsen, and to make some criticism of the theses held in it by Ferrajoli himself. Major criticisms that the author believes should be addressed in this regard to Ferrajoli affect the purely internal nature of Ferrajoli's approach to the law, the always debatable character, never true or false that, according to Ferrajoli, interpretive statements have, and the incompatibility which, according to the author, exists between the ambitions of Ferrajoli's theory and the limitations imposed on it by its anchoring in ethical non-cognitivism.
Isonomía 42 by Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho
The article reconstructs and critically analyzes Jeremy Waldron's responses to major problems on law and politics, justice and authority. Waldron claims at the same time a non-skeptical thesis about the existence of moral-political rights, a skeptical thesis about the existence of more accurate epistemic procedures to identify them, and a positive thesis about political legitimacy (participatory majoritarianism). The paper argues that his theory is consistent only if a fourth vertex, implicit in the theory, is added (the "equality of agency and epistemic capacity" of rights-holders). But this explicit addition requires abandoning and redefining two of the other elements, and this eventually conducts us to the typical claims of epistemic deliberativism. Waldron's criticisms to judicial review are reinterpreted on these new grounds.
H.L.A. Hart did not pay much attention to the rule of adjudication -and neither did scholars. This paper aims to go beyond what Hart explicitly says about it and to give an account of its role within his concept of law. The perspective will be reconstructive, since the goal is not to develop an original concept of rule of adjudication, inspired on Hart's theory of law, but rather to shed light on the potential -but also the limits- of this kind of secondary rule. Therefore, the article will first explore the interrelation between the rule of adjudication, on the one hand, and coercion and legal interpretation, on the other: the goal is to outline the theoretical position of judges, which becomes clear when analyzing their (different) tasks in easy and hard cases. Then, this position is put under criticism; by examining, in particular, the well-known problem of the infallibility and finality of judicial decisions, it is shown that Hart considered the judicial application of law in a too declarative way.
Can we rationally speak to someone who offends our beliefs, dishonors our logical faith and laughs at our personal and theoretical opinions? Can we discuss with the enemy (political, ideological or doctrinal enemy...)? This paper is a theoretical-philosophical attempt to think analytically (far beyond the legal dogmatic) about this controversial issue. It explores the limits, possibilities and confines of freedom of speech, from a realistic theory of argumentation and from a pragmatics of normative discourse. It takes as examples the conflicts generated by radical groups of the neo-fascist type, religious sects or violent social movements.
The article explores the relations between law, democracy and equal treatment, developing in the way the meaning of notions such us "political community", "political acts" or "rights" and setting forth a specific understanding of what could be properly called "democratic rights" in whose context the right to have equal access to judicial protection plays a crucial role. The analysis combines inquiry at the level of legal language with inquiry at the philosophical, philological, historical and sociopolitical levels, in congruence with the idea that historical sources (social facts and their theoretical explanation) are axes that encircle both legal life and the democratic game (where it exists).
The Mendez v. Westminster case has a very important role in the development of equality rights and the abolition of racial segregation. It influenced legal reform in the State of California, increasing equal access to education. But no doubt its greatest influence was on the Brown v. Board of Education ruling, whose main tenets were grounded on considerations set down in Mendez.
The paper reflects on the concept of interpretation in conformity with the Constitution and the treaties in the context of the new parameters of judicial review in Mexico, in view of a recent Supreme Court ruling, the so-called "Asperger case", which deals with the disability model adopted by Mexico City legislation. The author argues that the Court erred in choosing the aforementioned interpretive tool. He warns about the abuse of this argumentative tool in the resolution of human rights cases and argues that legitimate purposes do not justify neglecting the selection of appropriate analytical frameworks.
Isonomía 41 by Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho
Isonomía 40 by Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho
Isonomía 39 by Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho
Desde una perspectiva histórica se intenta aportar elementos que clarifiquen la problemática sobre la mundialización y la confrontación de las culturas jurídicas. Así, por una parte, se ofrece una interrogación acerca de la manera en que se practica la teoría del derecho en el mundo anglosajón y en el continental europeo, lo cual conduce a poner en cuestión su pretensión de universalidad. Por otra parte se analiza y discute el estatus y la pertinencia de ciertas teorías del derecho, como la del legal origins theory, que afirman la superioridad del common law sobre el resto de las culturas jurídicas. Se destaca además la necesidad de introducir la dimensión sociológica para la comprensión del fenómeno jurídico.
Abstract
Departing from a historical viewpoint, the article provides elements intending to clarify the problems associated to globalization and the confrontation between different legal cultures. Thus, on the one hand, there is an inquiry about the ways of doing legal theory in the Anglo world and in continental Europe, casting doubts on their pretense of universality. On the other hand, the article analyzes and discusses the status and pertinence of several legal theories, such as the legal origins theory, which affirm the superiority of the common law over the rest of legal cultures. The need to adopt a sociological perspective for the understanding of legal phenomena is further underlined.
The problem of legal disagreements can be approached in different ways. On one version, the problem arises because positivism assumes that legal concepts are criteriological, thus conceiving of disagreement among lawyers as pointless and a mere verbal dispute. Plunkett and Sundell have offered a novel response to this criticism, which holds that it is not necessary to share a concept in order to disagree. In this paper I analyze this response and I offer a number of objections against it.
Democratic decision-making processes (as well as constitutional limits to majority rule) may be evaluated on the basis of their results, their intrinsic value or a combination of both. I will show that an in-depth analysis of these alternatives uncovers serious weaknesses in the usual models of justification for constitutionalism. The theoretical basis to describe the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism has remained stuck in a trap that I seek to break from. I conclude by showing the need to overcome epistemic and counter-epistemic arguments by proposing standards that I believe have been scarcely considered in the classical literature about this issue.
The article discusses some features of Carlos Nino’s account of moral truth. We will focus on two aspects of this account. First, we will argue against an interpretation according to which Nino’s ideas of moral truth and deliberative democracy resemble a Platonic model. From our point of view Nino’s constructivism impedes the adoption of a transcendent position. Second, we will try to highlight the inconsistencies around the idea of individual access to moral truth. To account this, it will be necessary to focus on Nino’s understanding of moral knowledge.
Democracy as a form of government admits its division in at least two different moments: its old form and its modern form. A distinctive trait of the latter version --representative (modern) democracy-- is the presence of representatives elected by popular vote. Given this, it is generally held that vote and majority rule are “typically democratic” mechanisms. However, neither vote nor majority rule are exclusive of democratic systems. Thus, defining how these two mechanisms should operate in a democratic system is one of the main problems of democratic theory in its relation with the study of fundamental rights. This article addresses the problems raised by these questions departing, mainly, from the theory of Norberto Bobbio.
The paper aims to provide an overview of Jordi Ferrer’s main contributions to the so called rationalist approach to legal proof, and to critically assess one aspect of his thought, which is the limited role that the author seems to attribute to epistemology within the general debate about the most appropriate standards of proof for the legal domain and particularly for the criminal law. The author holds that while it is adequate that the decision about standards of proof be taken by the people’s representatives, this does not prevent (legal) epistemology from influencing the decision-making process by way of advancing arguments, making observations and suggesting methodologies which can make it make it a more informed and rational decision. Larry Laudan’s legal epistemology project is introduced to exemplify this position.
This article spells out an analytical and realistic theory of legal interpretation. Analytical, since its method is the logical analysis of jurists’ and judges’ language. Realistic, since it assumes, first, that law is indeterminate and, second, that judicial interpretation is intrinsically discretionary. In the first part, some fundamental distinctions are introduced, namely: “in abstracto” and “in concreto” interpretation; cognitive, adjudicative, and creative interpretation; interpretation strictly understood and juristic construction. The last mentioned distinction, in particular, takes on a special importance.
While the debate on legal principles reaches its breaking point with the work of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy, it recognizes previous developments and finds one of its deepest formulations in reaction to Inter-War positivist legal thought. In this work we focus on the contributions of social-democratic jurist Hermann Heller to legal theory which —in contrast to those he made to State theory— remain forgotten. We reconstrict his theory of law to show that his ideas about the structure of legal systems and about the foundations of legal principles explain very well the relationship between law and power in modern constitutional States and the role of judges in a democracy, while simultaenously being a precursor to some of those Robert Alexy would later develop.
The core purpose of this paper is to show that the exclusive-inclusive legal positivism debate is based on at least three erroneous ideas about the relation between legal and moral language, the relations between legal theory and legal practice, and the understanding of what a normative science is. Then, assuming the Neokantian-Kelsenian conception of jurisprudence, I propose the thesis that the legal language and the theory of law are, respectively, the conceptual foundations of moral language and legal practice. I also reject the idea that normative sciences embrace some kind of value-judgments. As a consequence, the debate between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism must be abandoned or, at the least, recasted.
In this paper I explore some of the topics traditionally associated with the problem of normativity of law: autonomy, rationality, practical relevance, reasons for action and authority. I will try to build a conceptual framework that reflects the theoretical complexity of the problem and the philosophical positions from which they can be addressed. Particularly, I will focus on the analysis of the philosophical assumptions related to certain positions and the revision of their mutual coherence.
The problem of social exclusion -situation of those who are excluded from social goods and services that lead to a basic development of personality- challenges the legitimacy of the social and the criminal system. Mainly because it means that in the same society there are individuals with the status of person -"ordinary", included citizen- and others who, since they are deprived of the rights to fulfill that status, are excluded from it. To avoid treating them as an instrument, especially in offenses connected more to citizenship than to dignity, the article proposes the attenuation or exclusion of punishment, as there is also a diminution of blame-worthiness. Since the offence is not only grounded on a deficit of motivation on the part of the author, but also in a deficit of socialization attributable to the social system itself, there is a sort of co-responsibility of the two in the commission of the offence.
This paper seeks to provide an analytic framework for tackling a phenomenon that has gone virtually unnoticed so far: the constitutional costs of the war on drugs. In the Americas, policies adopted and implemented to suppress illicit drug markets have required or justified a battery of significant legal reforms and changes in institutional designs and practices. We analyze these settings through the lenses of a category we have chosen to call "constitutional costs" and develop, as a first step in a potentially wider assessment, an analysis of the Colombian and Mexican cases.
The purpose of this paper is to give an account of the critiques that Ferrajoli addresses to Kelsen in his latest -still unpublished- book, Diritto e lógica. Dieci aporie nell'opera di Hans Kelsen, and to make some criticism of the theses held in it by Ferrajoli himself. Major criticisms that the author believes should be addressed in this regard to Ferrajoli affect the purely internal nature of Ferrajoli's approach to the law, the always debatable character, never true or false that, according to Ferrajoli, interpretive statements have, and the incompatibility which, according to the author, exists between the ambitions of Ferrajoli's theory and the limitations imposed on it by its anchoring in ethical non-cognitivism.
The article reconstructs and critically analyzes Jeremy Waldron's responses to major problems on law and politics, justice and authority. Waldron claims at the same time a non-skeptical thesis about the existence of moral-political rights, a skeptical thesis about the existence of more accurate epistemic procedures to identify them, and a positive thesis about political legitimacy (participatory majoritarianism). The paper argues that his theory is consistent only if a fourth vertex, implicit in the theory, is added (the "equality of agency and epistemic capacity" of rights-holders). But this explicit addition requires abandoning and redefining two of the other elements, and this eventually conducts us to the typical claims of epistemic deliberativism. Waldron's criticisms to judicial review are reinterpreted on these new grounds.
H.L.A. Hart did not pay much attention to the rule of adjudication -and neither did scholars. This paper aims to go beyond what Hart explicitly says about it and to give an account of its role within his concept of law. The perspective will be reconstructive, since the goal is not to develop an original concept of rule of adjudication, inspired on Hart's theory of law, but rather to shed light on the potential -but also the limits- of this kind of secondary rule. Therefore, the article will first explore the interrelation between the rule of adjudication, on the one hand, and coercion and legal interpretation, on the other: the goal is to outline the theoretical position of judges, which becomes clear when analyzing their (different) tasks in easy and hard cases. Then, this position is put under criticism; by examining, in particular, the well-known problem of the infallibility and finality of judicial decisions, it is shown that Hart considered the judicial application of law in a too declarative way.
Can we rationally speak to someone who offends our beliefs, dishonors our logical faith and laughs at our personal and theoretical opinions? Can we discuss with the enemy (political, ideological or doctrinal enemy...)? This paper is a theoretical-philosophical attempt to think analytically (far beyond the legal dogmatic) about this controversial issue. It explores the limits, possibilities and confines of freedom of speech, from a realistic theory of argumentation and from a pragmatics of normative discourse. It takes as examples the conflicts generated by radical groups of the neo-fascist type, religious sects or violent social movements.
The article explores the relations between law, democracy and equal treatment, developing in the way the meaning of notions such us "political community", "political acts" or "rights" and setting forth a specific understanding of what could be properly called "democratic rights" in whose context the right to have equal access to judicial protection plays a crucial role. The analysis combines inquiry at the level of legal language with inquiry at the philosophical, philological, historical and sociopolitical levels, in congruence with the idea that historical sources (social facts and their theoretical explanation) are axes that encircle both legal life and the democratic game (where it exists).
The Mendez v. Westminster case has a very important role in the development of equality rights and the abolition of racial segregation. It influenced legal reform in the State of California, increasing equal access to education. But no doubt its greatest influence was on the Brown v. Board of Education ruling, whose main tenets were grounded on considerations set down in Mendez.
The paper reflects on the concept of interpretation in conformity with the Constitution and the treaties in the context of the new parameters of judicial review in Mexico, in view of a recent Supreme Court ruling, the so-called "Asperger case", which deals with the disability model adopted by Mexico City legislation. The author argues that the Court erred in choosing the aforementioned interpretive tool. He warns about the abuse of this argumentative tool in the resolution of human rights cases and argues that legitimate purposes do not justify neglecting the selection of appropriate analytical frameworks.