Peter Singer argues that a satisfactory act-consequentialist explanation of the wrongness of kill... more Peter Singer argues that a satisfactory act-consequentialist explanation of the wrongness of killing can be given by preference-utilitarianism. By positing a distinction between immediate and future- oriented (prospective) preferences, the latter of which can only be had by persons, he claims to be able to (i) explain why killing is a direct wrong done to the person killed; and (ii) block the application of the replaceability argument to persons. This essay argues that he fails to accomplish (ii). If (i) and (ii) together are taken as the criteria for an adequate condemnation of killing, Singer’s account fails to provide it. §1 explains Singer’s account of the wrongness of killing; §2 shows that Singer’s commitment to total consequentialism prevents him from being able to achieve (ii).
British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, Vol. 8(1), 2014, pp.1-12.
In his Basic Rights, Henry Shue attempts to establish that, first, if there are any rights, there... more In his Basic Rights, Henry Shue attempts to establish that, first, if there are any rights, there are rights to subsistence and physical security, because these are necessary for enjoying any other right; second, that all (basic) rights impose both positive and negative duties, and the two kinds of duty cannot be distinguished along these lines. On this basis, he argues that if the global indigent are said to have any rights, they must therefore have a right to subsistence, and that this right imposes underived positive duties of aid on the global rich. Shue’s first claim is based on his definition of a moral right, and assertion that basic rights follow by conceptual necessity from this definition. This essay aims to rebut criticism of this first claim, and argues that on a suitable construal of Shue’s definition that pays sufficient attention to (a) the normative element of his definition of a right; and (b) construes ‘enjoying a right’ in a plausible way, Shue succeeds in showing that basic rights are entailed by non-basic rights, and that subsistence is one of these rights. §1 explains Shue’s argument for basic rights; §2 examines Thomas Pogge’s claim that there are no rights that could count as basic on any interpretation of ‘enjoying a right’, and argues that while Pogge highlights a crucial ambiguity in what Shue means by this, there is a disambiguation on which some rights are in fact basic; §3 examines an argument by Andrew Cohen that subsistence in particular is not a basic right, and argues that he too fails to give adequate attention to the normative element of a right.
The Undergraduate Awards Journal, Vol. 5, 2013, pp. 347-366.
Expressivism is a metaethical thesis about the function and structure of moral language. Whereas ... more Expressivism is a metaethical thesis about the function and structure of moral language. Whereas descriptive claims like ‘grass is green’ express truth-apt propositions, expressivism supposes that moral claims express non-cognitive mental states such as emotions. Thus the claim ‘killing is wrong’, on this analysis, is an expression of the speaker’s strong disapproval of killing. Crucially, moral claims cannot be true or false on this view, because the attitudes they express are not truth-apt. This essay examines whether, given this analysis of the meaning of moral claims, expressivists can explain how moral claims feature in apparently valid arguments without expressing propositions. The focus is on the accounts of Simon Blackburn and Mark Schroeder, both of whom attempt to formulate alternative semantics in terms of attitudes that are isomorphic with, and yield the same results as, truth-functional semantics, while removing the dependence of valid inference on truth. The essay argues that each of the solutions offered fails because it is unable to replicate some crucial part of ordinary truth-functional semantics. Moreover, it argues that this problem is not dependent on the particular details of either account, but results from the general way in which expressivists construe the meaning of both descriptive and normative language. It concludes that expressivists should abandon the semantic project and instead focus on the metaphysics of truth for normative claims.
Peter Singer argues that a satisfactory act-consequentialist explanation of the wrongness of kill... more Peter Singer argues that a satisfactory act-consequentialist explanation of the wrongness of killing can be given by preference-utilitarianism. By positing a distinction between immediate and future- oriented (prospective) preferences, the latter of which can only be had by persons, he claims to be able to (i) explain why killing is a direct wrong done to the person killed; and (ii) block the application of the replaceability argument to persons. This essay argues that he fails to accomplish (ii). If (i) and (ii) together are taken as the criteria for an adequate condemnation of killing, Singer’s account fails to provide it. §1 explains Singer’s account of the wrongness of killing; §2 shows that Singer’s commitment to total consequentialism prevents him from being able to achieve (ii).
British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, Vol. 8(1), 2014, pp.1-12.
In his Basic Rights, Henry Shue attempts to establish that, first, if there are any rights, there... more In his Basic Rights, Henry Shue attempts to establish that, first, if there are any rights, there are rights to subsistence and physical security, because these are necessary for enjoying any other right; second, that all (basic) rights impose both positive and negative duties, and the two kinds of duty cannot be distinguished along these lines. On this basis, he argues that if the global indigent are said to have any rights, they must therefore have a right to subsistence, and that this right imposes underived positive duties of aid on the global rich. Shue’s first claim is based on his definition of a moral right, and assertion that basic rights follow by conceptual necessity from this definition. This essay aims to rebut criticism of this first claim, and argues that on a suitable construal of Shue’s definition that pays sufficient attention to (a) the normative element of his definition of a right; and (b) construes ‘enjoying a right’ in a plausible way, Shue succeeds in showing that basic rights are entailed by non-basic rights, and that subsistence is one of these rights. §1 explains Shue’s argument for basic rights; §2 examines Thomas Pogge’s claim that there are no rights that could count as basic on any interpretation of ‘enjoying a right’, and argues that while Pogge highlights a crucial ambiguity in what Shue means by this, there is a disambiguation on which some rights are in fact basic; §3 examines an argument by Andrew Cohen that subsistence in particular is not a basic right, and argues that he too fails to give adequate attention to the normative element of a right.
The Undergraduate Awards Journal, Vol. 5, 2013, pp. 347-366.
Expressivism is a metaethical thesis about the function and structure of moral language. Whereas ... more Expressivism is a metaethical thesis about the function and structure of moral language. Whereas descriptive claims like ‘grass is green’ express truth-apt propositions, expressivism supposes that moral claims express non-cognitive mental states such as emotions. Thus the claim ‘killing is wrong’, on this analysis, is an expression of the speaker’s strong disapproval of killing. Crucially, moral claims cannot be true or false on this view, because the attitudes they express are not truth-apt. This essay examines whether, given this analysis of the meaning of moral claims, expressivists can explain how moral claims feature in apparently valid arguments without expressing propositions. The focus is on the accounts of Simon Blackburn and Mark Schroeder, both of whom attempt to formulate alternative semantics in terms of attitudes that are isomorphic with, and yield the same results as, truth-functional semantics, while removing the dependence of valid inference on truth. The essay argues that each of the solutions offered fails because it is unable to replicate some crucial part of ordinary truth-functional semantics. Moreover, it argues that this problem is not dependent on the particular details of either account, but results from the general way in which expressivists construe the meaning of both descriptive and normative language. It concludes that expressivists should abandon the semantic project and instead focus on the metaphysics of truth for normative claims.
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