REV WADIGALA SAMITHARATHANA

University of Oxford, Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Graduate Student

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I am a Theravāda Buddhist monk, who was born and fully ordained in Sri Lanka in 1995 and 2009, respectively. I will be pursuing a Master of Philosophy in Buddhist Studies at St Cross College, University of Oxford on 6th October 2024 onwards. Prior to that, I have more recently completed an MA in Buddhist Studies at SOAS University of London - that is upon the completion of BA (Hons) in Philosophy in 2023 at Oxford Brookes University, United Kingdom. Notably, there are a few mainstreams that lie upon my scholarship, viz., Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism, comparative religious views, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of language.Rather, for the sake of thriving in academia, I have now been engaged in some scholarly bodies - as a general member: the Pali Text Society (PTS) in Bristol, International Association of Buddhist Studies (IABS) in Lausanne, the UK Association for Buddhist Studies (UKABS) in England, and suchlike. Despite that, for the last few years, I have been a member of the Royal Institute of Philosophy in London, American Philosophical Association in New York, and British Society for the Philosophy of Religion in London. Moreover, I have recently founded the Oxford Buddhist Society, wherein I am now playing a vital role as the Founding President of the Oxford Centre of Theravāda Buddhism. By all means - it helps enhance societal well-being through the practice of mindfulness meditation and other intellectual activities par excellence.
Supervisors: Prof Kate Crosby, Balliol College, and University of Oxford

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Is Reductive Materialism a Defensible Philosophy of Mind?

American Journal of Psychology, Aug 12, 2022

Over the past decades, reductive materialism has made a recipe for philosophy of mind to explore ... more Over the past decades, reductive materialism has made a recipe for philosophy of mind to explore the subtle nature of the human mind. By and large, many identity theorists were likely to argue that mental states can be found in cognitive faculties of the brain so that the mind, if not most, associates with discoverable phenomena with no burden of proof. To put this bluntly, reductive materialism is typically defined by its very nature: all mental states are neurological states of the brain; ergo, it is implausible to make room for the substance dualism thereto. In response to this naturalist stance, aka reductive materialism, this article, thereby, contends that reductive materialism cannot be placed in a defensible position in philosophy of mind vis-àvis the Kripkean modality; accordingly, this brief survey has identified several barnstorming findings in support of the thesis: the necessity and contingency, the core plank of possibility, rigid and non-rigid designators, and conceivability and possibility. In spite of its limitations, the study certainly adds to our understanding of the so-called reductive materialism in philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, a full discussion of naturalism lies beyond the scope of this study. Further work is, therefore, needed to fully digest the implications of reductive materialism and Kripke's modal argument.

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