Papers by Paul Billingham
European Journal of Political Theory, 2020
Proponents of public reason views hold that the exercise of political power ought to be acceptabl... more Proponents of public reason views hold that the exercise of political power ought to be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. This paper elucidates the common structure shared by all public reason views, first by identifying a set of questions that all such views must answer and, second, by showing that the answers to these questions stand in a particular relationship to each other. In particular, we show that what we call the ‘rationale question’ is fundamental. This fact, and the common structure more generally, is often overlooked or distorted within the literature. As a result, we argue, several prominent argumentative moves made by both critics and defenders of public reason are unsuccessful. Our overall conclusion is that discussions of public reason views would be more fruitful if they made consistent use of the common structure we identify.
Social Theory and Practice, 2021
The success of political liberalism depends on there being an overlapping consensus among reasona... more The success of political liberalism depends on there being an overlapping consensus among reasonable citizens—including religious citizens—upon principles of political morality. This paper explores the resources within one major religion—Christianity—that might lead individuals to endorse (or reject) political liberalism, and thus to join (or not join) the overlapping consensus. I show that there are several strands within Christian political ethics that are consonant with political liberalism and might form the basis for Christian citizens’ membership of the overlapping consensus. Nonetheless, tensions remain, and it is not clear that Christians could wholeheartedly endorse the political conception or give unreserved commitment to political liberal ideals.
European Journal of Philosophy , 2020
Public shaming plays an important role in upholding valuable social norms. But, under what condit... more Public shaming plays an important role in upholding valuable social norms. But, under what conditions, if any, is it morally justifiable? Our aim in this paper is systemically to investigate the morality of public shaming, so as to provide an answer to this neglected question. We develop an overarching framework for assessing the justifiability of this practice, which shows that, while shaming can sometimes be morally justifiable, it very often is not. In turn, our framework highlights several reasons to be concerned about the increasingly widespread phenomenon of online public shaming.
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2020
This article considers how successfully Watson and Hartley achieve the two main aims of their exc... more This article considers how successfully Watson and Hartley achieve the two main aims of their excellent book, Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: first, developing and defending a distinctive version of political liberalism and, second, showing that this is a feminist political liberalism. I challenge both their general defence of their view and the arguments regarding feminism. Both discussions raise questions about the conceptualisation of reasonable disagreement, so I finish with some further comments about ways in which reasonable disagreement about justice creates internal tensions within Watson and Hartley’s theory.
Journal of Social Philosophy
We are witnessing increasing use of the Internet, particular social media, to criticize (perceive... more We are witnessing increasing use of the Internet, particular social media, to criticize (perceived) moral failings and misdemeanors. This phenomenon of so-called ‘online public shaming’ could provide a powerful tool for reinforcing valuable social norms. But it also threatens unwarranted and severe punishments meted out by online mobs. Drawing on the work of John Locke, as well as on recent discussions of social norms, we analyze the dangers associated with the informal enforcement of norms, but also highlight the promise of this practice. We then consider two crucial conditions that online public shaming must meet in order to be justifiable: proportionality and accountability. We argue that these requirements are in fact frequently violated, rendering most cases of online public shaming unjustified. While the use of online public shaming against others’ vices has some apparent virtues, it is currently rarely justified, given its own vices.
Legal Theory, 2019
The idea of “church autonomy” has risen to prominence in law and religion discourse in recent yea... more The idea of “church autonomy” has risen to prominence in law and religion discourse in recent years. Defenders argue that church autonomy is essential to protecting religious freedom, while critics argue that it permits great harm. This heated dispute often obscures the fact that religious group autonomy is not all-or-nothing. Religious organizations can enjoy some autonomy without being free from all legal oversight. This
article thus seeks to make progress in the debate by providing a taxonomy of kinds of judicial examination of religious organizations’ decisions—focusing on employment decisions—and normatively assessing each kind. I argue that religious groups should enjoy protection from certain kinds of examination, but other kinds are justifiable, and even required. My argument supports an approach similar to that seen in some recent European Court of Human Rights decisions, rather than the less discriminating approach of U.S. courts.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2019
'Transformative liberals' believe that the state should use its non-coercive capacities to counte... more 'Transformative liberals' believe that the state should use its non-coercive capacities to counter hateful speech and practices, by seeking to transform the views of those who hold hateful and discriminatory beliefs. This paper critically assesses transformative liberalism, with a particular focus on the theory developed by Corey Brettschneider. For Brettschneider, the state should engage in 'democratic persuasion' by speaking out against views that are incompatible with the ideal of free and equal citizenship, and refusing to fund or subsidise civil society groups that hold such views. My critique has five parts. I first rebut two central justifications for transformative liberalism, regarding complicity and the undermining of equal citizenship. Second, I show that some of the central policies that Brettschneider advocates are in fact coercive. Third, I raise concerns about the nature of the complex and contestable judgments that transformative liberalism requires the state to make. Fourth, I argue that Brettschneider's view has various troubling implications. Finally, I argue that many of these problems derive from his adoption of a thick conception of free and equal citizenship, resulting in an overly broad definition of hateful viewpoints and of hate speech. A defensible version of transforma-tive liberalism would use a significantly narrower conception. Debates concerning hate speech and offensive speech typically focus on legal regulation: should such speech be made unlawful? Opponents claim that legal regulation constitutes an objectionable restriction of free speech, while proponents insist that hate speech imposes the kinds of harms that ought to be coer-cively prohibited. 1 However, some theorists have taken a different tack, arguing that the state should use its non-coercive, 'persuasive', capacities to seek to transform the views of those holding hateful and discriminatory beliefs. In this way, the state can promote liberal values, and oppose groups that reject those 1 The most comprehensive overview is Brown (2015).
Secular Studies, 2019
In Chapter 5 of Liberalism’s Religion, Cécile Laborde considers the freedom and autonomy of relig... more In Chapter 5 of Liberalism’s Religion, Cécile Laborde considers the freedom and autonomy of religious associations within liberal democratic societies. This paper evaluates her central arguments in that chapter. First, I argue that Laborde makes things too easy for herself in dismissing controversies over the state’s legitimate jurisdictional authority. Second, I argue that Laborde’s view of when associations’ ‘coherence interests’ justify exemptions is too narrow. Third, I consider how we might develop an account of judicial deference to associations’ ‘competence interests’.
Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State, 2019
Liberal justifications of exemptions for religious groups appeal to the rights or interests of in... more Liberal justifications of exemptions for religious groups appeal to the rights or interests of individuals. Individuals’ interests in freedom of religion and association are said to be served through religious groups being granted a level of autonomy from state con-trol, which includes their enjoying exemptions from certain other-wise applicable laws. All such justifications face a significant prob-lem, however, which is that religious groups invariably contain dis-senters, who object to the group’s decisions, policies, or current exer-cise of an exemption. It is unclear how these internal dissenters’ in-terests are served by the group being granted exemptions. This chap-ter explores, and seeks to resolve, this problem. I show that three standard liberal responses—appealing to the religious groups’ own decision-making procedures, to implied consent, and to exit rights—contain important insights, but do not provide a satisfactory solution. I then argue that liberal political theory nonetheless has the re-sources to justify exemptions for religious groups in the face of inter-nal dissent, by highlighting the way in which dissenters’ own interest in freedom of religion can be protected and promoted through reli-gious group autonomy. This enables liberal theorists to justify inter-nally contested exemptions for religious groups.
Religion and Political Theory: Secularism, Accommodation and The New Challenges of Religious Diversity , 2019
How should the liberal state respond to religious individuals and groups whose beliefs and practi... more How should the liberal state respond to religious individuals and groups whose beliefs and practices do not seem to fully cohere with liberal values? All liberal theorists agree that toleration of, and even respect for, religion diversity is at the heart of liberalism; individuals in liberal states should enjoy a great degree of freedom in pursuing their religious ideals. All also agree that religion cannot be an excuse for direct violations of basic rights; the rights of others place constraints on religious freedom. But this leaves wide scope for disagreement concerning how the state ought to respond in cases where religious practices do not directly violate basic rights, but nonetheless appear to be in tension with liberal values. Examples here include religious groups discriminating in their membership or leadership policies, or being internally hierarchical, in ways that seemingly diverge from liberal norms of democracy, equality, and non-discrimination. Most theorists rightly reject prohibitions on such practices. Religious freedom includes the freedom to form religious groups whose practices are not fully congruent with liberal values – including exclusionary membership policies, male-only priesthoods, and non-democratic decision-making structures. Congruence between liberal values and group practices should not be coercively enforced. This still leaves room for a transformative response, however: the state actively opposing practices deemed insufficiently liberal, seeking to persuade groups engaged in such practices to reform, and refusing or revoking subsidies such as tax exemptions or funding for public services provided by such groups. This kind of ‘transformative liberalism’ has become increasingly popular in recent years, but in this paper I argue that it ought to be rejected – or at least severely constrained. It grants the state excessive authority to interfere in civil society and shape religion, invites the state to make complex theological and metaphysical judgments for which it is ill equipped, risks alienating many good-willed citizens, and ultimately objectionably restricts religious freedom. We should be more modest in the transformative role we assign to the state, but also thereby more confident in the robustness of liberal values and the political stability of liberal society even when some religions are not fully congruent with liberalism.
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2018
This essay critically assesses the central claim of Kevin Vallier’s Liberal Politics and Public F... more This essay critically assesses the central claim of Kevin Vallier’s Liberal Politics and Public Faith: that public religious faith and public reason liberalism can be reconciled, because the values underlying public reason liberalism should lead us to endorse the ‘convergence view’, rather than the mainstream consensus view. The convergence view is friendlier to religious faith, because it jettisons the consensus view’s much-criticised ‘duty of restraint’. I present several challenges to Vallier’s claim. Firstly, if Vallier is right to reject the duty of restraint then consensus theorists can also do so, and on the same grounds. Secondly, the independent force of the objections to the duty of restraint is unclear. Thirdly, Vallier has not successfully identified desiderata that unite all public reason liberals and favour convergence over consensus. Finally, even if convergence is in some ways friendlier to religious faith, this does not show that it will be attractive to religious citizens.
American Journal of Jurisprudence, 2018
This paper presents a dilemma for Matthew Kramer’s view, as defended in his Liberalism with Excel... more This paper presents a dilemma for Matthew Kramer’s view, as defended in his Liberalism with Excellence. A central aim of that book is to critique existing liberal perfectionist theories, which he labels ‘edificatory’, and to defend a different such theory, which he calls ‘aspirational’. Edificatory perfectionism holds that governments ought to promote citizens’ well-being directly by inducing them to live lives that are more wholesome, cultivated, or autonomous. Aspirational perfectionism, meanwhile, holds that governments ought to promote the conditions under which every citizen can be warranted in harbouring a strong sense of self-respect, by promoting the occurrence of outstanding achievements within society. We first argue that Kramer’s two central arguments against edificatory perfectionism, which appeal to the value of freedom and to moral integrity, fail to establish the impermissibility of edificatory policies. His critique could be salvaged by holding that the ambit of legitimate government activity is limited to the provision and distribution of primary goods. However, we argue, second, that Kramer’s own aspirational perfectionism also runs afoul of this restriction, because his conception of warranted self-respect is not a primary good. Kramer is thus faced with a choice between upholding his objections to edificatory perfectionism and maintaining the coherence of his aspirational perfectionism.
Law and Philosophy, 2017
Most public reason theorists believe that citizens are under a ‘duty of
restraint’. Citizens must... more Most public reason theorists believe that citizens are under a ‘duty of
restraint’. Citizens must refrain from supporting laws for which they have only non-public reasons, such as religious reasons. The theo-ethical equilibrium argument purports to show that theists should accept this duty, on the basis of their religious convictions. Theists’ beliefs about God’s nature should lead them to doubt moral claims for which they cannot find secular grounds, and to refrain from imposing such claims upon others. If successful, this argument would defuse prominent objections to public reason liberalism. This paper assesses the theo-ethical equilibrium argument, with a specific focus on Christian citizens. I argue that Christians should seek theo-ethical equilibrium, but need not endorse the duty
of restraint. I establish this in part through examining the important theological concept of natural law. That discussion also points to more general and persistent problems with defining ‘public reasons’.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Jan 2017
The 'convergence conception' of political liberalism has become increasingly popular in recent ye... more The 'convergence conception' of political liberalism has become increasingly popular in recent years. Steven Wall has shown that convergence liberals face a serious dilemma in responding to disagreement about whether laws are publicly justified. What I call the 'conjunctive approach' to such disagreement threatens anarchism, while the 'non-conjunctive' approach appears to render convergence liberalism internally inconsistent. This paper defends the non-conjunctive approach, which holds that the correct view of public justification should be followed even if some citizens do not consider enacted laws to be publicly justified. My argument sheds light on the fundamental structure of convergence liberalism.
Social Theory and Practice, Jan 2017
Debates between political liberals and liberal perfectionists have been reinvigorated by Jonathan... more Debates between political liberals and liberal perfectionists have been reinvigorated by Jonathan Quong's Liberalism Without Perfection. In this paper I argue that certain forms of perfectionism can rebut or evade Quong's three central objections – that perfectionism is manipulative, paternalistic, and illegitimate. I then argue that perfectionists can defend an 'internal conception' of perfectionism, parallel in structure to Quong's 'internal conception' of political liberalism, but with a different conception of the justificatory constituency. None of Quong's arguments show that his view should be preferred to this perfectionist internal conception. It can thus equally claim to achieve 'justification to all reasonable citizens'.
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, Jan 2017
Many philosophers and jurists believe that individuals should sometimes be granted religiously-gr... more Many philosophers and jurists believe that individuals should sometimes be granted religiously-grounded exemptions from laws or rules. To determine whether an exemption is merited in a particular case, the religious claim must be weighed against the countervailing values that favour the uniform application of the law or rule. This paper develops and applies a framework for assessing the weight of religious claims to exemption, across two dimensions. First, the importance of the burdened religious practice, which is determined by its level of obligatoriness and centrality, according to the beliefs of the individual claimant. Second, the extent of the burden on the practice, which depends on the cost the individual bears if she both undertakes the religious practice and obeys the law or rule, where costs are assessed using an impartial account of individual interests. Exemptions should be granted when claims are weighty on either of these dimensions and the countervailing value is relatively weak. The final section of the paper responds to an important objection to this approach, which concerns administrability.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Jun 2017
In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a family of reaso... more In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice, rather than just one. This ‘Deep Version’ of political liberalism opens up new questions about the relationship between citizens’ political conceptions, from which they must draw and offer public reasons in their political advocacy, and their comprehensive doctrines. These questions centre on whether a reasonable citizen’s choice of political conception can be influenced by her comprehensive doctrine. In this paper I present two models of the relationship, which give contrasting answers to these questions, and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines. This has important implications for our understanding of Rawlsian political liberalism, and reduces the force of objections that have been offered by theorists sympathetic to religion.
Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Feb 2016
Andrew Lister’s Public Reason and Political Community is an important new contribution to the deb... more Andrew Lister’s Public Reason and Political Community is an important new contribution to the debate over political liberalism. In this article, I critically evaluate some of the central arguments of the book in order to assess the current state of public reason liberalism. I pursue two main objections to Lister’s work. First, Lister’s justification for public reason, which appeals to the value of civic friendship, fails to show why public reason liberalism should be preferred to an alternative democratic theory that does not include public reason restrictions. Second, there are several important ambiguities and tensions within Lister’s view that he does not adequately resolve. His approach to them often takes public reason liberalism in directions that many of its advocates will reject. More work thus remains to be done by public reason liberals both to show why public reason restrictions are necessary and to resolve these tensions in a more satisfactory way.
Book chapters by Paul Billingham
Uploads
Papers by Paul Billingham
article thus seeks to make progress in the debate by providing a taxonomy of kinds of judicial examination of religious organizations’ decisions—focusing on employment decisions—and normatively assessing each kind. I argue that religious groups should enjoy protection from certain kinds of examination, but other kinds are justifiable, and even required. My argument supports an approach similar to that seen in some recent European Court of Human Rights decisions, rather than the less discriminating approach of U.S. courts.
restraint’. Citizens must refrain from supporting laws for which they have only non-public reasons, such as religious reasons. The theo-ethical equilibrium argument purports to show that theists should accept this duty, on the basis of their religious convictions. Theists’ beliefs about God’s nature should lead them to doubt moral claims for which they cannot find secular grounds, and to refrain from imposing such claims upon others. If successful, this argument would defuse prominent objections to public reason liberalism. This paper assesses the theo-ethical equilibrium argument, with a specific focus on Christian citizens. I argue that Christians should seek theo-ethical equilibrium, but need not endorse the duty
of restraint. I establish this in part through examining the important theological concept of natural law. That discussion also points to more general and persistent problems with defining ‘public reasons’.
Book chapters by Paul Billingham
article thus seeks to make progress in the debate by providing a taxonomy of kinds of judicial examination of religious organizations’ decisions—focusing on employment decisions—and normatively assessing each kind. I argue that religious groups should enjoy protection from certain kinds of examination, but other kinds are justifiable, and even required. My argument supports an approach similar to that seen in some recent European Court of Human Rights decisions, rather than the less discriminating approach of U.S. courts.
restraint’. Citizens must refrain from supporting laws for which they have only non-public reasons, such as religious reasons. The theo-ethical equilibrium argument purports to show that theists should accept this duty, on the basis of their religious convictions. Theists’ beliefs about God’s nature should lead them to doubt moral claims for which they cannot find secular grounds, and to refrain from imposing such claims upon others. If successful, this argument would defuse prominent objections to public reason liberalism. This paper assesses the theo-ethical equilibrium argument, with a specific focus on Christian citizens. I argue that Christians should seek theo-ethical equilibrium, but need not endorse the duty
of restraint. I establish this in part through examining the important theological concept of natural law. That discussion also points to more general and persistent problems with defining ‘public reasons’.