The 2008 banking failures in the UK and the United States reshaped global economic governance. Th... more The 2008 banking failures in the UK and the United States reshaped global economic governance. The aftershocks of the financial crisis exposed the need for global agencies which could rapidly allocate resources to prevent countries collapsing. Equally highlighted was the need for more inclusive institutions, drawing in major emerging economies to provide resources and agree upon institutional reform.
Prince, UN agencies and international NGOs had established "taskspecific cluster groups to improv... more Prince, UN agencies and international NGOs had established "taskspecific cluster groups to improve communication across operating agencies, discuss specific needs, and coordinate activities in order to avoid overlap and maximize outreach and coverage of a response." 9 There were daily discussions with the government but the government was very clearly not "in charge". 10 HAITI: Technical Meeting on Aid Coordination and Budget Support, Friday
Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Aug 3, 2006
... of Russia), Gill Marcus (former deputy finance minister and deputy central bank governor of S... more ... of Russia), Gill Marcus (former deputy finance minister and deputy central bank governor of South Africa), and Rizal Ramli (former coordinating ... with the IMF can be useful for policymakers wish-ing to undertake unpopular decisions.12 Furthermore, there is some evi-dence that ...
The United States enjoys a special position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Worl... more The United States enjoys a special position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. When the institutions were created, their structure, location, and mandate were all pretty much determined by the United States. 1 The United States had just over a third of the voting power in each institution. 2 No drawing from the IMF was approved without US agreement first being made clear. 3 These observations suggest that the US was set to play a dominant role in the institutions. Yet neither the Fund nor the Bank can be cast as a mere instrument of US policy. To some extent the institutions were created in order to propound and enforce US-supported aims and policies around the world. It is also true that the Fund and the Bank exist because their 'neutral and apparently technical advice may be less offensive to national sentiments than direct intervention by the United States', in the case of the World Bank 'sparing the USA the unsavory epithets of. .. "aid with strings", "arm-twisting political pressures" etc.'. 4 However, if the organizations had absolutely no autonomy, they would be redundant, for they would have no greater legitimacy or mobilizing power than government agencies of the US. The very creation of multilateral organizations reflects the fact that, in order to propound a vision of the global economy, the participation of a large number of states in the world is required. Such participation in turn requires that a wide range of countries believe in the institutions' legitimacy: that they perceive the institutions to proffer a particular technical expertise as well as a certain degree of independence, a genuinely international character, and actions which are rule-based rather than reflecting US discretionary judgements. Susan Strange once described multilateral institutions serving either as 'instruments of the structural strategy and foreign policy of the dominant state or states' or to provide necessary public goods: 'allowing states to enjoy the political luxury of national autonomy
Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Jul 19, 1999
Since the early 1990s many international institutions have been urging governments to conform to ... more Since the early 1990s many international institutions have been urging governments to conform to standards of `good governance'. Yet the same institutions have been rather slow in applying equivalent standards to their own structures and decision-making processes. In this paper I examine what this would mean. I argue that principles of participation, accountability, and fairness can be applied broadly to global civil society, but that they ought equally be applied to relations among states within international organizations. Using illustrations drawn from the experience of a number of institutions (the Inter-American and African Development Banks, the UN Security Council, the GATT/WTO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Global Environment Facility, and the European Union), I explore the tensions and trade-offs which arise in trying to ensure full participation and accountability. I conclude that neither formal structures of representation nor consensus decision-making necessarily enhance good governance. Rather, institutions need to focus on adequately representing different categories of stake-holders, and implementing voting and decision-making rules which better ensure transparency and accountability. GOOD GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Good governance moved onto the agenda of many international organizations at the end of the Cold War when calls for democracy and better government became louder and as expectations were heightened as to what international organizations might do to further this aim. Many multilateral agencies took up the summons-from the United Nations, to multilateral development banks-and are now part of a chorus of voices urging governments across the world to heed higher standards of democratic representation, accountability and transparency. Much more slowly, multilateral organizations have begun to question what `good governance' means for the way in which they themselves are structured and make and implement decisions. They have been very slow to set down a standard for themselves-and indeed there is little precedent in the international system for doing so. To quote the former Secretary General of the United Nations: `democracy has not
This chapter examines the IMF's relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa, explaining the poli... more This chapter examines the IMF's relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa, explaining the political pressures which have shaped the Fund's engagement with countries on the continent. It explores the way powerful donor countries have affected this relationship from both within and from outside the IMF, as well as non-governmental organizations. Within these political forces, the IMF has struggled to shape economic programs for its borrowing members. Equally challenging for the institution has been negotiating politics within borrowing countries. As a result the institution faces two powerful ongoing challenges: reconciling greater ‘ownership’ by its low-income borrowers with the mission defined by its most powerful shareholders; and working out the relationship of its work to that of the World Bank and other institutions in an increasingly complex aid architecture.
He is researching the social and environmental regulation of multinational corporations, focussin... more He is researching the social and environmental regulation of multinational corporations, focussing on the role of the World Bank Group as a standard-setter for major extractive industries projects. David holds an MPhil in international relations and a BA with first class honours in Politics, Philosophy and Economics, both from the University of Oxford. He is Junior Dean of University College.
Background International development assistance for health (DAH) quadrupled between 1990 and 2012... more Background International development assistance for health (DAH) quadrupled between 1990 and 2012, from US$ 5.6 billion to US$ 28.1 billion. This generates an increasing need for transparent and replicable tools that could be used to set investment priorities, monitor the distribution of funding in real time, and evaluate the impact of those investments. Methods In this paper we present a methodology that addresses these three challenges. We call this approach PLANET, which stands for planning, monitoring and evaluation tool. Fundamentally, PLANET is based on crowdsourcing approach to obtaining information relevant to deployment of large-scale programs. Information is contributed in real time by a diverse group of participants involved in the program delivery. Findings PLANET relies on real-time information from three levels of participants in large-scale programs: funders, managers and recipients. At each level, information is solicited to assess five key risks that are most relevant to each level of operations. The risks at the level of funders involve systematic neglect of certain areas, focus on donor' s interests over that of program recipients, ineffective coordination between donors, questionable mechanisms of delivery and excessive loss of funding to "middle men". At the level of managers, the risks are corruption, lack of capacity and/or competence, lack of information and /or communication, undue avoidance of governmental structures / preference to non-governmental organizations and exclusion of local expertise. At the level of primary recipients, the risks are corruption, parallel operations / "verticalization", misalignment with local priorities and lack of community involvement, issues with ethics, equity and/or acceptability, and low likelihood of sustainability beyond the end of the program' s implementation. Interpretation PLANET is intended as an additional tool available to policy-makers to prioritize, monitor and evaluate large-scale development programs. In this, it should complement tools such as LiST (for health care/interventions), EQUIST (for health care/interventions) and CHNRI (for health research), which also rely on information from local experts and on local context to set priorities in a transparent, userfriendly, replicable, quantifiable and specific, algorithmic-like manner.
The world of development assistance is being shaken by the power shift occurring across the globa... more The world of development assistance is being shaken by the power shift occurring across the global economy. Emerging economies are quietly beginning to change the rules of the game. China,
In May 2017 a new director general of the World Health Organization will be elected-one of the wo... more In May 2017 a new director general of the World Health Organization will be elected-one of the world's most critical appointments. The process is long and highly political. In January 2017 the executive board of WHO will shortlist a maximum of three candidates from the field of six (table 1⇓), and the new director general will be elected from the shortlist by all 194 member states at the World Health Assembly in May 2017.
The 2008 banking failures in the UK and the United States reshaped global economic governance. Th... more The 2008 banking failures in the UK and the United States reshaped global economic governance. The aftershocks of the financial crisis exposed the need for global agencies which could rapidly allocate resources to prevent countries collapsing. Equally highlighted was the need for more inclusive institutions, drawing in major emerging economies to provide resources and agree upon institutional reform.
Prince, UN agencies and international NGOs had established "taskspecific cluster groups to improv... more Prince, UN agencies and international NGOs had established "taskspecific cluster groups to improve communication across operating agencies, discuss specific needs, and coordinate activities in order to avoid overlap and maximize outreach and coverage of a response." 9 There were daily discussions with the government but the government was very clearly not "in charge". 10 HAITI: Technical Meeting on Aid Coordination and Budget Support, Friday
Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Aug 3, 2006
... of Russia), Gill Marcus (former deputy finance minister and deputy central bank governor of S... more ... of Russia), Gill Marcus (former deputy finance minister and deputy central bank governor of South Africa), and Rizal Ramli (former coordinating ... with the IMF can be useful for policymakers wish-ing to undertake unpopular decisions.12 Furthermore, there is some evi-dence that ...
The United States enjoys a special position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Worl... more The United States enjoys a special position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. When the institutions were created, their structure, location, and mandate were all pretty much determined by the United States. 1 The United States had just over a third of the voting power in each institution. 2 No drawing from the IMF was approved without US agreement first being made clear. 3 These observations suggest that the US was set to play a dominant role in the institutions. Yet neither the Fund nor the Bank can be cast as a mere instrument of US policy. To some extent the institutions were created in order to propound and enforce US-supported aims and policies around the world. It is also true that the Fund and the Bank exist because their 'neutral and apparently technical advice may be less offensive to national sentiments than direct intervention by the United States', in the case of the World Bank 'sparing the USA the unsavory epithets of. .. "aid with strings", "arm-twisting political pressures" etc.'. 4 However, if the organizations had absolutely no autonomy, they would be redundant, for they would have no greater legitimacy or mobilizing power than government agencies of the US. The very creation of multilateral organizations reflects the fact that, in order to propound a vision of the global economy, the participation of a large number of states in the world is required. Such participation in turn requires that a wide range of countries believe in the institutions' legitimacy: that they perceive the institutions to proffer a particular technical expertise as well as a certain degree of independence, a genuinely international character, and actions which are rule-based rather than reflecting US discretionary judgements. Susan Strange once described multilateral institutions serving either as 'instruments of the structural strategy and foreign policy of the dominant state or states' or to provide necessary public goods: 'allowing states to enjoy the political luxury of national autonomy
Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Jul 19, 1999
Since the early 1990s many international institutions have been urging governments to conform to ... more Since the early 1990s many international institutions have been urging governments to conform to standards of `good governance'. Yet the same institutions have been rather slow in applying equivalent standards to their own structures and decision-making processes. In this paper I examine what this would mean. I argue that principles of participation, accountability, and fairness can be applied broadly to global civil society, but that they ought equally be applied to relations among states within international organizations. Using illustrations drawn from the experience of a number of institutions (the Inter-American and African Development Banks, the UN Security Council, the GATT/WTO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Global Environment Facility, and the European Union), I explore the tensions and trade-offs which arise in trying to ensure full participation and accountability. I conclude that neither formal structures of representation nor consensus decision-making necessarily enhance good governance. Rather, institutions need to focus on adequately representing different categories of stake-holders, and implementing voting and decision-making rules which better ensure transparency and accountability. GOOD GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Good governance moved onto the agenda of many international organizations at the end of the Cold War when calls for democracy and better government became louder and as expectations were heightened as to what international organizations might do to further this aim. Many multilateral agencies took up the summons-from the United Nations, to multilateral development banks-and are now part of a chorus of voices urging governments across the world to heed higher standards of democratic representation, accountability and transparency. Much more slowly, multilateral organizations have begun to question what `good governance' means for the way in which they themselves are structured and make and implement decisions. They have been very slow to set down a standard for themselves-and indeed there is little precedent in the international system for doing so. To quote the former Secretary General of the United Nations: `democracy has not
This chapter examines the IMF's relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa, explaining the poli... more This chapter examines the IMF's relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa, explaining the political pressures which have shaped the Fund's engagement with countries on the continent. It explores the way powerful donor countries have affected this relationship from both within and from outside the IMF, as well as non-governmental organizations. Within these political forces, the IMF has struggled to shape economic programs for its borrowing members. Equally challenging for the institution has been negotiating politics within borrowing countries. As a result the institution faces two powerful ongoing challenges: reconciling greater ‘ownership’ by its low-income borrowers with the mission defined by its most powerful shareholders; and working out the relationship of its work to that of the World Bank and other institutions in an increasingly complex aid architecture.
He is researching the social and environmental regulation of multinational corporations, focussin... more He is researching the social and environmental regulation of multinational corporations, focussing on the role of the World Bank Group as a standard-setter for major extractive industries projects. David holds an MPhil in international relations and a BA with first class honours in Politics, Philosophy and Economics, both from the University of Oxford. He is Junior Dean of University College.
Background International development assistance for health (DAH) quadrupled between 1990 and 2012... more Background International development assistance for health (DAH) quadrupled between 1990 and 2012, from US$ 5.6 billion to US$ 28.1 billion. This generates an increasing need for transparent and replicable tools that could be used to set investment priorities, monitor the distribution of funding in real time, and evaluate the impact of those investments. Methods In this paper we present a methodology that addresses these three challenges. We call this approach PLANET, which stands for planning, monitoring and evaluation tool. Fundamentally, PLANET is based on crowdsourcing approach to obtaining information relevant to deployment of large-scale programs. Information is contributed in real time by a diverse group of participants involved in the program delivery. Findings PLANET relies on real-time information from three levels of participants in large-scale programs: funders, managers and recipients. At each level, information is solicited to assess five key risks that are most relevant to each level of operations. The risks at the level of funders involve systematic neglect of certain areas, focus on donor' s interests over that of program recipients, ineffective coordination between donors, questionable mechanisms of delivery and excessive loss of funding to "middle men". At the level of managers, the risks are corruption, lack of capacity and/or competence, lack of information and /or communication, undue avoidance of governmental structures / preference to non-governmental organizations and exclusion of local expertise. At the level of primary recipients, the risks are corruption, parallel operations / "verticalization", misalignment with local priorities and lack of community involvement, issues with ethics, equity and/or acceptability, and low likelihood of sustainability beyond the end of the program' s implementation. Interpretation PLANET is intended as an additional tool available to policy-makers to prioritize, monitor and evaluate large-scale development programs. In this, it should complement tools such as LiST (for health care/interventions), EQUIST (for health care/interventions) and CHNRI (for health research), which also rely on information from local experts and on local context to set priorities in a transparent, userfriendly, replicable, quantifiable and specific, algorithmic-like manner.
The world of development assistance is being shaken by the power shift occurring across the globa... more The world of development assistance is being shaken by the power shift occurring across the global economy. Emerging economies are quietly beginning to change the rules of the game. China,
In May 2017 a new director general of the World Health Organization will be elected-one of the wo... more In May 2017 a new director general of the World Health Organization will be elected-one of the world's most critical appointments. The process is long and highly political. In January 2017 the executive board of WHO will shortlist a maximum of three candidates from the field of six (table 1⇓), and the new director general will be elected from the shortlist by all 194 member states at the World Health Assembly in May 2017.
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Papers by Ngaire Woods