Papers by Mikolaj Barczentewicz
Hart Publishing eBooks, 2019
In this chapter, my focus is on an aspect of original constitutional founding moments (events tha... more In this chapter, my focus is on an aspect of original constitutional founding moments (events that bring about a new constitutional order): the question of who made the constitution as law. Or, in other words, who was the legally authoritative agent (or author) in the making of a constitution? This question, for better or worse, plays a significant role in legal arguments about the legal content of some codified constitutions. I take no position on how significant, if at all, founding moments should be in constitutional law. I only offer a jurisprudential account of who, among the potentially many participants of a founding moment, counts as the legal authority who made the constitution (the constitution-maker). Lawyers across the globe routinely talk about what the 'founding fathers' or the 'framers' of their constitution (or a founding treaty) meant, expected, intended and so on. The point of this chapter is that some of the founding fathers talk is confused, because it refers to people who did not make the constitution. I dispel the confusion through analysis of what it means to be an agent behind making a constitution as law: what does it mean to be a constitution-maker?
Social Science Research Network, 2017
Social Science Research Network, Mar 4, 2021
University of Oxford, 2020
Social Science Research Network, Apr 19, 2017
American Journal of Comparative Law, 2019
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022
Founding Moments in Constitutionalism, 2019
In this chapter, my focus is on an aspect of original constitutional founding moments (events tha... more In this chapter, my focus is on an aspect of original constitutional founding moments (events that bring about a new constitutional order): the question of who made the constitution as law. Or, in other words, who was the legally authoritative agent (or author) in the making of a constitution? This question, for better or worse, plays a significant role in legal arguments about the legal content of some codified constitutions. I take no position on how significant, if at all, founding moments should be in constitutional law. I only offer a jurisprudential account of who, among the potentially many participants of a founding moment, counts as the legal authority who made the constitution (the constitution-maker). Lawyers across the globe routinely talk about what the 'founding fathers' or the 'framers' of their constitution (or a founding treaty) meant, expected, intended and so on. The point of this chapter is that some of the founding fathers talk is confused, because it refers to people who did not make the constitution. I dispel the confusion through analysis of what it means to be an agent behind making a constitution as law: what does it mean to be a constitution-maker?
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
The purpose of this working paper is to critically analyze selected provisions of the proposed Di... more The purpose of this working paper is to critically analyze selected provisions of the proposed Digital Services Act (‘DSA’) and to recommend amendments. I consider the Commission’s proposal for the DSA, as well as the IMCO (Schadelmose) draft report and the LIBE (Breyer) draft opinion.
How to distinguish law from non-legal but systematic and rule-guided practices of legal officials... more How to distinguish law from non-legal but systematic and rule-guided practices of legal officials? This issue features prominently in the debate on ‘positive originalism’ in US constitutional law, and in similar fundamental controversies in other legal orders. I take it as a question about content and constitution of ultimate rules of recognition. Legal philosophers have been too quick in dealing with this problem. I argue that there is more space to claim that non officials have a constitutive relationship with the content of the law, thus potentially providing a standard to distinguish legal and non-legal practices of officials. However, to the extent officials play a constitutive role in the law, what matters is their genuine acceptance of ultimate rules of recognition. To show this, I develop the concept of acceptance of a social rule by specifying the requirement of genuineness of acceptance and the role of mental dispositions associated with acceptance.
Judicial Review, 2021
Cart judicial reviews constitute the largest single group of claims for judicial review in the Hi... more Cart judicial reviews constitute the largest single group of claims for judicial review in the High Court. However, they are difficult to study because they rarely result in a High Court judgment and thus are reflected in the popular case law databases. I analysed the best public source of information on the fate of successful Cart judicial reviews: Upper Tribunal decisions following successful Cart claims from 2018 to 2020 selected programmatically from a dataset of over 42,000—mostly unreported—decisions. Thus, I can discuss the key aspects of successful Cart challenges, including the question what claims succeed in meeting the ‘second-tier appeals’ test for permission set in CPR 54.7A(7). This study complements previous quantitative work on rates of success in Cart and non Cart judicial reviews and contributes to the broader discussion on the appropriateness of retaining the Cart procedure in the context of the proposal to discontinue Cart claims made by the Independent Review of Administrative Law and adopted by the Government in the Judicial Review and Courts Bill.
LSN: International & Comparative Law (Topic), 2014
In R. (Buckinghamshire CC) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 324 ... more In R. (Buckinghamshire CC) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 324 (HS2) the Supreme Court has provided a good reason to think that the idea of a hierarchy of statutes within the legal system of the United Kingdom is still alive, despite the fact that some commentators have already heralded its early demise (see e.g. Nicholas Bamforth, “Same-sex partnerships: some comparative constitutional lessons” (2007) E.H.R.L.R. 47 at 48). After the famous passage in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195; [2003] 1 Q.B. 151 where Laws L.J. introduced the distinction between “constitutional” and “ordinary” statutes (at [62]), there indeed seemed to be some reticence among their Lordships to make use of this distinction and clarify its practical import. Among others, Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32; [2002] N.I. 390 at [11] and Lord Hope in H. v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 24; [2013] 1 A.C. 413 at ...
Public Law, 2017
This article critically analyses the Supreme Court’s Miller judgment, taking it as an opportunity... more This article critically analyses the Supreme Court’s Miller judgment, taking it as an opportunity to reflect on the true place of EU law in UK law and on the right way to advance legal arguments on that point. It argues that the Miller majority did not provide an adequate answer to two strong arguments regarding interpretation of the European Communities Act 1972. Firstly, to the argument from the time-gap between enactment of the ECA and the moment Community law became directly effective in the UK. Secondly, to the argument from the purpose of s. 1(3) ECA, showing that the 1972 Act was enacted on the assumption of the orthodox dualist model.
In “Enduring Originalism,” Jeffrey Pojanowski and Kevin C. Walsh outline how originalism in const... more In “Enduring Originalism,” Jeffrey Pojanowski and Kevin C. Walsh outline how originalism in constitutional interpretation can be grounded in modern natural law theory as developed by John Finnis. Their argument to that effect is powerful and constitutes a welcome addition both to natural law theory and to originalist theory. However, the authors chose to present their account as a superior alternative to, or modification of, “positive” (“original-law”) originalism of Stephen Sachs and William Baude. It is that aspect of the paper that I focus on in this short essay. Contrary to their strong claims in that direction, Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are far from establishing that positive originalism is deficient and that that their version of natural-law-based originalism offers a plausible alternative to positivist originalism. There is also a worry that, despite professing sympathy towards the “positive turn” in originalism, “Enduring Originalism” is at its core an account of what ...
The Modern Law Review, 2021
This paper considers methodological standards in public law scholarship, showing the perils of cu... more This paper considers methodological standards in public law scholarship, showing the perils of current issues with access to relevant data and the promise of what can be achieved using better data and computational methods. It focusses on the effectiveness of Cart challenges – the largest group of claims for judicial review in the High Court – and discusses how the empirical question of the effectiveness of judicial review is linked with the normative question of what counts as ‘success’. The article demonstrates the perils of inattention to data limitations in the analyses of Cart claims by the Independent Review of Administrative Law and by the government and shows the promise of better data and computational methods through an unprecedented empirical study of Upper Tribunal decisions that followed Cart judicial reviews. It concludes that the government's claim that Cart challenges are a disproportionate burden on resources lacks adequate empirical basis.
The Modern Law Review, 2020
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Papers by Mikolaj Barczentewicz