Before the Panic of 1907 the large New York City banks were able to maintain the call loan market... more Before the Panic of 1907 the large New York City banks were able to maintain the call loan market's liquidity during panics, but the rise in outside lending by trust companies and interior banks in the decade leading up the panic weakened the influence of the large banks. Creating a reliable source of liquidity and reserves external to the financial market like a central bank became obvious after the panic. In the call loan market, like the REPO market in 2008, lack of information on the identity of lenders and volume of the market hindered attempts to stop panic-related depositor withdrawals. Our new estimates of who was participating in the call loan market reveal that it did not contract after 1907; while the trust companies became less important, the New York national banks and outside lenders more than made up the difference.
Analyses of the economic effects of the introduction of the public pension system on older men in... more Analyses of the economic effects of the introduction of the public pension system on older men in the US have been hamstrung by difficulties generating reliable estimates of historical labor-force participation rates using data from early US censuses that only asked respondents about their occupations and not whether they were actively employed. We extend a unique feature of the 1901 Canadian census, which asked about retirement status as well as occupation, to older men in the 1900 US Census to estimate labor-force participation rates that adjust for misreporting of employment status. Our estimates show that reported rates substantially overestimate labor-force participation among older men. We also show that adjusted rates based on an econometric correction for misclassified limited dependent variables produces are similar to those based on the 1901 Canadian census. Using this technique to extend our adjustment shows that reported rates overstate older men’s labor-force participat...
The paper examines the New York Clearing House (NYCH) as a lender of last resort by looking at cl... more The paper examines the New York Clearing House (NYCH) as a lender of last resort by looking at clearing-house-loan-certifi cate borrowing during fi ve banking panics of the National Banking Era (1863-1913). In that system, adequate aggregate liquidity provision was passive and dependent upon member bank borrowing. We document bank borrowing behavior using bank-level data for clearing-house loan certifi cates issued to NYCH member banks. The historical record reveals that the large New York City banks behaved in ways that resembled those of a central bank in 1884 and in 1890, but less so in the more severe crises.
for a summer research grant supporting this project. The reference department staff of the Joseph... more for a summer research grant supporting this project. The reference department staff of the Joseph Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago provided valuable help in locating information on Chicago trust companies. T he recently proposed (and aborted) merger between software giant Microsoft and Intuit, the producer of the leading personal financial software for personal computers, demonstrated the potential for growth among nonbank providers of payment services. In this case, neither of the parties is in the payments system, of course, but the recent growth in payments services provided through nonbank entities and the tremendous potential for the use of technologies like the Internet for such services points toward greater participation in the payments system by nonbank providers of payment services. For regulators, this trend raises questions: What if nonbank providers of such services suffer unfavorable balances or experience a run? How should they be treated? New York's and Chicago's contrasting experiences during the Panic of 1907 may provide useful lessons concerning this issue for both regulators and market participants. During the National Banking Era (1863-1914), several episodes of recurrent financial crises plagued the United States well after most other developed banking systems had eliminated them. By this time most European countries had central banks that could provide reserves during a crisis, but in the United States bankers and depositors still had to rely mainly on the private sector to meet unusual demands for cash. Without a central bank to function as a lender of last resort, the U.S. banking system during panics turned to private market organizations known as clearinghouses to protect the system from a total shutdown. 1 The Panic of 1907, the last and most severe of the National Banking Era panics in the United States, provides an example of how private market participants, in the absence of government institutions, react to a crisis in their Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review
We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearinghouse loan certificate issu... more We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearinghouse loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearinghouse loan certificates were essentially "bridge loans" arranged between clearinghouse members that enabled and were issued in anticipation of monetary gold imports, which took a few weeks to arrive. The large New York City national banks acted as private liquidity providers by requesting (and the New York clearinghouse issuing) a volume of clearinghouse loan certificates beyond their own immediate liquidity needs. While loan certificates were a temporary solution at best to the liquidity crisis in 1907, their issuance allowed the New York banks to serve their role as central reserve city banks in the national banking system.
... 10 Pamela Barnhouse Walters and Carl M. Briggs, The Family Economy, Child Labor, and Schooli... more ... 10 Pamela Barnhouse Walters and Carl M. Briggs, The Family Economy, Child Labor, and Schooling: Evidence from the Early Twentieth Century South, American ... and when folks come visitin' a the mill he'd bring them to see the yungun that could spin good. Jessie Lee Carter ...
ABSTRACT I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two ... more ABSTRACT I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non-monotonic functions of a bidder's type. Multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in allocation, efficiency and revenue. The sequence of sale affects the competition for a good and therefore also affects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders. The sequence of sale may affect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative to the number of goods. If a particular good, say [alpha], is allocated to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale, then auction revenue and the price of good [alpha] are higher when good [alpha] is sold first.
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1162 002219504771997890, Mar 13, 2006
ABSTRACT Alarmed by child labor in factories and mills, Progressive-era reformers criticized immi... more ABSTRACT Alarmed by child labor in factories and mills, Progressive-era reformers criticized immigrants and immigrant cultures for sanctioning exploitation of their young. Neither qualitative nor quantitative appraisals find much evidence that ethnicity had any important effect on the likelihood that a child would work. Relative and absolute poverty were more important influences. Under all conditions, black children were much more likely to work. The use of children as workers, customary in all rural societies including that of the American family farm, reappeared in industrial settings and then quickly declined. Higher male earnings, technological shifts, and changes in law and culture compelled children to become students instead of wage earners.
Using an extensive high-frequency data set, we investigate the transmission of fi nancial crisis ... more Using an extensive high-frequency data set, we investigate the transmission of fi nancial crisis specifi cally focusing on the Panic of 1907, the fi nal severe panic of the National Banking Era (1863-1913). We trace the transmission of the crisis from New York City trust companies to the New York City national banks through direct and indirect interconnections. Trust companies held cash balances at national banks, and these balances were liquidated as trust companies suffered depositor runs. Secondly, trust companies and national banks were notable creditors to the New York Stock Exchange; when trusts were suffering runs, the call loan market on the stock exchange seized. The crisis spread to the interior banks after the New York Clearing House banks restricted the convertibility of deposits into cash. Bond returns were sharply negative in the two weeks following the suspension. We highlight commonalities between the Panic of 1907 and the fi nancial crisis of 2007-2009.
The paper provides a brief history of central banking institutions in the United States. Specific... more The paper provides a brief history of central banking institutions in the United States. Specifically, the authors highlight the role of New York banking interests in the legislations affecting the creation or expiration of central banking institutions. In our previous research we have detected that New York City banking entities usually exert substantial influence on legislation, greater than their large proportion of United States' banking resources. The authors describe how this influence affected the success or failure of central banking movements in the United States, and the authors use this evidence to support their arguments regarding the influence of New York City bankers on the legislative efforts that culminated in the creation of the Federal Reserve System. The paper argues that successful central banking movements in the United States owed much to the influence of New York City banking interests.
Before the Panic of 1907 the large New York City banks were able to maintain the call loan market... more Before the Panic of 1907 the large New York City banks were able to maintain the call loan market's liquidity during panics, but the rise in outside lending by trust companies and interior banks in the decade leading up the panic weakened the influence of the large banks. Creating a reliable source of liquidity and reserves external to the financial market like a central bank became obvious after the panic. In the call loan market, like the REPO market in 2008, lack of information on the identity of lenders and volume of the market hindered attempts to stop panic-related depositor withdrawals. Our new estimates of who was participating in the call loan market reveal that it did not contract after 1907; while the trust companies became less important, the New York national banks and outside lenders more than made up the difference.
Analyses of the economic effects of the introduction of the public pension system on older men in... more Analyses of the economic effects of the introduction of the public pension system on older men in the US have been hamstrung by difficulties generating reliable estimates of historical labor-force participation rates using data from early US censuses that only asked respondents about their occupations and not whether they were actively employed. We extend a unique feature of the 1901 Canadian census, which asked about retirement status as well as occupation, to older men in the 1900 US Census to estimate labor-force participation rates that adjust for misreporting of employment status. Our estimates show that reported rates substantially overestimate labor-force participation among older men. We also show that adjusted rates based on an econometric correction for misclassified limited dependent variables produces are similar to those based on the 1901 Canadian census. Using this technique to extend our adjustment shows that reported rates overstate older men’s labor-force participat...
The paper examines the New York Clearing House (NYCH) as a lender of last resort by looking at cl... more The paper examines the New York Clearing House (NYCH) as a lender of last resort by looking at clearing-house-loan-certifi cate borrowing during fi ve banking panics of the National Banking Era (1863-1913). In that system, adequate aggregate liquidity provision was passive and dependent upon member bank borrowing. We document bank borrowing behavior using bank-level data for clearing-house loan certifi cates issued to NYCH member banks. The historical record reveals that the large New York City banks behaved in ways that resembled those of a central bank in 1884 and in 1890, but less so in the more severe crises.
for a summer research grant supporting this project. The reference department staff of the Joseph... more for a summer research grant supporting this project. The reference department staff of the Joseph Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago provided valuable help in locating information on Chicago trust companies. T he recently proposed (and aborted) merger between software giant Microsoft and Intuit, the producer of the leading personal financial software for personal computers, demonstrated the potential for growth among nonbank providers of payment services. In this case, neither of the parties is in the payments system, of course, but the recent growth in payments services provided through nonbank entities and the tremendous potential for the use of technologies like the Internet for such services points toward greater participation in the payments system by nonbank providers of payment services. For regulators, this trend raises questions: What if nonbank providers of such services suffer unfavorable balances or experience a run? How should they be treated? New York's and Chicago's contrasting experiences during the Panic of 1907 may provide useful lessons concerning this issue for both regulators and market participants. During the National Banking Era (1863-1914), several episodes of recurrent financial crises plagued the United States well after most other developed banking systems had eliminated them. By this time most European countries had central banks that could provide reserves during a crisis, but in the United States bankers and depositors still had to rely mainly on the private sector to meet unusual demands for cash. Without a central bank to function as a lender of last resort, the U.S. banking system during panics turned to private market organizations known as clearinghouses to protect the system from a total shutdown. 1 The Panic of 1907, the last and most severe of the National Banking Era panics in the United States, provides an example of how private market participants, in the absence of government institutions, react to a crisis in their Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review
We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearinghouse loan certificate issu... more We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearinghouse loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearinghouse loan certificates were essentially "bridge loans" arranged between clearinghouse members that enabled and were issued in anticipation of monetary gold imports, which took a few weeks to arrive. The large New York City national banks acted as private liquidity providers by requesting (and the New York clearinghouse issuing) a volume of clearinghouse loan certificates beyond their own immediate liquidity needs. While loan certificates were a temporary solution at best to the liquidity crisis in 1907, their issuance allowed the New York banks to serve their role as central reserve city banks in the national banking system.
... 10 Pamela Barnhouse Walters and Carl M. Briggs, The Family Economy, Child Labor, and Schooli... more ... 10 Pamela Barnhouse Walters and Carl M. Briggs, The Family Economy, Child Labor, and Schooling: Evidence from the Early Twentieth Century South, American ... and when folks come visitin' a the mill he'd bring them to see the yungun that could spin good. Jessie Lee Carter ...
ABSTRACT I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two ... more ABSTRACT I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non-monotonic functions of a bidder's type. Multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in allocation, efficiency and revenue. The sequence of sale affects the competition for a good and therefore also affects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders. The sequence of sale may affect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative to the number of goods. If a particular good, say [alpha], is allocated to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale, then auction revenue and the price of good [alpha] are higher when good [alpha] is sold first.
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1162 002219504771997890, Mar 13, 2006
ABSTRACT Alarmed by child labor in factories and mills, Progressive-era reformers criticized immi... more ABSTRACT Alarmed by child labor in factories and mills, Progressive-era reformers criticized immigrants and immigrant cultures for sanctioning exploitation of their young. Neither qualitative nor quantitative appraisals find much evidence that ethnicity had any important effect on the likelihood that a child would work. Relative and absolute poverty were more important influences. Under all conditions, black children were much more likely to work. The use of children as workers, customary in all rural societies including that of the American family farm, reappeared in industrial settings and then quickly declined. Higher male earnings, technological shifts, and changes in law and culture compelled children to become students instead of wage earners.
Using an extensive high-frequency data set, we investigate the transmission of fi nancial crisis ... more Using an extensive high-frequency data set, we investigate the transmission of fi nancial crisis specifi cally focusing on the Panic of 1907, the fi nal severe panic of the National Banking Era (1863-1913). We trace the transmission of the crisis from New York City trust companies to the New York City national banks through direct and indirect interconnections. Trust companies held cash balances at national banks, and these balances were liquidated as trust companies suffered depositor runs. Secondly, trust companies and national banks were notable creditors to the New York Stock Exchange; when trusts were suffering runs, the call loan market on the stock exchange seized. The crisis spread to the interior banks after the New York Clearing House banks restricted the convertibility of deposits into cash. Bond returns were sharply negative in the two weeks following the suspension. We highlight commonalities between the Panic of 1907 and the fi nancial crisis of 2007-2009.
The paper provides a brief history of central banking institutions in the United States. Specific... more The paper provides a brief history of central banking institutions in the United States. Specifically, the authors highlight the role of New York banking interests in the legislations affecting the creation or expiration of central banking institutions. In our previous research we have detected that New York City banking entities usually exert substantial influence on legislation, greater than their large proportion of United States' banking resources. The authors describe how this influence affected the success or failure of central banking movements in the United States, and the authors use this evidence to support their arguments regarding the influence of New York City bankers on the legislative efforts that culminated in the creation of the Federal Reserve System. The paper argues that successful central banking movements in the United States owed much to the influence of New York City banking interests.
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Papers by Jon Moen