Papers by Evgeny Yakovlev
Corruption, Development and Institutional Design, 2009
In this short paper we attempt to assess the results of Putin's centralization and anti-corruptio... more In this short paper we attempt to assess the results of Putin's centralization and anti-corruption measures on the overall level of state capture in the Russian regions as well as on the balance of power between different interest groups. We proceed by, first, describing the results of previous research on state capture in the Russia's regions during Yeltsin in section 1 and, then, analyzing the changes in the nature and the level of state capture during Putin's administration in section 2. Section 3 concludes. 1. State capture during Yeltsin's governance After the collapse of the Soviet Union a new force emerged in Russia, which was to affect the country's economy and politics. The name of the force was oligarchy. A large-scale privatization of state assets in the beginning of the 1990s, which led to a growth in income inequality, was combined with weak legal and political institutions, a legacy from the communist times. The fragility of democratic institutions and the state's poor accountability to the public made the governments in Russia easily susceptible to "capture" by the new wealth. Politically powerful firms influenced the very rules of the game in the economy: they created obstacles to emergence and development of competitive businesses and changed the direction and speed of economic reforms. 1 The 1999 ± Authors are from CEFIR; and CEFIR and CEPR, respectively. 1 The phenomenon of shaping institutes by powerful businesses is called State Capture.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2005
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed here are those of the author(s) and do n... more The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank cannot guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work.
Journal of Public Economics, 2010
M o tiva tio n T h e o ry C a se stu d ie s M e th o d o lo g y R e su lts R o b u stn e ss C o n... more M o tiva tio n T h e o ry C a se stu d ie s M e th o d o lo g y R e su lts R o b u stn e ss C o n c lu sio n s
In a federation, local policies with interregional spillovers depend on the extent and the nature... more In a federation, local policies with interregional spillovers depend on the extent and the nature of local capture. Local lobbyists who have multi-regional scope internalize inter-jurisdictional externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests in a single region. In particular, multi-regional industrial groups lobby for lower interregional trade barriers than local industrial lobbies. The results are based on a simple model, case-study evidence, and econometric analysis of micro-level panel data from Russia. Controlling for firm-level fixed effects, the performance of firms increases with an increase in the number of neighboring regions captured by multiregional groups. The paper has implications for international trade: lobbying by multinationals should lead to lower protectionism compared to lobbying by national corporations.
What determines the enforcement of reform of business regulation? What are the outcomes of such r... more What determines the enforcement of reform of business regulation? What are the outcomes of such reform? We address these questions using an episode of a drastic reform in Russia between 2001 and 2004 which liberalized registration, licensing, and inspections. Based on the analysis of micro-level panel data on regulatory burden, we find that: 1) On average, the reform reduced the administrative costs of firms; but, the progress of reform had a substantial geographical variation. 2) The enforcement of deregulation reform was better in regions with a transparent government, low corruption, better access of the public to independent media sources, a powerful industrial lobby, and stronger fiscal autonomy. 3) Using the exogenous variation in regulation generated by the interaction of reform and its institutional determinants, we find a substantial positive effect of regulatory reform on net entry into the official sector and small business employment and no effect on pollution and public health. The results support public choice theory of the nature of regulation and are inconsistent with the predictions of public interest theory.
Bank, and CEFIR for helpful comments. We thank CEFIR MABS team and, particularly, Oleg Schetinin ... more Bank, and CEFIR for helpful comments. We thank CEFIR MABS team and, particularly, Oleg Schetinin and Oleg Zamulin for help in data collection. The financial support of USAID and EBRD is gratefully acknowledged. Yakovlev: UC Berkeley,
What are the effects of institutional subversion on small business development, fiscal policies, ... more What are the effects of institutional subversion on small business development, fiscal policies, economic growth, and firm performance? This paper provides an empirical investigation of institutional subversion in Russia's regions. We develop a complete account of preferential treatments to the largest regional firms in texts of regional legislation during 1992-2000. The concentration of preferential treatments is used as a proxy for legislative subversion. Based on cross-section and panel data analysis, we find that regional institutional subversion has an adverse effect on small business growth, tax collection, social public spending, and federal tax arrears. Robustness of these results is verified by looking at a proxy for potential subversion based on size concentration in regional economies. The alternative approach produces similar results. Regional political influence generates substantial gains to firms both in the long and the short run. These firms exhibit faster growth in sales, market share, profitability, employment, and capital compared to their counterparts who are not politically connected. Yet, firms that exercise political influence have lower labor productivity.
American Law and Economics Review, 2005
How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms ... more How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms and regional regulatory capture using micro-level data on the preferential treatment of firms through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992-2000. Using these measures, we find that: 1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; 2) a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically connected firms; 3) capture adversely affects small business growth and the tax capacity of the state; 4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
Deaths rates Alcohol consumption Sales of vodka Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign Liberalization ... more Deaths rates Alcohol consumption Sales of vodka Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign Liberalization of alcohol market of vodka, in billion liters Death rates: Deaths per Alcohol consumption: Annual liters of pure alcohol Deaths rates Alcohol consumption Sales of vodka Source: WHO, Treisman (2010), Rosstat. Left axis: Deaths per 1000 working age males (Rosstat); Annual adult per capita consumption, liters of pure alcohol (WHO). Right axis: Sales of vodka in billion of liters (Rosstat).
In this short paper we attempt to assess the results of Putin's centralization and anti-corruptio... more In this short paper we attempt to assess the results of Putin's centralization and anti-corruption measures on the overall level of state capture in the Russian regions as well as on the balance of power between different interest groups. We proceed by, first, describing the results of previous research on state capture in the Russia's regions during Yeltsin in section 1 and, then, analyzing the changes in the nature and the level of state capture during Putin's administration in section 2. Section 3 concludes. 1. State capture during Yeltsin's governance After the collapse of the Soviet Union a new force emerged in Russia, which was to affect the country's economy and politics. The name of the force was oligarchy. A large-scale privatization of state assets in the beginning of the 1990s, which led to a growth in income inequality, was combined with weak legal and political institutions, a legacy from the communist times. The fragility of democratic institutions and the state's poor accountability to the public made the governments in Russia easily susceptible to "capture" by the new wealth. Politically powerful firms influenced the very rules of the game in the economy: they created obstacles to emergence and development of competitive businesses and changed the direction and speed of economic reforms. 1 The 1999 ± Authors are from CEFIR; and CEFIR and CEPR, respectively. 1 The phenomenon of shaping institutes by powerful businesses is called State Capture.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We use two quasi-natural experiments in the 1980s and 1990s to identify how public policies affec... more We use two quasi-natural experiments in the 1980s and 1990s to identify how public policies affect important long-run outcomes by changing preferences. Large but shortlived shocks to product availability in Russia shifted young consumers' long-run preferences from hard to light alcohol. The resulting large cohort differences in current alcohol consumption shares decades after the interventions ended explain about 60% of the recent decrease in male mortality based on both micro-level and aggregate estimates. Mortality will continue to decrease by another 23% over the next twenty years based on our analysis. Program impact evaluations that focus only on contemporaneous effects can therefore severely underestimate the total effect of such public policies.
We use two quasi-natural experiments, the rapid expansion of many markets after the collapse of t... more We use two quasi-natural experiments, the rapid expansion of many markets after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Anti-Alcohol Campaign in 1986, and a migrants research design to identify highly persistent habits in food and alcohol consumption. Large shocks to product availability and persistent habits produce large cohort dierences in consumption. Placebo tests and descriptive statistics show that habits are formed when individuals start consuming a good regularly and remain largely unaected afterward. We estimate that Russian male mortality will decrease by 23% within twenty years even without further interventions due to changes in alcohol consumption preferences. JEL Classication: D12, I10, E21
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Papers by Evgeny Yakovlev