The paper argues that although James does a good job in showing how his conception of the moral p... more The paper argues that although James does a good job in showing how his conception of the moral philosopher’s concrete standpoint offers a sharp rebuke of traditional moral philosophy’s preoccupation with demonstrating other-regarding obligations to an egoist skeptic, his meta-ethical argument for inclusivity seems vulnerable to the sort of skeptical doubts raised by Aiken/Talisse’s (2011) intolerant fundamentalist. I argue that an explication of the concrete experiential starting point of James’ moral philosophy puts to rest these doubts. This standpoint includes James’ relational account of the self, which stresses identity formation via the capacity to sympathetically apprehend the point of view of others, and James’ phenomenological exploration, in the essay “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” to the experience of overcoming blindness to others’ alien ideals.
... supporting circumstances. Accordingly, its alternative model of justificatory structure is gr... more ... supporting circumstances. Accordingly, its alternative model of justificatory structure is grounded in the primacy of deliberative events. Here is the model, which is really a restatement of Dewey's theory of the pattern of inquiry: ...
In this paper I argue that the standoff between justice and care approaches to animal et... more In this paper I argue that the standoff between justice and care approaches to animal ethics presents us with a false dilemma. We should take justice's focus on reasoning from principles, and care's use of sympathetic awareness, as two integrated deliberative capacities necessary for the consideration of arguments for extending moral concern to animals. Such an integrated approach rests on a plausible account of the psychology of moral deliberation. I develop my argument as follows. Section I summarizes the nature of the debate between justice and care approaches to animal ethics, focusing on Brian Luke's arguments against justice approaches. Section II provides pro-justice rebuttals to Luke's objections. These rebuttals, while largely successful against Luke's objections, do not account for the intuition that sympathy does play a central epistemological role in animal ethics. Section III explains how sympathy cognitively simulates the perspective of the other, and thus can play an epistemological role in animal ethics. I argue that the abilities to simulate the perspective of the other and to reason from moral principles can complement each other. In section IV, I argue that though it may not be desirable to use both sympathy and reasoning from principles in all moral deliberation, it is a desirable aim when offering, and considering, moral arguments for what I will term the "extensionist project" of extending over moral concern to animals. I make this idea plausible by elucidating the claim that arguments for this project are best thought of as second-order deliberations about our first-order deliberative life.
Animal rights advocates frequently compare our treatment of non-human animals to cognitively disa... more Animal rights advocates frequently compare our treatment of non-human animals to cognitively disabled humans. Sometimes called " the argument from marginal cases, " the claim is that if the intellectually disabled are sufficiently similar to non-human animals then we are guilty of moral inconsistency because we accord special status to the marginal humans that we would never give to animals. For example, we perform painful experiments on animals that we would never allow be done to cognitively disabled humans. Consistency requires that we treat non-human animals better. This argument has troubled some disabilities theorists who argue that however well intentioned, animal advocates are bolstering the very same sorts of prejudices that have marginalized the cognitively disabled. Historically, comparisons to non-human animals have been used to strip away the humanity of the cognitively disabled. Therefore what that group needs now is an affirmation of their humanity, rather than comparisons to animals. In this paper, I offer a solution to mediate this unfortunate dispute between advocates of marginalized groups. I show that once we jettison the assumption that degrees of moral status correspond to degrees of psychological complexity the argument from marginal cases need not threaten the interests of the cognitively disabled. Our account of what makes a being morally matter or capable of being wronged should not rest on static notions like " biological humanity " or " psychological complexity. " Rather, we should be open to a quite diverse ways in which conscious beings morally matter. In this vein, I do think disabilities theorists are right to worry that simply grouping non-human animals and cognitively disabled humans together misses morally significant aspects of the latter. In particular, it is important to grasp the significance of identity-forming relationships between the cognitively normal and disabled. One example includes the intersubjective, or self-to-other, relationships between cognitively different individuals. While philosophers have tended to privilege relationships between fully rational adults who are capable of mutual recognition, disabilities theorists help us to see that many identity-forming relationships between cognitively different individuals. These are not best described as 'mutual' if by that we mean that the relationship partners are very much alike (biologically, psychologically, socially). The second identity-forming relationship is the intrasubjective, or self-to-self, relationship between one's " abled/independent " self and one's " disabled/dependent " self. Those cognitively normal who marginalize the cognitively disabled may fail to acknowledge aspects of their own fragile selfhood. They may be blind to their previous cognitively undeveloped infant selves or their future cognitively limited aging, diseased, or injured selves. These two kinds of identity-forming relationships reveal the special ways intellectually disabled people matter and, accordingly, special ways that they can be marginalized. Nevertheless, when properly understood, neither of these relationships require that we use the notion of " shared humanity " to defend the interests of the cognitively disabled.
Animal rights advocates frequently compare our treatment of non-human animals to cognitively disa... more Animal rights advocates frequently compare our treatment of non-human animals to cognitively disabled humans. Sometimes called " the argument from marginal cases, " the claim is that if the intellectually disabled are sufficiently similar to non-human animals then we are guilty of moral inconsistency because we accord special status to the marginal humans that we would never give to animals. For example, we perform painful experiments on animals that we would never allow be done to cognitively disabled humans. Consistency requires that we treat non-human animals better. This argument has troubled some disabilities theorists who argue that however well intentioned, animal advocates are bolstering the very same sorts of prejudices that have marginalized the cognitively disabled. Historically, comparisons to non-human animals have been used to strip away the humanity of the cognitively disabled. Therefore what that group needs now is an affirmation their humanity, rather than comparisons to animals. In this paper, I offer a solution to mediate this unfortunate dispute between advocates of marginalized groups. I show that once we jettison the assumption that degrees of moral status correspond to degrees of psychological complexity the argument from marginal cases need not threaten the interests of the cognitively disabled. Our account of what makes a being morally matter or capable of being wronged should not rest on static notions like " biological humanity " or " psychological complexity. " Rather, we should be open to a quite diverse ways in which conscious beings morally matter. In this vein, I do think disabilities theorists are right to worry that simply grouping non-human animals and cognitively disabled humans together misses morally significant aspects of the latter. In particular, it is important to grasp the significance of identity-forming relationships between the cognitively normal and disabled. One example includes the intersubjective, or self-to-other, relationships between cognitively different individuals. While philosophers have tended to privilege relationships between fully rational adults who are capable of mutual recognition, disabilities theorists help us to see that many identity-forming relationships between cognitively different individuals. These are not best described as 'mutual' if by that we mean that the relationship partners are very much alike (biologically, psychologically, socially). The second identity-forming relationship is the intrasubjective, or self-to-self, relationship between one's " abled/independent " self and one's " disabled/dependent " self. Those cognitively normal who marginalize the cognitively disabled may fail to acknowledge aspects of their own fragile selfhood. They may be blind to their previous cognitively undeveloped infant selves or their future cognitively limited aging, diseased, or injured selves. These two kinds of identity-forming relationships reveal the special ways intellectually disabled people matter and, accordingly, special ways that they can be marginalized. Nevertheless, when properly understood, neither of these relationships require that we use the notion of " shared humanity " to defend the interests of the cognitively disabled.
To be read at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Marc... more To be read at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, March 8, 2018
In his essay “What Makes a Life Significant” James argues that significant lives are based on a m... more In his essay “What Makes a Life Significant” James argues that significant lives are based on a marriage of two components: consciously chosen ideals and bold energetic activity. James’ metaphor of “marriage” richly indicates the relationship between ideals and courageous activity. As is the case in so many of his writings, James’ metaphors perform philosophical functions by situating abstract concepts like a “significant life” in experiential contexts that reveal core aspects of their meanings. I offer a fresh interpretation of the two elements of significant living, and then explain how they are integrally connected, or, “married.” James’ account is worth another look, in part, because of the unique way it probes the issue of a meaningful life without presuming a single conception of the good life. He helps us to see how to address important issues of character in a pluralist age.
The paper argues that although James does a good job in showing how his conception of the moral p... more The paper argues that although James does a good job in showing how his conception of the moral philosopher’s concrete standpoint offers a sharp rebuke of traditional moral philosophy’s preoccupation with demonstrating other-regarding obligations to an egoist skeptic, his meta-ethical argument for inclusivity seems vulnerable to the sort of skeptical doubts raised by Aiken/Talisse’s (2011) intolerant fundamentalist. I argue that an explication of the concrete experiential starting point of James’ moral philosophy puts to rest these doubts. This standpoint includes James’ relational account of the self, which stresses identity formation via the capacity to sympathetically apprehend the point of view of others, and James’ phenomenological exploration, in the essay “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” to the experience of overcoming blindness to others’ alien ideals.
... supporting circumstances. Accordingly, its alternative model of justificatory structure is gr... more ... supporting circumstances. Accordingly, its alternative model of justificatory structure is grounded in the primacy of deliberative events. Here is the model, which is really a restatement of Dewey's theory of the pattern of inquiry: ...
In this paper I argue that the standoff between justice and care approaches to animal et... more In this paper I argue that the standoff between justice and care approaches to animal ethics presents us with a false dilemma. We should take justice's focus on reasoning from principles, and care's use of sympathetic awareness, as two integrated deliberative capacities necessary for the consideration of arguments for extending moral concern to animals. Such an integrated approach rests on a plausible account of the psychology of moral deliberation. I develop my argument as follows. Section I summarizes the nature of the debate between justice and care approaches to animal ethics, focusing on Brian Luke's arguments against justice approaches. Section II provides pro-justice rebuttals to Luke's objections. These rebuttals, while largely successful against Luke's objections, do not account for the intuition that sympathy does play a central epistemological role in animal ethics. Section III explains how sympathy cognitively simulates the perspective of the other, and thus can play an epistemological role in animal ethics. I argue that the abilities to simulate the perspective of the other and to reason from moral principles can complement each other. In section IV, I argue that though it may not be desirable to use both sympathy and reasoning from principles in all moral deliberation, it is a desirable aim when offering, and considering, moral arguments for what I will term the "extensionist project" of extending over moral concern to animals. I make this idea plausible by elucidating the claim that arguments for this project are best thought of as second-order deliberations about our first-order deliberative life.
Animal rights advocates frequently compare our treatment of non-human animals to cognitively disa... more Animal rights advocates frequently compare our treatment of non-human animals to cognitively disabled humans. Sometimes called " the argument from marginal cases, " the claim is that if the intellectually disabled are sufficiently similar to non-human animals then we are guilty of moral inconsistency because we accord special status to the marginal humans that we would never give to animals. For example, we perform painful experiments on animals that we would never allow be done to cognitively disabled humans. Consistency requires that we treat non-human animals better. This argument has troubled some disabilities theorists who argue that however well intentioned, animal advocates are bolstering the very same sorts of prejudices that have marginalized the cognitively disabled. Historically, comparisons to non-human animals have been used to strip away the humanity of the cognitively disabled. Therefore what that group needs now is an affirmation of their humanity, rather than comparisons to animals. In this paper, I offer a solution to mediate this unfortunate dispute between advocates of marginalized groups. I show that once we jettison the assumption that degrees of moral status correspond to degrees of psychological complexity the argument from marginal cases need not threaten the interests of the cognitively disabled. Our account of what makes a being morally matter or capable of being wronged should not rest on static notions like " biological humanity " or " psychological complexity. " Rather, we should be open to a quite diverse ways in which conscious beings morally matter. In this vein, I do think disabilities theorists are right to worry that simply grouping non-human animals and cognitively disabled humans together misses morally significant aspects of the latter. In particular, it is important to grasp the significance of identity-forming relationships between the cognitively normal and disabled. One example includes the intersubjective, or self-to-other, relationships between cognitively different individuals. While philosophers have tended to privilege relationships between fully rational adults who are capable of mutual recognition, disabilities theorists help us to see that many identity-forming relationships between cognitively different individuals. These are not best described as 'mutual' if by that we mean that the relationship partners are very much alike (biologically, psychologically, socially). The second identity-forming relationship is the intrasubjective, or self-to-self, relationship between one's " abled/independent " self and one's " disabled/dependent " self. Those cognitively normal who marginalize the cognitively disabled may fail to acknowledge aspects of their own fragile selfhood. They may be blind to their previous cognitively undeveloped infant selves or their future cognitively limited aging, diseased, or injured selves. These two kinds of identity-forming relationships reveal the special ways intellectually disabled people matter and, accordingly, special ways that they can be marginalized. Nevertheless, when properly understood, neither of these relationships require that we use the notion of " shared humanity " to defend the interests of the cognitively disabled.
Animal rights advocates frequently compare our treatment of non-human animals to cognitively disa... more Animal rights advocates frequently compare our treatment of non-human animals to cognitively disabled humans. Sometimes called " the argument from marginal cases, " the claim is that if the intellectually disabled are sufficiently similar to non-human animals then we are guilty of moral inconsistency because we accord special status to the marginal humans that we would never give to animals. For example, we perform painful experiments on animals that we would never allow be done to cognitively disabled humans. Consistency requires that we treat non-human animals better. This argument has troubled some disabilities theorists who argue that however well intentioned, animal advocates are bolstering the very same sorts of prejudices that have marginalized the cognitively disabled. Historically, comparisons to non-human animals have been used to strip away the humanity of the cognitively disabled. Therefore what that group needs now is an affirmation their humanity, rather than comparisons to animals. In this paper, I offer a solution to mediate this unfortunate dispute between advocates of marginalized groups. I show that once we jettison the assumption that degrees of moral status correspond to degrees of psychological complexity the argument from marginal cases need not threaten the interests of the cognitively disabled. Our account of what makes a being morally matter or capable of being wronged should not rest on static notions like " biological humanity " or " psychological complexity. " Rather, we should be open to a quite diverse ways in which conscious beings morally matter. In this vein, I do think disabilities theorists are right to worry that simply grouping non-human animals and cognitively disabled humans together misses morally significant aspects of the latter. In particular, it is important to grasp the significance of identity-forming relationships between the cognitively normal and disabled. One example includes the intersubjective, or self-to-other, relationships between cognitively different individuals. While philosophers have tended to privilege relationships between fully rational adults who are capable of mutual recognition, disabilities theorists help us to see that many identity-forming relationships between cognitively different individuals. These are not best described as 'mutual' if by that we mean that the relationship partners are very much alike (biologically, psychologically, socially). The second identity-forming relationship is the intrasubjective, or self-to-self, relationship between one's " abled/independent " self and one's " disabled/dependent " self. Those cognitively normal who marginalize the cognitively disabled may fail to acknowledge aspects of their own fragile selfhood. They may be blind to their previous cognitively undeveloped infant selves or their future cognitively limited aging, diseased, or injured selves. These two kinds of identity-forming relationships reveal the special ways intellectually disabled people matter and, accordingly, special ways that they can be marginalized. Nevertheless, when properly understood, neither of these relationships require that we use the notion of " shared humanity " to defend the interests of the cognitively disabled.
To be read at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Marc... more To be read at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, March 8, 2018
In his essay “What Makes a Life Significant” James argues that significant lives are based on a m... more In his essay “What Makes a Life Significant” James argues that significant lives are based on a marriage of two components: consciously chosen ideals and bold energetic activity. James’ metaphor of “marriage” richly indicates the relationship between ideals and courageous activity. As is the case in so many of his writings, James’ metaphors perform philosophical functions by situating abstract concepts like a “significant life” in experiential contexts that reveal core aspects of their meanings. I offer a fresh interpretation of the two elements of significant living, and then explain how they are integrally connected, or, “married.” James’ account is worth another look, in part, because of the unique way it probes the issue of a meaningful life without presuming a single conception of the good life. He helps us to see how to address important issues of character in a pluralist age.
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