Papers by Cleyton Cavallaro
Influenza A virus (IAV) is an airborne pathogen that causes significant morbidity and mortality e... more Influenza A virus (IAV) is an airborne pathogen that causes significant morbidity and mortality each year. Macrophages (Mϕ) are the first immune population to encounter IAV virions in the lungs and are required to control infection. In the present study, we explored the mechanism by which cytokine signaling regulates the phenotype and function of Mϕ via epigenetic modifi-cation of chromatin. We have found that type I interferon (IFN-I) potently upregulates the lysine methyltransferase Setdb2 in murine and humanMϕ, and in turn Setdb2 regulates Mϕ-mediated immunity in response to IAV. The induction of Setdb2 by IFN-I was significantly impaired upon inhibition of the JAK-STAT signaling cascade, and chromatin immunoprecipi-tation revealed that both STAT1 and interferon regulatory factor 7 bind upstream of the tran-scription start site to induce expression. The generation of Setdb2LacZ reporter mice revealed that IAV infection results in systemic upregulation of Setdb2 in myeloid cells. ...
Energy Research & Social Science
Despite the recent drastic reversal of decarbonization effort by the current Presidential adminis... more Despite the recent drastic reversal of decarbonization effort by the current Presidential administration, the majority of U.S. states continue policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increasing renewable energy technology (RET) deployment. Although electrical power utilities are required and/or encouraged to comply with these policies, their executives lack direct incentives to do so. In this study, a novel incentive mechanism is evaluated for specifically aligning electric utility executive compensation with RET declining costs, renewable portfolio standards adopted by the majority of U.S. states, and global environmental goals. First, an overview is provided on chief executive officer (CEO) pay and the GHG emissions. The relationship between GHG emissions, renewable energy diversification, and CEO pay is examined using the case study of three of the large electric utilities in Michigan. The results show that the regulated utility market is not consistently rewarding CEOs with higher compensation for decreasing GHG emissions and that both an approach incentivizing RETs adoption and an approach encouraging GHG emissions have deficiencies. A combined approach is then analyzed that results in a compensation equation allowing for utility executives to receive incentive pay for reducing overall emissions and increasing renewable generation. The results indicate that by careful calibration of the proposed incentive equations the harmful effects of emissions can be prevented through CEO incentive pay.
PLoS pathogens, 2015
Influenza A virus (IAV) is an airborne pathogen that causes significant morbidity and mortality e... more Influenza A virus (IAV) is an airborne pathogen that causes significant morbidity and mortality each year. Macrophages (Mϕ) are the first immune population to encounter IAV virions in the lungs and are required to control infection. In the present study, we explored the mechanism by which cytokine signaling regulates the phenotype and function of Mϕ via epigenetic modification of chromatin. We have found that type I interferon (IFN-I) potently upregulates the lysine methyltransferase Setdb2 in murine and human Mϕ, and in turn Setdb2 regulates Mϕ-mediated immunity in response to IAV. The induction of Setdb2 by IFN-I was significantly impaired upon inhibition of the JAK-STAT signaling cascade, and chromatin immunoprecipitation revealed that both STAT1 and interferon regulatory factor 7 bind upstream of the transcription start site to induce expression. The generation of Setdb2LacZ reporter mice revealed that IAV infection results in systemic upregulation of Setdb2 in myeloid cells. In...
Despite the recent drastic reversal of decarbonization effort by the current Presidential adminis... more Despite the recent drastic reversal of decarbonization effort by the current Presidential administration, the majority of U.S. states continue policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increasing renewable energy technology (RET) deployment. Although electrical power utilities are required and/or encouraged to comply with these policies, their executives lack direct incentives to do so. In this study, a novel incentive mechanism is evaluated for specifically aligning electric utility executive compensation with RET declining costs, renewable portfolio standards adopted by the majority of U.S. states, and global environmental goals. First, an overview is provided on chief executive officer (CEO) pay and the GHG emissions. The relationship between GHG emissions, renewable energy diversification, and CEO pay is examined using the case study of three of the large electric utilities in Michigan. The results show that the regulated utility market is not consistently rewarding CEOs with higher compensation for decreasing GHG emissions and that both an approach incentivizing RETs adoption and an approach encouraging GHG emissions have deficiencies. A combined approach is then analyzed that results in a compensation equation allowing for utility executives to receive incentive pay for reducing overall emissions and increasing renewable generation. The results indicate that by careful calibration of the proposed incentive equations the harmful effects of emissions can be prevented through CEO incentive pay.
Despite the recent drastic reversal of decarbonization effort by the current Presidential adminis... more Despite the recent drastic reversal of decarbonization effort by the current Presidential administration, the majority of U.S. states continue policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increasing renewable energy technology (RET) deployment. Although electrical power utilities are required and/or encouraged to comply with these policies, their executives lack direct incentives to do so. In this study, a novel incentive mechanism is evaluated for specifically aligning electric utility executive compensation with RET declining costs, renewable portfolio standards adopted by the majority of U.S. states, and global environmental goals. First, an overview is provided on chief executive officer (CEO) pay and the GHG emissions. The relationship between GHG emissions, renewable energy diversification, and CEO pay is examined using the case study of three of the large electric utilities in Michigan. The results show that the regulated utility market is not consistently rewarding CEOs with higher compensation for decreasing GHG emissions and that both an approach incentivizing RETs adoption and an approach encouraging GHG emissions have deficiencies. A combined approach is then analyzed that results in a compensation equation allowing for utility executives to receive incentive pay for reducing overall emissions and increasing renewable generation. The results indicate that by careful calibration of the proposed incentive equations the harmful effects of emissions can be prevented through CEO incentive pay.
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Papers by Cleyton Cavallaro