Books by Olga Onuch
Moments of mass mobilization astound us. As a sea of protesters fills the streets, observers scra... more Moments of mass mobilization astound us. As a sea of protesters fills the streets, observers scramble to understand this extraordinary political act by 'ordinary' citizens. This study presents a paired comparison of two 'moments' of mass mobilization, in Ukraine and Argentina. The two cases are compared and analyzed on a cross-temporal and an inter- regional basis, thereby offering two critical cases in response to assumptions that the processes and patterns of mobilization, and democratization politics more broadly, are region specific. This study challenges political science's focus on elites and structural factors in the study of political participation during democratization.
The conclusion applies the model of mass-mobilization developed from the two cases to the Arab Spring (Egypt) and EuroZone Sovereign Debt Crisis (Greece) protests. The epilogue assesses the EuroMaidan Revolution in Ukraine in comparative context.
Contents:
PART I
1. Introduction: The Shock and Awe of Moments of Mass Mobilization
2. Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization
PART II
3. Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe 1920-2004
4. Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina and Latin America 1920-2001
PART III
5. Setting Precedents: Medium-term Structural Factors in the Mobilization Process
6. Context is Only Part of the Puzzle: Short-term Structural Factors in the Mass Mobilization Process
PART IV
7. The Activist and Elite Interaction and Information Exchange Game
8. The Duty to Protest: Participation of 'Ordinary' People in Mass Mobilization
9. Conclusions: Understanding Revolutionary Moments and Movements
Epilogue: It Happened Again: The 2014 EuroMaidan Mass Mobilization in Ukraine
Moments of mass mobilization astound us. As a sea of protesters fills the streets, observers scra... more Moments of mass mobilization astound us. As a sea of protesters fills the streets, observers scramble to understand this extraordinary political act by 'ordinary' citizens. This study presents a paired comparison of two 'moments' of mass mobilization, in Ukraine and Argentina. The two cases are compared and analyzed on a cross-temporal and an inter- regional basis, thereby offering two critical cases in response to assumptions that the processes and patterns of mobilization, and democratization politics more broadly, are region specific. This study challenges political science's focus on elites and structural factors in the study of political participation during democratization.
The conclusion applies the model of mass-mobilization developed from the two cases to the Arab Spring (Egypt) and EuroZone Sovereign Debt Crisis (Greece) protests. The epilogue assesses the EuroMaidan Revolution in Ukraine in comparative context.
Contents:
PART I
1. Introduction: The Shock and Awe of Moments of Mass Mobilization
2. Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization
PART II
3. Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe 1920-2004
4. Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina and Latin America 1920-2001
PART III
5. Setting Precedents: Medium-term Structural Factors in the Mobilization Process
6. Context is Only Part of the Puzzle: Short-term Structural Factors in the Mass Mobilization Process
PART IV
7. The Activist and Elite Interaction and Information Exchange Game
8. The Duty to Protest: Participation of 'Ordinary' People in Mass Mobilization
9. Conclusions: Understanding Revolutionary Moments and Movements
Epilogue: It Happened Again: The 2014 EuroMaidan Mass Mobilization in Ukraine
Articles by Olga Onuch
Geopolitics, 2018
How do people form beliefs about the factual content of major events when established geopolitica... more How do people form beliefs about the factual content of major events when established geopolitical orders are violently challenged? Here we address the tragic events of May 2, 2014, in Odesa, Ukraine. There, Euromaidan protest movement supporters and opponents clashed following Russia's annexation of Crimea and the onset of the Donbas conflict, culminating in the worst civilian death toll the city had seen since World War II. Shortly after, we surveyed Ukraine's population about who they thought had actually perpetrated the killings and relate people's answers to alternative narratives (frames) that an original content analysis finds were available to Ukrainian citizens through different media. We find evidence, consistent with theories of hot cognition and motivated reasoning, that the Odesa violence triggered emotional responses linked to ethnic, regional, and partisan identity, which then activated attitudes associated with these identities that, in turn, led people to adopt very different (sometimes highly improbable) beliefs about who carried out the killings. Ethnic identity in particular is found to have strongly moderated the effects of television, with Ukrainian television greatly influencing Ukrainians but backfiring among Russians, and Russian television mainly impacting non-Ukrainians. Education and local information are found to reduce susceptibility to televised factual narratives.
Post Soviet Affairs, 2018
Building on past survey-based studies of ethnic identity, we employ the case of Ukraine to demons... more Building on past survey-based studies of ethnic identity, we employ the case of Ukraine to demonstrate the importance of taking seriously the multidimensionality of ethnicity, even in a country that is regarded as deeply divided. Drawing on relational theory, we identify four dimensions of ethnicity that are each important in distinctive ways in Ukraine: individual language preference, language embeddedness, ethnolinguistic identity, and nationality. Using original survey data collected in May 2014, we show that the choice of one over the other can be highly consequential for the conclusions one draws about ethnicity's role in shaping attitudes (e.g., to NATO membership), actions (e.g., participation in the Euromaidan protests), and the anticipation of outgroups' behavior (e.g., expectations of a Russian invasion). Moreover, we call attention to the importance of including the right control variables for precisely interpreting any posited effects of ethnicity, making specific recommendations for future survey research on ethnic identity in Ukraine.
Post Soviet Affairs, 2018
While it is common wisdom that “identity matters” in Ukrainian politics, we still lack a robust u... more While it is common wisdom that “identity matters” in Ukrainian politics, we still lack a robust understanding of precisely when and how it matters. Reflecting challenges facing the broader interdisciplinary field of comparative identity politics, authors frequently bring to their analyses very different notions of the nature of identity itself, skipping a rigorous examination of these notions in an effort to get right to documenting the effects of identity. Similarly, identity is frequently operationalized in quantitative studies without much discussion of the implications of selecting one particular measure over another or of what precisely each measure is reflecting, not to mention what might have changed over time. While we do have nuanced research on Ukrainian identity, it tends not to address the evolution of identity over time or the moments and conditions of identity change. Such issues are particularly important for current research since identities and their associated meanings may shift or “harden” during severe crises or conflicts like those that unfolded in Ukraine during 2013–14. The five original articles that make up this special issue1 all address these challenges, with important implications for how we understand Ukrainian politics after the EuroMaidan.
Europe Asia Studies, 2016
The Maidan protests provide us with insights into Ukrainian society and the dynamics of mobilisat... more The Maidan protests provide us with insights into Ukrainian society and the dynamics of mobilisation more generally. Based on the EuroMaidan Protest Participant Survey, on-site rapid interviews with protesters, interviews with politicians, activists and journalists, and focus groups with ordinary citizens and activists, this essay maps the actors, claims and frames of each phase in the protest cycle. It highlights the diversity of actors and the inability of activists and party leaders to coordinate as the central features of the protests. Our analysis reveals the fluid and contingent nature of cleavages commonly portrayed as fixed and politically salient.
New Eastern Europe, 2017
Lead: The 1990 Revolution on Granite was an innovative contentious performance.
This is a sample of the chapter:
In this chapter we provide an analysis of European Union (EU) n... more This is a sample of the chapter:
In this chapter we provide an analysis of European Union (EU) narratives and policies with respect to mass mobilisations in Eastern Europe (EE) and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Specifically, the focus here is on the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ and the recent ‘EuroMaidan’ in Ukraine; as well as on the 2011 ‘J25’ Egyptian revolution and the later summer 2013 cycle of protests and violence following the ousting of President Mohammad Morsi. European Union and ‘EU3’ (French, German, British) perspectives and policies are compared to those of ‘new’ EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe, identifying and accounting for patterns of convergence and divergence.
While politicians are engaging in the most prominent debates and decision-making, the perceptions... more While politicians are engaging in the most prominent debates and decision-making, the perceptions of Ukraine’s population will be central to the success of any such political solution. What exactly are the public’s perceptions and how subject have they been to change? We address this question with data from a new survey that interviewed the same set of Ukrainian citizens three times during 2014. The chief finding is that despite the major costs of war, Ukrainians (even in the east) tend to agree strongly that Ukraine should remain undivided, with many (especially in the west) believing this is something worth fighting for. However, major divides exist on exactly what form this unity should take. Judging by public sentiment, issue-specific autonomy arrangements and some form of limited decentralization offer a much greater chance of eventually unifying the country than would sweeping reforms that invoke the term “federalism.”
Journal of Democracy , 2014
This is the pre-print working paper version, see the full printed version: http://muse.jhu.edu/jo... more This is the pre-print working paper version, see the full printed version: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v025/25.3.onuch.html
The protests that began in Ukraine’s capital of Kyiv on 21 Novem- ber 2013 and became known as the EuroMaidan took even seasoned observers of East European politics by surprise. By December, around 800,000 “ordinary” Ukrainians were demonstrating in Kyiv and other cities across the country. The rapid rise of mass protests, especially at a time when the world’s established democracies are struggling with growing political apathy and declining voter turnout, appears as what Timur Kuran has called one of those moments “when out of never you have a revolution.”1 These episodes may help the cause of democ- racy, but they can also destabilize countries by polarizing citizens and boosting extremists. In order to gauge what a protest outbreak will mean for a country’s democratic prospects, it is crucial to understand who the bulk of the protesters are and what goals they hope to achieve. Here follows original survey data that may help to shed light on Euro- Maidan protest participation and its implications for democratic hopes in Ukraine.
Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 2015
See the full printed version: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/enhanced/doi/10.1111/sena.12129/
... more See the full printed version: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/enhanced/doi/10.1111/sena.12129/
This article deals with the role of informational communication technologies, and specifically social media in the EuroMaidan mobilization process. It asks who used which of these ‘tools’, when, and how in order to better understand the role Facebook, VKontake, Twitter and internet TV played during mobilization process. Drawn out of extensive data collection (surveys, interviews, focus groups and digital archival research) the main argument presented in this article is that while ICTs, and social media specifically, were not the only mechanism behind the mobilization of millions of Ukrainians these were important but part of larger protester ‘tool-kit’ allowing activists to facilitate connectivity, coordinate the mobilization process, speed up the flow of information and created opportunities for grassroots self-organization by ‘Ordinary’ citizens who participated in the protests. The article also highlights that these new protest ‘tools’ also had a de-mobilizing effect. The speed at which social media were used made it possible to spread misinformation confuse protesters, and even potentially made repression easier.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukrainians and Russians have been living peacefully i... more Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukrainians and Russians have been living peacefully in two separate and independent states for nearly a quarter of a century. Much has been said about the cultural and historical links between these two ‘brotherly’ countries, but also about the tensions between the two countries’ different perspectives on nation building and democratisation processes (Jakubanecs, Supphellen, and thorbjørnsen, 2005; Janmaat, 2000; laba, 1996; Prizel, 1998; Puglisi, 2003; Shulman, 1998; Szporluk, 2000; Velychenko, 1992). Although Russian leaders, in the manner of an older brother, have consistently labelled Ukraine as the central element of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ (cameron and orenstein, 2012; Rywkin, 2003; trenin, 2006), the citizens and their foreign policies preferences have historically (i.e. on gas, on the Georgian War, on the EU and nAto) converged and diverged several times over the course of the last twenty-plus years.
Yet, even though there were sensitive moments during the last twenty-plus years of Ukraine-Russia relations (october 1996 crisis, 2004 orange Revolution, gas crisis of January 2006, gas crisis of January 2009), the events of 2014 (the Euromaidan Protests, the annexation of Crimea, and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas3) are predicted by social scientists to not only sour formal relations between the two states, but also between ‘ordinary’ citizens. While there are many ‘myths’ about the way brother Russians and Ukrainians view the ‘other’ state and its people, the reality is much more complex, permeating with conflict, competition, and ideological disagreements, as in any other family. in such critical times, we must stop and ask: do Russians and Ukrainians view the events of the last year differently? or are there points of convergence? do these events affect the way Russians see Ukraine and Ukrainians see Russia? if so, how? And can we identify any shifts in views overtime from before the 2014 crisis to today? Data on the topic is difficult to find and even more difficult to assess. This is specifically the case when so many contextual variables are in flux and when little, if any, of the available data consists of either a repeated and duplicated schedule of questions, or a panel (following citizens and their views) tracking preferences over time.
Thus, we must scour a variety of polls conducted at different times, by different institutions, to map out the views of Ukrainians and Russians.
At first the EuroMaidan, seemed like something we have seen before: the ‘Orange Revolution’. We w... more At first the EuroMaidan, seemed like something we have seen before: the ‘Orange Revolution’. We were brought back to 23 November 2004, when observers of Ukrainian politics were shocked when they witnessed a sea of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians, joined activists and opposition party members in a moment of mass mobilization. While Ukraine had previously experienced several smaller protest events, such as the 1986 Chornobyl disaster protests, the 1991 Revolution on the Granite, and the 2001 Ukraine Without Kuchma protests, the sheer size of the 2004 protests and the fact that participation quickly shifted to a majority made of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians was unprecedented (Onuch 2014a). First heralded as a democratic awakening and the first step to Europeanization, but after the election of Viktor Yanukovych (the villain of the ‘Orange Revolution’) as president in 2010, academics agreed that for a variety of reasons, including protest fatigue, Ukraine would not see another mass-‐‑mobilization any time soon (Meirowitz and Tucker 2013). Thus, when the November 2013 protests grew to 800,000, political scientists had to go back to the drawing board. It was happening again, and again they did not see it coming. While it seemed like déjà vu, it was very different and not least because it was happening with the events of 2004 as the precedent. This chapter’s aim is to analyse and contextualizes the EuroMaidan as a critical case of mass protest, by placing it in comparative reference to the ‘Orange Revolution’. First, the chapter will briefly outline the data used. Second, the chapter will highlight some key writing on mobilization and activism in Ukraine and identify potential contributions of this analysis to the literature. The majority of the text will assess the EuroMaidan mobilization. Employing interview and focus groups data collected by the author, we will be able to contrast and compare the parameters and trajectories of two protest waves (duration, location, and geographical diffusion); the central actors involved in the mobilization process and their main claims. At each step highlighting the convergence and divergence between the 2004 and 2013/14 mass mobilizations. Finally, once the main boundaries of the mobilization have been mapped out, the chapter will address the recent focus among the media and social scientists alike on: the rise of the right, the rise of violence, and the ‘new’ role of social media in the EuroMaidan mobilizations. This initial analysis seeks to provide a blue print for larger studies of the EuroMaidan mobilizations and in the conclusion will highlight key hypotheses for future testing.
The Euromaidan, shocked most observers of Ukrainian politics, not only for its longevity (Novembe... more The Euromaidan, shocked most observers of Ukrainian politics, not only for its longevity (November 21, 2013 – February 22, 2014), but also for its turn to violent repertoires of protest in the later stages. What was at first a peaceful mass protest event which saw nearly equal participation of men and women (Onuch, 2014d; Onuch & Martsenyuk, 2013), turned into what seemed to be a violent and male dominated riot. While much attention has been paid to the brave ‘women of the Euromaidan’ who also engaged in violent protests (Khromeychuk, 2014; Phillips, 2014), female activists and other protest participants (‘ordinary’ citizens) have reported a gendered division of labour in the protest zone. Thus, it is still not clear what the role of gender was during the different stages of protest - and if the participation of women was in fact, any different from that of male protest participants. This paper employs original data from rapid interviews and onsite surveys of protest participants, and the authors’ in-depth interviews with 48 activists to investigate how violent repertoires and the general militarization of the Euromaidan protests reproduced patriarchal gender stereotypes.
The Political Causes Of The Argentine MassCMobilization During The Economic Crisis Of 2001, 2014
I argue that contextual factors such as an economic crisis, or an austerity policy like the Corra... more I argue that contextual factors such as an economic crisis, or an austerity policy like the Corralito can exacerbate pre-existing conditions and foster ‘new’ relationships between and within the politico-economic elite and opposition activists, as well as between the politico-economic elite, activists and ‘ordinary’ citizens. This chapter thus opposes the interpretation of economic crises as causes or explanatory triggers, but rather sees them as intervening variables that can make mass-mobilization more likely. Thus, the main argument is that ‘ordinary’ Argentines came out to protest on 19 December, with the purpose of defending their political rights, and not solely to voice their grievances against an on-going economic crisis.
Book Reviews by Olga Onuch
Talks by Olga Onuch
I am discussing my book Mapping Mass Mobilization in Kyiv . At Knyharniya Ye on Lycenka May 4, 2015.
Uploads
Books by Olga Onuch
The conclusion applies the model of mass-mobilization developed from the two cases to the Arab Spring (Egypt) and EuroZone Sovereign Debt Crisis (Greece) protests. The epilogue assesses the EuroMaidan Revolution in Ukraine in comparative context.
Contents:
PART I
1. Introduction: The Shock and Awe of Moments of Mass Mobilization
2. Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization
PART II
3. Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe 1920-2004
4. Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina and Latin America 1920-2001
PART III
5. Setting Precedents: Medium-term Structural Factors in the Mobilization Process
6. Context is Only Part of the Puzzle: Short-term Structural Factors in the Mass Mobilization Process
PART IV
7. The Activist and Elite Interaction and Information Exchange Game
8. The Duty to Protest: Participation of 'Ordinary' People in Mass Mobilization
9. Conclusions: Understanding Revolutionary Moments and Movements
Epilogue: It Happened Again: The 2014 EuroMaidan Mass Mobilization in Ukraine
The conclusion applies the model of mass-mobilization developed from the two cases to the Arab Spring (Egypt) and EuroZone Sovereign Debt Crisis (Greece) protests. The epilogue assesses the EuroMaidan Revolution in Ukraine in comparative context.
Contents:
PART I
1. Introduction: The Shock and Awe of Moments of Mass Mobilization
2. Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization
PART II
3. Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe 1920-2004
4. Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina and Latin America 1920-2001
PART III
5. Setting Precedents: Medium-term Structural Factors in the Mobilization Process
6. Context is Only Part of the Puzzle: Short-term Structural Factors in the Mass Mobilization Process
PART IV
7. The Activist and Elite Interaction and Information Exchange Game
8. The Duty to Protest: Participation of 'Ordinary' People in Mass Mobilization
9. Conclusions: Understanding Revolutionary Moments and Movements
Epilogue: It Happened Again: The 2014 EuroMaidan Mass Mobilization in Ukraine
Articles by Olga Onuch
In this chapter we provide an analysis of European Union (EU) narratives and policies with respect to mass mobilisations in Eastern Europe (EE) and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Specifically, the focus here is on the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ and the recent ‘EuroMaidan’ in Ukraine; as well as on the 2011 ‘J25’ Egyptian revolution and the later summer 2013 cycle of protests and violence following the ousting of President Mohammad Morsi. European Union and ‘EU3’ (French, German, British) perspectives and policies are compared to those of ‘new’ EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe, identifying and accounting for patterns of convergence and divergence.
The protests that began in Ukraine’s capital of Kyiv on 21 Novem- ber 2013 and became known as the EuroMaidan took even seasoned observers of East European politics by surprise. By December, around 800,000 “ordinary” Ukrainians were demonstrating in Kyiv and other cities across the country. The rapid rise of mass protests, especially at a time when the world’s established democracies are struggling with growing political apathy and declining voter turnout, appears as what Timur Kuran has called one of those moments “when out of never you have a revolution.”1 These episodes may help the cause of democ- racy, but they can also destabilize countries by polarizing citizens and boosting extremists. In order to gauge what a protest outbreak will mean for a country’s democratic prospects, it is crucial to understand who the bulk of the protesters are and what goals they hope to achieve. Here follows original survey data that may help to shed light on Euro- Maidan protest participation and its implications for democratic hopes in Ukraine.
This article deals with the role of informational communication technologies, and specifically social media in the EuroMaidan mobilization process. It asks who used which of these ‘tools’, when, and how in order to better understand the role Facebook, VKontake, Twitter and internet TV played during mobilization process. Drawn out of extensive data collection (surveys, interviews, focus groups and digital archival research) the main argument presented in this article is that while ICTs, and social media specifically, were not the only mechanism behind the mobilization of millions of Ukrainians these were important but part of larger protester ‘tool-kit’ allowing activists to facilitate connectivity, coordinate the mobilization process, speed up the flow of information and created opportunities for grassroots self-organization by ‘Ordinary’ citizens who participated in the protests. The article also highlights that these new protest ‘tools’ also had a de-mobilizing effect. The speed at which social media were used made it possible to spread misinformation confuse protesters, and even potentially made repression easier.
Yet, even though there were sensitive moments during the last twenty-plus years of Ukraine-Russia relations (october 1996 crisis, 2004 orange Revolution, gas crisis of January 2006, gas crisis of January 2009), the events of 2014 (the Euromaidan Protests, the annexation of Crimea, and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas3) are predicted by social scientists to not only sour formal relations between the two states, but also between ‘ordinary’ citizens. While there are many ‘myths’ about the way brother Russians and Ukrainians view the ‘other’ state and its people, the reality is much more complex, permeating with conflict, competition, and ideological disagreements, as in any other family. in such critical times, we must stop and ask: do Russians and Ukrainians view the events of the last year differently? or are there points of convergence? do these events affect the way Russians see Ukraine and Ukrainians see Russia? if so, how? And can we identify any shifts in views overtime from before the 2014 crisis to today? Data on the topic is difficult to find and even more difficult to assess. This is specifically the case when so many contextual variables are in flux and when little, if any, of the available data consists of either a repeated and duplicated schedule of questions, or a panel (following citizens and their views) tracking preferences over time.
Thus, we must scour a variety of polls conducted at different times, by different institutions, to map out the views of Ukrainians and Russians.
Book Reviews by Olga Onuch
Talks by Olga Onuch
The conclusion applies the model of mass-mobilization developed from the two cases to the Arab Spring (Egypt) and EuroZone Sovereign Debt Crisis (Greece) protests. The epilogue assesses the EuroMaidan Revolution in Ukraine in comparative context.
Contents:
PART I
1. Introduction: The Shock and Awe of Moments of Mass Mobilization
2. Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization
PART II
3. Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe 1920-2004
4. Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina and Latin America 1920-2001
PART III
5. Setting Precedents: Medium-term Structural Factors in the Mobilization Process
6. Context is Only Part of the Puzzle: Short-term Structural Factors in the Mass Mobilization Process
PART IV
7. The Activist and Elite Interaction and Information Exchange Game
8. The Duty to Protest: Participation of 'Ordinary' People in Mass Mobilization
9. Conclusions: Understanding Revolutionary Moments and Movements
Epilogue: It Happened Again: The 2014 EuroMaidan Mass Mobilization in Ukraine
The conclusion applies the model of mass-mobilization developed from the two cases to the Arab Spring (Egypt) and EuroZone Sovereign Debt Crisis (Greece) protests. The epilogue assesses the EuroMaidan Revolution in Ukraine in comparative context.
Contents:
PART I
1. Introduction: The Shock and Awe of Moments of Mass Mobilization
2. Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization
PART II
3. Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe 1920-2004
4. Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina and Latin America 1920-2001
PART III
5. Setting Precedents: Medium-term Structural Factors in the Mobilization Process
6. Context is Only Part of the Puzzle: Short-term Structural Factors in the Mass Mobilization Process
PART IV
7. The Activist and Elite Interaction and Information Exchange Game
8. The Duty to Protest: Participation of 'Ordinary' People in Mass Mobilization
9. Conclusions: Understanding Revolutionary Moments and Movements
Epilogue: It Happened Again: The 2014 EuroMaidan Mass Mobilization in Ukraine
In this chapter we provide an analysis of European Union (EU) narratives and policies with respect to mass mobilisations in Eastern Europe (EE) and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Specifically, the focus here is on the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ and the recent ‘EuroMaidan’ in Ukraine; as well as on the 2011 ‘J25’ Egyptian revolution and the later summer 2013 cycle of protests and violence following the ousting of President Mohammad Morsi. European Union and ‘EU3’ (French, German, British) perspectives and policies are compared to those of ‘new’ EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe, identifying and accounting for patterns of convergence and divergence.
The protests that began in Ukraine’s capital of Kyiv on 21 Novem- ber 2013 and became known as the EuroMaidan took even seasoned observers of East European politics by surprise. By December, around 800,000 “ordinary” Ukrainians were demonstrating in Kyiv and other cities across the country. The rapid rise of mass protests, especially at a time when the world’s established democracies are struggling with growing political apathy and declining voter turnout, appears as what Timur Kuran has called one of those moments “when out of never you have a revolution.”1 These episodes may help the cause of democ- racy, but they can also destabilize countries by polarizing citizens and boosting extremists. In order to gauge what a protest outbreak will mean for a country’s democratic prospects, it is crucial to understand who the bulk of the protesters are and what goals they hope to achieve. Here follows original survey data that may help to shed light on Euro- Maidan protest participation and its implications for democratic hopes in Ukraine.
This article deals with the role of informational communication technologies, and specifically social media in the EuroMaidan mobilization process. It asks who used which of these ‘tools’, when, and how in order to better understand the role Facebook, VKontake, Twitter and internet TV played during mobilization process. Drawn out of extensive data collection (surveys, interviews, focus groups and digital archival research) the main argument presented in this article is that while ICTs, and social media specifically, were not the only mechanism behind the mobilization of millions of Ukrainians these were important but part of larger protester ‘tool-kit’ allowing activists to facilitate connectivity, coordinate the mobilization process, speed up the flow of information and created opportunities for grassroots self-organization by ‘Ordinary’ citizens who participated in the protests. The article also highlights that these new protest ‘tools’ also had a de-mobilizing effect. The speed at which social media were used made it possible to spread misinformation confuse protesters, and even potentially made repression easier.
Yet, even though there were sensitive moments during the last twenty-plus years of Ukraine-Russia relations (october 1996 crisis, 2004 orange Revolution, gas crisis of January 2006, gas crisis of January 2009), the events of 2014 (the Euromaidan Protests, the annexation of Crimea, and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas3) are predicted by social scientists to not only sour formal relations between the two states, but also between ‘ordinary’ citizens. While there are many ‘myths’ about the way brother Russians and Ukrainians view the ‘other’ state and its people, the reality is much more complex, permeating with conflict, competition, and ideological disagreements, as in any other family. in such critical times, we must stop and ask: do Russians and Ukrainians view the events of the last year differently? or are there points of convergence? do these events affect the way Russians see Ukraine and Ukrainians see Russia? if so, how? And can we identify any shifts in views overtime from before the 2014 crisis to today? Data on the topic is difficult to find and even more difficult to assess. This is specifically the case when so many contextual variables are in flux and when little, if any, of the available data consists of either a repeated and duplicated schedule of questions, or a panel (following citizens and their views) tracking preferences over time.
Thus, we must scour a variety of polls conducted at different times, by different institutions, to map out the views of Ukrainians and Russians.