James Ker-Lindsay
James Ker-Lindsay is Visiting Professor at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and Research Associate at the Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford. His research is focused on conflict, peace and security in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean (in particular the Cyprus Problem, Greek-Turkish relations and Kosovo), EU enlargement, and secession and recognition in international politics.
His authored books include, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States (Oxford University Press, 2012); The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2011); Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (IB Tauris, 2009); Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey (IB Tauris, 2007); EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); and, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-1964 (Bibliopolis, 2004). He is currently working on a co-authored book (with Mikulas Fabry): Secession and State Creation: What Everyone Needs to Know, to be published by Oxford University Press. He has also co-edited a number of volumes, such as, Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution (IB Tauris) Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans (Palgrave Macmillan, with Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic); An Island in Europe: The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus (I.B.Tauris, co-edited with Hubert Faustmann and Fiona Mullen); New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies (2010, Routledge, with Dejan Djokic); The Government and Politics of Cyprus (2009, Peter Lang, with Hubert Faustmann), and, The Work of the United Nations in Cyprus (2001, Palgrave Macmillan, with Oliver Richmond). He is currently editing a journal special issue on the attitudes of EU members towards enlargement in the Western Balkans and another special issue on 'engagement without recognition' in international politics. He has also published articles in many leading journals, including International Affairs, Survival, Cambridge Review of International Affairs and the Journal of Common Market Studies. He has served as the co-editor of The Cyprus Review and is a member of the editorial boards of Ethnopolitics, the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, and Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. He is also a member of the Steering Committee of the ECPR Standing Group on South East Europe and was formerly co-convenor of the British International Studies Association (BISA) Working Group on South East Europe.
In addition to his academic work, he also has extensive experience in public and private sector consulting and advising and has a practical background in conflict analysis and resolution. He was the co-ordinator of the Greek-Turkish Forum, a peace support initiative run by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), where he was based, and the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO). He has also served as an advisor/consultant to a number of governments and international organisations, including the European Union, Council of Europe and the United Nations. Most recently, he served as a research analyst at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and was a member of the British delegation at the 2017 UN-sponsored Conference on Cyprus. He has also undertaken regular media commentary and analysis. He has written for Jane's Foreign Report and the Economist Intelligence Unit (Cyprus politics correspondent 2001-2006), and has been cited/interviewed by many leading news sources, including BBC, CNN, Reuters, AFP, Associated Press, The Economist, The Guardian, International Herald Tribune, New York Times, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, SKY News, The Times and The Wall Street Journal.
He holds a BSc(econ) from London University and an MA and PhD in International Conflict Analysis from the University of Kent. He has held visiting positions at the University of Pristina, the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius, and the University of Nicosia.
YouTube Channel Page: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
His authored books include, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States (Oxford University Press, 2012); The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2011); Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (IB Tauris, 2009); Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey (IB Tauris, 2007); EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); and, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-1964 (Bibliopolis, 2004). He is currently working on a co-authored book (with Mikulas Fabry): Secession and State Creation: What Everyone Needs to Know, to be published by Oxford University Press. He has also co-edited a number of volumes, such as, Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution (IB Tauris) Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans (Palgrave Macmillan, with Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic); An Island in Europe: The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus (I.B.Tauris, co-edited with Hubert Faustmann and Fiona Mullen); New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies (2010, Routledge, with Dejan Djokic); The Government and Politics of Cyprus (2009, Peter Lang, with Hubert Faustmann), and, The Work of the United Nations in Cyprus (2001, Palgrave Macmillan, with Oliver Richmond). He is currently editing a journal special issue on the attitudes of EU members towards enlargement in the Western Balkans and another special issue on 'engagement without recognition' in international politics. He has also published articles in many leading journals, including International Affairs, Survival, Cambridge Review of International Affairs and the Journal of Common Market Studies. He has served as the co-editor of The Cyprus Review and is a member of the editorial boards of Ethnopolitics, the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, and Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. He is also a member of the Steering Committee of the ECPR Standing Group on South East Europe and was formerly co-convenor of the British International Studies Association (BISA) Working Group on South East Europe.
In addition to his academic work, he also has extensive experience in public and private sector consulting and advising and has a practical background in conflict analysis and resolution. He was the co-ordinator of the Greek-Turkish Forum, a peace support initiative run by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), where he was based, and the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO). He has also served as an advisor/consultant to a number of governments and international organisations, including the European Union, Council of Europe and the United Nations. Most recently, he served as a research analyst at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and was a member of the British delegation at the 2017 UN-sponsored Conference on Cyprus. He has also undertaken regular media commentary and analysis. He has written for Jane's Foreign Report and the Economist Intelligence Unit (Cyprus politics correspondent 2001-2006), and has been cited/interviewed by many leading news sources, including BBC, CNN, Reuters, AFP, Associated Press, The Economist, The Guardian, International Herald Tribune, New York Times, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, SKY News, The Times and The Wall Street Journal.
He holds a BSc(econ) from London University and an MA and PhD in International Conflict Analysis from the University of Kent. He has held visiting positions at the University of Pristina, the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius, and the University of Nicosia.
YouTube Channel Page: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
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Books by James Ker-Lindsay
Contributors include: Emel Akcali, Ahmet An, Jan Asmussen, Tozun Bahcheli, Georgios Charalambous, Costas Constantinou, Hubert Faustmann, Ayla Gurel, Yeshim Harris, Robert Holland, Erol Kaymak, James Ker-Lindsay, Paschalis Kitromilidis, Klearchos Kyriakides, George Kyris, Neophytos Loizides, Robert McDonald, Michael Moran, Sid Noel, Mustafa Ergun Olgun, Yiannis Papadakis, Oliver Richmond, Nikos Skoutaris, Mary Southcott, Ahmet Sözen, Zenon Stavrinides, Harry Tzimitras, Birte Vogel
Contributors: John O'Brennan, Adam Fagan, Iavor Rangelov, Giulio Venneri, Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, Francesco Strazzari, Ervjola Selenica, Anita Brkanić, Nenad Markovic, Gemma Collantes-Celador, Jens Narten, Joanna Hanson, Jelena Obradović-Wochnik, Mladen Ostojić, Florence Hartmann
The Cyprus Problem covers all aspects of the Cyprus problem, placing it in historical context, addressing the situation as it now stands, and looking toward its possible resolution. The book begins with the origins of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as well as the other indigenous communities on the island (Maronites, Latin, Armenians, and Gypsies). It then examines the tensions that emerged between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots after independence in 1960 and the complex constitutional provisions and international treaties designed to safeguard the new state. He pays special attention to the Turkish invasion in 1974 and the subsequent efforts by the UN and the international community to reunite Cyprus. The book's final two chapters address a host of pressing issues that divide the two Cypriot communities, including key concerns over property, refugee returns, and the repatriation of settlers. The book concludes by considering whether partition really is the best solution, as many observers increasingly suggest.
Contributors include Dejan Djokic, James Ker-Lindsay, Connie Robinson, Mark Cornwall, John Paul Newman, Tomislav Dulic, Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Dejan Jovic, Nebojša Vladisavljevic, Florian Bieber, Jasna Dragovic-Soso and Eric Gordy.
Contributors include: Derya Beyatli, Hubert Faustmann, Christina Ioannou, Engin Karatas, George Kentas, James Ker-Lindsay, Fiona Mullen and Nikos Skoutaris
Journal Articles by James Ker-Lindsay
Contributors include: Emel Akcali, Ahmet An, Jan Asmussen, Tozun Bahcheli, Georgios Charalambous, Costas Constantinou, Hubert Faustmann, Ayla Gurel, Yeshim Harris, Robert Holland, Erol Kaymak, James Ker-Lindsay, Paschalis Kitromilidis, Klearchos Kyriakides, George Kyris, Neophytos Loizides, Robert McDonald, Michael Moran, Sid Noel, Mustafa Ergun Olgun, Yiannis Papadakis, Oliver Richmond, Nikos Skoutaris, Mary Southcott, Ahmet Sözen, Zenon Stavrinides, Harry Tzimitras, Birte Vogel
Contributors: John O'Brennan, Adam Fagan, Iavor Rangelov, Giulio Venneri, Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, Francesco Strazzari, Ervjola Selenica, Anita Brkanić, Nenad Markovic, Gemma Collantes-Celador, Jens Narten, Joanna Hanson, Jelena Obradović-Wochnik, Mladen Ostojić, Florence Hartmann
The Cyprus Problem covers all aspects of the Cyprus problem, placing it in historical context, addressing the situation as it now stands, and looking toward its possible resolution. The book begins with the origins of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as well as the other indigenous communities on the island (Maronites, Latin, Armenians, and Gypsies). It then examines the tensions that emerged between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots after independence in 1960 and the complex constitutional provisions and international treaties designed to safeguard the new state. He pays special attention to the Turkish invasion in 1974 and the subsequent efforts by the UN and the international community to reunite Cyprus. The book's final two chapters address a host of pressing issues that divide the two Cypriot communities, including key concerns over property, refugee returns, and the repatriation of settlers. The book concludes by considering whether partition really is the best solution, as many observers increasingly suggest.
Contributors include Dejan Djokic, James Ker-Lindsay, Connie Robinson, Mark Cornwall, John Paul Newman, Tomislav Dulic, Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Dejan Jovic, Nebojša Vladisavljevic, Florian Bieber, Jasna Dragovic-Soso and Eric Gordy.
Contributors include: Derya Beyatli, Hubert Faustmann, Christina Ioannou, Engin Karatas, George Kentas, James Ker-Lindsay, Fiona Mullen and Nikos Skoutaris
The possible disappearance of these countries poses challenges to international policymakers on several levels. There are obvious and serious questions about what will happen to the populations of the countries at risk. Where will they live? What will be their status? Yet there are also pro- found, but less well understood, legal and political questions. As things stand, it is wholly unclear how the international community would handle the repercussions arising from the physical disappearance of these countries. In some instances, such uncertainty could lead to territorial tensions, and even conflict.
In June 2010, I had another opportunity to speak with the Nobel Laureate. It proved to be equally interesting and no less surprising. This time, the subject of discussion was to be the importance of principles in peacemaking. Once again, he challenged a central tenet of peacemaking by arguing that principles were absolutely necessary and that these should not be compromised, even for the sake of a solution. What made this statement even more interesting was the fact, as will be shown in this essay, that in his handling of the Kosovo status talks, he himself had ignored important and well-established principles.
Although Britain continues to support Kosovo’s international integration, and still lobbies for recognition whenever and wherever opportunities arise, there is no doubt that the intensity of British activity in this area has decreased in recent years. This is due to several factors. In large part, it is down to the increasing difficulty of persuading countries that have not yet recognized Kosovo to do so. Allied to this, there has been a growing realization of the damage that this failure to secure more recognitions has on wider perceptions of British influence. Then there is Britain’s frustration at what it sees as Kosovo’s inability to structure a plan to secure further recognitions. Meanwhile, British officials have expressed frustration at the dysfunctional domestic political situation in Kosovo. This has also made it more difficult to persuade countries to recognize Kosovo. Finally, all these factors are playing out at a time when the wider international environment is in a period of extreme change. The looming prospect of Britain’s departure from the European Union raises important questions about the way in which it can continue to support Kosovo in the years ahead.
Given the highly contentious way in which it emerged, there is perhaps a tendency to think about the way in which the international community interacts with Kosovo in distinctly binary terms: the recognisers and the non-recognisers. This division naturally leads to assumptions about the quality of the relationship Kosovo enjoys with the wider world. Amongst the recognisers, or so the thinking goes, relations are good, and the ties are strong and fruitful. Meanwhile, as the non-recognisers refuse to accept Kosovo’s statehood, they must necessarily keep their distance. To be sure, there are some states that sit firmly within these categories. For instance, amongst the recognisers, there are those states that have built up strong relations with Kosovo across a range of areas. In some cases, these states have been at the forefront of efforts to help Kosovo cement its status on the international stage. Likewise, at the other end of the scale are the non-recognising countries that resolutely oppose Kosovo’s claim to statehood and steadfastly refuse to have anything to do with it. Some of these countries have been instrumental in trying to prevent Kosovo from being recognised by other states or from joining international bodies.
However, this simple division tells an incomplete, if not wholly wrong, story. In truth the two broad camps – recognisers and non-recognisers – are far more heterogeneous than is often realised. Over the course of the past ten years, a wide variation of positions has emerged. While recognition is important, there is a tendency to forget that it is merely one element, albeit an important one, of the wider process of interaction between states. It is, in many ways, a starting point (although not the only starting point). The subsequent establishment of working political, economic and cultural relations are the basis for deeper and more sustained engagement between countries. It is in this regard that the binary divisions between recognisers and non-recognisers begins to break down. One thing that has become very obvious is that recognition does not necessarily mean engagement. The past decade has shown that there are many countries that have recognised Kosovo but have little, if any, actual interaction with it, whether in terms of formal diplomatic relations or in terms of wider economic and cultural engagement. Equally, the past decade has also shown that non-recognition does not automatically preclude any form of interaction. Around the world, there are a number of countries that have not recognised Kosovo, but nevertheless have developed a range of relations with it, including regular contacts between officials.
To date, the question of de facto states—territories that are unrecognized or partially recognized—has been at the heart of studies into secession and recognition in the field of politics and international relations. Attention in this area has tended to focus on the nature, structure, and international interaction of unrecognized territories. However, the scope of research is now widening. As well as interest in the historical development of attitudes towards secession and recognition practices, scholars are now looking at the way in which parent states—as the territories they have broken away from are generally known—attempt to prevent de facto states from being recognized or otherwise legitimized by the international community. Meanwhile, increasing attention is also being given to the role of external parties, such as great powers, as well as to the efforts of secessionist territories themselves to find ways to encourage recognition, or at least to participate more widely in the international system. Therefore, while the community of scholars working in the field of secession and recognition is still relatively small, the subject itself is undergoing rapid growth.
The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union will be felt in the Western Balkans in at least three distinct ways. In the first instance, Britain will no longer be a central actor in the region. This is likely to be felt most acutely in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, and perhaps contrary to perceived wisdom, its effects on enlargement might actually be rather less pronounced than many believe. Of course, Britain will try to ensure that its role in the region will be maintained through other avenues. These are likely to be very poor substi- tutes. Secondly, Brexit is likely to change the wider debate about enlargement. As the EU digests the consequences of Britain’s departure, the question many are now asking is whether the process of expansion will speed up, as the EU attempts to reinforce the European project, or slow down, as it confronts the need for fundamental changes internally. Indeed, will we perhaps see other countries follow the UK thereby weakening the EU even further? Thirdly, there is the wider question about growing populism across Europe. Brexit may well have been a product of specific circumstances pre- sent in the United Kingdom. However, we cannot ignore the fact that it also appears to have wider origins. Again, this could well be felt in the Western Balkans. Then there is the question about the reaction from the region. Will Brexit see a growth in Eurosceptic senti- ment in the Western Balkans?
The problem is that solving Cyprus has seemingly become an impossible task. Starting in 1964 and continuing to the present day, the United Nations has been at the forefront of efforts to bridge the gap between the two communities. However, despite numerous initiatives, the island remains divided. This chapter will consider the various attempts to solve the Cyprus Problem before analysing the main points of difference that appear to stand in the way of a comprehensive settlement. Lastly, it will consider the implications of yet another breakdown of talks. What effects does the continued division of the island have for the various actors that are most directly involved – the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Greece, Turkey, as well as the European Union and the United Nations? After all this time and effort, and with little apparent prospect of success on the horizon, does a solution to the Cyprus Problem really still matter?
Instead, the EU provided the context for a meaningful reunification process to take place. Its decision to accept Cyprus as a candidate for membership, and its insistence that it could not be held back because of the division, created the political conditions for the parties, most particularly the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot community, to engage in the negotiation process in a way that had not been seen before. It therefore provided a catalyst for a settlement. The problem was that this process of ‘incentivisation’ was unevenly applied. Steps needed to be taken to ensure that the Greek Cypriot community could not play the system. This, perhaps more than anything, highlights the fact that while the EU can indeed be a ‘game changer’, this role requires it to be more active than many assume. It is not enough to think that the mere prospect of accession can help parties reach a solution to a long-standing dispute. The EU must continually ensure that the political incentives and conditions are managed to ensure full engagement by all sides. In other words, when one is considering the ways in which the EU can act as a catalyst for conflict resolution, even the power of attraction – the desirability of EU membership that draws countries closer to the Union – needs to be managed.
To my mind, the key problem lies in the way in which the end outcome of the process has been presented and debated. In particular, it seems regrettable that the concept of ‘loose federation’ has come to be seen by Greek Cypriots as a wholly unacceptable model for a settlement. Indeed, the mere mention of the term tends to provoke strongly negative reactions from many ordinary Greek Cypriots. This is unfortunate. In many ways, and being wholly realistic, as much as it would be desirable to see the two communities forge a close cooperative working relationship, it seems obvious that this is not going to happen at this stage. Instead, limiting the points of likely or potential political friction between the two communities represents the most logical aim for any settlement process.
Drawn from a conference held at the Royal United Services Institute in March 2009, it explores a wide range of topics, ranging from the ways in which Turkey is seeking to secure its energy infrastructure, through to the ways in which it has built a co-operative relationship with neighbours who once supported terrorist activities in Turkey.
The conference discussions were based at the time on the UK’s long-term CONTEST strategy and its four main pillars: PREPARE, PURSUE, PREVENT and PROTECT as they applied to Turkey, bringing experts together to explore the issues and ways of tackling them.
examining the implications of a continued Greek and Turkish military presence on the island and the proposals for demilitarisation, which will require a rather more comprehensive approach to security than has hitherto been the case. In ensuring the island’s domestic stability, as well as securing its external defences, inventive thinking will be needed to reach some form of acceptable mechanism to ensure the island’s post-solution independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Keywords: Cyprus, Security, Defence, United Nations, NATO, OSCE, European Union, Britain, Greece, Turkey
Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008 has left the International community bitterly divided. However, it has also seen divisions within Kosovo. While ethnic Serbs in the central and southern parts of Kosovo accept the new state of affairs, the Serbs in the north have acknowledged Pristina's authority. However, calls for the four northern regions - Leposavic, Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and North Mitrovica - to be handed over to Serbia's control as part of a wider territorial adjustment, or 'land-swap', between Serbia and Kosovo has been steadfastly rejected by many Western countries. Indeed, talks aimed at a settlement based on this option in 2018 were blocked by Britain and Germany. Instead, international efforts have been directed towards autonomy in the form of an Association of Serb Municipalities. But a decade after the idea was first proposed, no progress has been made on the issue. Given the ongoing problems, is it time to revisit a territorial settlement that would finally allow Kosovo to gain full international acceptance and allow Serbia to move on?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Manipur lies in northeast India, close to the borders with Bangladesh, China and Burma, also known as Myanmar. Once an independent kingdom, it became a princely state within British India in the Kate nineteenth century. Then, after Indian independence, it briefly became an independent kingdom again before uniting with India, where it became an Indian state in 1972. However, throughout its history, it has faced a conflict between the various main groups: the Meitei, the Naga and the Kuki - the latter two recognised as ‘Scheduled Tribes’ and thus protected under the Indian Constitution. This tension has been fed by the privileges enjoyed by the Hindu-majority Meitei and the Christian Kuki ties to neighbouring regional groups, including the Mizo and the Chin, in Burma. But while this at one stage led to an armed independence movement, since 2008, the Kuki insurgents have accepted a ceasefire agreement - the Suspension of Operation (SoO). However, this was thrown into doubt when the Manipur government refused to renew the SoO, and the Manipur Hugh Court called for the Meitei also to be given Scheduled Tribe status. Seen as a threat by the Kuki, this soon led to rioting and wider unrest. It has also fed calls for a new Kuki territory within India, known as Kukiland. But is this likely?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Even today, the legacy of European imperialism is still felt worldwide. But it is most acutely felt in territories that were partitioned as part of a process of partial decolonisation. Mayotte is one of the most interesting examples. It refused to join the Union of the Comoros, which unilaterally declared independence from France in 1975. Instead, following its referendum, it decided to remain a part of France. In the years since then, it has gradually integrated further into France - to the point that it is now the country's 101st department and one of its five overseas departments, alongside French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Reunion. But this integration has also made the island a destination for Comorans seeking a better life. But as the number of migrants reaches unsustainable levels and social problems grow, the Mahorais (the inhabitants of Mayotte) have called for action. And this led to the latest massive crackdown by French security forces. But in the face of anger from Comoros, the operation has also cast an important spotlight on the consequences of the partition of the Comoros Islands fifty years ago.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
For much of its history, Ireland has clung to the principle of military neutrality. Originally defined as a way to set itself apart from neighbouring Britain, this controversially saw Ireland refuse to take up arms against Nazi Germany during the Second World War. It also rejected a US offer to join NATO when it was founded in 1949. Since then, neutrality has become a fundamental part of the Irish identity on the world stage. The Irish Defence Forces have been a leading participant in UN peacekeeping operations. But there are now questions about whether it is time to rethink the policy of neutrality. Many argue that Ireland can no longer afford to ignore changes in the world. This is especially important given Ireland's growing significance for vital undersea cables linking Europe and North America. More to the point, a stunning revelation that Ireland has had a secret agreement with the United Kingdom for seventy years that allows the Royal Air Force (RAF) to protect Irish airspace has called into question one of the main rationales for Irish neutrality. So, is it time for Ireland to abandon neutrality and formally join NATO?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Sikhism is the fifth largest religious group globally, with over 25 million adherents worldwide. Founded in the early sixteenth century By Guru Nanak, it was later refined by nine further Gurus. However, from the start, it has faced persecution. As a result, when Britain decolonised India, there were calls for a separate Sikh homeland. However, this was rejected. Instead, in 1966, Punjab was reorganised and partitioned to create a Sikh-majority federal state. But in the years that followed, disillusionment grew. This then led to tensions. This came to a head in 1984 when Indian forces raided the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the holiest shrine of the Sikhs. As well as killing the leader of the militants, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, many thousands were killed. Operation Blue Star, as it was known, caused outrage and led to the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, by two of her Sikh bodyguards. But in the years that followed, it seemed that the Khalistani movement was gradually declining. However, this changed with the emergence of a young preacher: Amritpal Singh. But is this really the start of a new phase of violent agitation for an independent Sikh state?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/jameskerlindsay
Sudan has been in a state of war for almost its entire history. Having become independent in 1956, it was immediately plunged into a brutal conflict as the Christian African South fought against the predominantly Arab Muslim North. While a peace deal was reached in the early 1970s, fighting erupted again in the early 1980s. But while this eventually led to the independence of South Sudan, another major conflict emerged in the Western province of Darfur. This saw the army assisted by a vicious paramilitary group, the Janjaweed. But as accusations of genocide grew, the fighters were incorporated into the armed forces as the RSF, under their leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (or Dagolo or Daglo), also known as Hemedti. This all came to a head in 2019 when Sudan's standing dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was overthrown, and the army took over. This saw Dagalo become deputy leader under the head of the armed forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. However, this relationship has now broken down, sparking the latest conflict. But how much further could it escalate? And why are other countries - including the United States, Russia and China and the EU - watching developments so closely?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Turkey is a fascinating country. Following its emergence in 1923 from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, one figure dominated the country: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the country's first president. Although he died in 1938, his ideology and image dominated the state. However, over the past two decades, Erdogan has also had an enormous influence over the country. But while we now think of this negatively - especially given his growing authoritarianism, which has seen a clampdown on media, democratic failings, an ailing economy, and serious allegations of corruption - it is easy to overlook the country he effectively took over in late 2002. And its also easy to forget some of his initial successes, such as efforts to take Turkey closer to the European Union and resolve Cyprus. So, is this really the end of the Erdogan era? And how should he be judged?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Although Scotland emerged as a kingdom in the ninth century, in 1603, James VI of Scotland became King of England, thus uniting the crowns of the two countries. Just over a century later, in 1707, the two parliaments merged to form Great Britain. However, in 1997, Scotland voted to re-establish its own parliament. This paved the way for an eventual referendum on independence on 18 September 2014. However, Scottish voters rejected this by 55% to 45%. Since then, Scotland has made a case for secession - especially after the Brexit referendum, which saw English voters pull Scotland out of the European Union. But even though support for independence appeared to be rising, the numbers now seem to be falling. So, is the dream of Scottish independence now over?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
While we think of secessionist conflicts as being fought between different ethnic, national or religious groups, sometimes issues arise between groups that come from the same background. The conflict between Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland is a case in point. While ethnic Somalis share a language, culture and religion, it is highly fragmented along clan lines. In the context of the current conflict this has seen the Isaaq, the most prominent clan in Somaliland, come into tensions with the Majeerteen, the dominant clan in Puntland, and the Dhulbahante and the Warsangeli, which are centred on eastern Somaliland - an area known as Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC). All three are aligned to the Harti, a sub-clan of the Darod (Darood) clan - one of the five key Somalia clans. This has raised fears that the fighting around Lasanod may evolve into a far larger clan war. At the same time, it raises crucial questions about efforts to reach a final agreement on the status of Somaliland.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
The relationship between Japan and South Korea is still shaped by the brutal legacy of the Japanese colonial occupation of Korea. This lasted from 1910 until 1945 when Japan was defeated in the Second World War. During this period, Imperial Japan not only introduced a policy of assimilation but also made many men work as slave labour and forced tens of thousands of Korean women (along with women in many other Asian countries) into sexual slavery - the so-called "comfort women". This has had a lasting impact on bilateral ties. Despite later Japanese apologies, and even though the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1965, the Republic of Korea has long sought proper compensation for those affected. And even now, almost eighty years after the war's end, the occupation and the horrific acts of abuse that took place at the time are a lingering sore between these two countries. But can things finally change?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
There has been a cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran for over forty years. While the countries have differences over religion - with Saudi Arabia following the Sunni branch of the faith and Iran leading the Shia faction - the two countries once had relatively good ties. However, this collapsed after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Since then, the two countries have differed on various issues and have taken opposing sides in multiple conflicts. These include the civil wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Meanwhile, tensions also grew over rising unrest in Saudi Arabia. This came to a head when Saudi Arabia executed 47 people in 2015 - an incident that led to demonstrations in Iran and saw the Saudi Embassy in Tehran attacked. Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations by accusing the Iranian government of instigating the attack. And it's this breakdown in relations that China has just repaired. But just how important is the Chinese agreement? And does it mark a new role for China? And could this mean the end of US influence in the region?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/jameskerlindsay
All this matters because the islands are strategically significant. Indeed, they sit in the middle of one of the busiest waterways in the world. On top of this, they are also economically valuable. As well as having considerable fish stocks, they are believed to have substantial oil and gas reserves. But while competing claims to the strategically important islands date back well over a century, having been claimed by colonial Britain and France and by Imperial Japan, the dispute really took off in 1947 when Taiwan published a map - the so-called Nine-Dash Line - that showed them as a part of its territory - a claim also made by the People's Republic of China. Since then, the issue has become increasingly tense, leading to an armed confrontation between China and Vietnam in 1988. Since then, China's increasingly forceful claims have been challenged by the Philippines, which brought a case against China in 2013 before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. But while the Court ruled against China, Beijing has continued to build several bases on reclaimed land and artificial islands. For all these reasons, there are growing fears that a major war could break out in the region.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Austria's neutrality emerged during the Cold War. Following the end of the Second World War, it was occupied by the Allied Powers - Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. However, this came to an end with the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, in 1955. In return for removing their troops, Austria agreed to permanent military neutrality. In the decades that followed, this principle became enshrined in the Austrian identity. And even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when many surrounding states joined NATO, it steadfastly retained its neutral stance. But with the start of the war in Ukraine, there have been suggestions that it is time for Austria to reconsider its neutral stance - a policy that it adheres to voluntarily. So far, though, public opinion stands strongly against any change. So too do the country's political leaders. Indeed, the country's chancellor has insisted that Austria will remain neutral. So, what exactly are the arguments for and against any change to Austrian neutrality?
Depending on the river for over 97% of its drinking water, as well as for agriculture, Egypt has demanded that the two countries reach a settlement over the issue. However, despite long-standing mediation efforts by the African Union, they have failed to reach an agreement. Meanwhile, there are also growing tensions with neighbouring Sudan over the issue. So, why exactly has the problem emerged? Can a solution be found? And is there really a possibility that it could lead to armed conflict?
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Kosovo has emerged as one of the most interesting and significant secessionist disputes in modern international relations. Highly controversial at the time it declared independence, its significance has been underscored by the fact that it has been cited by Russia as a justification for many of its own actions in the former Soviet Union, including its attempts to annex Crimea and part of eastern Ukraine. In many ways, it highlights to the tensions and apparent contradictions between the concepts of self-determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of states.
This would have a major impact when, on 17 February 2008, it declared independence. Having been an autonomous part of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the fact that it was not a republic meant that it was not granted the right of independence enjoyed by the other parts of the state. As a result, in the late 1990s, it took up arms to fight for statehood, leading to a brutal guerrilla war with Serbian forces and, eventually, NATO's decision to intervene and launch a 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia. Following on from this, it came under UN administration according to the terms of UN security Council Resolution 1244, which affirmed its place as a part of Yugoslavia. However, following deadlocked UN-led final status talks, it chose to declare independence, supported by much of the West, but opposed by Russia, China and half the United Nations. As a result, 15 years later, the issue still remains unresolved.
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This raises the question as to why the response has been so low key? In truth, it plays out against a history of covert confrontation between the two countries - a confrontation that has often been called a cold war or "shadow war". While Israel and Iran enjoyed good relations for many decades, and even had some significant ties after the Iranian Revolution, since the mid-1980s the relationship has completely collapsed over a range of issues, including Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. Developing nuclear weapons, Iran has vowed to destroy the Jewish state. Since then, Israel and Iran have engaged in a covert confrontation. This has involved proxies in Gaza and Lebanon (Hamas and Hezbollah), assassinations, bombings, cyber attacks and now, seemingly, drones. In this sense, the latest incident fits a wider pattern of a serious, but nevertheless clandestine, conflict that's been fought in the shadows and which neither side wants to escalate. But as Russia deepens its ties to Iran over Ukraine, could the latest incident indicate that the Iran-Israel conflict is now set to intensify?
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In recent months there’s been a growing wave of attacks in Pakistan by Tehrik-e Taliban - otherwise known as the TTP or the Pakistani Taliban. However, while Islamabad may have hoped that the Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan would help to control its Pakistani partners, it has seemingly done little to control them. Meanwhile, having reasserted control in Kabul, tensions appear to be emerging between the Taliban and Pakistan in other ways. For example, there have been renewed questions over the border between the two countries, the Durand Line, which was drawn up by British colonial authorities in Imperial India. This divided the Pashtun people, who make up most of the Taliban, and has been a lingering source of resentment. This all suggests that relations may now become increasingly difficult between Pakistan and its former partners.
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However, the financial elements of each Compact of Free Association (CoFA) with the three countries are due to end in 2023 and 2024. Without a renewal, the vast sums of money will come to an end. This in turn could pose a huge risk to the US presence in the Pacific at a time when China is steadily increasing its influence in the region. Even if the states don't abandon their agreements, they may love closer to Beijing diplomatically. This could see the Marshall Islands and Palau rescind their recognition of Taiwan. And yet, as crucial as the talks clearly are, the negotiations are proving a lot more difficult than many expected. So, just what are the problems?
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The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most complex and emotional disputes in modern international relations. It has not only sparked four major wars, it has also seen the emergence of an insurgency and popular uprising - the Intifada. However, at one stage, it appears as though a settlement could be found. In the early 1990s, the sides agreed on a two-state solution. However, in the years since then, hopes for a negotiated solution have diminished. While Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, it has steadily expanded its settlements across the West Bank. This makes it hard to envisage the creation of a viable Palestinian State. But what does this longterm occupation now mean under international law? This is the question now facing the justices of the ICJ.
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Tunisia has always had a rather unusual place in the Arab world. Having become a French Protectorate in 1881, in the first part of the 20th century a nationalist movement arose. In 1934, this split to form Neo-Destour, which would become the ruling party after the country eventually attained independence in 1956. After the monarchy was abolished in 1957, the country came under the rule of Habib Bourguiba, who ruled as a dictator until 1987, when he was ousted by Ben Ali. However, all this changed in 2011, when a young market trader, Mohamed Bouazizi, took his own life in protest at police corruption. However, a decade later, Tunisia faces huge economic, political and social problems. It against this backdrop that Saied has introduced a number of measured rolling back democracy. But is this for the country's good, as he claims. Or is it the return to dictatorship?
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1. In your opinion, what is going on in Macedonia, is it a political crisis, ethnic crisis, mix or both, or maybe something even worse (heading towards full scale conflict, perhaps) ?
What we are seeing is a political crisis. Over recent years there have been growing concerns about the autocratic turn taken by Prime Minister Gruevski. This has even prompted the EU to suggest that the long standing recommendation to start formal accession talks with Macedonia, which has been an EU candidate since 2005, could be rescinded. Meanwhile, worries about the country have grown significantly over the past few months. Since February, the opposition has been releasing tapped conversations that appear to show that the government has been involved in a stunning array of serious misdeed and political skullduggery, including voter fraud, manipulating the justice system and even covering up a murder. As a result, there has seen rising public opposition to the regime, culminating in serious demonstrations this past week.
It is against this backdrop that we have now seen serious clashes between police and what are being described as ‘terrorists’ in the city of Kumanovo, close to the border of Serbia and Kosovo. To many observers, the timing just seems too suspicious. Questions are being asked as to whether the government has somehow orchestrated this in order to divert attention away from the growing scandal. This may certainly sound implausible to outsiders. The problem is that such views cannot be easily dismissed as Balkan conspiracy theorising. Given the evidence of serious wrongdoings by the government, many people believe that the administration is more than capable of staging a terrorist attack in order to stay in power. This in itself is an indication of just how grim the political situation in Macedonia is.
Crucially, it is important to stress that these claims do not mean that the country is not in fact facing some sort of armed insurgency. It is more than possible that a separatist group is indeed trying to take advantage of the political instability in the country. We just don’t know as yet. However, one must be wary about promoting the idea that this means that the country is teetering on the verge of serious renewed ethnic conflict, as it did in 2001. For a start, leaders of the Albanian community have been quick to stress that there will be no return to fighting. And to my mind there does seem a genuine will to avoid bloodshed. Also, the recent anti-government protests have seen the country’s various communities come out onto the streets to demonstrate together. (I also saw at first hand how a protest at the university earlier this year crossed ethnic boundaries.) Nevertheless, the situation is fraught with danger. Until the political situation is resolved, there is always the risk, however small, that it could take a turn for the worse and develop a violent ethnic dimension. This is why it needs to be resolved as soon as possible.
2. What could/should the EU do?
The European Union needs to take a much firmer role than it has done to date. At the moment, there is a political mediation process conducted by three MEPs. However, this is simply not enough. There needs to be much higher level intervention. Obviously, the EU faces a number of very serious challenges at the moment, such as Russia and Ukraine and the horrific situation in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, it is imperative that senior officials, as well as leaders from the member states, recognise the dangers of the current crisis in Macedonia and respond urgently to resolve the situation. What would this mean in real terms? The current thinking is that some form of interim transitional government is needed in advance of fresh elections (properly monitored, of course). Beyond that, the EU will need to take steps to rebuild and consolidate democracy in the country. The best way to do this will be to open accession talks. However, for this to happen Greece will need to lift its veto. One sincerely hopes that this will happen. This is not to say that Athens must abandon its position that a solution to the name issue needs to be found. Rather, it is about the Greek Government behaving in a responsible manner and recognising that the political stability of its northern neighbour is far more important to its interests than ongoing turmoil and possibly conflict.
But what if the next big independence movement happened closer to home? With more money than the North’s biggest cities combined, a booming population and established trading links with the rest of the world, what would happen if the people of London chose to go it alone?
It’s an idea that’s been mooted a few times, not least by former Mayor Ken Livingstone. When asked what he wanted for London during the 2012 elections, he claimed he wanted a "Republic of London", and that the city could be improved if other areas of the UK weren’t so busy sucking all the blood out of it. According to Ken, London generates between £10bn and £20bn more in tax for the UK than it receives in public expenditure, making it the cashcow of the UK’s feckless regions.
But how feasible would London’s independence claim be? After convincing him this wasn’t a joke, I spoke to Dr James Ker-Lindsay, a senior research fellow at the London School of Economics who specialises in secession movements.
While the force is a fixture of the Cypriot political landscape, few now remember the difficult political circumstances surrounding its creation. It is a fascinating story that unfolded against the backdrop of the Cold War and British imperial decline.
The breakdown of the constitutional order in Cyprus, in December 1963, just three years after independence, sparked concern in many Western capitals. The emergence of a full scale civil war in Cyprus could have spilled over to Greece and Turkey, with potentially catastrophic implications for NATO unity.
In London, there was particular panic. Apart from the wider implications for the Western alliance, fighting on the island could threaten Britain’s military bases as well as the lives of the many British citizens still living in Cyprus.
Having hastily recalled ministers back from their Christmas holidays, the British government decided to take the lead on the creation of a peacekeeping mission composed of troops from Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, the three states that had undertaken to guarantee the island’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity under the terms of the island’s 1960 constitution.
However, from the very start, the mission – the Joint Truce Force (JTF) – ran into problems. The Turkish troops earmarked to participate had left their barracks to take up positions in Turkish Cypriot villages and neighbourhoods. They were not coaxed back. Without them, Athens made it clear that its forces on the island could not play a part in the operation. This effectively left Britain as the lone peacekeeper from day one.
Although the force carried out its duties to the best of its abilities, it was immediately apparent that Britain could not sustain such a major commitment indefinitely. Apart from its major presence in Germany, it was also dealing with its retreat from empire across the globe. Fighting several insurgencies and small wars elsewhere, it simply did not have the manpower to maintain a mission for more than a few months.
By late January, the pressure was starting to show. Although it was doing a good job calming tensions between the communities, many Greek Cypriots were starting to question the neutrality of the British army they had been fighting just a few years earlier. Meanwhile, a conference in London to try to broker a political agreement had failed. As a result, Turkey was showing increasing signs that it would take matters into its own hands and invade the island.
Faced with this, Britain scrambled to put together a new, more permanent peacekeeping force. One obvious option was to create a UN mission. However, the fear was that this would give the Soviet Union a say over developments. London therefore decided to explore the possibility of a force based around NATO. Cautious at first, Washington soon came to support the idea enthusiastically.
In contrast, the Greek Cypriot community, under the leadership of President Makarios, roundly rejected any talk of NATO involvement on the island. As they saw it, the organisation would always be inclined to side with Ankara given Turkey’s strategic position as the Western alliance’s most south-easterly flank. The presence of a NATO force would inevitably cement Turkish control over the island.
With growing pressure from London and Washington, Makarios played the Cold War card. In early February 1964, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier, wrote to the three Guarantor Powers warning them against any interference in Cypriot affairs.
As its desperation increased, London now had no choice but to give up on the idea of a NATO force. Although a couple of other options were explored, including the idea of a Commonwealth Force, they failed to gain enough wider support. On February 15, and acting against the wishes of the United States, which still believed that an alternative route could be found, the United Kingdom gave up and submitted a request for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation on the island.
The debates that took place in New York over the next two weeks or so were to have a profound effect on the nature of the Cyprus Problem. It was, for example, at this stage that the Greek Cypriot led administration was recognised as the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus. Most notably, it culminated in Security Council Resolution 186, passed on March 4, 1964, which established a mediating role for the UN – a role that essentially continues to this day – and the creation of UNFICYP. The first peace-keepers arrived in Cyprus on March 13.
One can only speculate what might have happened had a NATO force been introduced instead. It would certainly not have been beyond the realms of possibility that Cyprus could have been united with Greece, albeit with a large Turkish military presence on the island, or perhaps partitioned between Greece and Turkey. We will never know. However, what can be said for certain is that for a few weeks in early 1964, Cyprus became a frontline state in the Cold War and a visible symbol of Britain’s rapidly declining strength on the world stage.
Quite apart from anything else, UNFICYP is an enduring reminder of that long gone era.
James Ker-Lindsay is Senior Research Fellow at the London School of Economics. He is the author of ‘Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-1964’ and ‘The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know’, as well several other books on the modern history, politics and international relations of Cyprus. He is on Twitter http://www.twitter.com/JamesKerLindsay
One question relating to recognition that has become especially important in the field, particularly for policy makers, is the degree to which third party states, in other words not the state from which the territory has seceded, can interact at a bilateral level (multilateral interaction is a rather different matter) with secessionist entities – variously called de facto states, unrecognised states, partially recognised states, and my personally preferred term, contested states – without actually recognising them, or giving the impression to the rest of the world that they have recognised them.
However, for the meanwhile, the British and Canadian examples remain very much the exception rather than the rule. In most cases, states still do everything possible to prevent parts of their territory from breaking away, often using force if necessary.
It is hardly surprising that most states have a deep aversion to secession. In part, this is driven by a sense of geographical and symbolic identity. A state has an image of itself, and the geographic boundaries of the state are seared onto the consciousness of the citizenry. For example, from an early age school pupils draw maps of their country. But the quest to preserve the borders of a country is rooted in a range of other factors. In some cases, the territory seeking to break away may hold mineral wealth, or historical and cultural riches. Sometimes secession is opposed because of fears that if one area is allowed to go its own way, other will follow.
For the most part, states are aided in their campaign to tackle separatism by international law and norms of international politics. While much has been made of the right to self-determination, the reality is that its application is extremely limited. Outside the context of decolonisation, this idea has almost always taken a backseat to the principle of the territorial integrity of states. This gives a country fighting a secessionist movement a massive advantage. Other countries rarely want to be seen to break ranks and recognise a state that has unilaterally seceded.
When a decision is taken to recognise unilateral declarations of independence, it is usually done by a state with close ethnic, political or strategic ties to the breakaway territory.Turkey’s recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are obvious examples. Even when other factors shape the decision, as happened in the case of Kosovo, which has been recognised by the United States and most of the European Union, considerable effort has been made by recognising states to present this as a unique case that should be seen as sitting outside of the accepted boundaries of established practice.
However, states facing a secessionist challenge cannot afford to be complacent. While there is a deep aversion to secession, there is always the danger that the passage of time will lead to the gradual acceptance of the situation on the ground. It is therefore important to wage a concerted campaign to reinforce a claim to sovereignty over the territory and prevent countries from recognising – or merely even unofficially engaging with – the breakaway territory.
At the same time, international organisations are also crucial battlegrounds. Membership of the United Nations, for example, has come to be seen as the ultimate proof that a state has been accepted by the wider international community. To a lesser extent, participation in other international and regional bodies, and even in sporting and cultural activities, can send the same message concerning international acceptance.
The British government’s decision to accept a referendum over Scotland’s future is still a rather unusual approach to the question of secession. Governments rarely accept the democratic right of a group of people living within its borders to pursue the creation of a new state. In most cases, the central authority seeks to keep the state together; and in doing so choosing to fight what can often be a prolonged campaign to prevent recognition or legitimisation by the wider international community.
James Ker-Lindsay is Eurobank EFG Senior Research Fellow on the Politics of South East Europe at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States (2012) and The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (2011), and a number of other books on conflict, peace and security in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean.
- See more at: http://blog.oup.com/2012/12/secession-independence-scotland/#sthash.JbKhtS5o.dpuf
It is a major breakthrough for all concerned.
This report examines Kosovo’s relations with these four broad categories of states. In doing so, it shows that even within these groups – what we can roughly term ‘recognisers and engagers’, ‘recognisers but non-engagers’, ‘non-recognisers but engagers’, and ‘non-recognisers and non-engagers’ – there are significant variations in how states behave. For ex-ample, even those states that recognise Kosovo, and have done a lot to support it in the past, may now be far less engaged than they once were. Also, whereas some counties that have always been hostile towards Kosovo have seen their positions harden, rather than soften, with the pas-sage of time, others have gone the other way and become more willing to engage with Pristina. As is shown, the reasons for these changes in positions are complex, and vary from country to country. In some cases, they refect domestic political changes. In other cases, it is driven by external policy concerns, such as a wish to be seen to be working closely with European partners. Also, the broader international political environment can play a part. For instance, events in Spain have made many countries warier about secession.