The main goal of this paper is to work out Quine's account of explication. Quine does not pro... more The main goal of this paper is to work out Quine's account of explication. Quine does not provide a general account, but considers a paradigmatic example which does not fit other examples he claims to be explications. Besides working out Quine's account of explication and explaining this tension, I show how it connects to other notions such as paraphrase and ontological commitment. Furthermore, I relate Quinean explication to Carnap's conception and argue that Quinean explication is much narrower because its main purpose is to be a criterion of theory choice
The main goal of this paper is to work out Quine's account of explication. Quine does not provide... more The main goal of this paper is to work out Quine's account of explication. Quine does not provide a general account, but considers a paradigmatic example which does not fit other examples he claims to be explications. Besides working out Quine's account of explication and explaining this tension, I show how it connects to other notions such as paraphrase and ontological commitment. Furthermore, I relate Quinean explication to Carnap's conception and argue that Quinean explication is much narrower because its main purpose is to be a criterion of theory choice.
In this paper, I argue that Amie Thomasson's Easy Ontology rests on a vicious circularity that is... more In this paper, I argue that Amie Thomasson's Easy Ontology rests on a vicious circularity that is highly damaging. Easy Ontology invokes the idea of application conditions that give rise to analytic entailments. Such entailments can be used to answer ontological questions easily. I argue that the application conditions for basic terms are only circularly specifiable showing that Thomasson misses her self-set goal of preventing such a circularity. Using this circularity, I go on to show that Easy Ontology as a whole collapses.
The goal of this paper is to present a new reconstruction of Aristotle’s assertoric logic as he d... more The goal of this paper is to present a new reconstruction of Aristotle’s assertoric logic as he develops it in Prior Analytics, Book A1-7. This reconstruction will be much closer to Aristotle’s original text than other such reconstructions brought forward up to now. To accomplish this, we will not use classical logic, but a novel system developed by Ben-Yami (2004; 2014) called ‘QUARC’. This system is apt for a more adequate reconstruction since it does not need first-order variables (‘x’, ‘y’, . . . ) on which the usual quantifiers act – a feature also not to be found in Aristotle. Further, in the classical reconstruction, there is also need for binary connectives (‘^’, ‘!’) that don’t have a counterpart in Aristotle. QUARC, again, does not need them either to represent the Aristotelian sentence types. However, the full QUARC is also not called for so that I develop a subsystem thereof (‘QUARC_AR') which closely resembles Aristotle’s way of developing his logic. I show that we can proof all of Aristotle’s claims within this systems and, lastly, relate it back to classical logic.
George Englebretsen (ed.): New Directions in Term Logic, 2024
Aristotle counts as the founder of formal logic. The logic he develops dominated until Frege and ... more Aristotle counts as the founder of formal logic. The logic he develops dominated until Frege and others introduced a new logic. This new logic is taken to be more powerful and better capable of capturing inference patterns. The new logic differs from Aristotelian logic in significant respects. It has been argued by Fred Sommers and Hanoch Ben-Yami that the new logic is not well equipped as a logic of natural language, and that a logic closer to Aristotle's is better suited for this task. Each of them developed their own formalism - Sommers in form of term logic, Ben-Yami in form of his Quantified Argument Calculus (QUARC). I discuss Aristotle's logic - a term logic - and attempt a comparison between Aristotelian logic and (i) the new logic, (ii) Sommers' term logic, and (iii) Ben-Yami's QUARC. I consider the differences between the systems, and show how they are related to and diverge from the new logic.
This entry considers the philosophical subject called metaphysics. There have been many conceptio... more This entry considers the philosophical subject called metaphysics. There have been many conceptions of metaphysics, and metaphysics has faced severe criticism throughout the history of philosophy and continues to do so. Besides discussing some major trends in analytic metaphysicsunderstood as 'metaphysics done by analytic philosophers'-we consider some of the criticisms and possible responses.
I develop a modal extension of the Quantified Argument Calculus (QUARC) - a novel logical system ... more I develop a modal extension of the Quantified Argument Calculus (QUARC) - a novel logical system introduced by Hanoch Ben-Yami. QUARC is meant to better capture the logic of natural language. The purpose of this paper is to develop a variable domain semantics for modal QUARC (M-QUARC), and to show that even if the usual restrictions are imposed on models with variable domains, M-QUARC-analogues of the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulas still are not validated. I introduce new restrictions - restrictions on the extension of the predicates - and show that with these in place, the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulas are valid. The upshot is that M-QUARC sheds light on the in-/validity of such formulas.
Conservativeness, Language, and Deflationary Metaontology, 2018
This paper is about the role conservativeness plays in the deflationary metaontologies of Schiffe... more This paper is about the role conservativeness plays in the deflationary metaontologies of Schiffer and Thomasson. Deflationary metaontologies lead to trivial answers to existence questions. However, to do so, they rely on languages and their possible extensions. To rule out inconsistent (or otherwise damaging) extensions, the common move is to restrict extensions to conservative ones. I argue that it is this very move that leads to trouble for both Schiffer's and Thomassons's account.
The purpose of this paper is to argue that ontological commitment, in order to deliver reasonable... more The purpose of this paper is to argue that ontological commitment, in order to deliver reasonable results, has to be understood as a relative notion---ontological commitment is relative to an ontology. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the paper discusses Quinean metaontology and considers Quine's understanding of ontology and ontological commitment. I aim to show that Quine distinguishes between a theory's ontology and a theory's ontological commitments---pointing out that his interpreters get this wrong. In particular, a theory's ontological commitments are what the theory says there is, whereas a theory's ontology is its range of variables. I argue that this gives rise to the following dilemma: either a theory's ontological commitments are irrelevant to its ontology or a theory's ontological commitments are relative to its ontology. Since Quinean metaontology is the currently dominant metaontology, this result strongly impacts contemporary metaontology.
The main goal of this paper is to consider whether we can distil a Lakatosian conception of expli... more The main goal of this paper is to consider whether we can distil a Lakatosian conception of explication. In order to do so, we will consider Lakatos' philosophy and read it focusing on explication. Based on that, we will work towards a Lakatosian explication. Such a conception embeds Lakatosian insights into existing research such as conceptual engineering.
In this paper, I develop a tolerant conception of explication. In order to provide conceptual eng... more In this paper, I develop a tolerant conception of explication. In order to provide conceptual engineering with foundations, I propose to understand it as tolerant explication. Explication is a two-step process. First, we need to clarify what we explicate before, in the second step, we can propose something better. My conception of explication is tolerant insofar as it makes the preservation of purposes---which are identified in the clarification process---the sole adequacy-condition for successful explication. I develop this notion, show how flexible it is, provide an argument for it, and consider how it handles some challenges.
The aim of this paper is to argue that if we take paraphrase strategies seriously, we have to emb... more The aim of this paper is to argue that if we take paraphrase strategies seriously, we have to embrace a Principle of Tolerance. I argue that paraphrase strategies need criteria for adequate paraphrase and that such are not forthcoming. Thus, we either have to abandon paraphrase altogether (which is absurd), or we have to accept several paraphrases. To make sense of the latter, we need to understand the paraphrases as concerned with different theories. This also means that we have to re-evaluate our conception of ontological commitment.
Amie Thomasson's so-called Easy Ontology relies on a conservativeness requirement. I argue that i... more Amie Thomasson's so-called Easy Ontology relies on a conservativeness requirement. I argue that it is this very requirement that leads to a dilemma for Easy Ontology, viz., it either has to assume contentious entities (and enough of them) or it cannot establish the ontology it claims to establish. As either case is damaging, Easy Ontology does not appear to be a tenable metaontology.
In this paper, I consider Carnap's seminal (1950) 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (ESO) and... more In this paper, I consider Carnap's seminal (1950) 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (ESO) and its metametaphysical ramifications. I first argue that Carnap's Principle of Tolerance is key in understanding Carnap's position in ESO which, nonetheless, is self-undermining. Nevertheless, the Principle of Tolerance is a key step in a metametaphysical position that dismisses linguistic considerations as the proper method for metaphysics; this is the focus of the second part of the paper.
The main question in the first part is from "where" exactly Carnap is making his claims, viz., from within a framework or from outside all such. Carnap famously argues in ESO that we have to distinguish between internal and external questions. The former are asked from within a framework (and the answers are trivial) whereas the latter are not. If these are the available options, Carnap's claims have likewise to be understood as from within a framework or from outside all of them.
I argue that both options are untenable for Carnap. For, in case he is working from within a framework, there is absolutely no need to take his claims to even apply to other frameworks. On the other hand, if Carnap is not speaking from within a framework, it is rather unclear how to assess what he is saying on his own analysis. Central to the argument of ESO is the claim that on some reading, external questions, i.e., questions not asked from within a framework, are meaningless as they lack 'cognitive content'. But this is hardly a tenable interpretation of Carnap's own claims. Therefore, another reading is asked for. Carnap himself provides one, viz., he suggests that external questions might be understood as 'practical' questions. Such practical questions concern "whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression for the framework in question" (ESO: 23). But this interpretation conflicts with his Principle of Tolerance that demands us to be "tolerant in permitting linguistic forms" (ESO: 40).
If the arguments of the first part are correct, Carnap's position is self-defeating. However, I argue that the main motivation of ESO is to provide a basis for doing, e.g., semantics without incurring ontological commitment to the 'entities' invoked in the semantics---and this is exactly what his Principle of Tolerance encodes. Contemporary analytic philosophy, on the other hand, regularly proceeds by looking at language to more or less read off the ontology and the structure of reality; a tight correspondence is (at least implicitly) assumed. Many contemporary metaphysicians pay lip service to rejecting such a position. However, there is no systematic evaluation of this claim and its ramifications (nor is an alternative methodology provided). The obvious problem is that any position has to be formulated using a language, and so the position comes close to be self-undermining; one has to be careful not to reject too much. I want to suggest that Carnap's Principle of Tolerance can at least partially provide a foundation of such a new method and thereby preserve Carnap's initial motivation of ESO.
At least since Quine's 'On What There Is', paraphrase has become a tool in metaphysics. The gener... more At least since Quine's 'On What There Is', paraphrase has become a tool in metaphysics. The general idea is to replace sentences apparently ontologically committing us to certain entities with sentences which intuitively say the same, but without the apparent ontological commitment---we employ a paraphrase strategy. Ontological commitment is to be understood along Quinean lines: We are ontologically committed to those entities necessary to make our assertions true. I argue that we need criteria for adequate paraphrase in order to make such a paraphrase strategy work. Such criteria need to put us into a position to prevent, among others, Alston's well-known symmetry-problem. Also, we need to account for the availability of several different paraphrases. I argue that there is no such set of criteria, and conclude that we cannot have an adequate criterion of ontological commitment.
In this paper, I bring forward yet another problem for Dutch Book Arguments. In recent years, the... more In this paper, I bring forward yet another problem for Dutch Book Arguments. In recent years, the concept of probability has been generalized and investigated (e.g., by Williams 2012). Due to the work of Paris (2001), there is a general characterization of probabilities that admit no Dutch Books. I argue that for any such probability, a Dutch Book Argument can be brought forward { and this in a similar general fashion. Since the Theorems are established in the same framework, all of the Dutch Book Arguments are on a par. Thus, either all of them are true or none of them is. However, even in the case that all of them are, the Dutch Book Argument loses its power since it is not able to establish what it is supposed to establish. In the rest of the paper, I address possible objections to this argument.
In this paper, I briefly introduce and motivate the Bayesian approach to argumentation (as presen... more In this paper, I briefly introduce and motivate the Bayesian approach to argumentation (as presented by Ulrike Hahn, among others) to bring forward four criticisms that show that this approach is inadequate. The problems that arise are concerned with (i) an issue with argumentation standard, (ii) logical reasoning, (iii) a specific kind of argument, and (iv) an arbitrariness issue. In particular, the Bayesian approach presents itself as a normative one and claims that argumentation is about (degree of) belief change. Its normative force stems from the application of Bayes's theorem as standard for belief change. The first criticism shows that what's a good argument according to this approach and what's an intuitively convincing argument diverge. The second criticism is a version of the problem of old evidence applied to the Bayesian approach to argumentation. The third criticism shows that there are arguments that are, indeed, about belief change but cannot be accounted for by the Bayesian approach. The fourth and last criticism points out that if we take the Bayesian approach as proposed, then its normative force becomes arbitrary.
In this paper, I propose a new solution to the problem of old evidence. I first present and dismi... more In this paper, I propose a new solution to the problem of old evidence. I first present and dismiss the counterfactual and Garber-style solutions. I then argue that it is the "structure" of the evidence that gives rise to a solution - a solution that has not to temper with the presuppositions of the problems. In particular, the problem is solved by realizing that a hypothesis usually does not imply the "full" evidence, but rather a part of it; conditionalizing on the part that is actually implied leads to an increase of the posterior probability of the hypothesis.
In this paper, I shall work towards an identity-criterion for Platonic Ideas. In the first step, ... more In this paper, I shall work towards an identity-criterion for Platonic Ideas. In the first step, I will be looking at the (first) "Third Man" argument as presented in the dialogue Parmenides and argue that Plato must have had an extensional criterion in mind. Next, I consider a section of the dialogue Sophistes to show that Plato himself asked identity questions of this sort. In particular, in the Sophistes he introduced the so-called greatest Ideas (megista gene) and shows them to be distinct. However, given a naive interpretation of how Ideas work and the discussion of the "Third Man" argument, this leads to a collapse of the Ideas; they turn out to be the same. In the following, I will introduce and dismiss other natural identity criteria, and show that a distinction of predication and participation leads to an appropriate one, viz. two Ideas are the same if the same Ideas participate in them and if their respective corresponding predicates apply to the same Ideas. This criterion is also apt to get rid of the "Third Man" threat while preserving the extensional spirit.
The main goal of this paper is to work out Quine's account of explication. Quine does not pro... more The main goal of this paper is to work out Quine's account of explication. Quine does not provide a general account, but considers a paradigmatic example which does not fit other examples he claims to be explications. Besides working out Quine's account of explication and explaining this tension, I show how it connects to other notions such as paraphrase and ontological commitment. Furthermore, I relate Quinean explication to Carnap's conception and argue that Quinean explication is much narrower because its main purpose is to be a criterion of theory choice
The main goal of this paper is to work out Quine's account of explication. Quine does not provide... more The main goal of this paper is to work out Quine's account of explication. Quine does not provide a general account, but considers a paradigmatic example which does not fit other examples he claims to be explications. Besides working out Quine's account of explication and explaining this tension, I show how it connects to other notions such as paraphrase and ontological commitment. Furthermore, I relate Quinean explication to Carnap's conception and argue that Quinean explication is much narrower because its main purpose is to be a criterion of theory choice.
In this paper, I argue that Amie Thomasson's Easy Ontology rests on a vicious circularity that is... more In this paper, I argue that Amie Thomasson's Easy Ontology rests on a vicious circularity that is highly damaging. Easy Ontology invokes the idea of application conditions that give rise to analytic entailments. Such entailments can be used to answer ontological questions easily. I argue that the application conditions for basic terms are only circularly specifiable showing that Thomasson misses her self-set goal of preventing such a circularity. Using this circularity, I go on to show that Easy Ontology as a whole collapses.
The goal of this paper is to present a new reconstruction of Aristotle’s assertoric logic as he d... more The goal of this paper is to present a new reconstruction of Aristotle’s assertoric logic as he develops it in Prior Analytics, Book A1-7. This reconstruction will be much closer to Aristotle’s original text than other such reconstructions brought forward up to now. To accomplish this, we will not use classical logic, but a novel system developed by Ben-Yami (2004; 2014) called ‘QUARC’. This system is apt for a more adequate reconstruction since it does not need first-order variables (‘x’, ‘y’, . . . ) on which the usual quantifiers act – a feature also not to be found in Aristotle. Further, in the classical reconstruction, there is also need for binary connectives (‘^’, ‘!’) that don’t have a counterpart in Aristotle. QUARC, again, does not need them either to represent the Aristotelian sentence types. However, the full QUARC is also not called for so that I develop a subsystem thereof (‘QUARC_AR') which closely resembles Aristotle’s way of developing his logic. I show that we can proof all of Aristotle’s claims within this systems and, lastly, relate it back to classical logic.
George Englebretsen (ed.): New Directions in Term Logic, 2024
Aristotle counts as the founder of formal logic. The logic he develops dominated until Frege and ... more Aristotle counts as the founder of formal logic. The logic he develops dominated until Frege and others introduced a new logic. This new logic is taken to be more powerful and better capable of capturing inference patterns. The new logic differs from Aristotelian logic in significant respects. It has been argued by Fred Sommers and Hanoch Ben-Yami that the new logic is not well equipped as a logic of natural language, and that a logic closer to Aristotle's is better suited for this task. Each of them developed their own formalism - Sommers in form of term logic, Ben-Yami in form of his Quantified Argument Calculus (QUARC). I discuss Aristotle's logic - a term logic - and attempt a comparison between Aristotelian logic and (i) the new logic, (ii) Sommers' term logic, and (iii) Ben-Yami's QUARC. I consider the differences between the systems, and show how they are related to and diverge from the new logic.
This entry considers the philosophical subject called metaphysics. There have been many conceptio... more This entry considers the philosophical subject called metaphysics. There have been many conceptions of metaphysics, and metaphysics has faced severe criticism throughout the history of philosophy and continues to do so. Besides discussing some major trends in analytic metaphysicsunderstood as 'metaphysics done by analytic philosophers'-we consider some of the criticisms and possible responses.
I develop a modal extension of the Quantified Argument Calculus (QUARC) - a novel logical system ... more I develop a modal extension of the Quantified Argument Calculus (QUARC) - a novel logical system introduced by Hanoch Ben-Yami. QUARC is meant to better capture the logic of natural language. The purpose of this paper is to develop a variable domain semantics for modal QUARC (M-QUARC), and to show that even if the usual restrictions are imposed on models with variable domains, M-QUARC-analogues of the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulas still are not validated. I introduce new restrictions - restrictions on the extension of the predicates - and show that with these in place, the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulas are valid. The upshot is that M-QUARC sheds light on the in-/validity of such formulas.
Conservativeness, Language, and Deflationary Metaontology, 2018
This paper is about the role conservativeness plays in the deflationary metaontologies of Schiffe... more This paper is about the role conservativeness plays in the deflationary metaontologies of Schiffer and Thomasson. Deflationary metaontologies lead to trivial answers to existence questions. However, to do so, they rely on languages and their possible extensions. To rule out inconsistent (or otherwise damaging) extensions, the common move is to restrict extensions to conservative ones. I argue that it is this very move that leads to trouble for both Schiffer's and Thomassons's account.
The purpose of this paper is to argue that ontological commitment, in order to deliver reasonable... more The purpose of this paper is to argue that ontological commitment, in order to deliver reasonable results, has to be understood as a relative notion---ontological commitment is relative to an ontology. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the paper discusses Quinean metaontology and considers Quine's understanding of ontology and ontological commitment. I aim to show that Quine distinguishes between a theory's ontology and a theory's ontological commitments---pointing out that his interpreters get this wrong. In particular, a theory's ontological commitments are what the theory says there is, whereas a theory's ontology is its range of variables. I argue that this gives rise to the following dilemma: either a theory's ontological commitments are irrelevant to its ontology or a theory's ontological commitments are relative to its ontology. Since Quinean metaontology is the currently dominant metaontology, this result strongly impacts contemporary metaontology.
The main goal of this paper is to consider whether we can distil a Lakatosian conception of expli... more The main goal of this paper is to consider whether we can distil a Lakatosian conception of explication. In order to do so, we will consider Lakatos' philosophy and read it focusing on explication. Based on that, we will work towards a Lakatosian explication. Such a conception embeds Lakatosian insights into existing research such as conceptual engineering.
In this paper, I develop a tolerant conception of explication. In order to provide conceptual eng... more In this paper, I develop a tolerant conception of explication. In order to provide conceptual engineering with foundations, I propose to understand it as tolerant explication. Explication is a two-step process. First, we need to clarify what we explicate before, in the second step, we can propose something better. My conception of explication is tolerant insofar as it makes the preservation of purposes---which are identified in the clarification process---the sole adequacy-condition for successful explication. I develop this notion, show how flexible it is, provide an argument for it, and consider how it handles some challenges.
The aim of this paper is to argue that if we take paraphrase strategies seriously, we have to emb... more The aim of this paper is to argue that if we take paraphrase strategies seriously, we have to embrace a Principle of Tolerance. I argue that paraphrase strategies need criteria for adequate paraphrase and that such are not forthcoming. Thus, we either have to abandon paraphrase altogether (which is absurd), or we have to accept several paraphrases. To make sense of the latter, we need to understand the paraphrases as concerned with different theories. This also means that we have to re-evaluate our conception of ontological commitment.
Amie Thomasson's so-called Easy Ontology relies on a conservativeness requirement. I argue that i... more Amie Thomasson's so-called Easy Ontology relies on a conservativeness requirement. I argue that it is this very requirement that leads to a dilemma for Easy Ontology, viz., it either has to assume contentious entities (and enough of them) or it cannot establish the ontology it claims to establish. As either case is damaging, Easy Ontology does not appear to be a tenable metaontology.
In this paper, I consider Carnap's seminal (1950) 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (ESO) and... more In this paper, I consider Carnap's seminal (1950) 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (ESO) and its metametaphysical ramifications. I first argue that Carnap's Principle of Tolerance is key in understanding Carnap's position in ESO which, nonetheless, is self-undermining. Nevertheless, the Principle of Tolerance is a key step in a metametaphysical position that dismisses linguistic considerations as the proper method for metaphysics; this is the focus of the second part of the paper.
The main question in the first part is from "where" exactly Carnap is making his claims, viz., from within a framework or from outside all such. Carnap famously argues in ESO that we have to distinguish between internal and external questions. The former are asked from within a framework (and the answers are trivial) whereas the latter are not. If these are the available options, Carnap's claims have likewise to be understood as from within a framework or from outside all of them.
I argue that both options are untenable for Carnap. For, in case he is working from within a framework, there is absolutely no need to take his claims to even apply to other frameworks. On the other hand, if Carnap is not speaking from within a framework, it is rather unclear how to assess what he is saying on his own analysis. Central to the argument of ESO is the claim that on some reading, external questions, i.e., questions not asked from within a framework, are meaningless as they lack 'cognitive content'. But this is hardly a tenable interpretation of Carnap's own claims. Therefore, another reading is asked for. Carnap himself provides one, viz., he suggests that external questions might be understood as 'practical' questions. Such practical questions concern "whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression for the framework in question" (ESO: 23). But this interpretation conflicts with his Principle of Tolerance that demands us to be "tolerant in permitting linguistic forms" (ESO: 40).
If the arguments of the first part are correct, Carnap's position is self-defeating. However, I argue that the main motivation of ESO is to provide a basis for doing, e.g., semantics without incurring ontological commitment to the 'entities' invoked in the semantics---and this is exactly what his Principle of Tolerance encodes. Contemporary analytic philosophy, on the other hand, regularly proceeds by looking at language to more or less read off the ontology and the structure of reality; a tight correspondence is (at least implicitly) assumed. Many contemporary metaphysicians pay lip service to rejecting such a position. However, there is no systematic evaluation of this claim and its ramifications (nor is an alternative methodology provided). The obvious problem is that any position has to be formulated using a language, and so the position comes close to be self-undermining; one has to be careful not to reject too much. I want to suggest that Carnap's Principle of Tolerance can at least partially provide a foundation of such a new method and thereby preserve Carnap's initial motivation of ESO.
At least since Quine's 'On What There Is', paraphrase has become a tool in metaphysics. The gener... more At least since Quine's 'On What There Is', paraphrase has become a tool in metaphysics. The general idea is to replace sentences apparently ontologically committing us to certain entities with sentences which intuitively say the same, but without the apparent ontological commitment---we employ a paraphrase strategy. Ontological commitment is to be understood along Quinean lines: We are ontologically committed to those entities necessary to make our assertions true. I argue that we need criteria for adequate paraphrase in order to make such a paraphrase strategy work. Such criteria need to put us into a position to prevent, among others, Alston's well-known symmetry-problem. Also, we need to account for the availability of several different paraphrases. I argue that there is no such set of criteria, and conclude that we cannot have an adequate criterion of ontological commitment.
In this paper, I bring forward yet another problem for Dutch Book Arguments. In recent years, the... more In this paper, I bring forward yet another problem for Dutch Book Arguments. In recent years, the concept of probability has been generalized and investigated (e.g., by Williams 2012). Due to the work of Paris (2001), there is a general characterization of probabilities that admit no Dutch Books. I argue that for any such probability, a Dutch Book Argument can be brought forward { and this in a similar general fashion. Since the Theorems are established in the same framework, all of the Dutch Book Arguments are on a par. Thus, either all of them are true or none of them is. However, even in the case that all of them are, the Dutch Book Argument loses its power since it is not able to establish what it is supposed to establish. In the rest of the paper, I address possible objections to this argument.
In this paper, I briefly introduce and motivate the Bayesian approach to argumentation (as presen... more In this paper, I briefly introduce and motivate the Bayesian approach to argumentation (as presented by Ulrike Hahn, among others) to bring forward four criticisms that show that this approach is inadequate. The problems that arise are concerned with (i) an issue with argumentation standard, (ii) logical reasoning, (iii) a specific kind of argument, and (iv) an arbitrariness issue. In particular, the Bayesian approach presents itself as a normative one and claims that argumentation is about (degree of) belief change. Its normative force stems from the application of Bayes's theorem as standard for belief change. The first criticism shows that what's a good argument according to this approach and what's an intuitively convincing argument diverge. The second criticism is a version of the problem of old evidence applied to the Bayesian approach to argumentation. The third criticism shows that there are arguments that are, indeed, about belief change but cannot be accounted for by the Bayesian approach. The fourth and last criticism points out that if we take the Bayesian approach as proposed, then its normative force becomes arbitrary.
In this paper, I propose a new solution to the problem of old evidence. I first present and dismi... more In this paper, I propose a new solution to the problem of old evidence. I first present and dismiss the counterfactual and Garber-style solutions. I then argue that it is the "structure" of the evidence that gives rise to a solution - a solution that has not to temper with the presuppositions of the problems. In particular, the problem is solved by realizing that a hypothesis usually does not imply the "full" evidence, but rather a part of it; conditionalizing on the part that is actually implied leads to an increase of the posterior probability of the hypothesis.
In this paper, I shall work towards an identity-criterion for Platonic Ideas. In the first step, ... more In this paper, I shall work towards an identity-criterion for Platonic Ideas. In the first step, I will be looking at the (first) "Third Man" argument as presented in the dialogue Parmenides and argue that Plato must have had an extensional criterion in mind. Next, I consider a section of the dialogue Sophistes to show that Plato himself asked identity questions of this sort. In particular, in the Sophistes he introduced the so-called greatest Ideas (megista gene) and shows them to be distinct. However, given a naive interpretation of how Ideas work and the discussion of the "Third Man" argument, this leads to a collapse of the Ideas; they turn out to be the same. In the following, I will introduce and dismiss other natural identity criteria, and show that a distinction of predication and participation leads to an appropriate one, viz. two Ideas are the same if the same Ideas participate in them and if their respective corresponding predicates apply to the same Ideas. This criterion is also apt to get rid of the "Third Man" threat while preserving the extensional spirit.
In this paper we show that the notorious chapters 7-9 of book Z of Aristotle’s Metaphysics are in... more In this paper we show that the notorious chapters 7-9 of book Z of Aristotle’s Metaphysics are in fact in the right place. Firstly, we will consider the objections to this thesis. Secondly, we will read the chapters 4-6 and 10-11 and show that there is a big gap such that, thirdly, we will argue that the gap will be closed by chapters 7-9. In due course, we will show that the objections are thus wrong in one of two senses: either they are plainly wrong, or they are objections which pose similar problems to a text without Z7-9.
Paraphrases are prevalent in ontological debates. Their main target is to avoid ontological commi... more Paraphrases are prevalent in ontological debates. Their main target is to avoid ontological commitment to particular (kinds of) entities. For example, a sentence such as 'There is a chance of rain' apparently commits to the existence of chances. However, as we can paraphrase this sentence to 'It is likely that it rains' which is not ontologically committed to chances, it seems as if we can avoid the particular commitment to them.
The first part of this thesis is devoted to the relation between paraphrase and ontological commitment. In particular, it considers what different paraphrase strategies are to be found in the literature and what problems they encounter. Only Alston's so-called symmetry objection is generally recognized, but I argue that there are at least four more problems.
Moreover, I argue that criteria of ontological commitment are problematic, too. I consider several candidate criteria and show that they are unsatisfactory. Furthermore, I argue that criteria of ontological commitment are in some sense equivalent to criteria of adequate paraphrase. Regarding the latter, I argue (i) that satisfactory criteria of adequate paraphrase need to resolve the problems such as Alston's symmetry objection and (ii) that the common candidate criteria don't even jointly resolve them. I conclude that there are no adequate criteria of ontological commitment.
I take it, however, that giving up on paraphrase is implausible in light of paraphrase examples such as the above one. To make sense of such paraphrases, the second part of my thesis proposes to understand them as explication proposals. In the rest of the thesis, I develop my understanding of explication which is called tolerant explication. Tolerant explication is build on Carnapian and Quinean explication, but it is more widely applicable. In particular, I argue that the notion is superior to other like notions, but also subsumes them as special cases.
Lastly, I propose to understand conceptual engineering as my tolerant explication by showing how tolerant explication resolves particular issues riddling conceptual engineering. One such problem is Strawson's objection that explication and conceptual engineering are just changing the topic instead of addressing the problem as posed. Another problem is that conceptual engineering forces us to commit to particular understanding of what's to be engineered, namely concepts.
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The main question in the first part is from "where" exactly Carnap is making his claims, viz., from within a framework or from outside all such. Carnap famously argues in ESO that we have to distinguish between internal and external questions. The former are asked from within a framework (and the answers are trivial) whereas the latter are not. If these are the available options, Carnap's claims have likewise to be understood as from within a framework or from outside all of them.
I argue that both options are untenable for Carnap. For, in case he is working from within a framework, there is absolutely no need to take his claims to even apply to other frameworks. On the other hand, if Carnap is not speaking from within a framework, it is rather unclear how to assess what he is saying on his own analysis. Central to the argument of ESO is the claim that on some reading, external questions, i.e., questions not asked from within a framework, are meaningless as they lack 'cognitive content'. But this is hardly a tenable interpretation of Carnap's own claims. Therefore, another reading is asked for. Carnap himself provides one, viz., he suggests that external questions might be understood as 'practical' questions. Such practical questions concern "whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression for the framework in question" (ESO: 23). But this interpretation conflicts with his Principle of Tolerance that demands us to be "tolerant in permitting linguistic forms" (ESO: 40).
If the arguments of the first part are correct, Carnap's position is self-defeating. However, I argue that the main motivation of ESO is to provide a basis for doing, e.g., semantics without incurring ontological commitment to the 'entities' invoked in the semantics---and this is exactly what his Principle of Tolerance encodes. Contemporary analytic philosophy, on the other hand, regularly proceeds by looking at language to more or less read off the ontology and the structure of reality; a tight correspondence is (at least implicitly) assumed. Many contemporary metaphysicians pay lip service to rejecting such a position. However, there is no systematic evaluation of this claim and its ramifications (nor is an alternative methodology provided). The obvious problem is that any position has to be formulated using a language, and so the position comes close to be self-undermining; one has to be careful not to reject too much. I want to suggest that Carnap's Principle of Tolerance can at least partially provide a foundation of such a new method and thereby preserve Carnap's initial motivation of ESO.
The main question in the first part is from "where" exactly Carnap is making his claims, viz., from within a framework or from outside all such. Carnap famously argues in ESO that we have to distinguish between internal and external questions. The former are asked from within a framework (and the answers are trivial) whereas the latter are not. If these are the available options, Carnap's claims have likewise to be understood as from within a framework or from outside all of them.
I argue that both options are untenable for Carnap. For, in case he is working from within a framework, there is absolutely no need to take his claims to even apply to other frameworks. On the other hand, if Carnap is not speaking from within a framework, it is rather unclear how to assess what he is saying on his own analysis. Central to the argument of ESO is the claim that on some reading, external questions, i.e., questions not asked from within a framework, are meaningless as they lack 'cognitive content'. But this is hardly a tenable interpretation of Carnap's own claims. Therefore, another reading is asked for. Carnap himself provides one, viz., he suggests that external questions might be understood as 'practical' questions. Such practical questions concern "whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression for the framework in question" (ESO: 23). But this interpretation conflicts with his Principle of Tolerance that demands us to be "tolerant in permitting linguistic forms" (ESO: 40).
If the arguments of the first part are correct, Carnap's position is self-defeating. However, I argue that the main motivation of ESO is to provide a basis for doing, e.g., semantics without incurring ontological commitment to the 'entities' invoked in the semantics---and this is exactly what his Principle of Tolerance encodes. Contemporary analytic philosophy, on the other hand, regularly proceeds by looking at language to more or less read off the ontology and the structure of reality; a tight correspondence is (at least implicitly) assumed. Many contemporary metaphysicians pay lip service to rejecting such a position. However, there is no systematic evaluation of this claim and its ramifications (nor is an alternative methodology provided). The obvious problem is that any position has to be formulated using a language, and so the position comes close to be self-undermining; one has to be careful not to reject too much. I want to suggest that Carnap's Principle of Tolerance can at least partially provide a foundation of such a new method and thereby preserve Carnap's initial motivation of ESO.
The first part of this thesis is devoted to the relation between paraphrase and ontological commitment. In particular, it considers what different paraphrase strategies are to be found in the literature and what problems they encounter. Only Alston's so-called symmetry objection is generally recognized, but I argue that there are at least four more problems.
Moreover, I argue that criteria of ontological commitment are problematic, too. I consider several candidate criteria and show that they are unsatisfactory. Furthermore, I argue that criteria of ontological commitment are in some sense equivalent to criteria of adequate paraphrase. Regarding the latter, I argue (i) that satisfactory criteria of adequate paraphrase need to resolve the problems such as Alston's symmetry objection and (ii) that the common candidate criteria don't even jointly resolve them. I conclude that there are no adequate criteria of ontological commitment.
I take it, however, that giving up on paraphrase is implausible in light of paraphrase examples such as the above one. To make sense of such paraphrases, the second part of my thesis proposes to understand them as explication proposals. In the rest of the thesis, I develop my understanding of explication which is called tolerant explication. Tolerant explication is build on Carnapian and Quinean explication, but it is more widely applicable. In particular, I argue that the notion is superior to other like notions, but also subsumes them as special cases.
Lastly, I propose to understand conceptual engineering as my tolerant explication by showing how tolerant explication resolves particular issues riddling conceptual engineering. One such problem is Strawson's objection that explication and conceptual engineering are just changing the topic instead of addressing the problem as posed. Another problem is that conceptual engineering forces us to commit to particular understanding of what's to be engineered, namely concepts.