The thesis of my dissertation is that Kant's theory of the social contract, which is the central ... more The thesis of my dissertation is that Kant's theory of the social contract, which is the central concept of his political philosophy, provides, when suitably reconstructed, an adequate theoretical foundation for liberal democracy. I take liberal democracy to consist of three components: first, the rule of law; second, democratic self-rule (either representative, direct, or some combination of the two); and third, the recognition and institutional guarantee of the rights of individuals. In the dissertation, I take as my starting point Kant's conception of autonomy. For Kant, the idea of the social contract explains how individual moral agents can maintain their autonomy in the context of community. The social contract resolves the conflict between moral autonomy and political authority by defining a model of civil society in which free, equal, and independent rational agents collectively legislate the public laws that are to govern their external relations, which are essentially property relations. Ideal civil society, then, is a condition of maximum equal freedom for rational agents who interact with one another. V
KANT’S THEORY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT SEPTEMBER, 1991 KEVIN E. DODSON, B. A. UNIVERSITY OF WASHING... more KANT’S THEORY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT SEPTEMBER, 1991 KEVIN E. DODSON, B. A. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Directed by: Professor Robert Paul Wolff The thesis of my dissertation is that Kant’s theory of the social contract, which is the central concept of his political philosophy, provides, when suitably reconstructed, an adequate theoretical foundation for liberal democracy. I take liberal democracy to consist of three components: first, the rule of law; second, democratic self-rule (either representative, direct, or some combination of the two); and third, the recognition and institutional guarantee of the rights of individuals. In the dissertation, I take as my starting point Kant’s conception of autonomy. For Kant, the idea of the social contract explains how individual moral agents can maintain their autonomy in the context of community. The social contract resolves the conflict between moral autonomy and political authority by defining a model of ...
Critical Theory and the Humanities in the Age of the Alt-Right, 2019
In the 1950s and 1960s, Conservatives themselves sought to distinguish an authentic conservatism ... more In the 1950s and 1960s, Conservatives themselves sought to distinguish an authentic conservatism from what Peter Viereck called “Reactionary Nationalism” and George Nash termed “The Radical Right.” In The National Review, William F. Buckley sought to expel the John Birch Society and Ayn Rand from the emerging Conservative movement. Perhaps most famously, the renowned historian Richard Hofstadter distinguished between Conservatism on the one hand and Pseudo-Conservatism on the other, which exhibited an opposition to the broad consensus of American society and culture and what he famously identified as “the paranoid style” that was characterized by a Manichean outlook, an uncompromising political stance, a sense of betrayal, and a conspiratorial mindset. The project of this chapter is to outline the philosophical origins of this development, locating the roots of this debasement deep in the project of modernity itself in which conservatism developed in opposition to the universalism o...
Traditionally, philosophy has occupied an esteemed position in the life of the mind as the centra... more Traditionally, philosophy has occupied an esteemed position in the life of the mind as the central, unifying discipline of our intel lectual and cultural life. Thus, philosophy was considered an es sential part of a sound education, and the institutions of higher learning recognized this by incorporating courses in philosophy into their general education or core requirements. However, in troductory philosophy courses have themselves all too often failed to perform this role. Rather than offering an intellectual frame work for the integration of the diverse contents of a university education, introductory philosophy courses tend to present merely a series of interesting problems and puzzles to be addressed in a piecemeal fashion. As a consequence, philosophy is prevented from playing the integrative role for which it is so uniquely suited, and students thereby lose the opportunity to explore the underly ing connections among different disciplines. What is needed to remedy this situation is a philosophical theme that would main tain the integrity of the introductory philosophy course while se curing its central place within a university education. In this pa per I propose that such a theme can be found in knowledge itself. I shall begin my argument by laying out a fundamental short coming of many philosophy texts: their fragmentation due to lack of an overarching vision. I shall follow this critique by elaborat ing on a theme that can fill this void. Finally, I shall argue for the merits of such a revision.
Etude de la justification de la necessite morale de la societe civile chez Kant. L'A. montre ... more Etude de la justification de la necessite morale de la societe civile chez Kant. L'A. montre que l'idee de contrat social occupe une place centrale dans le projet de la «Doctrine du droit» en ce sens qu'elle etablit l'unite conceptuelle entre l'autonomie morale et l'autorite politique, la liberte et la coercition, l'institution de la propriete et l'etablissement de la societe civile
accepted, then a large area of the traditionalist position has to be rejected. It is no longer po... more accepted, then a large area of the traditionalist position has to be rejected. It is no longer possible to construe Kant's central project as that of showing how in some transcendent psychology subjects in themselves actually construct reality from their private sense impressions. The naive account of 'the mind making nature' is no longer available, but the chapter does not go on to offer any more positive account of the 'making possible' relation. What is done elsewhere is to offer various models, in terms of colours and 'perspectival subjectivity', with which to understand the crucial contrast between what is 'subjective' and what is 'mental'. Those models are valuable at least in indicating ways of understanding transcendental idealism without commitment to empirical idealism, but they do not completely explain 'making possible'. That relation has to be understood in relation both to the understanding and its a priori concepts and to our sense perception. Just as more needs to be said about things in themselves and noumena, so more needs to be said positively about that relation. I have tried to make plain that Collins's book valuably supports the revolutionary position. The few noted reservations point towards a need for further development of his general thesis, and not for its rejection or even substantial amendment. The appearance of his book is especially timely in this respect because it coincides with that of another book which takes a firmly traditionalist position, namely James van Cleve's Problems from Kant. I indicated earlier that the division between traditionalist and revolutionary accounts of the first Critique remains unresolved, and these two books illustrate that continued division very clearly. Collins's book provides a valuable statement of the revolutionary case and a useful antidote to the traditionalist position.
and at the same time understand that philosophy will fit others differently" 093). Ultimatel... more and at the same time understand that philosophy will fit others differently" 093). Ultimately, what these quotations reveal is a lack o f philosophical sophistication which does get in the way of the arguments that Siebert presents. There are, I believe, more significant difficulties. First, informing the whole book is the idea that Hume shapes his history for didactic purposes. What seemingly never enters Siebert's mind is that in his H/story, Hume is interested in getting at the truth of historical matters 0 5 9 is a possible exception). Second, outside o f the first two chapters, Siebert does little to connect the arguments of the book together, leaving readers with an impressionistic mosaic that they have to piece together. Third, Siebert never discusses the tension between the central claim of the first chapter, that the purpose o f the H/story is moral instruction, and the claim o f the fourth chapter that moral philosophy is impotent. Finally, in several places, Siebert severs Hume the philosopher f rom Hume the historian. I would like to suggest that this leads to a distortion o f both Hume's philosophy and his history. STUART D. WARNER Roosevelt University
hundred and ten persons from six different countries attended the conference, making it one of th... more hundred and ten persons from six different countries attended the conference, making it one of the largest conferences in the United States devoted to moral philosophy and other investigations of evaluative concerns, and the second largest Conference on Value Inquiry ever. The theme of the conference was "Values in an Age of Globalization." In addition to a host of papers, the conference featured three plenary speakers: Thomas Magnell, Julius Moravcsik, and George Sher. The conference convened at an evening banquet on Thursday, 13 April, with the first of the three plenary addresses. Thomas Magnell, Chair of the Philosophy Department at Drew University and the Executive Director of the Conference on Value Inquiry, laid out a framework for the discussions at the conference in his paper "Conflicts to Face When Values Conflict." In his paper, Professor Magnell focused on the context of moral justification, as opposed to that of moral decision-making, and in that vein, began examining moral conflicts confronting individual moral agents. He maintained that such conflicts can be adequately described using W.D. Ross's concept of a prima facie duty, though their resolution and the corresponding determination of our duty proper may prove difficult in any particular case. When confronted by such difficulties, we may in fact be left with not a single course of action prescribed as a duty, but with a disjunctive duty involving a choice between two or more permissible actions, of which we are obligated to perform at least one. Professor Magnell then proceeded to generalize from the case of the individual agent to that of multiple agents by employing the notion of the correlativity of duties and rights. At the social level, we confront most profoundly conflicts among the moral ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Though such conflicts often prove difficult to resolve, to say the least, the ideals are, as he put it, homogeneous in nature and thus comparable in principle. Finally, Professor Magnell turned to conflicts among what he described as heterogeneous values. Here he argued that, because heterogeneous values are comparable in extreme cases, we can reach clearly justifiable decisions. He
to place the thought of great figures, extends well beyond those figures themselves. I have menti... more to place the thought of great figures, extends well beyond those figures themselves. I have mentioned several essays that take up issues often under-represented in introductions, but that exemplify the virtues of this volume overall. There remains in its pages plenty with which advanced students can enter into critical discussion. In his very good Chapter 10 on Leibniz's theistic arguments, Blumenfeld is appropriately forthright about their weaknesses. Odd time for him to pull his punches, then, about the utter ambiguity of the main premise in all of Leibniz's versions of the ontological argument. Let it be true that God (alternatively: a perfect or necessary being) is by definition blessed with all perfections, necessary existence among them. What could this mean? Either that anything that is God has this perfection-in which case we get a trivial conclusion that anything that's a necessary being exists-or else that there is a being that has this perfection-in which case we get a non-trivial conclusion by begging the question. In his (much welcomed) effort to highlight the non-phenomenalist aspects of Leibniz's account of bodies, Rutherford (pp. 14549) emphasises that for Leibniz bodies are "constituted from" a plurality of monads: but if this is indeed to represent a theory about the nature of bodies, according to which they are "identified with" or "are" pluralities of monads, it is unclear how the (former) apparently one-many relation of constitution can give us the (latter) one-one relation of identity that is formally transitive.
While writing this book, I have received invaluable advice and support from many people. I would ... more While writing this book, I have received invaluable advice and support from many people. I would particularly like to thank Bernard Manin, who has read and commented on the book through several drafts. Bernard advised me throughout my graduate educa-tion at the University ...
The thesis of my dissertation is that Kant's theory of the social contract, which is the central ... more The thesis of my dissertation is that Kant's theory of the social contract, which is the central concept of his political philosophy, provides, when suitably reconstructed, an adequate theoretical foundation for liberal democracy. I take liberal democracy to consist of three components: first, the rule of law; second, democratic self-rule (either representative, direct, or some combination of the two); and third, the recognition and institutional guarantee of the rights of individuals. In the dissertation, I take as my starting point Kant's conception of autonomy. For Kant, the idea of the social contract explains how individual moral agents can maintain their autonomy in the context of community. The social contract resolves the conflict between moral autonomy and political authority by defining a model of civil society in which free, equal, and independent rational agents collectively legislate the public laws that are to govern their external relations, which are essentially property relations. Ideal civil society, then, is a condition of maximum equal freedom for rational agents who interact with one another. V
KANT’S THEORY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT SEPTEMBER, 1991 KEVIN E. DODSON, B. A. UNIVERSITY OF WASHING... more KANT’S THEORY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT SEPTEMBER, 1991 KEVIN E. DODSON, B. A. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Directed by: Professor Robert Paul Wolff The thesis of my dissertation is that Kant’s theory of the social contract, which is the central concept of his political philosophy, provides, when suitably reconstructed, an adequate theoretical foundation for liberal democracy. I take liberal democracy to consist of three components: first, the rule of law; second, democratic self-rule (either representative, direct, or some combination of the two); and third, the recognition and institutional guarantee of the rights of individuals. In the dissertation, I take as my starting point Kant’s conception of autonomy. For Kant, the idea of the social contract explains how individual moral agents can maintain their autonomy in the context of community. The social contract resolves the conflict between moral autonomy and political authority by defining a model of ...
Critical Theory and the Humanities in the Age of the Alt-Right, 2019
In the 1950s and 1960s, Conservatives themselves sought to distinguish an authentic conservatism ... more In the 1950s and 1960s, Conservatives themselves sought to distinguish an authentic conservatism from what Peter Viereck called “Reactionary Nationalism” and George Nash termed “The Radical Right.” In The National Review, William F. Buckley sought to expel the John Birch Society and Ayn Rand from the emerging Conservative movement. Perhaps most famously, the renowned historian Richard Hofstadter distinguished between Conservatism on the one hand and Pseudo-Conservatism on the other, which exhibited an opposition to the broad consensus of American society and culture and what he famously identified as “the paranoid style” that was characterized by a Manichean outlook, an uncompromising political stance, a sense of betrayal, and a conspiratorial mindset. The project of this chapter is to outline the philosophical origins of this development, locating the roots of this debasement deep in the project of modernity itself in which conservatism developed in opposition to the universalism o...
Traditionally, philosophy has occupied an esteemed position in the life of the mind as the centra... more Traditionally, philosophy has occupied an esteemed position in the life of the mind as the central, unifying discipline of our intel lectual and cultural life. Thus, philosophy was considered an es sential part of a sound education, and the institutions of higher learning recognized this by incorporating courses in philosophy into their general education or core requirements. However, in troductory philosophy courses have themselves all too often failed to perform this role. Rather than offering an intellectual frame work for the integration of the diverse contents of a university education, introductory philosophy courses tend to present merely a series of interesting problems and puzzles to be addressed in a piecemeal fashion. As a consequence, philosophy is prevented from playing the integrative role for which it is so uniquely suited, and students thereby lose the opportunity to explore the underly ing connections among different disciplines. What is needed to remedy this situation is a philosophical theme that would main tain the integrity of the introductory philosophy course while se curing its central place within a university education. In this pa per I propose that such a theme can be found in knowledge itself. I shall begin my argument by laying out a fundamental short coming of many philosophy texts: their fragmentation due to lack of an overarching vision. I shall follow this critique by elaborat ing on a theme that can fill this void. Finally, I shall argue for the merits of such a revision.
Etude de la justification de la necessite morale de la societe civile chez Kant. L'A. montre ... more Etude de la justification de la necessite morale de la societe civile chez Kant. L'A. montre que l'idee de contrat social occupe une place centrale dans le projet de la «Doctrine du droit» en ce sens qu'elle etablit l'unite conceptuelle entre l'autonomie morale et l'autorite politique, la liberte et la coercition, l'institution de la propriete et l'etablissement de la societe civile
accepted, then a large area of the traditionalist position has to be rejected. It is no longer po... more accepted, then a large area of the traditionalist position has to be rejected. It is no longer possible to construe Kant's central project as that of showing how in some transcendent psychology subjects in themselves actually construct reality from their private sense impressions. The naive account of 'the mind making nature' is no longer available, but the chapter does not go on to offer any more positive account of the 'making possible' relation. What is done elsewhere is to offer various models, in terms of colours and 'perspectival subjectivity', with which to understand the crucial contrast between what is 'subjective' and what is 'mental'. Those models are valuable at least in indicating ways of understanding transcendental idealism without commitment to empirical idealism, but they do not completely explain 'making possible'. That relation has to be understood in relation both to the understanding and its a priori concepts and to our sense perception. Just as more needs to be said about things in themselves and noumena, so more needs to be said positively about that relation. I have tried to make plain that Collins's book valuably supports the revolutionary position. The few noted reservations point towards a need for further development of his general thesis, and not for its rejection or even substantial amendment. The appearance of his book is especially timely in this respect because it coincides with that of another book which takes a firmly traditionalist position, namely James van Cleve's Problems from Kant. I indicated earlier that the division between traditionalist and revolutionary accounts of the first Critique remains unresolved, and these two books illustrate that continued division very clearly. Collins's book provides a valuable statement of the revolutionary case and a useful antidote to the traditionalist position.
and at the same time understand that philosophy will fit others differently" 093). Ultimatel... more and at the same time understand that philosophy will fit others differently" 093). Ultimately, what these quotations reveal is a lack o f philosophical sophistication which does get in the way of the arguments that Siebert presents. There are, I believe, more significant difficulties. First, informing the whole book is the idea that Hume shapes his history for didactic purposes. What seemingly never enters Siebert's mind is that in his H/story, Hume is interested in getting at the truth of historical matters 0 5 9 is a possible exception). Second, outside o f the first two chapters, Siebert does little to connect the arguments of the book together, leaving readers with an impressionistic mosaic that they have to piece together. Third, Siebert never discusses the tension between the central claim of the first chapter, that the purpose o f the H/story is moral instruction, and the claim o f the fourth chapter that moral philosophy is impotent. Finally, in several places, Siebert severs Hume the philosopher f rom Hume the historian. I would like to suggest that this leads to a distortion o f both Hume's philosophy and his history. STUART D. WARNER Roosevelt University
hundred and ten persons from six different countries attended the conference, making it one of th... more hundred and ten persons from six different countries attended the conference, making it one of the largest conferences in the United States devoted to moral philosophy and other investigations of evaluative concerns, and the second largest Conference on Value Inquiry ever. The theme of the conference was "Values in an Age of Globalization." In addition to a host of papers, the conference featured three plenary speakers: Thomas Magnell, Julius Moravcsik, and George Sher. The conference convened at an evening banquet on Thursday, 13 April, with the first of the three plenary addresses. Thomas Magnell, Chair of the Philosophy Department at Drew University and the Executive Director of the Conference on Value Inquiry, laid out a framework for the discussions at the conference in his paper "Conflicts to Face When Values Conflict." In his paper, Professor Magnell focused on the context of moral justification, as opposed to that of moral decision-making, and in that vein, began examining moral conflicts confronting individual moral agents. He maintained that such conflicts can be adequately described using W.D. Ross's concept of a prima facie duty, though their resolution and the corresponding determination of our duty proper may prove difficult in any particular case. When confronted by such difficulties, we may in fact be left with not a single course of action prescribed as a duty, but with a disjunctive duty involving a choice between two or more permissible actions, of which we are obligated to perform at least one. Professor Magnell then proceeded to generalize from the case of the individual agent to that of multiple agents by employing the notion of the correlativity of duties and rights. At the social level, we confront most profoundly conflicts among the moral ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Though such conflicts often prove difficult to resolve, to say the least, the ideals are, as he put it, homogeneous in nature and thus comparable in principle. Finally, Professor Magnell turned to conflicts among what he described as heterogeneous values. Here he argued that, because heterogeneous values are comparable in extreme cases, we can reach clearly justifiable decisions. He
to place the thought of great figures, extends well beyond those figures themselves. I have menti... more to place the thought of great figures, extends well beyond those figures themselves. I have mentioned several essays that take up issues often under-represented in introductions, but that exemplify the virtues of this volume overall. There remains in its pages plenty with which advanced students can enter into critical discussion. In his very good Chapter 10 on Leibniz's theistic arguments, Blumenfeld is appropriately forthright about their weaknesses. Odd time for him to pull his punches, then, about the utter ambiguity of the main premise in all of Leibniz's versions of the ontological argument. Let it be true that God (alternatively: a perfect or necessary being) is by definition blessed with all perfections, necessary existence among them. What could this mean? Either that anything that is God has this perfection-in which case we get a trivial conclusion that anything that's a necessary being exists-or else that there is a being that has this perfection-in which case we get a non-trivial conclusion by begging the question. In his (much welcomed) effort to highlight the non-phenomenalist aspects of Leibniz's account of bodies, Rutherford (pp. 14549) emphasises that for Leibniz bodies are "constituted from" a plurality of monads: but if this is indeed to represent a theory about the nature of bodies, according to which they are "identified with" or "are" pluralities of monads, it is unclear how the (former) apparently one-many relation of constitution can give us the (latter) one-one relation of identity that is formally transitive.
While writing this book, I have received invaluable advice and support from many people. I would ... more While writing this book, I have received invaluable advice and support from many people. I would particularly like to thank Bernard Manin, who has read and commented on the book through several drafts. Bernard advised me throughout my graduate educa-tion at the University ...
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