In this study, I analyse the historical origins of China’s distinctive tiered economy by employin... more In this study, I analyse the historical origins of China’s distinctive tiered economy by employing the analytic framework of a complex adaptive system to examine how the process of change involves selection, interaction among elements, and variation in types, which ultimately lead to adaptation. I argue that the rise of China’s tiered economy can be traced back to the Mao era and that it was enhanced throughout Deng’s economic reforms. To elaborate on this argument, I first describe how Mao’s invisible hand planted the seeds of the tiered economy. Selection at the strategy level and the resulting variation are examined as Mao’s adaptive tactics for nurturing the industrial sector. This mechanism of selection was also maintained to partially embrace market forces in Deng’s early era of reform. I then closely examine how Deng’s vision of the socialist market economy provided the party-state with raw materials for adaptation, deepening its tiered economy.
How does the China’s new leadership accomplish two mutually incompatible goals, such as the marke... more How does the China’s new leadership accomplish two mutually incompatible goals, such as the market’s decisive role and the economy led by the state ownership? This article attempts to analyze China’s economic reform policies stemming from the CCP 18th third plenum, particularly focusing on the state-owned enterprises(SOEs) reform. To this ends, the paper examines how the newly suggested ambitious ‘deepening reform leading small group’ and mixed ownership, as well as the introduction of more market-oriented system of the board of directors would constrain the market’s decisive role in the China’s economy. As such embedded institutional limits indicate, Xi Jinping leadership’s plan for ‘the comprehensive deep reform’ will once again remain bounded if the market-oriented reforms are pushed mainly aiming to consolidate its political and economic dominance.
In deepening the post-Mao economic reforms, one of the most notable changes has been the transfor... more In deepening the post-Mao economic reforms, one of the most notable changes has been the transformation of the Chinese state from planner to regulator in governing the economy. However, instead of shifting in the direction of a minimalist government or independent regulators, this study argues Chinese state regulation, that has been underpinned by informal institutions and the party organizations combined with formal institutions, has remained resilient. Moreover, the pattern of selective industrial management and the ensuing internal variance in the forms of regulation reflect that there are many political economies in China. This study attempts to explain what generates such varied forms of state regulation, and then deals with two additional issues: one is whether this varied pattern of industrial regulation in China is compatible with the broader socialist regulation patterns found in other post-socialist contexts, such as Vietnam; and the other issue is whether the implications of this paper’s findings suggest future evolution toward a liberal market economy with independent regulators and autonomous business, or the consolidation of state capitalism as an alternative path.
Rampant corruption among China’s party members suggests that the existing system of party discipl... more Rampant corruption among China’s party members suggests that the existing system of party discipline is too fragile to function effectively. The question now is how the central leadership reinforces party supervision over leading cadres in both government and state firms. The Chinese leadership, after some period of experimentation, has introduced new institutions, named zhongyang xunshizu (central inspection groups), to complement the existing discipline system. This paper examines how these central inspection groups complement the existing groups institutionally and normatively, and explores the Chinese Communist Party’s institutional engineering efforts to maintain legitimacy, organizational integrity, and sustainability. This paper considers these initiatives from the view of institutional complementarity and compensation. Theoretically, the application of institutional complementarity to China’s party discipline inspection should expand the scope of analysis into China’s institutional reform of party discipline. Empirically, the central inspection groups are the least known, but perhaps most significant direct channel for central supervision of leaders in both local government and key state-owned enterprises. By comparing the rationale and operation of disciplinary inspection commissions (DICs), this paper attempts to explain how the central inspection groups complement the supervision of local DICs in terms of scope, structure, and methods of control.
A growing body of literature on China's “regulatory state” has analysed the efforts of the C... more A growing body of literature on China's “regulatory state” has analysed the efforts of the Chinese government to regulate strategic yet highly centralized state-owned industries. Yet how does decentralization affect this need for regulation? This article analyses the pattern ...
Marketization and state restructuring are proceeding apace in China and Vietnam. China and Vietna... more Marketization and state restructuring are proceeding apace in China and Vietnam. China and Vietnam are not, however, converging upon the global regulatory model, even allowing for customary national variations. Rather, they are building up distinctive forms of regulatory regimes aiming to maintain the party-state's control over key state sectors, while at the same time integrating with the global economy and conforming to international norms and standards. This study argues that the regulatory model being adopted in Vietnam and China is the product of a specific kind of transition from a command to a market economy within an authoritarian political regime. While diffusion theories are of use in identifying external driving forces for the reform effort, these theories are of limited value for unveiling the dynamics of local contexts. Indigenous incentives, opportunity structures, and the experimental nature of public policy explain why, despite their exposure to global reform movements and commitment to multilateral institutions, China and Vietnam are likely to end up not with just a variety of the same regulatory regime, but a different one. The case of telecommunications regulation is used to illustrate this.
This report explains the shifts and strains in the 2008 super-ministry government reform, focusin... more This report explains the shifts and strains in the 2008 super-ministry government reform, focusing on the reform of government institutions of economic governance. Drawing on interviews with officials and scholars in Beijing after the reform, and on Chinese-language reports and books, this study suggests that the key to substantial progress in remaking the Chinese state into a macroeconomic regulator is the reform of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which was lacking in the 2008 scheme. Its powerful authority for investment endorsement is particularly problematic. A continued administrative malaise in the energy sector and strategically articulated state engagement in industrial development also should be noted as the salient features of China's economic governance.
This study examines the historical evolution of China’s foreign aid regime and key features of Ch... more This study examines the historical evolution of China’s foreign aid regime and key features of Chinese-style development aid, focusing on the case of Africa. Particularly, the central roles of state firms and their overseas direct investments, foreign economic trade special zones, the rise of development fund, and the changing balance of power between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce are discussed as the signs of China’s mercantilistic foreign aid. In doing so, this study attempts to beg some questions on how this Chinese-style development aid challenges the norms and institutions of international aid, as well as whether it can be the alternative to the West-centered regime of development and cooperation.
In this study, I analyse the historical origins of China’s distinctive tiered economy by employin... more In this study, I analyse the historical origins of China’s distinctive tiered economy by employing the analytic framework of a complex adaptive system to examine how the process of change involves selection, interaction among elements, and variation in types, which ultimately lead to adaptation. I argue that the rise of China’s tiered economy can be traced back to the Mao era and that it was enhanced throughout Deng’s economic reforms. To elaborate on this argument, I first describe how Mao’s invisible hand planted the seeds of the tiered economy. Selection at the strategy level and the resulting variation are examined as Mao’s adaptive tactics for nurturing the industrial sector. This mechanism of selection was also maintained to partially embrace market forces in Deng’s early era of reform. I then closely examine how Deng’s vision of the socialist market economy provided the party-state with raw materials for adaptation, deepening its tiered economy.
How does the China’s new leadership accomplish two mutually incompatible goals, such as the marke... more How does the China’s new leadership accomplish two mutually incompatible goals, such as the market’s decisive role and the economy led by the state ownership? This article attempts to analyze China’s economic reform policies stemming from the CCP 18th third plenum, particularly focusing on the state-owned enterprises(SOEs) reform. To this ends, the paper examines how the newly suggested ambitious ‘deepening reform leading small group’ and mixed ownership, as well as the introduction of more market-oriented system of the board of directors would constrain the market’s decisive role in the China’s economy. As such embedded institutional limits indicate, Xi Jinping leadership’s plan for ‘the comprehensive deep reform’ will once again remain bounded if the market-oriented reforms are pushed mainly aiming to consolidate its political and economic dominance.
In deepening the post-Mao economic reforms, one of the most notable changes has been the transfor... more In deepening the post-Mao economic reforms, one of the most notable changes has been the transformation of the Chinese state from planner to regulator in governing the economy. However, instead of shifting in the direction of a minimalist government or independent regulators, this study argues Chinese state regulation, that has been underpinned by informal institutions and the party organizations combined with formal institutions, has remained resilient. Moreover, the pattern of selective industrial management and the ensuing internal variance in the forms of regulation reflect that there are many political economies in China. This study attempts to explain what generates such varied forms of state regulation, and then deals with two additional issues: one is whether this varied pattern of industrial regulation in China is compatible with the broader socialist regulation patterns found in other post-socialist contexts, such as Vietnam; and the other issue is whether the implications of this paper’s findings suggest future evolution toward a liberal market economy with independent regulators and autonomous business, or the consolidation of state capitalism as an alternative path.
Rampant corruption among China’s party members suggests that the existing system of party discipl... more Rampant corruption among China’s party members suggests that the existing system of party discipline is too fragile to function effectively. The question now is how the central leadership reinforces party supervision over leading cadres in both government and state firms. The Chinese leadership, after some period of experimentation, has introduced new institutions, named zhongyang xunshizu (central inspection groups), to complement the existing discipline system. This paper examines how these central inspection groups complement the existing groups institutionally and normatively, and explores the Chinese Communist Party’s institutional engineering efforts to maintain legitimacy, organizational integrity, and sustainability. This paper considers these initiatives from the view of institutional complementarity and compensation. Theoretically, the application of institutional complementarity to China’s party discipline inspection should expand the scope of analysis into China’s institutional reform of party discipline. Empirically, the central inspection groups are the least known, but perhaps most significant direct channel for central supervision of leaders in both local government and key state-owned enterprises. By comparing the rationale and operation of disciplinary inspection commissions (DICs), this paper attempts to explain how the central inspection groups complement the supervision of local DICs in terms of scope, structure, and methods of control.
A growing body of literature on China's “regulatory state” has analysed the efforts of the C... more A growing body of literature on China's “regulatory state” has analysed the efforts of the Chinese government to regulate strategic yet highly centralized state-owned industries. Yet how does decentralization affect this need for regulation? This article analyses the pattern ...
Marketization and state restructuring are proceeding apace in China and Vietnam. China and Vietna... more Marketization and state restructuring are proceeding apace in China and Vietnam. China and Vietnam are not, however, converging upon the global regulatory model, even allowing for customary national variations. Rather, they are building up distinctive forms of regulatory regimes aiming to maintain the party-state's control over key state sectors, while at the same time integrating with the global economy and conforming to international norms and standards. This study argues that the regulatory model being adopted in Vietnam and China is the product of a specific kind of transition from a command to a market economy within an authoritarian political regime. While diffusion theories are of use in identifying external driving forces for the reform effort, these theories are of limited value for unveiling the dynamics of local contexts. Indigenous incentives, opportunity structures, and the experimental nature of public policy explain why, despite their exposure to global reform movements and commitment to multilateral institutions, China and Vietnam are likely to end up not with just a variety of the same regulatory regime, but a different one. The case of telecommunications regulation is used to illustrate this.
This report explains the shifts and strains in the 2008 super-ministry government reform, focusin... more This report explains the shifts and strains in the 2008 super-ministry government reform, focusing on the reform of government institutions of economic governance. Drawing on interviews with officials and scholars in Beijing after the reform, and on Chinese-language reports and books, this study suggests that the key to substantial progress in remaking the Chinese state into a macroeconomic regulator is the reform of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which was lacking in the 2008 scheme. Its powerful authority for investment endorsement is particularly problematic. A continued administrative malaise in the energy sector and strategically articulated state engagement in industrial development also should be noted as the salient features of China's economic governance.
This study examines the historical evolution of China’s foreign aid regime and key features of Ch... more This study examines the historical evolution of China’s foreign aid regime and key features of Chinese-style development aid, focusing on the case of Africa. Particularly, the central roles of state firms and their overseas direct investments, foreign economic trade special zones, the rise of development fund, and the changing balance of power between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce are discussed as the signs of China’s mercantilistic foreign aid. In doing so, this study attempts to beg some questions on how this Chinese-style development aid challenges the norms and institutions of international aid, as well as whether it can be the alternative to the West-centered regime of development and cooperation.
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Papers by Yukyung Yeo
To this ends, the paper examines how the newly suggested ambitious ‘deepening reform leading small group’ and mixed ownership, as well as the introduction of more market-oriented system of the board of directors would constrain the market’s decisive role in the China’s economy. As such embedded institutional limits indicate, Xi Jinping leadership’s plan for ‘the comprehensive deep reform’ will once again remain bounded if the market-oriented reforms are pushed mainly aiming to consolidate its political and economic dominance.
of the Chinese state from planner to regulator in governing the economy. However, instead
of shifting in the direction of a minimalist government or independent regulators, this study
argues Chinese state regulation, that has been underpinned by informal institutions and the party
organizations combined with formal institutions, has remained resilient. Moreover, the pattern of
selective industrial management and the ensuing internal variance in the forms of regulation reflect
that there are many political economies in China. This study attempts to explain what generates
such varied forms of state regulation, and then deals with two additional issues: one is whether this
varied pattern of industrial regulation in China is compatible with the broader socialist regulation
patterns found in other post-socialist contexts, such as Vietnam; and the other issue is whether the
implications of this paper’s findings suggest future evolution toward a liberal market economy with
independent regulators and autonomous business, or the consolidation of state capitalism as an alternative
path.
Books by Yukyung Yeo
To this ends, the paper examines how the newly suggested ambitious ‘deepening reform leading small group’ and mixed ownership, as well as the introduction of more market-oriented system of the board of directors would constrain the market’s decisive role in the China’s economy. As such embedded institutional limits indicate, Xi Jinping leadership’s plan for ‘the comprehensive deep reform’ will once again remain bounded if the market-oriented reforms are pushed mainly aiming to consolidate its political and economic dominance.
of the Chinese state from planner to regulator in governing the economy. However, instead
of shifting in the direction of a minimalist government or independent regulators, this study
argues Chinese state regulation, that has been underpinned by informal institutions and the party
organizations combined with formal institutions, has remained resilient. Moreover, the pattern of
selective industrial management and the ensuing internal variance in the forms of regulation reflect
that there are many political economies in China. This study attempts to explain what generates
such varied forms of state regulation, and then deals with two additional issues: one is whether this
varied pattern of industrial regulation in China is compatible with the broader socialist regulation
patterns found in other post-socialist contexts, such as Vietnam; and the other issue is whether the
implications of this paper’s findings suggest future evolution toward a liberal market economy with
independent regulators and autonomous business, or the consolidation of state capitalism as an alternative
path.