In this exciting book, Marco Sgarbi traces the importance of the local context of philosophical a... more In this exciting book, Marco Sgarbi traces the importance of the local context of philosophical activities at Königsberg University in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century in order to understand the emergence of Kant’s critical philosophy, and it turns out that this context in large part thrived on doctrines originating in Aristotle. Rather than focusing on Aristotle himself, as the title suggests, the focus is actually on philosophers of relatively minor importance who were concerned with topics discussed in the Aristotelian corpus, sometimes expanding, sometimes developing, and interpreting these ideas in novel ways. In many cases, these philosophers had in turn been influenced by their predecessors of a similar attachment, so that a complex transmission and multifaceted variation of Aristotelian thought already occurred before Kant came into contact with it. Together with the excellent volumes in the Bloomsbury series ‘Kant’s Sources in Translation’ and the comprehensive background information on the texts in question provided in them, Sgarbi’s contribution helps evoke a fascinating overview of what had been going on philosophically in Kant’s immediate surroundings, beyond the radar of standard historiography of philosophy. Sgarbi has thus provided us with an important piece of a mosaic, which nonetheless is still far from complete. At first view Sgarbi’s strategy may seem to be at odds with the standing of Kant as a thinker of undisputed pre-eminence on the world stage of philosophy, given the alleged provincialism of Kant’s hometown. Whether Königsberg was indeed as small-town as often suggested – and a certain degree of what Karl Ameriks (2019: 279, n. 44) has described as ‘cultural provincialism’ is not unlikely (of which Kant himself, sadly enough, is sometimes guilty) – is not something I wish to address here. The point is rather that there are indeed significant examples of local context reconstruction which have turned out to be extremely helpful for broadening our understanding of works of genius in other fields, for example, music and art. Along this line of thought, Kant’s Königsberg turns out to be like Bach’s Leipzig and the specifics of musical performance practice there, or Dürer’s Nuremberg with its local medicophilosophical discourse on melancholy. Of the various traditions of philosophy in Königsberg, Sgarbi identifies two which stand out in particular for their Aristotelian leanings, namely philosophers influenced by Renaissance Aristotelianism on the one hand, especially the variant developed in Padua by Jacopo Zabarella and Giulio Pace, and Protestant scholastics on the other, such as Abraham Calov. It is Calov’s case which illustrates that, while Königsberg’s Albertina was a Lutheran University, something like an inter-confessional debate in philosophy was going on there, as it was Calov who introduced Francisco Suárez’s account of metaphysics there. The interest shown in Clemens Timpler also indicates an exchange with the Reformed wing of Protestantism. In any case, the
This book will be warmly greeted by the many political theorists who celebrate the politics of id... more This book will be warmly greeted by the many political theorists who celebrate the politics of identity and 'difference'. Toleration as Recognition seeks to co-opt the concept of toleration into serving a kind of super-liberalism, while excoriating liberalism itself. Elisabetta Galeotti 'revises' the concept of toleration by drawing on liberal neutrality, only to censure liberals for falling below the moral standards which the revised concept imposes. She thus aims to outflank liberals from the moral high ground, turning liberalism's moralizing aspirations against itself. This revision poses a puzzle. Galeotti initially formulates it thus: 'how can toleration be good if it involves putting up with what is disliked or disapproved of?' (p. 21). Put this way, the puzzle is familiar, and soluble. For one thing, the disapproval may be baseless, and so no real conundrum arises. Even if the practice in question warrants disapproval, there may be both pragmatic and principled reasons why it should not be forcibly stopped. But later on she comes up with a knottier version of the puzzle. This asks how tolerators can disapprove of a practice, yet also regard and treat it as valuable. In her response Galeotti cuts through the knot rather than untying it. Her account of toleration runs together political advocacy and philosophical argument. The political advocacy holds that certain groups, such as homosexuals and Muslims, have suffered unjust disadvantages which should be redressed by 'recognition': the public acceptance or affirmation of their worth. By contrast, she argues, the morally evacuated or would-be universal notions of citizenship favoured by liberals turn out in practice to perpetuate dominance and disadvantage, as do standard liberal accounts of toleration. So far this reiterates the familiar charge that liberal policies which aim to be impartial, e.g. by being 'colour-blind', or gender-neutral, in fact work to the advantage of society's most powerful groups. Galeotti's clearest example of this is the French headscarf affair of 1989, where the state policy of secularism in education was questioned after some Muslim schoolgirls were temporarily excluded from their classes for attending school in the Islamic headscarf. In place of the French Constitutional Court's pragmatic ruling on the affair, Galeotti seeks a political response which goes beyond the grudging acceptance allegedly offered by traditional liberal theories of toleration, and which publicly affirms the identity of Muslims as such. It follows with added force that disapproval of them is consigned to the political margin. Galeotti seems to think that ultimately these claims follow as a matter of justice. Despite her repeated attempts to distance herself from a 'distributive'
Wiewohl die Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen integraler Bestandteil von Kants ... more Wiewohl die Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen integraler Bestandteil von Kants transzendentalem Idealismus ist, begegnete man ihr nicht selten mit einigermaßen schroffer Ablehnung. Was darüber hinaus sicher nicht zur Popularität dieser Lehre beigetragen hat, ist die Tatsache, dass sich in den Texten Kants zwei verschiedene Modelle finden, die diese Unterscheidung erläutern sollen. Gewöhnlich werden diese Modelle die "Zwei-Aspekte-Lehre" und die "Zwei-Welten-Lehre" genannt, doch möglicherweise laden bereits diese Kennzeichnungen zu Missverständnissen ein und verunklären eher, was Kant mit dieser Unterscheidung im Sinn hatte. In diesem Aufsatz werde ich zunächst kurz diskutieren, wie diese beiden Modelle Kants auf passendere Weise beschrieben und bezeichnet werden können. Sodann werde ich untersuchen, welches der Modelle für die Auflösung der dritten Antinomie einschlägig ist. Kants Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen spielt eine Schlüsselrolle in seiner Lösung der Kompatibilitätsfrage in Bezug auf die menschliche Freiheit. Angesichts der außerordentlich wichtigen Bedeutung dieser Lösung für das kritische Programm insgesamt sind die dritte Antinomie und ihre Auflösung von daher ein idealer Testfall für ein korrektes Verständnis dieser Unterscheidung. Ich werde zu zeigen versuchen, dass Kant-obwohl sie inkompatibel zu sein scheinen-wohl tatsächlich beide Modelle in dieser entscheidenden Passage seines Werkes verwendet. So verstanden kann uns Kants Strategie zur Behandlung des Freiheitsproblems letztlich zeigen, wie die beiden anscheinend inkompatiblen Modelle nebeneinander bestehen können.
The movements of original sound and historical performance practice have altered the way we perce... more The movements of original sound and historical performance practice have altered the way we perceive the music of Bach and other composers of the Baroque era; in fact these movements functioned as an antidote to measuring the respective works against a system of aesthetic norms which were not theirs. The foundation of these approaches lay not only in accurate context reconstruction as to conventions and patterns of encoding musical ideas into scores and the specific norms governing the translation of musical scores into sound, but also in minute local history which uncovered the details of what-sometimes quite mediocre-material was at the disposition of the creative genius of the composer. There can be no doubt that in the case of Kant, his philosophy has often been pulled towards contemporary debates in philosophy, just like Bach's music had been performed in agreement with the norms of the Classic-Romantic era for many years. In what follows I shall try to attempt something like a reading of aspects of Kant's transcendental idealism ("TI") in a way comparable to an original sound performance of Bach. Needless to say, what I can attempt in such a small space is just a very rough sketch and not more than something like an outline of how such a type of reading might work. TI can be approached in various ways, one of which is the distinction of and the relationship between things in themselves and appearances, and I shall focus on just a few issues of this vast problem. The context relevant for our purposes is the specific condition, or if you will the philosophical climate, at Kçnigsberg University, more specifically the strength of Aristotelianism there, as the research summarized in
The focus of this paper will be on Kant and on a text which has often been drawn upon when talkin... more The focus of this paper will be on Kant and on a text which has often been drawn upon when talking about the present situation of philosophy at university, namely his The Conflict of the Faculties of 1798. Kant's claims, though not applicable to the contemporary situation directly, can indeed be worked out in a way which can assign a distinct and clearly identifiable role for university-based philosophy. I need to emphasize, though, that I am not suggesting that this is the only way Kant's thoughts in this respect can be adapted to and utilized for such an account. Quite the contrary, Kant's text offers a manifold of highly important options here. In my article I will seek to establish the following claims: a) Kant, in his later years, which therefore amounts to something like his "mature" position, subscribed to a conception of a public use of reason which mainly referred to the Faculties of Philosophy at universities. b) Kant's dismissal of philosophy according to the school conception of it must not be taken as a dismissal of academic philosophy altogether. Philosophy practiced at university by professionals is vital for Kant to build philosophy as a fully worked out discipline and to answer questions revolving around the issue of the compatibility of the theoretical standpoint and Kant's own moral theory. c) Neither a) nor b) can be immediately applied to the contemporary situation we find ourselves in. Combining elements of a) and b), however, a possible route for the actualization of Kant's ideas may open up. At least one of the functions for which university-based philosophy is uniquely qualified is the assessment of the implications of progress in the natural sciences for the conception of a moral standpoint in general, and as such for a core element of our self-understanding as rational beings.
In this exciting book, Marco Sgarbi traces the importance of the local context of philosophical a... more In this exciting book, Marco Sgarbi traces the importance of the local context of philosophical activities at Königsberg University in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century in order to understand the emergence of Kant’s critical philosophy, and it turns out that this context in large part thrived on doctrines originating in Aristotle. Rather than focusing on Aristotle himself, as the title suggests, the focus is actually on philosophers of relatively minor importance who were concerned with topics discussed in the Aristotelian corpus, sometimes expanding, sometimes developing, and interpreting these ideas in novel ways. In many cases, these philosophers had in turn been influenced by their predecessors of a similar attachment, so that a complex transmission and multifaceted variation of Aristotelian thought already occurred before Kant came into contact with it. Together with the excellent volumes in the Bloomsbury series ‘Kant’s Sources in Translation’ and the comprehensive background information on the texts in question provided in them, Sgarbi’s contribution helps evoke a fascinating overview of what had been going on philosophically in Kant’s immediate surroundings, beyond the radar of standard historiography of philosophy. Sgarbi has thus provided us with an important piece of a mosaic, which nonetheless is still far from complete. At first view Sgarbi’s strategy may seem to be at odds with the standing of Kant as a thinker of undisputed pre-eminence on the world stage of philosophy, given the alleged provincialism of Kant’s hometown. Whether Königsberg was indeed as small-town as often suggested – and a certain degree of what Karl Ameriks (2019: 279, n. 44) has described as ‘cultural provincialism’ is not unlikely (of which Kant himself, sadly enough, is sometimes guilty) – is not something I wish to address here. The point is rather that there are indeed significant examples of local context reconstruction which have turned out to be extremely helpful for broadening our understanding of works of genius in other fields, for example, music and art. Along this line of thought, Kant’s Königsberg turns out to be like Bach’s Leipzig and the specifics of musical performance practice there, or Dürer’s Nuremberg with its local medicophilosophical discourse on melancholy. Of the various traditions of philosophy in Königsberg, Sgarbi identifies two which stand out in particular for their Aristotelian leanings, namely philosophers influenced by Renaissance Aristotelianism on the one hand, especially the variant developed in Padua by Jacopo Zabarella and Giulio Pace, and Protestant scholastics on the other, such as Abraham Calov. It is Calov’s case which illustrates that, while Königsberg’s Albertina was a Lutheran University, something like an inter-confessional debate in philosophy was going on there, as it was Calov who introduced Francisco Suárez’s account of metaphysics there. The interest shown in Clemens Timpler also indicates an exchange with the Reformed wing of Protestantism. In any case, the
Wiewohl die Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen integraler Bestandteil von Kants ... more Wiewohl die Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen integraler Bestandteil von Kants transzendentalem Idealismus ist, begegnete man ihr nicht selten mit einigermaßen schroffer Ablehnung. Was darüber hinaus sicher nicht zur Popularität dieser Lehre beigetragen hat, ist die Tatsache, dass sich in den Texten Kants zwei verschiedene Modelle finden, die diese Unterscheidung erläutern sollen. Gewöhnlich werden diese Modelle die "Zwei-Aspekte-Lehre" und die "Zwei-Welten-Lehre" genannt, doch möglicherweise laden bereits diese Kennzeichnungen zu Missverständnissen ein und verunklären eher, was Kant mit dieser Unterscheidung im Sinn hatte. In diesem Aufsatz werde ich zunächst kurz diskutieren, wie diese beiden Modelle Kants auf passendere Weise beschrieben und bezeichnet werden können. Sodann werde ich untersuchen, welches der Modelle für die Auflösung der dritten Antinomie einschlägig ist. Kants Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen spielt eine Schlüsselrolle in seiner Lösung der Kompatibilitätsfrage in Bezug auf die menschliche Freiheit. Angesichts der außerordentlich wichtigen Bedeutung dieser Lösung für das kritische Programm insgesamt sind die dritte Antinomie und ihre Auflösung von daher ein idealer Testfall für ein korrektes Verständnis dieser Unterscheidung. Ich werde zu zeigen versuchen, dass Kant-obwohl sie inkompatibel zu sein scheinen-wohl tatsächlich beide Modelle in dieser entscheidenden Passage seines Werkes verwendet. So verstanden kann uns Kants Strategie zur Behandlung des Freiheitsproblems letztlich zeigen, wie die beiden anscheinend inkompatiblen Modelle nebeneinander bestehen können.
Getting it wrong? An overview of the central arguments for Mackie's error theory Sub Title Au... more Getting it wrong? An overview of the central arguments for Mackie's error theory Sub Title Author Ertl, Wolfgang Publisher Centre for Advanced Research on Logic and Sensibility The Global Centers of Excellence Program, Keio University Publication year 2011 Jtitle CARLS series of advanced study of logic and sensibility Vol.4, (2010. ) ,p.383391 Abstract Notes Part 5 : Logic and Informatics Genre Research Paper URL https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=KO12002001-2011033 1-0383
In this exciting book, Marco Sgarbi traces the importance of the local context of philosophical a... more In this exciting book, Marco Sgarbi traces the importance of the local context of philosophical activities at Königsberg University in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century in order to understand the emergence of Kant’s critical philosophy, and it turns out that this context in large part thrived on doctrines originating in Aristotle. Rather than focusing on Aristotle himself, as the title suggests, the focus is actually on philosophers of relatively minor importance who were concerned with topics discussed in the Aristotelian corpus, sometimes expanding, sometimes developing, and interpreting these ideas in novel ways. In many cases, these philosophers had in turn been influenced by their predecessors of a similar attachment, so that a complex transmission and multifaceted variation of Aristotelian thought already occurred before Kant came into contact with it. Together with the excellent volumes in the Bloomsbury series ‘Kant’s Sources in Translation’ and the comprehensive background information on the texts in question provided in them, Sgarbi’s contribution helps evoke a fascinating overview of what had been going on philosophically in Kant’s immediate surroundings, beyond the radar of standard historiography of philosophy. Sgarbi has thus provided us with an important piece of a mosaic, which nonetheless is still far from complete. At first view Sgarbi’s strategy may seem to be at odds with the standing of Kant as a thinker of undisputed pre-eminence on the world stage of philosophy, given the alleged provincialism of Kant’s hometown. Whether Königsberg was indeed as small-town as often suggested – and a certain degree of what Karl Ameriks (2019: 279, n. 44) has described as ‘cultural provincialism’ is not unlikely (of which Kant himself, sadly enough, is sometimes guilty) – is not something I wish to address here. The point is rather that there are indeed significant examples of local context reconstruction which have turned out to be extremely helpful for broadening our understanding of works of genius in other fields, for example, music and art. Along this line of thought, Kant’s Königsberg turns out to be like Bach’s Leipzig and the specifics of musical performance practice there, or Dürer’s Nuremberg with its local medicophilosophical discourse on melancholy. Of the various traditions of philosophy in Königsberg, Sgarbi identifies two which stand out in particular for their Aristotelian leanings, namely philosophers influenced by Renaissance Aristotelianism on the one hand, especially the variant developed in Padua by Jacopo Zabarella and Giulio Pace, and Protestant scholastics on the other, such as Abraham Calov. It is Calov’s case which illustrates that, while Königsberg’s Albertina was a Lutheran University, something like an inter-confessional debate in philosophy was going on there, as it was Calov who introduced Francisco Suárez’s account of metaphysics there. The interest shown in Clemens Timpler also indicates an exchange with the Reformed wing of Protestantism. In any case, the
This book will be warmly greeted by the many political theorists who celebrate the politics of id... more This book will be warmly greeted by the many political theorists who celebrate the politics of identity and 'difference'. Toleration as Recognition seeks to co-opt the concept of toleration into serving a kind of super-liberalism, while excoriating liberalism itself. Elisabetta Galeotti 'revises' the concept of toleration by drawing on liberal neutrality, only to censure liberals for falling below the moral standards which the revised concept imposes. She thus aims to outflank liberals from the moral high ground, turning liberalism's moralizing aspirations against itself. This revision poses a puzzle. Galeotti initially formulates it thus: 'how can toleration be good if it involves putting up with what is disliked or disapproved of?' (p. 21). Put this way, the puzzle is familiar, and soluble. For one thing, the disapproval may be baseless, and so no real conundrum arises. Even if the practice in question warrants disapproval, there may be both pragmatic and principled reasons why it should not be forcibly stopped. But later on she comes up with a knottier version of the puzzle. This asks how tolerators can disapprove of a practice, yet also regard and treat it as valuable. In her response Galeotti cuts through the knot rather than untying it. Her account of toleration runs together political advocacy and philosophical argument. The political advocacy holds that certain groups, such as homosexuals and Muslims, have suffered unjust disadvantages which should be redressed by 'recognition': the public acceptance or affirmation of their worth. By contrast, she argues, the morally evacuated or would-be universal notions of citizenship favoured by liberals turn out in practice to perpetuate dominance and disadvantage, as do standard liberal accounts of toleration. So far this reiterates the familiar charge that liberal policies which aim to be impartial, e.g. by being 'colour-blind', or gender-neutral, in fact work to the advantage of society's most powerful groups. Galeotti's clearest example of this is the French headscarf affair of 1989, where the state policy of secularism in education was questioned after some Muslim schoolgirls were temporarily excluded from their classes for attending school in the Islamic headscarf. In place of the French Constitutional Court's pragmatic ruling on the affair, Galeotti seeks a political response which goes beyond the grudging acceptance allegedly offered by traditional liberal theories of toleration, and which publicly affirms the identity of Muslims as such. It follows with added force that disapproval of them is consigned to the political margin. Galeotti seems to think that ultimately these claims follow as a matter of justice. Despite her repeated attempts to distance herself from a 'distributive'
Wiewohl die Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen integraler Bestandteil von Kants ... more Wiewohl die Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen integraler Bestandteil von Kants transzendentalem Idealismus ist, begegnete man ihr nicht selten mit einigermaßen schroffer Ablehnung. Was darüber hinaus sicher nicht zur Popularität dieser Lehre beigetragen hat, ist die Tatsache, dass sich in den Texten Kants zwei verschiedene Modelle finden, die diese Unterscheidung erläutern sollen. Gewöhnlich werden diese Modelle die "Zwei-Aspekte-Lehre" und die "Zwei-Welten-Lehre" genannt, doch möglicherweise laden bereits diese Kennzeichnungen zu Missverständnissen ein und verunklären eher, was Kant mit dieser Unterscheidung im Sinn hatte. In diesem Aufsatz werde ich zunächst kurz diskutieren, wie diese beiden Modelle Kants auf passendere Weise beschrieben und bezeichnet werden können. Sodann werde ich untersuchen, welches der Modelle für die Auflösung der dritten Antinomie einschlägig ist. Kants Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen spielt eine Schlüsselrolle in seiner Lösung der Kompatibilitätsfrage in Bezug auf die menschliche Freiheit. Angesichts der außerordentlich wichtigen Bedeutung dieser Lösung für das kritische Programm insgesamt sind die dritte Antinomie und ihre Auflösung von daher ein idealer Testfall für ein korrektes Verständnis dieser Unterscheidung. Ich werde zu zeigen versuchen, dass Kant-obwohl sie inkompatibel zu sein scheinen-wohl tatsächlich beide Modelle in dieser entscheidenden Passage seines Werkes verwendet. So verstanden kann uns Kants Strategie zur Behandlung des Freiheitsproblems letztlich zeigen, wie die beiden anscheinend inkompatiblen Modelle nebeneinander bestehen können.
The movements of original sound and historical performance practice have altered the way we perce... more The movements of original sound and historical performance practice have altered the way we perceive the music of Bach and other composers of the Baroque era; in fact these movements functioned as an antidote to measuring the respective works against a system of aesthetic norms which were not theirs. The foundation of these approaches lay not only in accurate context reconstruction as to conventions and patterns of encoding musical ideas into scores and the specific norms governing the translation of musical scores into sound, but also in minute local history which uncovered the details of what-sometimes quite mediocre-material was at the disposition of the creative genius of the composer. There can be no doubt that in the case of Kant, his philosophy has often been pulled towards contemporary debates in philosophy, just like Bach's music had been performed in agreement with the norms of the Classic-Romantic era for many years. In what follows I shall try to attempt something like a reading of aspects of Kant's transcendental idealism ("TI") in a way comparable to an original sound performance of Bach. Needless to say, what I can attempt in such a small space is just a very rough sketch and not more than something like an outline of how such a type of reading might work. TI can be approached in various ways, one of which is the distinction of and the relationship between things in themselves and appearances, and I shall focus on just a few issues of this vast problem. The context relevant for our purposes is the specific condition, or if you will the philosophical climate, at Kçnigsberg University, more specifically the strength of Aristotelianism there, as the research summarized in
The focus of this paper will be on Kant and on a text which has often been drawn upon when talkin... more The focus of this paper will be on Kant and on a text which has often been drawn upon when talking about the present situation of philosophy at university, namely his The Conflict of the Faculties of 1798. Kant's claims, though not applicable to the contemporary situation directly, can indeed be worked out in a way which can assign a distinct and clearly identifiable role for university-based philosophy. I need to emphasize, though, that I am not suggesting that this is the only way Kant's thoughts in this respect can be adapted to and utilized for such an account. Quite the contrary, Kant's text offers a manifold of highly important options here. In my article I will seek to establish the following claims: a) Kant, in his later years, which therefore amounts to something like his "mature" position, subscribed to a conception of a public use of reason which mainly referred to the Faculties of Philosophy at universities. b) Kant's dismissal of philosophy according to the school conception of it must not be taken as a dismissal of academic philosophy altogether. Philosophy practiced at university by professionals is vital for Kant to build philosophy as a fully worked out discipline and to answer questions revolving around the issue of the compatibility of the theoretical standpoint and Kant's own moral theory. c) Neither a) nor b) can be immediately applied to the contemporary situation we find ourselves in. Combining elements of a) and b), however, a possible route for the actualization of Kant's ideas may open up. At least one of the functions for which university-based philosophy is uniquely qualified is the assessment of the implications of progress in the natural sciences for the conception of a moral standpoint in general, and as such for a core element of our self-understanding as rational beings.
In this exciting book, Marco Sgarbi traces the importance of the local context of philosophical a... more In this exciting book, Marco Sgarbi traces the importance of the local context of philosophical activities at Königsberg University in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century in order to understand the emergence of Kant’s critical philosophy, and it turns out that this context in large part thrived on doctrines originating in Aristotle. Rather than focusing on Aristotle himself, as the title suggests, the focus is actually on philosophers of relatively minor importance who were concerned with topics discussed in the Aristotelian corpus, sometimes expanding, sometimes developing, and interpreting these ideas in novel ways. In many cases, these philosophers had in turn been influenced by their predecessors of a similar attachment, so that a complex transmission and multifaceted variation of Aristotelian thought already occurred before Kant came into contact with it. Together with the excellent volumes in the Bloomsbury series ‘Kant’s Sources in Translation’ and the comprehensive background information on the texts in question provided in them, Sgarbi’s contribution helps evoke a fascinating overview of what had been going on philosophically in Kant’s immediate surroundings, beyond the radar of standard historiography of philosophy. Sgarbi has thus provided us with an important piece of a mosaic, which nonetheless is still far from complete. At first view Sgarbi’s strategy may seem to be at odds with the standing of Kant as a thinker of undisputed pre-eminence on the world stage of philosophy, given the alleged provincialism of Kant’s hometown. Whether Königsberg was indeed as small-town as often suggested – and a certain degree of what Karl Ameriks (2019: 279, n. 44) has described as ‘cultural provincialism’ is not unlikely (of which Kant himself, sadly enough, is sometimes guilty) – is not something I wish to address here. The point is rather that there are indeed significant examples of local context reconstruction which have turned out to be extremely helpful for broadening our understanding of works of genius in other fields, for example, music and art. Along this line of thought, Kant’s Königsberg turns out to be like Bach’s Leipzig and the specifics of musical performance practice there, or Dürer’s Nuremberg with its local medicophilosophical discourse on melancholy. Of the various traditions of philosophy in Königsberg, Sgarbi identifies two which stand out in particular for their Aristotelian leanings, namely philosophers influenced by Renaissance Aristotelianism on the one hand, especially the variant developed in Padua by Jacopo Zabarella and Giulio Pace, and Protestant scholastics on the other, such as Abraham Calov. It is Calov’s case which illustrates that, while Königsberg’s Albertina was a Lutheran University, something like an inter-confessional debate in philosophy was going on there, as it was Calov who introduced Francisco Suárez’s account of metaphysics there. The interest shown in Clemens Timpler also indicates an exchange with the Reformed wing of Protestantism. In any case, the
Wiewohl die Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen integraler Bestandteil von Kants ... more Wiewohl die Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen integraler Bestandteil von Kants transzendentalem Idealismus ist, begegnete man ihr nicht selten mit einigermaßen schroffer Ablehnung. Was darüber hinaus sicher nicht zur Popularität dieser Lehre beigetragen hat, ist die Tatsache, dass sich in den Texten Kants zwei verschiedene Modelle finden, die diese Unterscheidung erläutern sollen. Gewöhnlich werden diese Modelle die "Zwei-Aspekte-Lehre" und die "Zwei-Welten-Lehre" genannt, doch möglicherweise laden bereits diese Kennzeichnungen zu Missverständnissen ein und verunklären eher, was Kant mit dieser Unterscheidung im Sinn hatte. In diesem Aufsatz werde ich zunächst kurz diskutieren, wie diese beiden Modelle Kants auf passendere Weise beschrieben und bezeichnet werden können. Sodann werde ich untersuchen, welches der Modelle für die Auflösung der dritten Antinomie einschlägig ist. Kants Unterscheidung von Dingen an sich und Erscheinungen spielt eine Schlüsselrolle in seiner Lösung der Kompatibilitätsfrage in Bezug auf die menschliche Freiheit. Angesichts der außerordentlich wichtigen Bedeutung dieser Lösung für das kritische Programm insgesamt sind die dritte Antinomie und ihre Auflösung von daher ein idealer Testfall für ein korrektes Verständnis dieser Unterscheidung. Ich werde zu zeigen versuchen, dass Kant-obwohl sie inkompatibel zu sein scheinen-wohl tatsächlich beide Modelle in dieser entscheidenden Passage seines Werkes verwendet. So verstanden kann uns Kants Strategie zur Behandlung des Freiheitsproblems letztlich zeigen, wie die beiden anscheinend inkompatiblen Modelle nebeneinander bestehen können.
Getting it wrong? An overview of the central arguments for Mackie's error theory Sub Title Au... more Getting it wrong? An overview of the central arguments for Mackie's error theory Sub Title Author Ertl, Wolfgang Publisher Centre for Advanced Research on Logic and Sensibility The Global Centers of Excellence Program, Keio University Publication year 2011 Jtitle CARLS series of advanced study of logic and sensibility Vol.4, (2010. ) ,p.383391 Abstract Notes Part 5 : Logic and Informatics Genre Research Paper URL https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=KO12002001-2011033 1-0383
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