Papers by Samuel T . Segun
SpringerBriefs in philosophy, 2019
With recent advancements in the neurosciences, it is evident that formerly held presuppositions a... more With recent advancements in the neurosciences, it is evident that formerly held presuppositions about consciousness and mental properties may have been hurriedly put forward. Neurophilosophy draws the attention of philosophers to the relevance of neuroscientific data to tackling some of the trickiest topics in philosophy of mind such as self, mind-body, intentionality and the likes. There however remains an important frontier to be adequately addressed—consciousness. Aspects of consciousness such as objective—subjective experiences cannot be thoroughly captured under existing explanatory models. This explanatory gap creates what Chalmers called the hard problem of consciousness. In this work, I articulate the theory of equiphenomenalism as a proposal to addressing the explanatory gap of consciousness. Equiphenomenalism is an explanatory theory of consciousness that advocates a systematisation of private account or first-person account of conscious mental experiences. It asserts that a strictly materialist/physicalist explanation of consciousness that jettisons subjective conscious experience is incapable of addressing the problem of consciousness. With this model, I justify the reliability of first-person data in explaining conscious mental experiences, if and only if it correlates with objective accounts. To do this, I employ the method of conversational thinking to engage with previous positions in the field as well as the new theories in the other two essays in this book.
Ethics and Information Technology, Nov 27, 2020
This article introduces readers to the special issue on Selected Issues in the Ethics of Artifici... more This article introduces readers to the special issue on Selected Issues in the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. In this paper, I make a case for a wider outlook on the ethics of AI. So far, much of the engagements with the subject have come from Euro-American scholars with obvious influences from Western epistemic traditions. I demonstrate that socio-cultural features influence our conceptions of ethics and in this case the ethics of AI. The goal of this special issue is to entertain more diverse views, particularly those from Africa; it brings together six articles addressing pertinent issues in the ethics of AI. These articles address topics around artificial moral agency, patiency, personhood, social robotics, and the principle of explicability. These works offer unique contributions for and from an African perspective. I contend that a wider engagement with the ethics of AI is worthwhile as we anticipate a global deployment of artificial intelligence systems.
AI & society, Jun 29, 2020
Research into the ethics of artificial intelligence is often categorized into two subareas-robot ... more Research into the ethics of artificial intelligence is often categorized into two subareas-robot ethics and machine ethics. Many of the definitions and classifications of the subject matter of these subfields, as found in the literature, are conflated, which I seek to rectify. In this essay, I infer that using the term 'machine ethics' is too broad and glosses over issues that the term computational ethics best describes. I show that the subject of inquiry of computational ethics is of great value and indeed is an important frontier in developing ethical artificial intelligence systems (AIS). I also show that computational is a distinct, often neglected field in the ethics of AI. In contrast to much of the literature, I argue that the appellation 'machine ethics' does not sufficiently capture the entire project of embedding ethics into AI/S and hence the need for computational ethics. This essay is unique for two reasons; first, it offers a philosophical analysis of the subject of computational ethics that is not found in the literature. Second, it offers a finely grained analysis that shows the thematic distinction among robot ethics, machine ethics and computational ethics.
Ethics and Information Technology, 2020
This article introduces readers to the special issue on Selected Issues in the Ethics of Artifici... more This article introduces readers to the special issue on Selected Issues in the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. In this paper, I make a case for a wider outlook on the ethics of AI. So far, much of the engagements with the subject have come from Euro-American scholars with obvious influences from Western epistemic traditions. I demonstrate that socio-cultural features influence our conceptions of ethics and in this case the ethics of AI. The goal of this special issue is to entertain more diverse views, particularly those from Africa; it brings together six articles addressing pertinent issues in the ethics of AI. These articles address topics around artificial moral agency, patiency, personhood, social robotics, and the principle of explicability. These works offer unique contributions for and from an African perspective. I contend that a wider engagement with the ethics of AI is worthwhile as we anticipate a global deployment of artificial intelligence systems.
Journal of Law Policy and Globalization, 2014
Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, 2015
Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, 2015
Philosophy today is often regionalized unlike science and other disciplines. Thus we talk of West... more Philosophy today is often regionalized unlike science and other disciplines. Thus we talk of Western, Eastern, American and African Philosophy. To speak or write philosophy within the ambit of the prefix “African” would elicit two major responses. First is the affirmative response which believes that indeed there exists some form of philosophy in Africa although distinct from Western philosophy in approach, procedure and methods but not in kind. The second is the denialist response which rejects vehemently the position of the former; in that they deny the existence of African philosophy independent of Western colouration. In other words, they do not believe that there exists any form of philosophy distinct from the Western idea of philosophy be it in approach or method. Within this frame certain problems arise such as the problem of interpretation or definition, the myth of unanimity and the problem of ethnophilosophy. The aim of this work thus is to understand the implications of t...
With recent advancements in the neurosciences, it is evident that formerly held presuppositions a... more With recent advancements in the neurosciences, it is evident that formerly held presuppositions about consciousness and mental properties may have been hurriedly put forward. Neurophilosophy draws the attention of philosophers to the relevance of neuroscientific data to tackling some of the trickiest topics in philosophy of mind such as self, mind-body, intentionality and the likes. There however remains an important frontier to be adequately addressed—consciousness. Aspects of consciousness such as objective—subjective experiences cannot be thoroughly captured under existing explanatory models. This explanatory gap creates what Chalmers called the hard problem of consciousness. In this work, I articulate the theory of equiphenomenalism as a proposal to addressing the explanatory gap of consciousness. Equiphenomenalism is an explanatory theory of consciousness that advocates a systematisation of private account or first-person account of conscious mental experiences. It asserts that...
SpringerBriefs in Philosophy
Research into the ethics of artificial intelligence is often categorized into two subareas-robot ... more Research into the ethics of artificial intelligence is often categorized into two subareas-robot ethics and machine ethics. Many of the definitions and classifications of the subject matter of these subfields, as found in the literature, are conflated, which I seek to rectify. In this essay, I infer that using the term 'machine ethics' is too broad and glosses over issues that the term computational ethics best describes. I show that the subject of inquiry of computational ethics is of great value and indeed is an important frontier in developing ethical artificial intelligence systems (AIS). I also show that computational is a distinct, often neglected field in the ethics of AI. In contrast to much of the literature, I argue that the appellation 'machine ethics' does not sufficiently capture the entire project of embedding ethics into AI/S and hence the need for computational ethics. This essay is unique for two reasons; first, it offers a philosophical analysis of the subject of computational ethics that is not found in the literature. Second, it offers a finely grained analysis that shows the thematic distinction among robot ethics, machine ethics and computational ethics.
This article introduces readers to the special issue on Selected Issues in the Ethics of Artifici... more This article introduces readers to the special issue on Selected Issues in the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. In this paper, I make a case for a wider outlook on the ethics of AI. So far, much of the engagements with the subject have come from Euro-American scholars with obvious influences from Western epistemic traditions. I demonstrate that socio-cultural features influence our conceptions of ethics and in this case the ethics of AI. The goal of this special issue is to entertain more diverse views, particularly those from Africa; it brings together six articles addressing pertinent issues in the ethics of AI. These articles address topics around artificial moral agency, patiency, personhood, social robotics, and the principle of explicability. These works offer unique contributions for and from an African perspective. I contend that a wider engagement with the ethics of AI is worthwhile as we anticipate a global deployment of artificial intelligence systems.
This paper is an exercise in Comparative Philosophy in that it attempts to compare the idea of Na... more This paper is an exercise in Comparative Philosophy in that it attempts to compare the idea of Natural Law which is the basis of the Natural Law theory in Western Jurisprudential thinking with a similar idea which occurs in Traditional African Jurisprudential thought. Thus the paper traverses the areas of Philosophy of law and Jurisprudence and of African philosophy. The thesis of this paper is that criticisms of the Natural Law theory or the Natural Law school of Jurisprudence does not imply that it has not contributed to the development of law and the legal system. It still does. The paper contends that Natural Law ideas have not only influenced the evolution of positive law, but in many cases have come to form part of it. The paper affirms the point that indeed, traditional African jurisprudence in which the metaphysical, the religious, the moral, the political and the legal are unified and which recognizes two realms of law, one resting on human authority and the other claiming divine or natural origin and therefore entitled to supremacy over the former – must have its origin in the same considerations which ground Western Natural Law theory.
Chimakonam’s brilliantly pieced article on Interrogatory Theory is his idea of a viable social ph... more Chimakonam’s brilliantly pieced article on Interrogatory Theory is his idea of a viable social philosophy for postcolonial Africa. The article is structured into two broad aspects namely: (i) Interrogatory Theory and (ii) Conversational order in African philosophy. Our attention in this critique will be on the first.
Philosophy today is often regionalized unlike science and other disciplines. Thus we talk of West... more Philosophy today is often regionalized unlike science and other disciplines. Thus we talk of Western, Eastern, American and African Philosophy. To speak or write philosophy within the ambit of the prefix " African " would elicit two major responses. First is the affirmative response which believes that indeed there exists some form of philosophy in Africa although distinct from Western philosophy in approach, procedure and methods but not in kind. The second is the denialist response which rejects vehemently the position of the former; in that they deny the existence of African philosophy independent of Western colouration. In other words, they do not believe that there exists any form of philosophy distinct from the Western idea of philosophy be it in approach or method. Within this frame certain problems arise such as the problem of interpretation or definition, the myth of unanimity and the problem of ethnophilosophy. The aim of this work thus is to understand the implications of the prefix " African " for philosophy in Africa. In this attempt, we uncover the subject of African Philosophy, its many possibilities, nature and interpretations. In understanding the implications of the prefix " African " for philosophy in Africa, the work avers that the affirmative response in modern times is an advocacy for what Chimakonam refers to as systematic African philosophy; and the denialist response to the subject is an outright rejection of the universal character of philosophy. For the laws of logic, the burden of axiology, the questions of metaphysics, the problems of socio-political philosophy and the concerns of epistemology all transcend geographical boundaries.
Drafts by Samuel T . Segun
The possibility of what today is called African philosophy is predicated upon early debates for s... more The possibility of what today is called African philosophy is predicated upon early debates for survival by African scholars against ethnocentric-driven western literature. Placide Tempels’ ground breaking book “Bantu Philosophy” undoubtedly ushered in a new trend in western study of Africa and her philosophy. This unfortunate trend has greatly militated against the growth of African Philosophy. The adverse effect of Tempels’ book is what we refer to in this work as the ‘Tempelsian damage’. This work argues against all misinterpretations of African philosophy -its essence and importance. In no small way have I rejected Tempels’ categorisation of the philosophy of the Bantus (in particular) to imply the philosophy of Africa (in general). Evident in this work is a rejection of Tempels’ claim of the absence of criticalness in Bantu thought as oppose to that obtainable in western philosophies. The damages incurred by formalised and documented African philosophy was succinctly captured and attempts were made at reconstructing this ‘Tempelsian damage’ using Asouzu’s complementary principle.
KEY WORDS: African Philosophy, Tempelsian damage, Bantu philosophy, Criticalness
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Papers by Samuel T . Segun
Drafts by Samuel T . Segun
KEY WORDS: African Philosophy, Tempelsian damage, Bantu philosophy, Criticalness
KEY WORDS: African Philosophy, Tempelsian damage, Bantu philosophy, Criticalness