Deconstruction, la déconstruction, is a term invented by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida i... more Deconstruction, la déconstruction, is a term invented by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida in the mid-1960's to describe his own practice of reading, writing, and thinking. It indicates the deriving or construction of some thought, or inscription, by way of taking apart a previously existing expression, viewpoint, or text. In Derrida's case, that something else was initially what he termed Western metaphysics, in part tidying up Heidegger's pathbreaking conception of that formation, by viewing metaphysics as defined by the privileging of presence in all its forms: the temporal present, presence to self, and so on. Heidegger's early project of the Destruktion of Western metaphysics, announced in Being and Time, is thus often taken as a percursor to Derridean deconstruction, though significant differences between the two projects exist, as we shall see. Derrida's and Heidegger's thinking also part ways owing to the manner in which, from deconstruction on, Derrida's project lends itself to appropriations outside the field of philosophy. (Deconstruction is but one of a number of characterizations that Derrida offers of his style of working, one most associated with the first years of his appearance as a thinker; at the same time, deconstruction proves the single term most applicable to his work as a whole.) The most notable, and earliest of these deconstructive offshoots appeared in literary studies. Versions of deconstruction and Derrida's endeavor subsequently surface in art criticism, architecture, and legal theory, to name but these. What Derrida's deconstruction yields, accordingly, has no home in any single discipline, including philosophy, despite the exemplary and even singular role philosophy's tradition and texts play in Derrida's thinking. Deconstruction makes its force felt in history and historical studies, too, and this also relatively early. The work in which deconstruction first appears, Derrida's 1966 De la Grammatologie was translated into English by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Derrida's project
“Historicity and Holism: The Example of Deleuze” charts new directions for work in the humanities... more “Historicity and Holism: The Example of Deleuze” charts new directions for work in the humanities, by offering a relatively novel conception of history as a framework for intellectual work (historicity), derived from a relatively novel view of language found in the early Heidegger and some analytic philosophy (holism). To this end, various phases of the project of Gilles Deleuze are examined. First, Deleuze’s setting out of (transcendental) genesis and becoming in the early works is interrogated and shown to be subtended by a dualism that potentially makes such becoming inconceivable (as Felix Guattari in his own way suggested in his essay “Machine and Structure”). Secondly, Deleuze’s approach to discourse, with its privileging of sense, is contrasted to Heidegger’s referential and world-based treatment of speech in Being and Time. On these bases, a new configuration of history, becoming, and truth (historicity) is expounded at the beginning of this paper’s final section, the workings of which are there further disclosed through a treatment of Deleuze and Guattari’s account of stratigraphy in their What Is Philosophy? Stratigraphy begins to model the operation of historicity, though it must be corrected, as stratigraphy, an inherently spatial concept, ultimately retreats from what historicity implies in respect to truth and time.
Attention to literature, it is commonly believed, is attention to how what is said is said, along... more Attention to literature, it is commonly believed, is attention to how what is said is said, along with what is said. Whether understood as New Critical irony, deconstructive textuality, the referential density of literary discourse in the new historicism, or the overdetermined signifier of cultural studies and ideology critique, the foregrounding of the way in which discourse comes to expression-to the point of breaking the confines of the volume and surmounting the identity of the author-distinguishes literature as an object, and literary studies as a discipline, from all others, such as philosophy or history. Less reflected upon, however, is whether such a distinction rebounds upon literary criticism itself. Beyond this minimal correlation of literary criticism and its object, is there a way of saying, a how of discourse, appropriate to literary critical work-a stance, a voice, a texture most suitable to its own positioning? The specifically political valences and reference points of contemporary criticism make this question an urgent one. Though such political concerns most often have emerged intertwined with the ongoing preoccupations of literary studies just identified, as the political stakes of literary criticism become more dominant, the question arises of how literary studies itself speaks, and, in particular, of its ability to speak to the widest possible audience. Does a tension, a conflict potentially exist, then, between literary criticism's political aspirations and its attention to the texture of the text, to the how of its saying? The ongoing fascination with the work of Edmund Wilson suggests that it might. Wilson looms as the Ur-cultural critic, writing before cultural criticism per se existed in a North American context. And his texts-exemplifying a criticism at once able to speak to a wide audience, to a large segment of our actually existing political community, yet always informed, thoughtful, judicious-are perennially held up as a corrective for all that is said to be lacking in contemporary critical discourse. 1 Indeed, Russell Jacoby, decrying the inability of the humanities to intervene in a wider public sphere, originally modeled the notion of the 'public intellectual' upon Wilson. 2 Wilson, moreover, can seem strong where literary studies may appear weak: in respect to its mode of address, with regard to the relation of its political aspirations to their putative audience, in a word, in respect to criticism's pragmatics (which is the technical name for the study of a discourse's relation to its audience). 3 One need only look at the advertisements of university presses in an issue of, say, the New York Review of Books to register this concern. Such presses consistently promote historical rather than literary scholarship, believing that unalloyed history garners more attention from the reading public, a practice that indeed suggests that the reach of contemporary literary studies may be somewhat attenuated. The knottiness of this problem, however-the difficulty of evaluating if something really has gone wrong with literary studies' relation to its audience, and if so, identifying what that something may be-also makes itself felt within the sphere of Wilson criticism, in the work of a scholar who has done as much as anyone recently to keep Wilson's work before our attention: Louis Menand. Menand, in a 2005 piece on Wilson, distinguished Wilson's work from that of contemporary literary criticism on the following basis. Wilson, unlike academic literary critics, Menand claimed, could not "give attention to the idea that literature is overdetermined, that a text is shaped by forces in the language and the culture that can multiply and ambiguate its meanings, and that can make it party to the very conditions that its author is attempting to criticize or transcend." 4 Yet insofar as Menand, one of our most widely read academic literary critics, himself never supplies this sort of attention to texts-his own corpus being almost self-avowedly Wilsonian-the possibility arises that Wilson's oversight is indeed a necessary one, and that what Menand himself concedes to be a defining characteristic of literary critical work
ABSTRACT“Talk! as Historical Practice” proposes a conception of our insertion into history, and t... more ABSTRACT“Talk! as Historical Practice” proposes a conception of our insertion into history, and thus the practice of historiography, by way of denying the existence of language as commonly understood: as a pregiven repository of words, signifieds, signifiers, and/or grammars regulative of communication and understanding. (To distinguish this more radical, discourse‐based conception, in part drawn from Donald Davidson's writings, from those of French discourse theory, it employs the neologism “talk!.”) In addition to sketching a version of talk!, this paper argues for its centrality for those writing history. Talk!, for one, gives a vantage point on the past and its relation to the rest of temporality, alternative to that held in common by two leading contemporary theorists, otherwise deeply opposed: Frank Ankersmit and Ethan Kleinberg. Second, it makes available new possibilities for historical practice, as here illustrated by a persusal of Henry Adams's The Education of Henry Adams, and some of his other late works. Adams's autobiography enshrines an externalist, talk!‐based view of his own past utterances and experiences; hence, he writes of himself only in the third person, as what he calls “the manikin.” In this instance and others, this approach lets Adams craft a unique kind of hyperbole, through which he presents a version of history as the medium of everything that happens and all who exist, within a modernity broken into ever more rapidly occurring epochs. Talk!, as here construed, ultimately questions modernity and all other periods and epochs, descending from “big picture” history. Adams's template, I thus argue in conclusion, may serve as a limit case for many more recent viewpoints.
Deconstruction, la déconstruction, is a term invented by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida i... more Deconstruction, la déconstruction, is a term invented by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida in the mid-1960's to describe his own practice of reading, writing, and thinking. It indicates the deriving or construction of some thought, or inscription, by way of taking apart a previously existing expression, viewpoint, or text. In Derrida's case, that something else was initially what he termed Western metaphysics, in part tidying up Heidegger's pathbreaking conception of that formation, by viewing metaphysics as defined by the privileging of presence in all its forms: the temporal present, presence to self, and so on. Heidegger's early project of the Destruktion of Western metaphysics, announced in Being and Time, is thus often taken as a percursor to Derridean deconstruction, though significant differences between the two projects exist, as we shall see. Derrida's and Heidegger's thinking also part ways owing to the manner in which, from deconstruction on, Derrida's project lends itself to appropriations outside the field of philosophy. (Deconstruction is but one of a number of characterizations that Derrida offers of his style of working, one most associated with the first years of his appearance as a thinker; at the same time, deconstruction proves the single term most applicable to his work as a whole.) The most notable, and earliest of these deconstructive offshoots appeared in literary studies. Versions of deconstruction and Derrida's endeavor subsequently surface in art criticism, architecture, and legal theory, to name but these. What Derrida's deconstruction yields, accordingly, has no home in any single discipline, including philosophy, despite the exemplary and even singular role philosophy's tradition and texts play in Derrida's thinking. Deconstruction makes its force felt in history and historical studies, too, and this also relatively early. The work in which deconstruction first appears, Derrida's 1966 De la Grammatologie was translated into English by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Derrida's project
“Historicity and Holism: The Example of Deleuze” charts new directions for work in the humanities... more “Historicity and Holism: The Example of Deleuze” charts new directions for work in the humanities, by offering a relatively novel conception of history as a framework for intellectual work (historicity), derived from a relatively novel view of language found in the early Heidegger and some analytic philosophy (holism). To this end, various phases of the project of Gilles Deleuze are examined. First, Deleuze’s setting out of (transcendental) genesis and becoming in the early works is interrogated and shown to be subtended by a dualism that potentially makes such becoming inconceivable (as Felix Guattari in his own way suggested in his essay “Machine and Structure”). Secondly, Deleuze’s approach to discourse, with its privileging of sense, is contrasted to Heidegger’s referential and world-based treatment of speech in Being and Time. On these bases, a new configuration of history, becoming, and truth (historicity) is expounded at the beginning of this paper’s final section, the workings of which are there further disclosed through a treatment of Deleuze and Guattari’s account of stratigraphy in their What Is Philosophy? Stratigraphy begins to model the operation of historicity, though it must be corrected, as stratigraphy, an inherently spatial concept, ultimately retreats from what historicity implies in respect to truth and time.
Attention to literature, it is commonly believed, is attention to how what is said is said, along... more Attention to literature, it is commonly believed, is attention to how what is said is said, along with what is said. Whether understood as New Critical irony, deconstructive textuality, the referential density of literary discourse in the new historicism, or the overdetermined signifier of cultural studies and ideology critique, the foregrounding of the way in which discourse comes to expression-to the point of breaking the confines of the volume and surmounting the identity of the author-distinguishes literature as an object, and literary studies as a discipline, from all others, such as philosophy or history. Less reflected upon, however, is whether such a distinction rebounds upon literary criticism itself. Beyond this minimal correlation of literary criticism and its object, is there a way of saying, a how of discourse, appropriate to literary critical work-a stance, a voice, a texture most suitable to its own positioning? The specifically political valences and reference points of contemporary criticism make this question an urgent one. Though such political concerns most often have emerged intertwined with the ongoing preoccupations of literary studies just identified, as the political stakes of literary criticism become more dominant, the question arises of how literary studies itself speaks, and, in particular, of its ability to speak to the widest possible audience. Does a tension, a conflict potentially exist, then, between literary criticism's political aspirations and its attention to the texture of the text, to the how of its saying? The ongoing fascination with the work of Edmund Wilson suggests that it might. Wilson looms as the Ur-cultural critic, writing before cultural criticism per se existed in a North American context. And his texts-exemplifying a criticism at once able to speak to a wide audience, to a large segment of our actually existing political community, yet always informed, thoughtful, judicious-are perennially held up as a corrective for all that is said to be lacking in contemporary critical discourse. 1 Indeed, Russell Jacoby, decrying the inability of the humanities to intervene in a wider public sphere, originally modeled the notion of the 'public intellectual' upon Wilson. 2 Wilson, moreover, can seem strong where literary studies may appear weak: in respect to its mode of address, with regard to the relation of its political aspirations to their putative audience, in a word, in respect to criticism's pragmatics (which is the technical name for the study of a discourse's relation to its audience). 3 One need only look at the advertisements of university presses in an issue of, say, the New York Review of Books to register this concern. Such presses consistently promote historical rather than literary scholarship, believing that unalloyed history garners more attention from the reading public, a practice that indeed suggests that the reach of contemporary literary studies may be somewhat attenuated. The knottiness of this problem, however-the difficulty of evaluating if something really has gone wrong with literary studies' relation to its audience, and if so, identifying what that something may be-also makes itself felt within the sphere of Wilson criticism, in the work of a scholar who has done as much as anyone recently to keep Wilson's work before our attention: Louis Menand. Menand, in a 2005 piece on Wilson, distinguished Wilson's work from that of contemporary literary criticism on the following basis. Wilson, unlike academic literary critics, Menand claimed, could not "give attention to the idea that literature is overdetermined, that a text is shaped by forces in the language and the culture that can multiply and ambiguate its meanings, and that can make it party to the very conditions that its author is attempting to criticize or transcend." 4 Yet insofar as Menand, one of our most widely read academic literary critics, himself never supplies this sort of attention to texts-his own corpus being almost self-avowedly Wilsonian-the possibility arises that Wilson's oversight is indeed a necessary one, and that what Menand himself concedes to be a defining characteristic of literary critical work
ABSTRACT“Talk! as Historical Practice” proposes a conception of our insertion into history, and t... more ABSTRACT“Talk! as Historical Practice” proposes a conception of our insertion into history, and thus the practice of historiography, by way of denying the existence of language as commonly understood: as a pregiven repository of words, signifieds, signifiers, and/or grammars regulative of communication and understanding. (To distinguish this more radical, discourse‐based conception, in part drawn from Donald Davidson's writings, from those of French discourse theory, it employs the neologism “talk!.”) In addition to sketching a version of talk!, this paper argues for its centrality for those writing history. Talk!, for one, gives a vantage point on the past and its relation to the rest of temporality, alternative to that held in common by two leading contemporary theorists, otherwise deeply opposed: Frank Ankersmit and Ethan Kleinberg. Second, it makes available new possibilities for historical practice, as here illustrated by a persusal of Henry Adams's The Education of Henry Adams, and some of his other late works. Adams's autobiography enshrines an externalist, talk!‐based view of his own past utterances and experiences; hence, he writes of himself only in the third person, as what he calls “the manikin.” In this instance and others, this approach lets Adams craft a unique kind of hyperbole, through which he presents a version of history as the medium of everything that happens and all who exist, within a modernity broken into ever more rapidly occurring epochs. Talk!, as here construed, ultimately questions modernity and all other periods and epochs, descending from “big picture” history. Adams's template, I thus argue in conclusion, may serve as a limit case for many more recent viewpoints.
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