Papers by UMBERTO MAIONCHI
DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals), 2018
it is possible to figure out how the phenomenological tradition, from its early stages, has origi... more it is possible to figure out how the phenomenological tradition, from its early stages, has originally approached the mind-body problem underlying the opportunity to develop an interactive conception based on the assumption of a radical interweaving between the experiential and the bodily domains. According to this view, perceptive experience can be conceived as a method through which the subject travels in the environment following his motor intentions and exploiting his skillful knowledge of the sensorimotor constraints that link the execution of a goal oriented action to the variation of the phenomenal features. Working on the clarification of the notion of embodiment we have the opportunity to cease to unreflectively privilege only one possible explanation of our experience. The human mind, observed through the lenses of embodiment, emerges at the interface of the brain, the body, the material and social environment. This is an inextricable mash influencing all aspects of our life. We are agents whose nature is fixed by a complex interaction involving our personal experience, a particular kind of physical embodiment and a certain embedding in the environment. This very combination of experience, flesh and environment is the main character of our being in the world. The assumption of agency as a critical aspect of our experience motivates the introduction of another classical philosophical problem such as that concerning the notion of free will. We usually consider human beings natural organisms that are morally responsible for their own actions. Yet this assumption represents one of the most intriguing puzzles that, from ancient Greece to the contemporary era, has absorbed philosophers and scientists of every kind. Are we really free agents? What does our subjective experience of agency reveal to us? And how do these questions relate to the fact that we are natural embodied beings? Except in cases where we are physically constrained, we consider ourselves free beings that think, believe and act autonomously, that is, according to the states of consciousness that characterize our own mental life. We consider ourselves responsible for our own acts because we perceive ourselves as being able to freely project the actions that our body can perform. Accordingly, the possibility of a free choice appears to be strictly related to the possibility of assigning independence to a particular domain such as our subjective consciousness. The subjective sense of agency, that is, the feeling that we control our own movements and actions, is certainly an essential, constant element of our XII Humana.Mente-Issue 15-January 2011 a radical indeterminacy characterizes a decision-making process cannot secure a condition for rational, responsible free actions. After having introduced and replied to some major objections to libertarianism, Zhu provides an interesting account of how indeterminism can be considered a freedom-enhancing condition, arguing for what he calls a deliberative libertarianism. According to Zhu, indeterminacy, instead of being an obstacle to the libertarian's purposes, can be considered a crucial element of creativity that plays a critical role in practical deliberations and problem solving. Three contributions from our call for papers conclude the Papers Section of the volume. They have been selected through a blind review process from among many other contributions we received. The first of them, by Liz Disley, emphasizes the role of social interactions in self-perception. The author focuses on the phenomenological experience of collective work as a paradigmatic example of intersubjectivity and human interaction. Following suggestions from Hegel, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, Disley argues that the experience of physical work can improve one's own capacity for intersubjectivity, thus enhancing the role of the agent's embodied nature. The second paper, by Susi Ferrarello, focuses on the notion of practical intentionality and investigates how it affects a decision-making process. Relying on a phenomenological approach, combining Husserl's theory of knowledge with Husserl's conception of will, the author defines a balance between logical and practical acts, showing how logical reason is necessary to give voice to our knowledge of reality, while practical reason is the starting point for every logical act. Finally, David Vender's paper focuses on the role of acquired skills as emblematic aspects of action. According to the author, we do not have to be fully aware of our contribution to an action for it to count as a genuine act, nor do we necessitate a rational justification of it, but we must be able to adapt ourselves to the perceived situation. In view of that, Vender points out the critical role of balancing underlying perceptual and bodily orientation in executing complex actions. As usual, we are also publishing a series of commentaries that provide new takes on well-established texts. They offer new, challenging arguments on the timeless questions concerning theory of agency and free will. Commentaries in this issue include the
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Papers by UMBERTO MAIONCHI