Three commonly applied trading mechanisms or methods to determine the terms of trade in general e... more Three commonly applied trading mechanisms or methods to determine the terms of trade in general equilibrium search or matching models are bargaining, auctions and price posting. It is known that, for instance, in search models of labour markets pairwise bargaining typically result in inefficient outcomes, while auctions result in efficient outcomes (eg. Jansen M. 1999 manuscript, Shimer R. 1999 manuscript). Similarly it is known that price posting results in efficient outcomes (eg. Acemoglu and Shimer 1999 IER, Peters M. 1984 Ecma). Further, Kultti (1999 GEB) shows that auctions and price posting are utilitywise equivalent mechanisms. In none of the above models there are basically any budget constraints, and the amount of production is fixed. To relax these assumptions I turn to the standard model of endogenous money (eg. Kiyotaki and Wright 1993 AER) where some agents are endowed with a unit of indivisible and intrinsically useless object, i.e. fiat money. The only way to trade in a monetary equilibrium is to exchange this unit of money to a consumption good. To get meaningful prices we assume that the amount of the good to be exchanged is a variable as it is assumed to be produced on the spot. To motivate anonymous monetary exchange, or the lack of credit relationships, it is assumed that the agents meet in a random manner. To make the study of different trading mechanisms meaningful it is assumed that the meetings are of many-to-one or urn-ball-type. The economy proceeds infinitely in discrete time. The agents are either in a role of buyers aka money holders, or sellers aka producers. Upon meeting the terms of trade, i.e. the amount produced is determined, and it depends on the trading mechanism. Bargaining is modelled non-strategically as a division of surplus using the Nash-bargaining solution. Price posting is a strategic game for sellers. The trade-off is that by lowering the posted price a seller attracts more buyers who choose mixed strategies determining which sellers to visit. We determine the Nash-equilibrium price. Auctions are of the second price sealed bid variety where the seller is assumed to be one of the participants. In the model the reservation values arise endogenously since the parties can always leave the current partner and wait for next period to meet new ones. We use specific functional forms to demonstrate that the there is basically no hope for any kind of equivalence results between any of the trading mechanisms. Further, it turns out that the trading mechanisms cannot be ordered in a welfare sense. Depending on the number of money holders any of them may be the most efficient. We also produce some illustrative numerical examples
Kuntien rahoitus nojautuu kolmeen asiaan: Verotuloihin, valtionosuuksiin ja toimintatuloi hin. Ve... more Kuntien rahoitus nojautuu kolmeen asiaan: Verotuloihin, valtionosuuksiin ja toimintatuloi hin. Verotuotot ovat pääosin kasvaneet kaikissa kuntaluokissa ja verolajeissa. Kuntien ve rotuotot muodostuvat käytännössä kolmesta verolajista eli kunnallisverosta, kiinteistöve rosta sekä yhteisöverosta. Koko maan tasolla noin 80 % kuntien verotuotoista tulee kun nallisverosta. Verotuotoissa vallitsevat erot kuntien välillä voidaan selittää hyvin kuntien taustamuuttujilla. Tutkimuksessa luotu tilastollinen malli selittää yli 90 % kuntien välillä vallitsevasta kunnal lisverotuottojen variaatiosta. Suomen väestön ikärakenteen kehitys näkyy selvästi tutki muksessa luoduissa verotuottoskenaarioissa. Verotuottojen kehityksen ennakoidaan ole van heikointa 2020-luvun loppupuoliskolla, jolloin ikärakenne Suomessa on heikoimmil laan. Kuntatalouden tasapainon ylläpito voi osoittautua haasteelliseksi, mikäli kustannuk set kasvavat samaa tahtia kuin tähän asti 2000-luvulla. Kuntien verojärjestelmää tulee...
This work is about the linkage between two important policies that play an important role in shap... more This work is about the linkage between two important policies that play an important role in shaping the future world. International trade is essential for the welfare of the world as well as for the welfare of different regions. Trade policies that different nations pursue are important for this reason. On the other hand economic activity that is needed to create goods and services for consumers unfortunately usually also causes pollution. The level of emissions has reached magnitudes such that actions to contain pollutants emitted from the production processes have been generally accepted to be necessary. Environmental policies to reduce emissions have moved to the next level at the international scene traditionally dominated by negotiations about trade liberalization due to the Kyoto-protocol. Both environmental and trade policies have attracted a lot of interest in the academic field. What has been so far largely neglected in the literature is the interaction of the two. It is e...
Aineistot ja arvioinnin toteutustapa Arviointi toteutettiin elokuusta 2013 ja maaliskuuhun 2014. ... more Aineistot ja arvioinnin toteutustapa Arviointi toteutettiin elokuusta 2013 ja maaliskuuhun 2014. Hyödynnetty aineisto on pääasiassa laadullista, mutta sisältää myös arvioinnissa toteutettujen sähköisten kyselyjen määrällistä analyysiä. Arvioinnin alkuvaiheen haastatteluissa kuultiin jätelain toteutuksen kannalta keskeisiä sidosryhmiä, muun muassa Kuntaliittoa, Jätelaitosyhdistystä, Suomen yrittäjiä, Elinkeinoelämän keskusliittoa, Ympäristöyritysten liittoa, Omakotiliittoa, Kiinteistöliittoa sekä aluehallintovirastojen sekä ELY-keskusten edustajia (haastatteluja kaikkiaan 18 kpl). Sähköiset kyselyt lähetettiin kolmelle viiteryhmälle, joita ovat jätealan yritykset, jätehuoltoviranomaiset sekä jätelaitokset. Ympäristöyritysten liitto, Suomen yrittäjät, Ympäristöteollisuus-ja palvelut, Kuntaliitto sekä Jätelaitosyhdistys välittivät kyselyihin liittyvän avoimen linkin omille vastaajatahoilleen. Kyselyt olivat varsin pitkiä ja eri intressiryhmillä oli voimakkaita odotuksia kyselyihin. Kyselyt olivat vastattavissa aikavälillä 1.11.2013-16.1.2014. Taulukko 1. Arvioinnin yhteydessä tehdyt kyselyt: lähetettyjen kyselyjen lukumäärä ja vastausprosentti kohderyhmittäin. Kysely Lähetetty kpl Vastausprosentti Kysely jätealan yrityksille Noin 250 24 % Kysely jätehuoltoviranomaisille 82 43 % Kysely jätelaitoksille Jätelaitosyhdistys, 35 Kuntaliiton kautta yksittäiset kunnat, 37 48 %
In this paper we analyse the problem why in many simulations of the impacts of the Kyoto agreemen... more In this paper we analyse the problem why in many simulations of the impacts of the Kyoto agreement Russia (or Former Soviet Union) appears to loose if the agreement is implemented via international emission permit markets even though with national implementation it cannot use its emission quota fully. We focus on the role of general equilibrium changes in world market prices as an explanation and show that it can, indeed, explain much of the welfare deterioration at least for Russia (Former Soviet Union). We base our quantitative analysis on the GTAP-E-model.
We quantify the costs of global climate change policies to Finland using a modified version of th... more We quantify the costs of global climate change policies to Finland using a modified version of the GTAP-E model. We calculate resource abundance profiles proposed by Leamer assuming emission rights to be new factor endowments to charcterize the impact of the Kyoto agreement on the distribution of the comparative advantage and to interpret the results. We estimate economy-level and detailed sector-specific effects of climate change policies without isolating Finland from world markets: changes in trade linkages are endogenously determined by global climate change policies. We produce a range of estimates by varying the regional coverage and the way of implementation of the climate treaty. When trade linkages are explicit, standard growth scenarios imply considerably higher emission reductions than previous studies.
Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications 2002 Isbn 84 472 0733 1 Pag 99, 2002
Three commonly applied trading mechanisms or methods to determine the terms of trade in general e... more Three commonly applied trading mechanisms or methods to determine the terms of trade in general equilibrium search or matching models are bargaining, auctions and price posting. It is known that, for instance, in search models of labour markets pairwise bargaining typically result in inefficient outcomes, while auctions result in efficient outcomes (eg. Jansen M. 1999 manuscript, Shimer R. 1999 manuscript). Similarly it is known that price posting results in efficient outcomes (eg. Acemoglu and Shimer 1999 IER, Peters M. 1984 Ecma). Further, Kultti (1999 GEB) shows that auctions and price posting are utilitywise equivalent mechanisms. In none of the above models there are basically any budget constraints, and the amount of production is fixed. To relax these assumptions I turn to the standard model of endogenous money (eg. Kiyotaki and Wright 1993 AER) where some agents are endowed with a unit of indivisible and intrinsically useless object, i.e. fiat money. The only way to trade in a monetary equilibrium is to exchange this unit of money to a consumption good. To get meaningful prices we assume that the amount of the good to be exchanged is a variable as it is assumed to be produced on the spot. To motivate anonymous monetary exchange, or the lack of credit relationships, it is assumed that the agents meet in a random manner. To make the study of different trading mechanisms meaningful it is assumed that the meetings are of many-to-one or urn-ball-type. The economy proceeds infinitely in discrete time. The agents are either in a role of buyers aka money holders, or sellers aka producers. Upon meeting the terms of trade, i.e. the amount produced is determined, and it depends on the trading mechanism. Bargaining is modelled non-strategically as a division of surplus using the Nash-bargaining solution. Price posting is a strategic game for sellers. The trade-off is that by lowering the posted price a seller attracts more buyers who choose mixed strategies determining which sellers to visit. We determine the Nash-equilibrium price. Auctions are of the second price sealed bid variety where the seller is assumed to be one of the participants. In the model the reservation values arise endogenously since the parties can always leave the current partner and wait for next period to meet new ones. We use specific functional forms to demonstrate that the there is basically no hope for any kind of equivalence results between any of the trading mechanisms. Further, it turns out that the trading mechanisms cannot be ordered in a welfare sense. Depending on the number of money holders any of them may be the most efficient. We also produce some illustrative numerical examples
The Kemp-Wan proposition on the existence of Pareto-improving customs union is extended by allowi... more The Kemp-Wan proposition on the existence of Pareto-improving customs union is extended by allowing the customs union to make trade agreements with non-members. We show that given some unused gains from trade a customs union improving its member' welfare with unchanged non-members' welfare exists as long as relative prices within the union and in some non-member country differ from each other. In this sense customs unions always have an incentive to build a multilateral harmonised trading system. In this system the customs union would reap all the gains from trade. This result contrasts with the original Kemp-Wan insight that customs unions can always expand with new members also increasing their welfare.
The changing role of trust in the New Economy forms an interesting research area. The purpose of ... more The changing role of trust in the New Economy forms an interesting research area. The purpose of this work is to contribute this area with a study that focuses on the role of banks in the New Economy. The major part of this work is a case study about three banks operating in Finland. The purpose is to analyse the effect that the ICT has had on the processes of these banks since the beginning of 1990s and analyse the mechanisms and processes of these banks from the perspective of trust. The work begins with a short theoretical part defining what is meant with the New Economy and trust and how the key elements of this work - the New Economy, trust and banking - are linked to each other from the perspective of economic growth. The key concept throughout the work is the changing role of trust in the New Economy. Our proposition is that the importance of trust is being emphasized in the New Econ- omy. Also the role of banks may be changing in the New Economy. We argue that banks can incr...
All opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ba... more All opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland.
Three commonly applied trading mechanisms or methods to determine the terms of trade in general e... more Three commonly applied trading mechanisms or methods to determine the terms of trade in general equilibrium search or matching models are bargaining, auctions and price posting. It is known that, for instance, in search models of labour markets pairwise bargaining typically result in inefficient outcomes, while auctions result in efficient outcomes (eg. Jansen M. 1999 manuscript, Shimer R. 1999 manuscript). Similarly it is known that price posting results in efficient outcomes (eg. Acemoglu and Shimer 1999 IER, Peters M. 1984 Ecma). Further, Kultti (1999 GEB) shows that auctions and price posting are utilitywise equivalent mechanisms. In none of the above models there are basically any budget constraints, and the amount of production is fixed. To relax these assumptions I turn to the standard model of endogenous money (eg. Kiyotaki and Wright 1993 AER) where some agents are endowed with a unit of indivisible and intrinsically useless object, i.e. fiat money. The only way to trade in a monetary equilibrium is to exchange this unit of money to a consumption good. To get meaningful prices we assume that the amount of the good to be exchanged is a variable as it is assumed to be produced on the spot. To motivate anonymous monetary exchange, or the lack of credit relationships, it is assumed that the agents meet in a random manner. To make the study of different trading mechanisms meaningful it is assumed that the meetings are of many-to-one or urn-ball-type. The economy proceeds infinitely in discrete time. The agents are either in a role of buyers aka money holders, or sellers aka producers. Upon meeting the terms of trade, i.e. the amount produced is determined, and it depends on the trading mechanism. Bargaining is modelled non-strategically as a division of surplus using the Nash-bargaining solution. Price posting is a strategic game for sellers. The trade-off is that by lowering the posted price a seller attracts more buyers who choose mixed strategies determining which sellers to visit. We determine the Nash-equilibrium price. Auctions are of the second price sealed bid variety where the seller is assumed to be one of the participants. In the model the reservation values arise endogenously since the parties can always leave the current partner and wait for next period to meet new ones. We use specific functional forms to demonstrate that the there is basically no hope for any kind of equivalence results between any of the trading mechanisms. Further, it turns out that the trading mechanisms cannot be ordered in a welfare sense. Depending on the number of money holders any of them may be the most efficient. We also produce some illustrative numerical examples
Kuntien rahoitus nojautuu kolmeen asiaan: Verotuloihin, valtionosuuksiin ja toimintatuloi hin. Ve... more Kuntien rahoitus nojautuu kolmeen asiaan: Verotuloihin, valtionosuuksiin ja toimintatuloi hin. Verotuotot ovat pääosin kasvaneet kaikissa kuntaluokissa ja verolajeissa. Kuntien ve rotuotot muodostuvat käytännössä kolmesta verolajista eli kunnallisverosta, kiinteistöve rosta sekä yhteisöverosta. Koko maan tasolla noin 80 % kuntien verotuotoista tulee kun nallisverosta. Verotuotoissa vallitsevat erot kuntien välillä voidaan selittää hyvin kuntien taustamuuttujilla. Tutkimuksessa luotu tilastollinen malli selittää yli 90 % kuntien välillä vallitsevasta kunnal lisverotuottojen variaatiosta. Suomen väestön ikärakenteen kehitys näkyy selvästi tutki muksessa luoduissa verotuottoskenaarioissa. Verotuottojen kehityksen ennakoidaan ole van heikointa 2020-luvun loppupuoliskolla, jolloin ikärakenne Suomessa on heikoimmil laan. Kuntatalouden tasapainon ylläpito voi osoittautua haasteelliseksi, mikäli kustannuk set kasvavat samaa tahtia kuin tähän asti 2000-luvulla. Kuntien verojärjestelmää tulee...
This work is about the linkage between two important policies that play an important role in shap... more This work is about the linkage between two important policies that play an important role in shaping the future world. International trade is essential for the welfare of the world as well as for the welfare of different regions. Trade policies that different nations pursue are important for this reason. On the other hand economic activity that is needed to create goods and services for consumers unfortunately usually also causes pollution. The level of emissions has reached magnitudes such that actions to contain pollutants emitted from the production processes have been generally accepted to be necessary. Environmental policies to reduce emissions have moved to the next level at the international scene traditionally dominated by negotiations about trade liberalization due to the Kyoto-protocol. Both environmental and trade policies have attracted a lot of interest in the academic field. What has been so far largely neglected in the literature is the interaction of the two. It is e...
Aineistot ja arvioinnin toteutustapa Arviointi toteutettiin elokuusta 2013 ja maaliskuuhun 2014. ... more Aineistot ja arvioinnin toteutustapa Arviointi toteutettiin elokuusta 2013 ja maaliskuuhun 2014. Hyödynnetty aineisto on pääasiassa laadullista, mutta sisältää myös arvioinnissa toteutettujen sähköisten kyselyjen määrällistä analyysiä. Arvioinnin alkuvaiheen haastatteluissa kuultiin jätelain toteutuksen kannalta keskeisiä sidosryhmiä, muun muassa Kuntaliittoa, Jätelaitosyhdistystä, Suomen yrittäjiä, Elinkeinoelämän keskusliittoa, Ympäristöyritysten liittoa, Omakotiliittoa, Kiinteistöliittoa sekä aluehallintovirastojen sekä ELY-keskusten edustajia (haastatteluja kaikkiaan 18 kpl). Sähköiset kyselyt lähetettiin kolmelle viiteryhmälle, joita ovat jätealan yritykset, jätehuoltoviranomaiset sekä jätelaitokset. Ympäristöyritysten liitto, Suomen yrittäjät, Ympäristöteollisuus-ja palvelut, Kuntaliitto sekä Jätelaitosyhdistys välittivät kyselyihin liittyvän avoimen linkin omille vastaajatahoilleen. Kyselyt olivat varsin pitkiä ja eri intressiryhmillä oli voimakkaita odotuksia kyselyihin. Kyselyt olivat vastattavissa aikavälillä 1.11.2013-16.1.2014. Taulukko 1. Arvioinnin yhteydessä tehdyt kyselyt: lähetettyjen kyselyjen lukumäärä ja vastausprosentti kohderyhmittäin. Kysely Lähetetty kpl Vastausprosentti Kysely jätealan yrityksille Noin 250 24 % Kysely jätehuoltoviranomaisille 82 43 % Kysely jätelaitoksille Jätelaitosyhdistys, 35 Kuntaliiton kautta yksittäiset kunnat, 37 48 %
In this paper we analyse the problem why in many simulations of the impacts of the Kyoto agreemen... more In this paper we analyse the problem why in many simulations of the impacts of the Kyoto agreement Russia (or Former Soviet Union) appears to loose if the agreement is implemented via international emission permit markets even though with national implementation it cannot use its emission quota fully. We focus on the role of general equilibrium changes in world market prices as an explanation and show that it can, indeed, explain much of the welfare deterioration at least for Russia (Former Soviet Union). We base our quantitative analysis on the GTAP-E-model.
We quantify the costs of global climate change policies to Finland using a modified version of th... more We quantify the costs of global climate change policies to Finland using a modified version of the GTAP-E model. We calculate resource abundance profiles proposed by Leamer assuming emission rights to be new factor endowments to charcterize the impact of the Kyoto agreement on the distribution of the comparative advantage and to interpret the results. We estimate economy-level and detailed sector-specific effects of climate change policies without isolating Finland from world markets: changes in trade linkages are endogenously determined by global climate change policies. We produce a range of estimates by varying the regional coverage and the way of implementation of the climate treaty. When trade linkages are explicit, standard growth scenarios imply considerably higher emission reductions than previous studies.
Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications 2002 Isbn 84 472 0733 1 Pag 99, 2002
Three commonly applied trading mechanisms or methods to determine the terms of trade in general e... more Three commonly applied trading mechanisms or methods to determine the terms of trade in general equilibrium search or matching models are bargaining, auctions and price posting. It is known that, for instance, in search models of labour markets pairwise bargaining typically result in inefficient outcomes, while auctions result in efficient outcomes (eg. Jansen M. 1999 manuscript, Shimer R. 1999 manuscript). Similarly it is known that price posting results in efficient outcomes (eg. Acemoglu and Shimer 1999 IER, Peters M. 1984 Ecma). Further, Kultti (1999 GEB) shows that auctions and price posting are utilitywise equivalent mechanisms. In none of the above models there are basically any budget constraints, and the amount of production is fixed. To relax these assumptions I turn to the standard model of endogenous money (eg. Kiyotaki and Wright 1993 AER) where some agents are endowed with a unit of indivisible and intrinsically useless object, i.e. fiat money. The only way to trade in a monetary equilibrium is to exchange this unit of money to a consumption good. To get meaningful prices we assume that the amount of the good to be exchanged is a variable as it is assumed to be produced on the spot. To motivate anonymous monetary exchange, or the lack of credit relationships, it is assumed that the agents meet in a random manner. To make the study of different trading mechanisms meaningful it is assumed that the meetings are of many-to-one or urn-ball-type. The economy proceeds infinitely in discrete time. The agents are either in a role of buyers aka money holders, or sellers aka producers. Upon meeting the terms of trade, i.e. the amount produced is determined, and it depends on the trading mechanism. Bargaining is modelled non-strategically as a division of surplus using the Nash-bargaining solution. Price posting is a strategic game for sellers. The trade-off is that by lowering the posted price a seller attracts more buyers who choose mixed strategies determining which sellers to visit. We determine the Nash-equilibrium price. Auctions are of the second price sealed bid variety where the seller is assumed to be one of the participants. In the model the reservation values arise endogenously since the parties can always leave the current partner and wait for next period to meet new ones. We use specific functional forms to demonstrate that the there is basically no hope for any kind of equivalence results between any of the trading mechanisms. Further, it turns out that the trading mechanisms cannot be ordered in a welfare sense. Depending on the number of money holders any of them may be the most efficient. We also produce some illustrative numerical examples
The Kemp-Wan proposition on the existence of Pareto-improving customs union is extended by allowi... more The Kemp-Wan proposition on the existence of Pareto-improving customs union is extended by allowing the customs union to make trade agreements with non-members. We show that given some unused gains from trade a customs union improving its member' welfare with unchanged non-members' welfare exists as long as relative prices within the union and in some non-member country differ from each other. In this sense customs unions always have an incentive to build a multilateral harmonised trading system. In this system the customs union would reap all the gains from trade. This result contrasts with the original Kemp-Wan insight that customs unions can always expand with new members also increasing their welfare.
The changing role of trust in the New Economy forms an interesting research area. The purpose of ... more The changing role of trust in the New Economy forms an interesting research area. The purpose of this work is to contribute this area with a study that focuses on the role of banks in the New Economy. The major part of this work is a case study about three banks operating in Finland. The purpose is to analyse the effect that the ICT has had on the processes of these banks since the beginning of 1990s and analyse the mechanisms and processes of these banks from the perspective of trust. The work begins with a short theoretical part defining what is meant with the New Economy and trust and how the key elements of this work - the New Economy, trust and banking - are linked to each other from the perspective of economic growth. The key concept throughout the work is the changing role of trust in the New Economy. Our proposition is that the importance of trust is being emphasized in the New Econ- omy. Also the role of banks may be changing in the New Economy. We argue that banks can incr...
All opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ba... more All opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland.
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Papers by Toni Riipinen