Preface 1. Clarke's Insight 2. A Normative Theory of Speech 3. The Moral Dimensions of Speech... more Preface 1. Clarke's Insight 2. A Normative Theory of Speech 3. The Moral Dimensions of Speech 4. Against the Mixed View: Part I 5. Against the Mixed View: Part II 6. Three Antirealist Views 7. Epistemic Implications Bibliography Index
This article considers the ethical dimensions of acts of assertion. Acts of assertion often have ... more This article considers the ethical dimensions of acts of assertion. Acts of assertion often have moral features, such as being wrong. In this regard, they are like many other familiar acts such as invasions of privacy and inflictions of bodily harm, which are also often wrong. But might assertion have an even more intimate link to moral reality than these other actions? Might it be that how things are ethically explains how it is that we could perform illocutionary acts such as asserting? A version of what the author calls the normative theory of speech answers in the affirmative. This view maintains that the performance of illocutionary acts such as asserting not only often have moral properties, such as being morally wrong, but also that there are cases in which moral facts explain (in part) how it is that agents can perform these acts. The article presents the rudiments of the normative theory of speech, paying attention to why it maintains that moral facts are among the features...
How should a religious person view the role of rights in the liberal polity? What should the role... more How should a religious person view the role of rights in the liberal polity? What should the role of religion be in public political discourse? Some prominent scholars have recently argued that religious persons ought to view the concept of a "right" as alien to a traditionally religious way of life. Others have suggested that there is no legitimate place for religious reasoning in public political discourse. Contributors to Religion in the Liberal Polity reject these positions by defending the claims that the concept of a "right" is central to traditional religion and that religious concerns belong in public political discourse. Part one of the collection addresses foundational issues of rights and authority. Nicholas Wolterstorff contends not only that rights exist, but that moral duties are determined by rights. Timothy P. Jackson raises the issue of how thinking about the imago dei may ground human rights issues for a Christian. John Hare explores whether the...
We develop an argument for a novel version of moral intuitionism centered on the claim that moral... more We develop an argument for a novel version of moral intuitionism centered on the claim that moral intuitions are trustworthy. Our argument employs an epistemic principle that we call the Trustworthiness Criterion, a distinctive feature of which is its emphasis on oft-neglected social dimensions of cognitive states, including non-doxastic attitudes such as intuition. Thus our argument is not that moral intuitions are trustworthy because they are regress-stoppers, or because they are innocent until proven guilty, or because denying their epistemic contribution would be self-defeating, or because they are presupposed in rational inference, or because they are analogous to perceptions, or because they are based on understanding-individualistic claims that have elsewhere been used (controversially) in defense of the thesis that moral intuitions are in good epistemic standing. Rather, our argument appeals to the idea that moral intuitions are trustworthy because they are the outputs of a cognitive practice, which has epistemically-fecund social elements, that is in good working order. This means that, as John Rawls writes in another context, if a person engaged in the practice is asked. .. to defend what he does, then his. .. defense lies in referring the questioner to the practice. 1 On our approach, the trustworthiness of moral intuitions is to be accounted for not in terms of features of the intuitions themselves, but by reference to the broader practice in which the agents who possess those intuitions are engaged. Our argument thus encourages a reorientation in philosophical work on moral intuitionism, which has largely operated within an individualistic framework. But first we must elucidate our notion of a moral intuition and get clear on what it is to be trustworthy. Once these clarifications are in place, we will be in a position to develop our argument that moral intuitions are trustworthy.
Thomas Reid's Essays on the Active Powers presents what is probably the most thoroughly devel... more Thomas Reid's Essays on the Active Powers presents what is probably the most thoroughly developed version of agent-causal libertarianism in the modern canon. While commentators today often acknowledge Reid's contribution, they typically focus on what appears to be a serious problem for the view: Reid appears to commit himself to a position according to which acting freely would require an agent to engage in an infinite number of exertions of active power. In this essay, we maintain that, properly understood, Reid's version of agent-causal libertarianism generates no regress of exertion. Our discussion begins by presenting Reid's account of free action and why it appears vulnerable to a worrisome regress. We then consider three attempts to address the regress in the contemporary literature offered by William Rowe, Gideon Yaffe, and James Van Cleve, which we find unsatisfactory. We then develop a solution to the worry—one that takes very seriously both what Reid means ...
A striking feature of the Eastern Orthodox liturgies is how much movement and touching occurs dur... more A striking feature of the Eastern Orthodox liturgies is how much movement and touching occurs during their performance. For example, when participants in these liturgies enter into a church building, they do not simply look at the icons; they typically venerate them by kissing them. Call events such as these scripted movement-touching sequences. The question I pursue in this article is why movement-touching sequences play such prominent roles in the performance of the Eastern liturgies. The answer I offer is that the performance of these actions has religious worth. I then consider two models that attempt to explain why the performance of scripted movement-touching sequences has religious worth. After exploring and rejecting what I call the instrumentalist model, I develop what I term the authorization-appropriation model of the composition of the church's liturgies. According to this model, the religious worth of scripted bodily liturgical action lies (in part) in the fact that...
Naturalists wonder whether there is a place in the world for moral facts. Some believe not, advoc... more Naturalists wonder whether there is a place in the world for moral facts. Some believe not, advocating either a view according to which moral discourse is massively in error or one in which it fails to express moral propositions altogether. Other naturalists believe there is a place for moral facts, but only if they are identical with (or perhaps constituted by) natural facts. According to these philosophers, moral discourse embodies no fundamental error and is straightforwardly assertoric. For some time, many philosophers believed that these positions exhausted the options for naturalists. Recently, however, a new position has emerged as an alternative. This position, dubbed moral fictionalism by its advocates, maintains that moral thought and discourse either are or should become modes of pretense, wherein we pretend that there are moral facts.
In his fine book The Wisdom to Doubt, J. L. Schellenberg builds a case for religious scepticism b... more In his fine book The Wisdom to Doubt, J. L. Schellenberg builds a case for religious scepticism by advancing a version of the Hiddenness Argument. This argument rests on the claim that God could not love, in an admirable way, those who seek God while also remaining hidden from them. In this article, I distinguish two arguments for this claim. Neither argument succeeds, I contend, as each rests on an unsatisfactory understanding of the nature of admirable love, whether human or divine.
Metaethics is a perennially popular subject, but one that can be challenging to study and teach. ... more Metaethics is a perennially popular subject, but one that can be challenging to study and teach. As it consists in an array of questions about ethics, it is really a mix of (at least) applied metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and mind. The seminal texts ...
Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism's resources for responding... more Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism's resources for responding to metaphysical and epistemological objections by taking the view in some new directions. The central thesis we will argue for is that there is a battery of substantive moral propositions that are also nonnaturalistic conceptual truths. We call these propositions the moral fixed points. We will argue that they must find a place in any system of moral norms that applies to beings like us, in worlds similar to our own. By committing themselves to true propositions of these sorts, nonnaturalists can fashion a view that is highly attractive in its own right, and resistant to the most prominent objections that have been pressed against it. Keywords Moral realism Á Nonnaturalism Á Conceptual truth Á Supervenience Á Evolutionary Á Debunking Á Moral disagreement At some point in the mid-20th century, philosophers threw nonnaturalist moral realism on the scrap heap of philosophical theories, allowing it to gather rust and be forgotten. While the view did gather rust, it was not forgotten. To the surprise of many, this form of moral realism (henceforth, just nonnaturalism) was retrieved, repaired, and reintroduced to the mainstream metaethical discussion as a view worthy of serious consideration. 1
The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim... more The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim that moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. To this end, I engage in two tasks. The first is to develop an account of the sense in which moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. After having sketched the concept of what I call a "configuring" cause, I contend that the exercise of the moral virtues is plausibly viewed as a configuring cause. The second is to show that the causalist position I develop can withstand objections inspired by the work of Robert Audi and Jaegwon Kim. Moral antirealists frequently object that, if moral realism were true, then moral facts would be explanatorily idle. 1 In particular, some moral antirealists complain that, if moral realism were true, then moral facts would be causally idle; they would not do any genuine causal explanatory work. 2 This complaint challenges the heart of what is perhaps the reigning orthodoxy among moral realists. The apparent orthodoxy among realists is that moral facts exist, but are in some interesting sense "natural" facts. 3 It is commonly assumed, however, that natural facts are, in the paradigmatic case, causally efficacious. Accordingly, if moral facts are not causally efficacious, then they are not paradigmatic natural facts. And for those naturalists who believe that being causally efficacious is necessary and sufficient for something's being real, 4 the causal indolence of putative moral facts establishes that moral facts don't exist. It is not surprising, then, that a chief concern of those who subscribe to the apparent realist orthodoxy has been to show that moral facts are causally efficacious. An interesting feature of the recent moral realism/antirealism debate is that some prominent moral realists have agreed with the aforementioned antirealist complaint.
Some fifteen years ago, John McDowell suggested that moral realists ought to exploit the analogy ... more Some fifteen years ago, John McDowell suggested that moral realists ought to exploit the analogy between moral qualities and secondary qualities. Rather than think of moral qualities as "brutely there" without any "internal relation to some exercise of human sensibility", McDowell proposed that moral realists should claim that moral qualities are dispositions of a sort-dispositions to elicit merited responses in appropriate agents. 1 In the intervening years, McDowell's suggestion has been widely discussed and criticized. 2 My aim in this essay is to consider afresh the claim that moral qualities are secondary qualities-or as I shall call them, "response-dependent qualities". 3 I will argue that some of the more prominent objections to this position are inconclusive, but that there are other good reasons for rejecting it. If the overall argument of this essay is correct, then we shall have further grounds for thinking that the moral realist ought to defend what I will call a "primary" account of moral qualities. I. Response-dependent Moral Qualities According to the traditional Lockean view, to say that something is a responsedependent property is to say~roughly! that that thing's instantiation in an object consists in the disposition of that object to give rise to certain kinds of response in certain types of agent in certain types of circumstance. 4 Colors, sounds, smells, and tastes are, on the traditional view, paradigmatic examples of response-dependent properties. A response-dependent account of colors, for example, says that something instantiates redness, because, and only because, that thing is disposed to look red to agents like us in suitable conditions. When applied to moral qualities, the response-dependent account tells us that
3 Iconostasis, p. 69. The claim is made in nearly every theological treatment of the Eastern view... more 3 Iconostasis, p. 69. The claim is made in nearly every theological treatment of the Eastern view of icons of which I know. By calling this the dominant view in the East, I do not wish to suggest that Eastern thinkers have not employed other models regarding the liturgical role of icons.
Robert G.W. Kirk and Neil Pemberton, Leech. By Sarah Chaney 173 Manfred Horstmanshoff, Helen King... more Robert G.W. Kirk and Neil Pemberton, Leech. By Sarah Chaney 173 Manfred Horstmanshoff, Helen King and Claus Zittel (eds.), Blood, Sweat and Tears: The Changing Concepts of Physiology from Antiquity into Early Modern Europe. By R. Allen Shotwell 175 Monica Azzolini, The Duke and the Stars: Astrology and Politics in Renaissance Milan. By Tayra M.C. Lanuza-Navarro 176 Nancy G. Siraisi, Communities of Learned Experience: Epistolary Medicine in the Renaissance. By Fred Gibbs 178 Germano Maifreda, From Oikonomia to Political Economy: Constructing Economic Knowledge from the Renaissance to the Scientific Revolution. By Jakob Bek-Thomsen 179 Alison D. Morrison-Low, Sven Dupré, Stephen Johnston and Giorgio Strano (eds.), From Earth-Bound to Satellite: Telescopes, Skills and Networks. By Alexi Baker 181 Catherine Packham, Eighteenth-Century Vitalism: Bodies, Culture, Politics. By Rina Knoeff 182 Piers Mitchell (ed.), Anatomical Dissection in Enlightenment England and Beyond: Autopsy, Pathology and Display. By Darren N. Wagner 184 Vera M. Kutzinski, Ottmar Ette and Laura Dassow Walls (eds.), Alexander von Humboldt and the Americas. By Alison E. Martin 185 Roger S. Wotton, Walking with Gosse: Natural History, Creation, and Religious Conflicts. By Courtney Salvey 187 Kristian H. Nielsen, Michael Harbsmeier and Christopher J. Ries (eds.), Scientists and Scholars in the Field: Studies in the History of Fieldwork and Expeditions. By Jean-Baptiste Gouyon 188 Marcel Chotkowski LaFollette, Science on American Television: A History. By Tim Boon 189 Nathaniel Comfort, The Science of Human Perfection: How Genes Became the Heart of American Medicine. By Norberto Serpente 191 Spencer R. Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear. By Alexander Hall 193
... Stephen Darwall, Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons, Richard Fumerton, Charles Pigden, Robert Shaver,... more ... Stephen Darwall, Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons, Richard Fumerton, Charles Pigden, Robert Shaver,Joshua Gert, Jonathan Dancy and the editors of the book explore Moore's views in ethics. As one might expect, given this list of contributors, the quality of the essays is very high. ...
Quasi-realist expressivists (or simply ''expressivists'') set themselves the task of developing a... more Quasi-realist expressivists (or simply ''expressivists'') set themselves the task of developing a metaethical theory that at once captures what they call the ''realist-sounding'' elements of ordinary moral thought and discourse but is also distinctively antirealist. Its critics have long suspected that the position cannot have what it wants. In this essay, I develop this suspicion. I do so by distinguishing two paradigmatic versions of the view-what I call Thin and Thick expressivism respectively. I contend that there is a metaethical datum regarding our epistemic achievements in the moral domain that presents challenges for each variety of expressivism. Thin expressivism opts not to accommodate and explain this datum but I contend that its rationale for not doing so rests on a suspect methodology. Thick expressivism looks as if it must accommodate and explain this datum but I argue that it is poorly situated to do so. I conclude that we have reason to believe that paradigmatic expressivism cannot have all that it wants. Keywords Expressivism Á Realism Á Epistemic achievements Á Methodology Quasi-realist expressivists (or ''expressivists'', for short) set themselves the task of developing a metaethical theory that at once captures what they call the ''realistsounding'' elements of ordinary moral thought and discourse but is also distinctively & Terence Cuneo
Preface 1. Clarke's Insight 2. A Normative Theory of Speech 3. The Moral Dimensions of Speech... more Preface 1. Clarke's Insight 2. A Normative Theory of Speech 3. The Moral Dimensions of Speech 4. Against the Mixed View: Part I 5. Against the Mixed View: Part II 6. Three Antirealist Views 7. Epistemic Implications Bibliography Index
This article considers the ethical dimensions of acts of assertion. Acts of assertion often have ... more This article considers the ethical dimensions of acts of assertion. Acts of assertion often have moral features, such as being wrong. In this regard, they are like many other familiar acts such as invasions of privacy and inflictions of bodily harm, which are also often wrong. But might assertion have an even more intimate link to moral reality than these other actions? Might it be that how things are ethically explains how it is that we could perform illocutionary acts such as asserting? A version of what the author calls the normative theory of speech answers in the affirmative. This view maintains that the performance of illocutionary acts such as asserting not only often have moral properties, such as being morally wrong, but also that there are cases in which moral facts explain (in part) how it is that agents can perform these acts. The article presents the rudiments of the normative theory of speech, paying attention to why it maintains that moral facts are among the features...
How should a religious person view the role of rights in the liberal polity? What should the role... more How should a religious person view the role of rights in the liberal polity? What should the role of religion be in public political discourse? Some prominent scholars have recently argued that religious persons ought to view the concept of a "right" as alien to a traditionally religious way of life. Others have suggested that there is no legitimate place for religious reasoning in public political discourse. Contributors to Religion in the Liberal Polity reject these positions by defending the claims that the concept of a "right" is central to traditional religion and that religious concerns belong in public political discourse. Part one of the collection addresses foundational issues of rights and authority. Nicholas Wolterstorff contends not only that rights exist, but that moral duties are determined by rights. Timothy P. Jackson raises the issue of how thinking about the imago dei may ground human rights issues for a Christian. John Hare explores whether the...
We develop an argument for a novel version of moral intuitionism centered on the claim that moral... more We develop an argument for a novel version of moral intuitionism centered on the claim that moral intuitions are trustworthy. Our argument employs an epistemic principle that we call the Trustworthiness Criterion, a distinctive feature of which is its emphasis on oft-neglected social dimensions of cognitive states, including non-doxastic attitudes such as intuition. Thus our argument is not that moral intuitions are trustworthy because they are regress-stoppers, or because they are innocent until proven guilty, or because denying their epistemic contribution would be self-defeating, or because they are presupposed in rational inference, or because they are analogous to perceptions, or because they are based on understanding-individualistic claims that have elsewhere been used (controversially) in defense of the thesis that moral intuitions are in good epistemic standing. Rather, our argument appeals to the idea that moral intuitions are trustworthy because they are the outputs of a cognitive practice, which has epistemically-fecund social elements, that is in good working order. This means that, as John Rawls writes in another context, if a person engaged in the practice is asked. .. to defend what he does, then his. .. defense lies in referring the questioner to the practice. 1 On our approach, the trustworthiness of moral intuitions is to be accounted for not in terms of features of the intuitions themselves, but by reference to the broader practice in which the agents who possess those intuitions are engaged. Our argument thus encourages a reorientation in philosophical work on moral intuitionism, which has largely operated within an individualistic framework. But first we must elucidate our notion of a moral intuition and get clear on what it is to be trustworthy. Once these clarifications are in place, we will be in a position to develop our argument that moral intuitions are trustworthy.
Thomas Reid's Essays on the Active Powers presents what is probably the most thoroughly devel... more Thomas Reid's Essays on the Active Powers presents what is probably the most thoroughly developed version of agent-causal libertarianism in the modern canon. While commentators today often acknowledge Reid's contribution, they typically focus on what appears to be a serious problem for the view: Reid appears to commit himself to a position according to which acting freely would require an agent to engage in an infinite number of exertions of active power. In this essay, we maintain that, properly understood, Reid's version of agent-causal libertarianism generates no regress of exertion. Our discussion begins by presenting Reid's account of free action and why it appears vulnerable to a worrisome regress. We then consider three attempts to address the regress in the contemporary literature offered by William Rowe, Gideon Yaffe, and James Van Cleve, which we find unsatisfactory. We then develop a solution to the worry—one that takes very seriously both what Reid means ...
A striking feature of the Eastern Orthodox liturgies is how much movement and touching occurs dur... more A striking feature of the Eastern Orthodox liturgies is how much movement and touching occurs during their performance. For example, when participants in these liturgies enter into a church building, they do not simply look at the icons; they typically venerate them by kissing them. Call events such as these scripted movement-touching sequences. The question I pursue in this article is why movement-touching sequences play such prominent roles in the performance of the Eastern liturgies. The answer I offer is that the performance of these actions has religious worth. I then consider two models that attempt to explain why the performance of scripted movement-touching sequences has religious worth. After exploring and rejecting what I call the instrumentalist model, I develop what I term the authorization-appropriation model of the composition of the church's liturgies. According to this model, the religious worth of scripted bodily liturgical action lies (in part) in the fact that...
Naturalists wonder whether there is a place in the world for moral facts. Some believe not, advoc... more Naturalists wonder whether there is a place in the world for moral facts. Some believe not, advocating either a view according to which moral discourse is massively in error or one in which it fails to express moral propositions altogether. Other naturalists believe there is a place for moral facts, but only if they are identical with (or perhaps constituted by) natural facts. According to these philosophers, moral discourse embodies no fundamental error and is straightforwardly assertoric. For some time, many philosophers believed that these positions exhausted the options for naturalists. Recently, however, a new position has emerged as an alternative. This position, dubbed moral fictionalism by its advocates, maintains that moral thought and discourse either are or should become modes of pretense, wherein we pretend that there are moral facts.
In his fine book The Wisdom to Doubt, J. L. Schellenberg builds a case for religious scepticism b... more In his fine book The Wisdom to Doubt, J. L. Schellenberg builds a case for religious scepticism by advancing a version of the Hiddenness Argument. This argument rests on the claim that God could not love, in an admirable way, those who seek God while also remaining hidden from them. In this article, I distinguish two arguments for this claim. Neither argument succeeds, I contend, as each rests on an unsatisfactory understanding of the nature of admirable love, whether human or divine.
Metaethics is a perennially popular subject, but one that can be challenging to study and teach. ... more Metaethics is a perennially popular subject, but one that can be challenging to study and teach. As it consists in an array of questions about ethics, it is really a mix of (at least) applied metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and mind. The seminal texts ...
Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism's resources for responding... more Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism's resources for responding to metaphysical and epistemological objections by taking the view in some new directions. The central thesis we will argue for is that there is a battery of substantive moral propositions that are also nonnaturalistic conceptual truths. We call these propositions the moral fixed points. We will argue that they must find a place in any system of moral norms that applies to beings like us, in worlds similar to our own. By committing themselves to true propositions of these sorts, nonnaturalists can fashion a view that is highly attractive in its own right, and resistant to the most prominent objections that have been pressed against it. Keywords Moral realism Á Nonnaturalism Á Conceptual truth Á Supervenience Á Evolutionary Á Debunking Á Moral disagreement At some point in the mid-20th century, philosophers threw nonnaturalist moral realism on the scrap heap of philosophical theories, allowing it to gather rust and be forgotten. While the view did gather rust, it was not forgotten. To the surprise of many, this form of moral realism (henceforth, just nonnaturalism) was retrieved, repaired, and reintroduced to the mainstream metaethical discussion as a view worthy of serious consideration. 1
The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim... more The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim that moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. To this end, I engage in two tasks. The first is to develop an account of the sense in which moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. After having sketched the concept of what I call a "configuring" cause, I contend that the exercise of the moral virtues is plausibly viewed as a configuring cause. The second is to show that the causalist position I develop can withstand objections inspired by the work of Robert Audi and Jaegwon Kim. Moral antirealists frequently object that, if moral realism were true, then moral facts would be explanatorily idle. 1 In particular, some moral antirealists complain that, if moral realism were true, then moral facts would be causally idle; they would not do any genuine causal explanatory work. 2 This complaint challenges the heart of what is perhaps the reigning orthodoxy among moral realists. The apparent orthodoxy among realists is that moral facts exist, but are in some interesting sense "natural" facts. 3 It is commonly assumed, however, that natural facts are, in the paradigmatic case, causally efficacious. Accordingly, if moral facts are not causally efficacious, then they are not paradigmatic natural facts. And for those naturalists who believe that being causally efficacious is necessary and sufficient for something's being real, 4 the causal indolence of putative moral facts establishes that moral facts don't exist. It is not surprising, then, that a chief concern of those who subscribe to the apparent realist orthodoxy has been to show that moral facts are causally efficacious. An interesting feature of the recent moral realism/antirealism debate is that some prominent moral realists have agreed with the aforementioned antirealist complaint.
Some fifteen years ago, John McDowell suggested that moral realists ought to exploit the analogy ... more Some fifteen years ago, John McDowell suggested that moral realists ought to exploit the analogy between moral qualities and secondary qualities. Rather than think of moral qualities as "brutely there" without any "internal relation to some exercise of human sensibility", McDowell proposed that moral realists should claim that moral qualities are dispositions of a sort-dispositions to elicit merited responses in appropriate agents. 1 In the intervening years, McDowell's suggestion has been widely discussed and criticized. 2 My aim in this essay is to consider afresh the claim that moral qualities are secondary qualities-or as I shall call them, "response-dependent qualities". 3 I will argue that some of the more prominent objections to this position are inconclusive, but that there are other good reasons for rejecting it. If the overall argument of this essay is correct, then we shall have further grounds for thinking that the moral realist ought to defend what I will call a "primary" account of moral qualities. I. Response-dependent Moral Qualities According to the traditional Lockean view, to say that something is a responsedependent property is to say~roughly! that that thing's instantiation in an object consists in the disposition of that object to give rise to certain kinds of response in certain types of agent in certain types of circumstance. 4 Colors, sounds, smells, and tastes are, on the traditional view, paradigmatic examples of response-dependent properties. A response-dependent account of colors, for example, says that something instantiates redness, because, and only because, that thing is disposed to look red to agents like us in suitable conditions. When applied to moral qualities, the response-dependent account tells us that
3 Iconostasis, p. 69. The claim is made in nearly every theological treatment of the Eastern view... more 3 Iconostasis, p. 69. The claim is made in nearly every theological treatment of the Eastern view of icons of which I know. By calling this the dominant view in the East, I do not wish to suggest that Eastern thinkers have not employed other models regarding the liturgical role of icons.
Robert G.W. Kirk and Neil Pemberton, Leech. By Sarah Chaney 173 Manfred Horstmanshoff, Helen King... more Robert G.W. Kirk and Neil Pemberton, Leech. By Sarah Chaney 173 Manfred Horstmanshoff, Helen King and Claus Zittel (eds.), Blood, Sweat and Tears: The Changing Concepts of Physiology from Antiquity into Early Modern Europe. By R. Allen Shotwell 175 Monica Azzolini, The Duke and the Stars: Astrology and Politics in Renaissance Milan. By Tayra M.C. Lanuza-Navarro 176 Nancy G. Siraisi, Communities of Learned Experience: Epistolary Medicine in the Renaissance. By Fred Gibbs 178 Germano Maifreda, From Oikonomia to Political Economy: Constructing Economic Knowledge from the Renaissance to the Scientific Revolution. By Jakob Bek-Thomsen 179 Alison D. Morrison-Low, Sven Dupré, Stephen Johnston and Giorgio Strano (eds.), From Earth-Bound to Satellite: Telescopes, Skills and Networks. By Alexi Baker 181 Catherine Packham, Eighteenth-Century Vitalism: Bodies, Culture, Politics. By Rina Knoeff 182 Piers Mitchell (ed.), Anatomical Dissection in Enlightenment England and Beyond: Autopsy, Pathology and Display. By Darren N. Wagner 184 Vera M. Kutzinski, Ottmar Ette and Laura Dassow Walls (eds.), Alexander von Humboldt and the Americas. By Alison E. Martin 185 Roger S. Wotton, Walking with Gosse: Natural History, Creation, and Religious Conflicts. By Courtney Salvey 187 Kristian H. Nielsen, Michael Harbsmeier and Christopher J. Ries (eds.), Scientists and Scholars in the Field: Studies in the History of Fieldwork and Expeditions. By Jean-Baptiste Gouyon 188 Marcel Chotkowski LaFollette, Science on American Television: A History. By Tim Boon 189 Nathaniel Comfort, The Science of Human Perfection: How Genes Became the Heart of American Medicine. By Norberto Serpente 191 Spencer R. Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear. By Alexander Hall 193
... Stephen Darwall, Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons, Richard Fumerton, Charles Pigden, Robert Shaver,... more ... Stephen Darwall, Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons, Richard Fumerton, Charles Pigden, Robert Shaver,Joshua Gert, Jonathan Dancy and the editors of the book explore Moore's views in ethics. As one might expect, given this list of contributors, the quality of the essays is very high. ...
Quasi-realist expressivists (or simply ''expressivists'') set themselves the task of developing a... more Quasi-realist expressivists (or simply ''expressivists'') set themselves the task of developing a metaethical theory that at once captures what they call the ''realist-sounding'' elements of ordinary moral thought and discourse but is also distinctively antirealist. Its critics have long suspected that the position cannot have what it wants. In this essay, I develop this suspicion. I do so by distinguishing two paradigmatic versions of the view-what I call Thin and Thick expressivism respectively. I contend that there is a metaethical datum regarding our epistemic achievements in the moral domain that presents challenges for each variety of expressivism. Thin expressivism opts not to accommodate and explain this datum but I contend that its rationale for not doing so rests on a suspect methodology. Thick expressivism looks as if it must accommodate and explain this datum but I argue that it is poorly situated to do so. I conclude that we have reason to believe that paradigmatic expressivism cannot have all that it wants. Keywords Expressivism Á Realism Á Epistemic achievements Á Methodology Quasi-realist expressivists (or ''expressivists'', for short) set themselves the task of developing a metaethical theory that at once captures what they call the ''realistsounding'' elements of ordinary moral thought and discourse but is also distinctively & Terence Cuneo
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